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A Collection of PAPERS,

Which passed between the late Learned

Mr. *LEIBNITZ*,

AND

Dr. *CLARKE*,

In the Years 1715 and 1716.

Relating to the

PRINCIPLES OF *Natural Philosophy and Religion.*

With an APPENDIX.

To which are added,

LETTERS to Dr. CLARKE concerning Liberty and Necessity; From a Gentleman of the University of *Cambridge*: With the Doctor's ANSWERS to them.

ALSO

REMARKS upon a Book, Entituled, *A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty.*

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D.
Rector of St. *James*'s *Westminster.*

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NICVM
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TO HER

ROYAL HIGHNESS,

THE

Princess of *WALES.*

MADAM,

AS the following Papers were at first written by your Command, and had afterwards the Honour of being severally transmitted

through Your Royal Highneſſes Hands: ſo the Principal Encouragement upon which they Now preſume to appear in Publick, is the Permiſſion they have of coming forth under the Protection of ſo Illuſtrious a Name.

The late Learned Mr. *Leibnitz* well underſtood, how great an Honour and Reputation it would be to him, to have his Arguments approved by a Perſon of Your Royal Highneſſes Character. But the ſame ſteady Impartiality and unalterable Love of Truth, the ſame conſtant Readineſs to hear and to ſubmit to Reaſon, always ſo conſpicuous, always ſhining forth ſo brightly in Your Royal Highneſſes Conduct; which juſtly made *Him* deſirous to exert in theſe Papers his utmoſt Skill

in defending his Opinions; was at the ſame time an Equal Encouragement to ſuch as thought him in an Error, to endeavour to prove that his Opinions could not be defended.

The Occaſion of his giving your Royal Highneſs the Trouble of his *Firſt* Letter, he declares to be his having entertained ſome Suſpicions, that the Foundations of *Natural Religion* were in danger of being hurt by Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Philoſophy. It appeared to Me, on the contrary, a moſt certain and evident Truth, that from the earlieſt Antiquity to This Day, the Foundations of Natural Religion had never been ſo deeply and ſo firmly laid, as in the Mathematical and Experimental Philoſophy of That Great Man. And Your

Royal Highneſſes ſingular Exactneſs in ſearching after Truth, and earneſt Concern for every thing that is of real Conſequence to Religion, could not permit thoſe Suſpicions, which had been ſuggeſted by a Gentleman of ſuch eminent Note in the Learned World as Mr. *Leibnitz* was, to remain unanſwered.

Chriſtianity preſuppoſes the Truth of *Natural Religion*. Whatſoever ſubverts Natural Religion, does conſequently much more ſubvert Chriſtianity: and whatſoever tends to confirm Natural Religion, is proportionably of Service to the True Intereſt of the Chriſtian. Natural Philoſophy therefore, ſo far as it affects Religion, by determining Queſtions concerning *Liberty* and *Fate*, concerning the *Extent* of

the

the *Powers of Matter and Motion*, and the *Proofs from Phenomena* of *God's Continual Government of the World*; is of very Great Importance. 'Tis of Singular Uſe, rightly to underſtand, and carefully to diſtinguiſh from Hypotheſes or mere Suppoſitions, the True and Certain Conſequences of Experimental and Mathematical Philoſophy; Which do, with wonderful Strength and Advantage, to All Such as are capable of apprehending them, confirm, eſtabliſh, and vindicate againſt all Objections, thoſe *Great and Fundamental Truths of Natural Religion*, which the Wiſdom of Providence has at the ſame time univerſally implanted, in ſome degree, in the Minds of Perſons even of the Meaneſt Capacities, not qua-

lified to examine Demonſtrative Proofs.

'Tis with the higheſt Pleaſure and Satisfaction, that the following Papers upon ſo important a Subject, are laid before a Princeſs, who, to an inimitable Sweetneſs of Temper, Candour and Affability towards All, has joined not only an Impartial Love of Truth, and a Deſire of promoting Learning in general, but has Herſelf alſo attained to a Degree of Knowledge very Particular and Uncommon, even in matters of the niceſt and moſt abſtract Speculation: And whoſe Sacred and always Unſhaken Regard to the Intereſt of ſincere and uncorrupt Religion, made Her the Delight of all Good Proteſtants Abroad, and by a juſt Fame filled

filled the Hearts of all true *Britons* at Home, with an Expectation beforehand, which, Great as it was, is fully anſwered by what they now ſee and are bleſſed with.

By the Proteſtant Succeſſion in the Illuſtrious Houſe of *HANOVER* having taken place, This Nation has Now, with the Bleſſing of God, a Certain Proſpect, (if our Own Vices and Follies prevent not,) of ſeeing Government actually adminiſtred, according to the Deſign and End for which it was inſtituted by Providence, with no other View than that of the Publick Good, the general Welfare and Happineſs of Mankind. We have a Proſpect of ſeeing the True Liberty of a Brave and Loyal People, firmly ſecured, eſtabliſhed,

and regulated, by Laws equally advantageous both to the Crown and Subject: Of ſeeing Learning and Knowledge encouraged and promoted, in oppoſition to all kinds of Ignorance and Blindneſs: And, (which is the Glory of All,) of ſeeing the True Chriſtian Temper and Spirit of Religion effectually prevail, both againſt Atheiſm and Infidelity on the one hand, which take off from Men All Obligations of doing what is Right; and againſt Superſtition and Bigottry on the other hand, which lay upon men the ſtrongeſt Obligations to do the greateſt Wrongs.

What Views and Expectations leſs than theſe, can a Nation reaſonably entertain; when it beholds a KING firmly ſettled upon the Throne

Throne of a wiſely limited Monarchy, whoſe Will, when without Limitation, ſhowed always a greater Love of Juſtice, than of Power; and never took Pleaſure in acting any otherwiſe, than according to the moſt perfect Laws of Reaſon and Equity? When it ſees a Succeſſion of the ſame Bleſſings continued, in a PRINCE, whoſe Noble Openneſs of Mind, and Generous Warmth of Zeal for the Preſervation of the Proteſtant Religion, and the Laws and Liberties of theſe Kingdoms, make him every day more and more beloved, as he is more known? And when theſe glorious Hopes open ſtill further into an unbounded Proſpect in a numerous Royal Offspring? Through whom, that the Juſt and Equitable Temper of the Grandfather;

the

the Noble Zeal and Spirit of the Father; the Affability, Goodneſs, and Judicious Exactneſs of the Mother; may, with Glory to Themſelves, and with the happieſt Influences both upon Theſe and Foreign Countries, deſcend to all ſucceeding Generations; to the Eſtabliſhment of Univerſal Peace, of Truth and Right amongſt Men; and to the entire rooting out That *Greateſt Enemy* of Chriſtian Religion, the *Spirit of Popery* both among *Romaniſts* and *Proteſtants*: And that Your *Royal Highneſs* may your Self long live, to continue a Bleſſing to theſe Nations, to ſee Truth and Virtue flouriſh in your own Days, and to be a Great Inſtrument, under the direction of Providence, in laying a Foundation for the Higheſt Happineſs of the

Publick

Publick in Times to come; is the Prayer of,

MADAM,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESSES

moſt Humble and

moſt Obedient Servant,

SAM. CLARKE.

AVERTISSEMENT.

On prie les Lecteurs de remarquer :

1. *QUE les Ecrits ſuivans ont été imprimez conformément aux Originaux, ſans ajouter, retrancher, ou changer un ſeul mot.* On n' *a ajouté que les* Notes marginales *& l'* Appendice.

2. *Que la Traduction eſt fort exacte, & qu' elle repreſente le véritable ſens de Mr.* Leibnitz.

3. *Que les* Nombres *ou les Sections de chaque Ecrit de Mr.* Clarke, *ſe rapportent aux* Nombres *ou aux Sections de chaque Ecrit de Mr.* Leibnitz, *qui précede immédiatement.*

Advertiſement to the READER.

The Reader will be pleaſed to obſerve,

1. THAT the following Letters are all printed exactly as they were written; without adding, diminiſhing, or altering a *Word*. The *Marginal Notes* only, and the *Appendix*, being added.

2. That the Tranſlation is made with Great Exactneſs, to prevent any Miſrepreſentation of Mr. *Leibnitz*'s Senſe.

3. That the *Numbers* or §'*s* in Each of Dr. *Clarke*'s Papers, refer reſpectively to the *Numbers* or §'s of each of Mr. *Leibnitz*'s Papers immediately fore-going.

ERRATA.

Pag.	Line	
12,	13.	*dele*, c'eſt à dire.
81,	26.	*read*; needs.
122,	11.	*in margin.* & 4.
143,	1.	by a repreſentative
152,	19.	After the word, *manifeſte*, add; *Et le raiſonnement ſera le même, par rapport à la matiere dont les Eſpeces particulieres des Corps ſont compoſées, ſoit que l' on ſuppoſe que les pores ſont vuides, ou qu' ils ſont remplis d' une matiere etrangere.*
153,	11.	After the word, *Abſurdity*, add; *And the Argument is the ſame, with regard to the Matter of which any particular Species of Bodies is compoſed, whether its Pores be ſuppoſed empty, or always full of extraneous matter.*
159,	9.	A, and to B,
202,	14.	dans ce troiſieme
213,	23.	abſtract
220,	25.	expliqué
236,	16.	préétablie
241,	*ult.*	is the ſame
242,	5.	leſquelles
246,	24.	Action.
263,	*ult.*	at the bottom, every thing will be either
265,	26.	Miracle; or
298,	12.	proportion
306,	25.	After the word, *Experience*, add; *Voiez ma quatrieme Réplique*, § 7; *& cinquieme Réplique*, § 33.
307,	22.	After the word, *Experience*, add; *See my Fourth Reply*, § 7; *& Fifth Reply*, § 33.
330,	22.	peſent ſur le bras
339,	11.	Abſurdities
348,	20.	ſans commencement & ſans fin.
350,	10.	nous diſons
390,	15.	pulchrè
391,	4.	Thoughts, ſhall be
398,	1.	liées
	7.	appercevons pas

In the REMARKS, *&c.*

21,	9.	that all the Actions
27,	22.	Mechanical & involuntary.

Mr. *LEIBNITZ*'s

First Paper.

Prémier Ecrit de Mr. LEIBNITZ.

Extrait d' une Lettre écrite au Mois de *Novembre*, 1715.

1. IL *ſemble que la* Réligion Naturelle même *s' affoiblit extremement. Pluſieurs font les* Ames *corporelles ; d' autres font* Dieu luy même *corporel.*

2. *M.* Locke, *& ſes Sectateurs*, doutent au moins, *ſi les* Ames *ne ſont* Materielles, *& naturellement periſſables.*

3. *M.* Newton *dit que l'Eſpace eſt* l'Organe, *dont Dieu ſe ſert pour ſentir les choſes. Mais s' il a beſoin de quelque* Moyen *pour les ſentir, elles ne dependent donc entierement de luy, & ne ſont point ſa production.*

4. *Monſieur* Newton, *& ſes Sectateurs, ont encore une fort plaiſante Opinion de l'ouvrage*

Mr. LEIBNITZ's First *Paper.*

BEING

An Extract of a Letter Written in November, 1715.

1. NAtural *Religion it ſelf*, ſeems to decay [*in England*] very much. Many will have Human *Souls* to be material: Others make *God himſelf* a corporeal Being.

2. Mr. *Locke*, and his Followers, are *uncertain* at leaſt, whether the *Soul* be not *Material*, and naturally periſhable.

3. Sir *Iſaac Newton* ſays, that Space is an *Organ*, which God makes uſe of to perceive Things by. But if God ſtands in need of any *Organ* to perceive Things by, it will follow, that they do not depend altogether upon him, nor were produced by him.

4. Sir *Iſaac Newton*, and his Followers, have alſo a very odd Opinion concerning

l'ouvrage de Dieu. Selon eux Dieu a beſoin de remonter *de temps en temps ſa Montre : Autrement elle ceſſeroit d'agir. Il n'a pas eu aſſez de veue, pour en faire un Mouvement perpetuel. Cette Machine de Dieu eſt même ſi imparfaite ſelon eux, qu' il eſt obligé de la* décraſſer *de temps en temps par un concours extraordinaire, & même de la* raccommoder, *comme un Horloger ſon ouvrage ; qui ſera d'autant plus mauvais Maiſtre, qu'il ſera plus ſouvent obligé d' y retoucher & d'y corriger. Selon mon Sentiment, la* même *Force & Vigueur y ſubſiſte toujours, & paſſe ſeulement*

the Work of God. According to their Doctrine, God Almighty * wants to *wind up* his Watch from Time to Time: Otherwiſe it would ceaſe to move. He had not, it ſeems, ſufficient Foreſight to make it a perpetual Motion. Nay, the Machine of God's making, is ſo imperfect, according to theſe Gentlemen; that he is obliged to *clean* it now and then by an extraordinary Concourſe, and even to *mend* it, as a Clock-maker mends his Work; Who muſt conſequently be ſo much the more unſkilful a Workman, as he is oftner obliged to mend his Work and to ſet it Right. According

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* *The Place Mr.* Leibnitz *here ſeems to allude to, is as follows.* Dum Cometæ moventur in Orbibus valdè eccentricis, undiq; & quoquoverſum in omnes Cœli Partes; utiq; nullo modo fieri potuit, ut cæco fato tribuendum ſit, quod Planetæ in Orbibus concentricis motu conſimili ferantur eodem omnes; exceptis nimirum irregularitatibus quibuſdam vix notatu dignis, quæ ex mutuis Cometarum & Planetarum in ſe invicem actionibus oriri potuerint, quæq; veriſimile eſt fore ut longinquitate temporis majores uſq; evadant, donec hæc Naturæ Compages manum emendatricem tandem ſit deſideratura. *i. e. Whilſt the Comets move in Orbs very eccentrical, with all variety of Directions towards every Part of the Heavens; 'tis not poſſible it ſhould have been cauſed by Blind Fate, that the Planets All move with one ſimilar Direction in concentrick Orbs; excepting only ſome very ſmall irregularities, which may have ariſen from the mutual Actions of the Planets and Comets one upon another; and which 'tis probable will in length of time increaſe more and more, till the preſent Syſtem of Nature ſhall want to be anew put in Order by its Author.* Newtoni Optice, Quæſt. ult. pag. 346.

ſeulement de matiere en matiere, ſuivant les loix de la Nature, & le bel Ordre préétabli. *Et je tiens, quand Dieu fait des Miracles, que ce n' eſt pas pour ſoutenir les beſoins de la Nature, mais pour ceux de la Grace. En juger autrement, ce ſeroit avoir une idée fort baſſe de la Sageſſe & de la Puiſſance de Dieu.*

to *My* Opinion, the † *ſame* Force || and Vigour remains always in the World, and only paſſes from one part of Matter to another, agreeably to the Laws of Nature, and the beautiful *pre-eſtabliſhed* Order. And I hold, that when God works Miracles, he does not do it in order to ſupply the Wants of Nature, but thoſe of *Grace*. Whoever thinks otherwiſe, muſt needs have a very mean Notion of the Wiſdom and Power of God.

† *See the* Note *on Dr.* Clarke's Fifth *Reply*, § 93, — 95.

|| *See Appendix*, N° 2. *Alſo Mr.* Leibnitz's Fifth *Paper*, § 87, *and* 91.

Premiere Replique de Mr. CLARKE.

1. *IL eſt vrai, & c'eſt une choſe déplorable, qu'il y a en Angleterre, auſſi bien qu'en d'autres païs, des perſonnes, qui nient même la* Réligion Naturelle, *ou qui la corrompent extrémement. Mais, après le déreglement des moeurs, on doit attribuer cela principalement à la fauſſe Philoſophie des* Materialiſtes, *qui eſt directement combatue par les* Principes Mathematiques de la Philoſophie. *Il eſt vrai auſſi, qu'il y a des perſonnes, qui font l'* Ame *materielle, &* Dieu *lui-même corporel ; mais ces gens-là ſe déclarent ouvertement contre les* Principes Mathematiques de la Philoſophie, *qui ſont les ſeuls Principes qui prouvent que la Matiere eſt la plus petite & la moins conſiderable Partie de l'Univers.*

2. *Il y a quelques endroits dans les Ecrits de Mr.* Locke, *qui pourroient faire ſoupçonner avec raiſon, qu'il* doutoit *de l'* Immaterialité *de l'* Ame ; *mais il n'a été ſuivi en cela que par quelques* Materialiſtes, *Ennemis des* Principes Mathematiques de la Philoſophie,

Dr. CLARKE's *First Reply.*

1. THAT there are ſome in *England*, as well as in other Countries, who deny or very much corrupt even *Natural Religion it ſelf*, is very true, and much to be lamented. But (next to the vitious Affections of Men) this is to be principally aſcribed to the falſe Philoſophy of the *Materialiſts*, to which *the Mathematick Principles of Philoſophy* are the moſt directly repugnant. That Some make the *Souls of Men*, and Others even *God* himſelf to be a Corporeal Being; is alſo very true: But thoſe who do ſo, are the great Enemies of the *Mathematical Principles of Philoſophy*; which Principles, and which alone, prove Matter, or Body, to be the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable Part of the Univerſe.

2. That Mr. *Locke doubted* whether the *Soul* was *immaterial* or no, may juſtly be ſuſpected from ſome Parts of his Writings: But herein he has been followed only by ſome *Materialiſts*, Enemies to the *Mathematical Principles of Philoſophy*; and who ap-

loſophie, *& qui n'approuvent preſque rien dans les Ouvrages de Mr.* Locke *que ſes Erreurs.*

3. *Mr. le Chevalier* Newton *ne dit pas, que l'Eſpace eſt l'* Organe, *dont Dieu ſe ſert pour appercevoir les choſes. Il ne dit pas non plus, que Dieu ait beſoin d'aucun* moyen *pour les appercevoir. Au contraire, il dit que Dieu, étant* preſent par tout, *apperçoit les choſes par ſa preſence immédiate, dans tout l'Eſpace où elles ſont, ſans l'intervention ou le ſecours d'aucun* Organe, *ou d'aucun* moyen. *Pour rendre cela plus intelligible, il l'éclaircit par une* Comparaiſon. *Il dit que comme l'Ame, étant immédiatement preſente aux* Images, *qui ſe forment dans le Cerveau par le moyen des Organes des Sens, voit ces* Images *comme ſi elles étoient les* choſes mêmes *qu'elles repreſentent ; de même, Dieu voit* tout *par ſa preſence immédiate, étant actuellement preſent aux* choſes mêmes, *à toutes les* choſes *qui ſont dans l'Univers, comme l'Ame eſt preſente à toutes les* Images, *qui ſe forment dans le Cerveau. Mr.* Newton *conſidere le Cerveau & les Organes des Sens, comme le Moyen* par lequel ces Images *ſont formées ; & non comme le Moyen* par lequel l'Ame voit ou apperçoit *ces Images, lors qu'elles ſont ainſi formées. Et dans l'Univers, il ne conſidere pas les choſes, comme ſi elles étoient des Images formées par un certain* Moyen *ou par des* Organes, *mais comme des choſes réelles,*

approve little or nothing in Mr. *Locke*'s Writings, but his Errors.

3. Sir *Iſaac Newton* doth not ſay, that Space is the *Organ* which God makes uſe of to perceive Things by; nor that he has need of any *Medium* at all, whereby to perceive Things: But on the contrary, that he, being *Omnipreſent*, perceives all Things by his immediate Preſence to them, in all Space whereever they are, without the Intervention or Aſſiſtance of any *Organ* or *Medium* whatſoever. In order to make this more intelligible, he illuſtrates it by a *Similitude*: That as the Mind of Man, by its immediate Preſence to the *Pictures* or *Images* of Things, form'd in the Brain by the means of the Organs of Senſation, ſees thoſe *Pictures* as if they were the Things themſelves; ſo God ſees *all Things*, by his immediate Preſence to them: he being actually preſent to the *Things themſelves*, to all Things in the Univerſe; as the Mind of Man is preſent to all the *Pictures of Things* formed in his Brain. Sir *Iſaac Newton* conſiders the Brain and Organs of Senſation, as the Means *by which thoſe Pictures are formed*; but not as the Means *by which the Mind ſees or perceives* thoſe Pictures, when they are ſo formed. And in the Univerſe, he doth not conſider Things as if they were Pictures, formed by certain *Means*, or *Organs*;

reélles, que Dieu lui-même a formées, & qu'il voit dans tous les lieux où elles ſont, ſans l'intervention d'aucun Moyen. *C'eſt tout ce que Mr.* Newton *a voulu dire par la* Comparaiſon, *dont il s'eſt ſervi, lors qu'il ſuppoſe que l'Eſpace infini † eſt,* (pour ainſi dire,) *le* Senſorium *de l'Etre qui eſt* preſent par tout.

4. *Si, parmi les* Hommes, *un Ouvrier paſſe avec raiſon pour être d'autant plus habile, que la Machine qu'il a fait, con-*

† Voici le Paſſage dont il s'agit. *Annon Senſorium Animalium*, &c. i. e. C'eſt-à-dire : Le *Senſorium* des Animaux n'eſt-il pas le Lieu, où la Subſtance qui apperçoit, eſt preſente, & où les Images ſenſibles des choſes ſont portées par les Nerfs & le Cerveau, afin qu'elles y ſoient apperçues, comme étant preſentes à la Subſtance qui apperçoit? Et les Phénomenes de la Nature ne font-ils pas voir, qu'il y a un Etre Incorporel, Vivant, Intelligent, Preſent par tout, qui, dans l'Eſpace infini, lequel eſt, *pour ainſi dire*, ſon *Senſorium* (ou le Lieu où il apperçoit,) voit & diſcerne de la maniere la plus intime & la plus parfaite, les *choſes mêmes*; & les comprend, comme étant entierement & immédiatement preſentes en lui? Au lieu que la Subſtance, qui apperçoit & qui penſe en *Nous*, n'apperçoit & ne contemple dans ſon petit *Senſorium*, que les *Images* de ces choſes; leſquelles (*Images*) y ſont portées par les *Organes* des Sens. *Newtoni Optice, Quæſt.* 20. *pag.* 315.

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gans; but as real Things, form'd by God himſelf, and ſeen by him in all Places whereever they are, without the Intervention of any *Medium* at all. And this *Similitude* is all that he means, when he ſuppoſes Infinite Space † to be (*as it were*) the *Senſorium* of the Omnipreſent Being.

4. The Reaſon why, among *Men*, an Artificer is juſtly eſteemed ſo much the more skilful, as the Machine of his compoſing

† *The Paſſage referred to, is as follows.* Annon Senſorium Animalium, eſt Locus cui Subſtantia ſentiens adeſt, & in quem ſenſibiles rerum Species per nervos & cerebrum deferuntur, ut ibi præſentes à præſente ſentiri poſſint? Atque —annon ex Phænomenis conſtat, eſſe Entem Incorporeum, Viventem, Intelligentem, Omnipræſentem, qui in Spatio infinito, *Tanquam* Senſorio ſuo, *Res Ipſas* intime cernat, penituſq; perſpiciat, totaſq; intra ſe præſens præſentes complectatur; quarum quidem rerum, Id quod in Nobis ſentit & cogitat, *Imagines tantum* ad ſe per *Organa* Senſuum delatas, in Senſoriolo ſuo percipit & contuetur? *i. e. Is not the Senſory of Animals, the Place where the Perceptive Subſtance is preſent, and To which the Senſible* Images *of Things are convey'd by the Nerves and Brain, that they may there be Perceived, as being Preſent to the Perceptive Subſtance? And do not the* Phænomena *of Nature ſhow, that there is an Incorporeal, Living, Intelligent, Omnipreſent Being, who in the Infinite Space, which is* as it were *His Senſorium* (or *Place of Perception,*) *ſees and diſcerns, in the inmoſt and moſt Thorough Manner, the* Very Things themſelves, *and comprehends them as being entirely and immediately Preſent within Himſelf; Of which Things, the Perceptive and Thinking Subſtance that is in* Us, *perceives and views, in its Little Senſory, nothing but the* Images, *conveyed thither by the* Organs *of the Senſes?* Newtoni Optice, Quæſt. 20. pag. 315.

will

tinue plus long temps d'avoir un mouvement réglé, ſans qu'elle ait beſoin d'être retouchée ; c'eſt parce que l'habileté de tous les Ouvriers Humains *ne conſiſte qu'à compoſer & à joindre certaines pieces, qui ont un mouvement, dont les* Principes *ſont tout-à-fait indépendans de l'Ouvrier ; comme les* Poids *& les* Reſſorts, *&c. dont les forces* ne *ſont pas* produites *par l'Ouvrier, qui ne fait que les ajuſter & les joindre enſemble. Mais il en eſt tout autrement à l'égard de Dieu ; qui non ſeulement compoſe & arrange les choſes, mais encore eſt l'Auteur de leurs Puiſſances* Primitives, *ou de leurs* Forces Mouvantes, *& les conſerve perpetuellement : Et par conſéquent, dire qu'il ne ſe fait* rien *ſans ſa* Providence *& ſon* Inſpection, *ce n'eſt pas avilir ſon Ouvrage, mais plûtôt en faire connoitre la grandeur & l'excellence. L'idée de ceux qui ſoûtiennent, que le Monde eſt une grande Machine, qui ſe meut* ſans que Dieu y intervienne, *comme une Horloge continue de ſe mouvoir ſans le ſecours de l'Horloger ; cette idée, dis-je, introduit le* Materialiſme *& la* Fatalité ; *& ſous prétexte de faire Dieu une* * Intelligentia Supra-mundana, *elle tend effectivement à bannir du monde la* Providence *& le* Gouvernement de Dieu. *J'ajoute que par la même raiſon qu'un* Philoſophe *peut s'imaginer, que tout ſe paſſe dans le Monde, depuis qu'il a été créé, ſans que*

* Voyez l'Appendix, N° 1.

la

will continue longer to move regularly without any farther Interpoſition of the Workman; is becauſe the skill of all *Human* Artificers conſiſts only in compoſing, adjuſting, or putting together certain Movements, the *Principles* of whoſe Motion are altogether independent upon the Artificer: Such as are *Weights* and *Springs*, and the like; whoſe forces are not *made*, but only *adjuſted*, by the Workman. But with regard to *God*, the Caſe is quite different; becauſe *He* not only compoſes or puts Things together, but is himſelf the Author and continual Preſerver of their *Original Forces* or *moving Powers*: And conſequently tis not a *diminution*, but the true *Glory* of his Workmanſhip, that *nothing* is done without his *continual Government* and *Inſpection*. The Notion of the World's being a great *Machine*, going on *without the Interpoſition of God*, as a Clock continues to go without the Aſſiſtance of a Clockmaker; is the Notion of *Materialiſm* and *Fate*, and tends, (under pretenſe of making God a * *Supra-Mundane Intelligence*,) to exclude *Providence* and *God's Government* in reality out of the World. And by the ſame Reaſon that a *Philoſopher* can repreſent all Things going on from the beginning of the Creation, *without* any Government or Interpoſition of Providence; a *Sceptick* will eaſily Argue ſtill farther Backwards,

* *See Appendix*, N° 1.

la Providence y ait aucune part ; il ne ſera pas difficile à un Pyrrhonien *de pouſſer ſes raiſonnements plus loin, & de ſuppoſer que les choſes ſont allées de toute éternité, comme elles vont preſentement, ſans qu'il ſoit néceſſaire d'admettre une Création, ou un autre Auteur du Monde que ce que ces ſortes de Raiſonneurs appellent la* Nature très-Sage & Eternelle. *Si un* Roi *avoit un* Royaume, *où tout ſe paſſeroit, ſans qu'il y intervint, & ſans qu'il ordonnât de quelle maniere les choſes ſe feroient ; ce ne ſeroit qu'un Royaume* de nom *par rapport à lui ; & il ne mériteroit pas d'avoir le Titre de Roi ou de Gouverneur. Et comme on pourroit ſoupçonner avec raiſon que ceux qui prétendent, que dans un Royaume les choſes peuvent aller parfaitement bien, ſans que le Roi s'en mêle : comme on pourroit, dis-je, ſoupçonner qu'ils ne ſeroient pas fâchez de ſe paſſer du Roi ; de même, on peut dire que ceux qui ſoûtiennent que l'Univers n'a pas beſoin que Dieu le dirige & le gouverne continuellement, avancent une Doctrine qui tend à le bannir du Monde.*

Second

Backwards, and ſuppoſe that Things have from Eternity gone on (as they now do) *without* any true Creation or Original Author at all, but only what ſuch Arguers call *All-Wiſe and Eternal Nature.* If a *King* had a *Kingdom*, wherein all Things would continually go on *without* his Government or Interpoſition, or *without* his Attending to and Ordering what is done therein; It would be to *him*, merely a *Nominal* Kingdom; nor would he in reality deſerve at all the Title of King or Governor. And as thoſe Men, who pretend that in an Earthly Government Things may go on perfectly well *without* the *King himſelf* ordering or diſpoſing of any Thing, may reaſonably be ſuſpected that they would like very well to ſet the King aſide: So whoſoever contends, that the Courſe of the World can go on *without* the Continual direction of *God*, the Supreme Governor; his Doctrine does in Effect tend to Exclude God out of the World.

Sécond Ecrit de Mr. LEIBNITZ, ou Réplique au prémier Ecrit Anglois.

1. *ON a raiſon de dire dans le Papier donné à* Madame la Princeſſe de Galles, *& que ſon Alteſſe Royale m'a fait la grace de m'envoyer ; qu' après les paſſions vitieuſes,* les Principes des Materialiſtes *contribuent beaucoup à entretenir l' impieté. Mais je ne crois pas qu'on ait ſujet d' adjouter, que* les Principes Mathematiques de la Philoſophie ſont opposés à ceux des Materialiſtes. *Au contraire, ils ſont les mêmes ; excepté que les* Materialiſtes, *à l'Exemple de* Democrite, *d'*Epicure, *& de* Hobbes, *ſe bornent aux ſeuls Principes* Mathematiques, *& n' admettent que des corps ; & que les* Mathematiciens Chrétiens *admettent encore des Subſtances immaterielles. Ainſi ce ne ſont pas les* Principes Mathematiques, (*ſelon le ſens ordinaire de ce terme,*) *mais les Principes* Metaphyſiques, *qu'il faut oppoſer à ceux des* Mate-

Mr. LEIBNITZ's *Second Paper.*

BEING

An Anſwer to Dr. CLARKE's *Firſt Reply.*

1. IT is rightly obſerved in the Paper delivered to the *Princeſs of Wales*, which Her *Royal Highneſs* has been pleaſed to communicate to me, that, next to Corruption of Manners, *the Principles of the Materialiſts* do very much contribute to keep up Impiety. But I believe the Author had no reaſon to add, that *the Mathematical Principles of Philoſophy are oppoſite to thoſe of the Materialiſts.* On the contrary, they are the ſame; only with this difference, that the *Materialiſts*, in Imitation of *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and *Hobbes*, confine themſelves altogether to *Mathematical* Principles, and admit only *Bodies*; whereas the *Chriſtian Mathematicians* admit alſo Immaterial Subſtances. Wherefore, not *Mathematical* Principles (according to the uſual ſenſe of that Word) but *Metaphyſical* Principles ought to be oppoſed to thoſe

Materialiſtes. Pythagore, Platon, *& en partie* Ariſtote, *en ont eu quelque connoiſſance ; mais je pretends les avoir établis Demonſtrativement, quoi qu' expoſés populairement, dans ma* Theodicée. *Le grand Fondement des* Mathematiques, *eſt* le Principe de la Contradiction, ou de l' Identité, *c' eſt à dire, qu'une Enontiation ne* ſauroit etre vraye & fauſſe *en même temps ; & qu' ainſi* A *eſt* A, *& ne ſauroit étre* non A. *Et ce ſeul Principe ſuffit pour demonſtrer toute l'Arithmetique & toute la Geometrie, c' eſt à dire tous les Principes* Mathematiques. *Mais pour paſſer de la* Mathematique *à la* Phyſique, *il faut encore un autre Principe, comme j' ay remarqué dans ma* Theodicée ; *c' eſt le* Principe de la Raiſon ſuffiſante ; *c' eſt que rien n' arrive, ſans qu'il y ait une* Raiſon *pourquoy céla ſoit ainſi pluſtot qu' autrement. C'eſt pourquoy* Archimede *en voulant paſſer de la* Mathematique *à la* Phyſique *dans ſon Livre* de l'Equilibre, *a été obligé d' employer un cas particulier du Grand Principe de la Raiſon ſuffiſante. Il prend pour accordé, que s'il y a une* Ballance *où tout ſoit de même de part & d'autre, & ſi l'on ſuſpend auſſi des poids égaux de part & d'autre aux deux Extremités de cette Ballance, le tout demeurera en repos. C'eſt parce qu' il n' y a aucune Raiſon pourquoy un coté deſcende pluſtot que l'autre. Or par ce principe ſeul, ſavoir,*

qu'

of the *Materialiſts*. *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle* in ſome meaſure, had a Knowledge of theſe Principles; but I pretend to have eſtabliſhed them demonſtratively in my *Theodicæa*, though I have done it in a popular manner. The great Foundation of *Mathematicks*, is *the principle of Contradiction, or Identity*, that is, that a Propoſition cannot be *true and falſe* at the ſame time; and that therefore *A* is *A*, and cannot be *not A*. This ſingle Principle is ſufficient to demonſtrate every part of Arithmetick and Geometry, that is, all *Mathematical* Principles. But in order to proceed from *Mathematicks* to *Natural Philoſophy*, another Principle is requiſite, as I have obſerved in my *Theodicæa:* I mean, *the Principle of a ſufficient Reaſon, viz.* that nothing happens without a *Reaſon* why it ſhould be *ſo*, rather than *otherwiſe*. And therefore *Archimedes* being to proceed from *Mathematicks* to *Natural Philoſophy*, in his Book *De Æquilibrio*, was obliged to make uſe of a particular Caſe of the great Principle of *a ſufficient Reaſon*. He takes it for granted, that if there be a * *Balance*, in which every thing is alike on both Sides, and if equal Weights are hung on the two ends of that Balance, the whole will be at reſt. 'Tis becauſe no *Reaſon* can be given, why one ſide ſhould weigh down, rather than the other. Now, by that ſingle Principle,

* *See Appendix*, N° 3.

qu'il faut qu'il y ait une Raiſon ſuffiſante, *pourquoy les choſes ſont pluſtoſt ainſi qu'autrement, ſe demonſtre la* Divinité, *& tout le reſte de la* Metaphyſique, *ou de la* Theologie Naturelle, *& même en quelque façon les Principes* Phyſiques *independans de la* Mathematique, *c'eſt à dire les Principes* Dynamiques, *ou de la* Force.

2. *On paſſe à dire que ſelon les* Principes Mathematiques, *c'eſt à dire ſelon la* Philoſophie *de* M. Newton, (*car les* Principes Mathematiques *n'y decident rien,*) la Matiere eſt la partie la moins conſiderable de l'Univers. *C'eſt qu'il admet, outre la* Matiere, *un* Eſpace vuide; *& que, ſelon luy, la* Matiere *n'occupe qu'une très petite partie de* l'Eſpace. *Mais* Democrite *&* Epicure *ont ſoutenu la même choſe, excepté qu'ils differoient en cela de* M. Newton *du plus au moins; & que peut être ſelon eux il y avoit plus de Matiere dans le monde, que ſelon* M. Newton; *En quoy je crois qu'ils étoient preferables; Car* plus *il y a de la Matiere,* plus *y a-t-il de l'occaſion à Dieu d'exercer ſa ſageſſe & ſa puiſſance; & c'eſt pour cela, entre autres Raiſons, que je tiens qu'il n'y a point de vuide du tout.*

viz. that *there ought to be a ſufficient Reaſon why Things ſhould be ſo, and not otherwiſe*, one may demonſtrate the Being of a *God*, and all the other Parts of *Metaphyſicks* or *Natural Theology*; and even, in ſome Meaſure, thoſe Principles of *Natural Philoſophy*, that are independent upon *Mathematicks*: I mean, the † *Dynamick* Principles, or the *Principles of Force.*

† *See Appendix*, N° 2.

2. The Author proceeds, and ſays, that according to the *Mathematical Principles*, that is, according to Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s *Philoſophy*, (for *Mathematical Principles* determine nothing in the preſent Caſe,) *Matter is the moſt inconſiderable part of the Univerſe.* The reaſon is, becauſe he admits *empty Space*, beſides *Matter*; and becauſe, according to *his* Notions, *Matter* fills up only a very ſmall part of *Space.* But *Democritus* and *Epicurus* maintained the ſame Thing: They differ'd from Sir *Iſaac Newton*, only as to the *Quantity* of Matter; and perhaps they believed there was *more* Matter in the World, than Sir *Iſaac Newton* will allow: Wherein I think their Opinion ought to be preferred; For, the *more* Matter there is, the *more* God has occaſion to exerciſe his Wiſdom and Power. Which is one Reaſon, among others, why I maintain that there is *no Vacuum* at all.

3. *Il ſe trouve expreſſement dans* l'Appendice de l' Optique *de* M. Newton ; *que* l'Eſpace *eſt le* Senſorium de Dieu. *Or le mot* Senſorium *a toujours ſignifié* l' Organe *de la Senſation. Permis à luy & à ſes amis de s'expliquer maintenant tout autrement. Je ne m' y oppoſe pas.*

4. *On ſuppoſe que la* preſence de l'Ame *ſuffit pour qu' elle s'apperçoive de ce qui ſe paſſe dans le cerveau. Mais c'eſt juſtement ce que le Pere* Mallebranche *& toute l' Ecole Carteſienne nie, & a raiſon de nier. Il faut toute autre choſe que la ſeule* preſence, *pour qu' une choſe repreſente ce qui ſe paſſe dans l'autre. Il faut pour cela quelque communication explicable ; quelque maniere d'*influence. *L'*Eſpace, *ſelon* M. Newton, *eſt intimement* preſent *au corps qu' il contient, & qui eſt commenſuré avec luy ; s' enſuit il pour cela que l'Eſpace* s'apperçoive *de ce qui ſe paſſe dans le corps, & qu' il* s' en ſouvienne *après que le corps en ſera ſorti ? Outre que l'Ame eſtant* indiviſible, *ſa* preſence *immediate qu' on pourroit s' imaginer dans le corps, ne ſeroit que dans* un Point. *Comment donc s' appercevroit elle de ce qui ſe fait hors de ce Point? Je pretends d' être le premier qui ait montré,* comment *l'ame s' apperçoit de ce qui ſe paſſe dans le corps.*

3. I find, in || expreſs Words, in the *Appendix* to Sir *Iſaac Newton's Opticks*, that *Space* is the *Senſorium* of *God*. But the Word *Senſorium* hath always ſignified the *Organ* of Senſation. He, and his Friends, may *now*, if they think fit, explain themſelves quite otherwiſe: I ſhall not be againſt it. || *See the Note, in Dr. Clarke's First Reply,* § 3.

4. The Author ſuppoſes that the *preſence* of the Soul is ſufficient to make it perceive what paſſes in the Brain. But this is the very Thing which Father *Mallebranche*, and all the *Carteſians* deny; and they *rightly* deny it. More is requiſite beſides *bare preſence*, to enable One thing to perceive what paſſes in another. Some Communication, that may be explained; ſome ſort of *influence*, is requiſite for this purpoſe. *Space*, according to Sir *Iſaac Newton*, is intimately preſent to the Body contained in it, and commenſurate with it. Does it follow from thence, that Space *perceives* what paſſes in a Body; and *remembers* it, when That Body is gone away? Beſides, the Soul being *indiviſible*, it's immediate *preſence*, which may be imagined in the Body, would only be in *one Point*. How then could it perceive what happens *out of* that Point? I pretend to be the firſt, who has ſhown * *how* the Soul perceives what paſſes in the Body. * *See Appendix*, N° 5.

5. The

5. *La Raiſon pourquoy Dieu s'apperçoit de tout, n'eſt pas ſa ſimple* preſence, *mais encore ſon* Operation ; *c'eſt parce qu'il conſerve les choſes par une action qui* produit continuellement *ce qu'il y a de bonté & de perfection en elles. Mais les* ames *n'ayant point d'*influence *immediate ſur les* corps, *ny les* corps *ſur les* ames ; *leur correſpondence mutuelle ne ſauroit étre expliquée par la* Preſence.

6. *La veritable raiſon qui fait louër principalement une Machine, eſt pluſtoſt priſe de l'*effect *de la Machine, que de ſa* Cauſe. *On ne s'informe pas tant de la* Puiſſance *du Machiniſte, que de ſon* Artifice. *Ainſi la raiſon qu'on allegue pour louër la Machine de Dieu, de ce qu'il l'a faite* toute entiere, *ſans avoir emprunté de la Matiere de dehors, n'eſt point ſuffiſante. C'eſt un petit detour, où l'on a été forcé de recourir. Et la raiſon qui rend Dieu preferable à un autre Machiniſte, n'eſt pas ſeulement parce qu'il* fait le tout, *au lieu que l'Artiſan a beſoin de chercher ſa Matiere. Cette preference viendroit ſeulement de la* Puiſſance. *Mais il y a une autre raiſon de l'excellence de Dieu, qui vient encore de la* Sageſſe. *C'eſt que ſa Machine dure auſſi* plus long temps, *& va* plus juſte, *que celle de quelque autre Machiniſte que ce ſoit. Celuy qui achete la Montre, ne ſe ſoucie poin*

5. The Reaſon why God perceives every thing, is not His bare *Preſence*, but alſo his *Operation*. 'Tis becauſe he preſerves Things by an Action, which *continually produces* whatever is good and perfect in them. But the *Soul* having * no immediate *Influence* over the *Body*, nor the *Body* over the *Soul*; their mutual Correſpondence cannot be explained by their being *preſent* to each other.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 5.

6. The true and principal Reaſon why we commend a Machine, is rather grounded upon the *Effects* of the Machine, than upon its *Cauſe*. We don't enquire ſo much about the *Power* of the Artiſt, as we do about his *Skill* in his Workmanſhip. And therefore the Reaſon alledged by the Author for extolling the Machine of God's making, grounded upon his having *made it entirely*, without wanting any Materials to make it of; That Reaſon, I ſay, is not ſufficient. 'Tis a mere Shift the Author has been forced to have recourſe to: And the Reaſon why God exceeds any other Artiſt, is *not only* becauſe he makes the *Whole*, whereas all other Artiſts muſt have Matter to work upon. This Excellency in God, would be *only* on the account of *Power*. But God's Excellency ariſes alſo from *another* Cauſe, *viz. Wiſdom*: whereby his Machine *laſts longer*, and moves *more regularly*, than thoſe of any other Artiſt whatſoever. He who buys a Watch, does not

ſi l'Ouvrier *l'a faite toute entiere, ou s'il en a fait faire les pieces par d'* autres Ouvriers, *& les a ſeulement ajuſtees ; pourveu qu'elle aille comme il faut. Et ſi l'Ouvrier avoit receu de Dieu le don juſqu'à créer la Matiere des roües, on n'en ſeroit point content, s'il n'avoit receu auſſi le don de les bien ajuſter. Et de même, celuy qui voudra être content de l'ouvrage de Dieu, ne le ſera point par la ſeule raiſon qu'on nous allegue.*

7. *Ainſi il faut que l'artifice de Dieu, ne ſoit point inferieur à celuy d'un Ouvrier ; il faut même qu'il aille infiniment au delà. La ſimple* Production de tout, *marqueroit bien la* Puiſſance *de Dieu ; mais elle ne marqueroit point aſſez ſa* Sageſſe. *Ceux qui ſoutiendront le contraire, tomberont juſtement dans le defaut de* Materialiſtes *& de* Spinoza, *dont ils proteſtent de s'éloigner : Ils reconnoitroient de la* Puiſſance, *mais non pas aſſez de* Sageſſe *dans le Principe des choſes.*

8. *Je ne dis point que le Monde corporel eſt une Machine ou Montre qui va* ſans l'interpoſition *de Dieu, & je preſſe aſſés que les Creatures ont beſoin de ſon* influence continuelle : *Mais je ſoutiens que c'eſt une Montre*

not mind whether the *Workman* made every Part of it *himſelf*, or whether he got the ſeveral Parts made by *Others*, and did only put them together; provided the Watch goes right. And if the Workman had received from God even the Gift of *creating* the Matter of the Wheels; yet the Buyer of the Watch would not be ſatisfied, unleſs the Workman had alſo received the Gift of *putting them well together.* In like manner, he who will be pleaſed with *God*'s Workmanſhip, cannot be ſo, without ſome *other* Reaſon than that which the Author has here alleged.

7. Thus the *Skill* of *God* muſt not be inferior to that of a Workman; nay, it muſt go infinitely beyond it. The bare *Production* of every thing, would indeed ſhow the *Power* of God; but it would not ſufficiently ſhow his *Wiſdom.* They who maintain the contrary, will fall exactly into the Error of the *Materialiſts*, and of *Spinoza*, from whom they profeſs to differ. They would, in ſuch caſe, acknowledge *Power*, but not ſufficient *Wiſdom*, in the Principle or Cauſe of all Things.

8. I do not ſay, the Material World is a Machine, or Watch, that goes *without* God's *Interpoſition*; and I have ſufficiently inſiſted, that the Creation wants to be continually influenc'd by its *Creator.* But

Montre qui va ſans avoir beſoin de ſa Correction : *Autrement il faudroit dire que Dieu ſe raviſe. Dieu a tout prevû, il a remedié à tout* par avance : *Il y a dans ſes ouvrages une harmonie, une beauté* deja préétablie.

9. *Ce Sentiment n'exclut point la* Providence *ou le* Gouvernment *de Dieu : Au contraire, cela le rend* parfait. *Une veritable* Providence *de Dieu, demande une parfaite* Prevoyance : *Mais de plus elle demande auſſi, non ſeulement qu'il ait tout* preveu, *mais auſſi qu'il ait* pourveu *à tout par des remedes convenables* préordonnés : *Autrement il manquera ou de* Sageſſe *pour le* prevoir, *ou de* Puiſſance *pour y* pourvoir. *Il reſemblera à un Dieu* Socinien, *qui* vit du jour à la journée, *comme diſoit M.* Jurieu. *Il eſt vray que Dieu, ſelon les Sociniens, manque même de* prevoir *les inconveniens ; au lieu que, ſelon ces Meſſieurs qui l'obligent à* ſe corriger, *il manque d'y* pourvoir. *Mais il me ſemble que c'eſt encore un* manquement *bien grand ; il faudroit qu'il manquât de* Pouvoir, *ou de* bonne Volonté.

10. *Je*

I maintain it to be a Watch, that goes *without* wanting to be *Mended* by him: Otherwiſe we muſt ſay, that God *bethinks himſelf again.* No; God has *foreſeen* every thing; He has provided a Remedy for every thing *before-hand*; There is in his Works a Harmony, a Beauty, already *preeſtabliſhed.*

9. This Opinion does not exclude God's *Providence*, or his *Government* of the World: On the contrary, it makes it *perfect.* A true *Providence* of God, requires a perfect *Foreſight.* But then it requires moreover, not only that he ſhould have *foreſeen* every thing; but alſo that he ſhould have *provided* for every thing *before-hand*, with proper Remedies: Otherwiſe, he muſt want either *Wiſdom* to *foreſee* Things, or *Power* to *provide* againſt them. He will be like the God of the *Socinians*, who *lives only from day to day*, as Mr. *Jurieu* ſays. Indeed God, according to the *Socinians*, does not ſo much as *foreſee* Inconveniences; whereas, the Gentlemen I am arguing with, who put him upon *Mending* his Work, ſay only, that he *does not provide againſt* them. But this ſeems to me to be ſtill a very great *Imperfection.* According to This Doctrine, God muſt want either *Power*, or *Good Will.*

10. I

10. *Je ne crois point qu'on me puisse reprendre avec raison, d'avoir dit que Dieu est* Intelligentia supramundana. *Diront-ils qu'il est* Intelligentia Mundana, *c'est à dire qu'il est* l'Ame du Monde? *J'espere que non. Cependant ils feront bien de se garder d'y donner sans y penser.*

11. *La Comparaison d'un Roy, où tout iroit sans qu'il s'en melât, ne vient point à propos ; puisque Dieu conserve tousjours les choses, & qu'elles ne sauroient subsister sans lui : Ainsi son Royaume n'est point* nominal. *C'est justement comme si l'on disoit, qu'un Roy qui auroit si bien fait élever ses Sujets, & les maintiendroit si bien dans leur capacité & bonne volonté, par le soin qu'il auroit pris de leur subsistence, qu'il n'auroit point besoin de les redresser ; seroit seulement un Roy* de nom.

12. *Enfin, si Dieu est obligé de corriger les choses naturelles de temps en temps, il faut que cela se fasse ou* surnaturellement *ou* naturellement. *Si cela se fait* surnaturellement, *il faut recourir au* Miracle *pour expliquer les choses naturelles ; ce qui est en effet une reduction d'un hypothese* ad absurdum.

10. I don't think I can be rightly blamed, for ſaying that God is * *Intelligentia ſupramundana.* Will they ſay, that he is *Intelligentia Mundana*; that is, the *Soul of the World*? I hope not. However, they will do well to take care, not to fall into that Notion unawares.

* *See Appendix,* N°. 1.

11. The Compariſon of a King, under whoſe Reign every thing ſhould go on without his Interpoſition, is by no means to the preſent Purpoſe; ſince God preſerves every thing continually, and nothing can ſubſiſt without him. His Kingdom therefore is not a *Nominal* one. 'Tis juſt as if one ſhould ſay, that a King, who ſhould originally have taken care to have his Subjects ſo well educated, and ſhould, by his Care in providing for their Subſiſtence, preſerve them ſo well in their Fitneſs for their ſeveral Stations, and in their good Affection towards him, as that he ſhould have no Occaſion ever to be amending any thing amongſt them; would be only a *Nominal* King.

12. To conclude. If God is oblig'd to mend the Courſe of Nature from time to time, it muſt be done either *ſupernaturally* or *naturally.* If it be done *ſupernaturally*, we muſt have recourſe to † *Miracles*, in order to explain Natural Things: Which is reducing an Hypotheſis *ad abſurdum*:

† *See Appendix,* N°. 6.

dum. *Car avec les* Miracles, *on peut rendre raiſon de tout ſans peine. Mais ſi cela ſe fait* naturellement, *Dieu ne ſera point* Intelligentia ſupramundana ; *il ſera compris ſous la nature des choſes, c'eſt à dire il ſera l'*Ame du Monde.

For, every thing may easily be accounted for by *Miracles*. But if it be done *naturally*, then God will not be * *Intelligentia Supramundana*: He will be comprehended under the Nature of Things; that is, He will be *the Soul of the World*.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 1.

Séconde Replique de Mr. CLARKE.

1. *LOrs que j'ai dit que les* Principes Mathematiques de la Philoſophie *ſont contraires à ceux des* Materialiſtes, *j'ai voulu dire, qu'au lieu que les* Materialiſtes *ſuppoſent que la Structure de l'Univers peut avoir été produite par les Seuls Principes* Mechaniques, *de la* Matiere *& du* Mouvement, *de la* Néceſſité *& de la* Fatalité ; *les* Principes Mathématiques de la Philoſophie *font voir au contraire, que l'Etat des choſes* [*la* Conſtitution *du* Soleil & des Planetes] *n'a pu être produit que par une Cauſe intelligente & libre. A l'égard du* mot *de* Mathematique *ou de* Metaphyſique, *on peut appeller, ſi on le juge à propos, les Principes* Mathematiques, *des Principes* Metaphyſiques, *ſelon que les Conſequences* Metaphyſiques *naiſſent démonſtrativement des Principes* Mathematiques. *Il eſt vrai que rien n'*exiſte, *ſans une* Raiſon ſuffiſante ; *& que rien n'exiſte d'une certaine maniere plûtôt que d'une autre, ſans qu'il y ait auſſi une Raiſon ſuffiſante pour cela ; & par conſéquent, lors qu'il n'y a aucune cauſe, il ne peut y avoir aucun Effet. Mais cette* Raiſon

Dr. CLARKE's *Second Reply.*

1. WHen I ſaid that the *Mathematical Principles of Philoſophy* are oppoſite to thoſe of the *Materialiſts*; the Meaning was, that whereas *Materialiſts* ſuppoſe the Frame of Nature to be ſuch, as could have ariſen from mere *Mechanical* Principles of *Matter* and *Motion*, of *Neceſſity* and *Fate*; the *Mathematical Principles of Philoſophy* ſhow on the contrary, that the State of Things [the *Conſtitution* of the *Sun and Planets*] is ſuch as could not ariſe from any thing but an *Intelligent* and *Free Cauſe*. As to the Propriety of the *Name*; ſo far as *Metaphyſical* Conſequences follow demonſtratively from *Mathematical* Principles, ſo far the *Mathematical* Principles may (if it be thought fit) be called *Metaphyſical* Principles.

'Tis very true, that nothing *is*, without a ſufficient *Reaſon why* it *is*, and why it is *thus* rather than *otherwiſe*. And therefore, where there is *no Cauſe*, there can be *no Effect*. But this *ſufficient Reaſon* is oft-

ſon ſuffiſante, *eſt ſouvent la* ſimple Volonté *de Dieu. Par exemple ; ſi l'on conſidere pourquoi* une certaine *Portion ou Syſteme de Matiere a été créée dans* un certain *lieu*, & une autre *dans* un autre certain *lieu, puiſque* tout lieu *etant abſolument indifferent à* toute Matiere, *c'eut été préciſément la même choſe* vice verſâ, *ſuppoſé que les deux Portions de Matiere* [*ou leurs* Particules,] *ſoient ſemblables ; ſi, dis-je, l'on conſidere cela, on n'en peut alleguer d'autre raiſon, que la* ſimple Volonté *de Dieu. Et ſi cette Volonté* * *ne pouvoit jamais agir, ſans être prédeterminée par quelque cauſe, comme une* Balance *ne ſçauroit ſe mouvoir, ſans le poids qui la fait pencher ; Dieu n'auroit pas la liberté de* choiſir ; *& ce ſeroit introduire la* Fatalité.

* Voïez l'*Appendice*, N°. 4.

2. *Pluſieurs anciens Philoſophes* Grecs, *qui avoient emprunté leur Philoſophie des* Pheniciens, *& dont la doctrine fut corrompue par* Epicure, *admettoient en général la* Matiere *& le* Vuide. *Mais ils ne ſçurent pas ſe ſervir de ces Principes, pour expliquer les* Phenomenes de la Nature *par le moyen des Mathématiques. Quelque* petite *que ſoit la* Quantité *de la Matiere, Dieu ne manque pas de Sujets, ſur leſquels il puiſſe exercer ſa ſageſſe & ſa puiſſance ; car il y a d'*autres *choſes, outre la* Matiere, *qui ſont également des Sujets, ſur leſquels Dieu exerce ſa puiſſance & ſa ſageſſe. On*

auroit

times no other, than the *mere Will* of God. For inſtance; Why *This* particular Syſtem of Matter, ſhould be created in *one* particular Place, and *That* in *another* particular Place; when, (*all Place* being abſolutely indifferent to *all Matter*,) it would have been exactly the ſame thing *vice verſa*, ſuppoſing the two *Syſtems* [or the *Particles*] of Matter to be *alike*; there can be *no other Reaſon*, but the *mere Will* of God. Which if it * could in No Caſe act without a predetermining Cauſe, any more than a *Balance* can move without a preponderating Weight; this would tend to take away all Power of *Chuſing*, and to introduce *Fatality*.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 4.

2. Many Ancient *Greeks*, who had their Philoſophy from the *Phœnicians*, and whoſe Philoſophy was corrupted by *Epicurus*, held indeed in general *Matter* and *Vacuum*; but they knew not how to apply thoſe Principles by *Mathematicks*, to the Explication of the *Phænomena of Nature*. How *Small* ſoever the *Quantity* of Matter be, God has not at all the leſs Subject to exerciſe his Wiſdom and Power upon: For, *Other* Things, as well as *Matter*, are equally Subjects, on which God exerciſes his Power and Wiſdom. By the

auroit pu prouver par la même raiſon, que les Hommes, *ou toute autre Eſpece de Creatures, doivent être* infinis en nombre, *afin que Dieu ne manque pas de Sujets pour exercer ſa Puiſſance & ſa Sageſſe.*

3. *Le Mot de* Senſorium *ne ſignifie pas proprement l'*Organe, *mais le* Lieu *de la Senſation. L'Oeil, l'Oreille,* &c. *ſont des Organes ; mais ce ne ſont pas des* Senſoria. *D'ailleurs, Mr. le Chevalier* Newton † *ne dit pas, que l'*Eſpace *eſt un* Senſorium ; *mais qu'il eſt, (par voye de Comparaiſon,)* pour ainſi dire *le* Senſorium, *&c.*

4. *On n'a jamais ſuppoſé que la Preſence de l'Ame ſuffit pour la Perception : On a dit ſeulement que cette Preſence eſt néceſſaire afin que l'Ame apperçoive. Si l'Ame n'étoit pas preſente aux Images des Choſes, qui ſont apperçues, elle ne pourroit pas les appercevoir : Mais ſa Preſence ne ſuffit pas, à moins qu'elle ne ſoit auſſi une* Subſtance vivante. *Les Subſtances* inanimées, *quoique preſentes, n'apperçoivent rien : Et une Subſtance vivante n'eſt capable de Perception, que dans le Lieu où elle eſt preſente ; ſoit aux* choſes *mêmes, comme Dieu eſt preſent à tout l'Univers ; ſoit aux* Images *des choſes, comme l'Ame leur eſt preſente dans ſon* Senſorium. *Il eſt impoſſible qu'une choſe*

† Voïez la Note dans ma prémiére Réplique, §. 3.

agiſſe,

ſame Argument it might juſt as well have been proved, that *Men*, or any other particular Species of Beings, muſt be *infinite in Number*, leaſt God ſhould want Subjects, on which to exerciſe his Power and Wiſdom.

3. The Word *Senſory* does not properly ſignify the *Organ*, but the *Place* of Senſation. The *Eye*, the *Ear*, &c. are *Organs*, but not *Senſoria*. Beſides, Sir *Iſaac Newton* † does not ſay, that *Space* is the *Senſory*; but that it is, by way of Similitude only, *as it were* the Senſory, *&c.*

4. It was never ſuppoſed, that the *Preſence* of the Soul was *ſufficient*, but only that it is *neceſſary* in order to Perception. *Without being preſent* to the Images of the Things perceived, it could not poſſibly perceive them: But *being preſent* is not *ſufficient*, without it be alſo a *Living Subſtance*. Any *inanimate* Subſtance, tho' *preſent*, perceives nothing: And a *Living* Subſtance can only *there* perceive, where it is *preſent* either to the *Things themſelves*, (as the Omnipreſent God is to the whole Univerſe;) or to the *Images* of Things, (as the Soul of Man is in its proper Senſory.) Nothing can any more *Act*, or *be Acted*

† *See the* Note *in my Firſt Reply*, §. 3.

upon,

agiſſe, *ou que quelque Sujet* agiſſe ſur elle, *dans un lieu où elle n'eſt pas preſente ; comme il eſt impoſſible qu'elle* ſoit *dans un lieu, où elle n'eſt pas. Quoique l'Ame ſoit* indiviſible, *il ne s'enſuit pas qu'elle n'eſt preſente que* dans un ſeul Point. *L'*Eſpace, *fini ou infini, eſt abſolument indiviſible, même par la penſée ; car on ne peut s'imaginer que ſes parties ſe ſeparent l'une de l'autre, ſans s'imaginer qu'elles* * *ſortent, pour ainſi dire,* hors d'elles mêmes ; *& cependant l'Eſpace n'eſt pas un* ſimple Point.

5. *Dieu n'apperçoit pas les choſes par ſa ſimple* Preſence, *ni parce qu'il* agit *ſur elles ; mais parce qu'il eſt, non ſeulement* preſent par tout, *mais encore un Etre* Vivant & Intelligent. *On doit dire la même choſe de l'Ame, dans ſa petite Sphere. Ce n'eſt point par ſa ſimple* Preſence, *mais parce qu'elle eſt une Subſtance* vivante, *qu'elle apperçoit les* Images *auxquelles elle eſt preſente, & qu'elle ne ſçauroit appercevoir* ſans leur être preſente.

6 & 7. *Il eſt vrai, que l'Excellence de l'Ouvrage de Dieu ne conſiſte pas ſeulement en ce que cet Ouvrage fait voir la* Puiſſance *de ſon Auteur, mais encore en ce qu'il mon-*

* Ut partium Temporis Ordo eſt immutabilis, ſic etiam Ordo partium *Spatij*. Moveantur hæ de locis ſuis, & movebuntur (ut ita dicam) *de Seipſis*. *Newton. Princip. Schol. ad Defin.* 8.

upon, where it is not preſent; than it can *Be*, where it is not. The Soul's being *Indiviſible*, does not prove it to be preſent *only in a mere Point*. *Space*, finite or infinite, is *abſolutely indiviſible*, even ſo much as in *Thought*; (To imagine its Parts moved from each other, is to imagine them * moved *out of themſelves*;) and yet *Space* is *not a mere Point*.

5. *God* perceives Things, not indeed by his ſimple *Preſence* to them, nor yet by his *Operation* upon them, but by his being a *Living* and *Intelligent*, as well as an *Omnipreſent* Subſtance. The *Soul* likewiſe, (within its narrow Sphere,) not by its ſimple *Preſence*, but by its being a *Living* Subſtance, perceives the *Images* to which it is *preſent*; and which, *without being preſent* to them, it could not perceive.

6 & 7. 'Tis very true, that the Excellency of *God*'s Workmanſhip does not conſiſt in its ſhowing the *Power* only, but in its ſhowing the *Wiſdom alſo* of its Author.

* Ut partium Temporis Ordo eſt immutabilis, ſic etiam Ordo partium *Spatij*. Moveantur hæ de locis ſuis, & movebuntur (ut ita dicam) *de Seipſis*. *Newton. Principia, Schol. ad Defin.* 8.

But

tre ſa Sageſſe. *Mais Dieu ne fait pas paroitre cette* Sageſſe, *en rendant la Nature capable de ſe mouvoir* ſans lui, *comme un Horloger fait mouvoir une Horloge. Cela eſt impoſſible, puis qu' il n' y a point de Forces dans la Nature, qui ſoient indépendantes de Dieu, comme les Forces des Poids & des Reſſorts ſont indépendantes des hommes. La Sageſſe de Dieu conſiſte donc en ce qu' il a formé dès le commencement une Idée parfaite & complete d'un Ouvrage, qui a commencé & qui ſubſiſte toûjours, conformément à cette Idée, par l' exercice perpetuel de la puiſſance & du Gouvernment de ſon Auteur.*

8. *Le mot de* Correction, *ou de* Réforme, *ne doit pas être entendu par rapport à Dieu; mais uniquement par rapport à Nous. L'Etat preſent du ſyſteme Solaire, (par exemple,) ſelon les Loix du mouvement qui ſont maintenant établies, tombera un jour* * *en confuſion ; & enſuite il ſera peut-être redreſſé, ou bien il recevra une nouvelle forme. Mais ce changement n'eſt que* relatif, *par rapport à notre maniere de concevoir les choſes.* L' Etat preſent *du Monde, le* deſordre *où il tombera, & le* Rénouvellement *dont ce deſordre ſera ſuivi, entrent également dans*

* Voïez la Note ſur le *prémier Ecrit* de Mr. *Leibnitz*, § 4.

le

But then this *Wiſdom of God* appears, not in making Nature (as an Artificer makes a Clock) capable of going on *Without him*: (For that's *impoſſible*; there being *no Powers* of Nature *independent* upon *God*, as the *Powers* of *Weights* and *Springs* are *independent* upon *Men*:) But the *Wiſdom of God* conſiſts, in framing *Originally* the *perfect* and *complete Idea* of a Work, which *begun and continues*, according to that Original perfect Idea, by the *Continual Uninterrupted Exerciſe* of his *Power* and *Government*,

8. The Word *Correction*, or *Amendment*, is to be underſtood, not with regard to *God*, but to *Us* only. The preſent Frame of the Solar Syſtem (for inſtance,) according to the preſent Laws of Motion, will in time * *fall into Confuſion*; and perhaps, after That, will be *amended* or put into a *new Form*. But this Amendment is only *relative*, with regard to *Our Conceptions*. In reality, and with regard to *God*; the preſent *Frame*, and the conſequent *Diſorder*, and the following *Renovation*, are *all* equally parts of the Deſign framed in Gods Original

* *See the* Note *on Mr.* Leibnitz's *Firſt* Paper. § 4.

perfect

le deſſein que Dieu a formé. Il en eſt de la Formation du Monde, comme de celle du Corps Humain : La Sageſſe de Dieu ne conſiſte pas à les rendre éternels, mais à les faire durer auſſi long temps qu' il le juge à propos.

9. *La Sageſſe & la* ‖ *Préſcience de Dieu ne conſiſtent pas à préparer des remedes par avance, qui gueriront d'eux mêmes les deſordres de la Nature. Car, à proprement parler, il n' arrive aucun deſordre dans le Monde, par rapport à Dieu ; & par conſéquent, il n' y a point de Remedes, il n' y a point même de Forces naturelles, qui* † *puiſſent agir d'elles mêmes, comme les* Poids *& les* Reſſorts *agiſſent d'eux mêmes par rapport aux hommes. Mais la Sageſſe & la Préſcience de Dieu conſiſtent, comme on l' a dit ci-deſſus, à former dès le commencement un deſſein, que ſa puiſſance met continuellement en execution.*

† Voïez l'Appendice, N°2.

10. *Dieu n' eſt point une* Intelligentia Mundana, *ni une* Intelligentia * Supramundana, *mais une Intelligence qui eſt* par tout, *dans le Monde, & hors du Monde. Il eſt* en tout, par tout, & par deſſus tout.

* Voyez l'Appendice, N°1.

‖ Voïez mes Diſcours ſur l'Exiſtence de Dieu, la Verité de la Réligion Naturelle, *&c.* Part I. Pag. 106. quatriéme Edition.

11. *Quand*

perfect Idea. 'Tis in the Frame of the *World*, as in the Frame of Mans *Body*: The *Wiſdom of God* does not conſiſt, in making the *preſent Frame* of Either of them *Eternal*, but to laſt *ſo long* as *he thought fit.*

9. The *Wiſdom* and || *Foreſight* of God, do not conſiſt in *providing originally Remedies*, which ſhall *of themſelves* cure the Diſorders of Nature. For in Truth and Strictneſs, with regard to God, there are *No Diſorders*, and conſequently *no Remedies*, and indeed *no Powers* of Nature *at all*, that † can do any Thing *of themſelves*, (as *Weights* and *Springs* Work *of themſelves* with regard to *Men*:) But the *Wiſdom and Foreſight* of God, conſiſt (as has been ſaid) in *contriving* at *once*, what his *Power and Government* is *Continually* putting in actual Execution.

† *See Appendix*, N°. 2.

10. God is neither a *Mundane* Intelligence, nor a * *Supra-Mundane* Intelligence; but an *Omnipreſent* Intelligence, both *In* and *Without* the World. He is *In* all, and *Through* all, as well as *Above* all.

* *See Appendix*, N° 1.

|| *See my Sermons preach'd at Mr.* Boyles *Lecture.* Part I. Page 106. Fourth Edition.

11. If

11. *Quand on dit que Dieu* conſerve *les choſes; ſi l'on veut dire par là, qu'il agit actuellement ſur elles, & qu'il les gouverne, en conſervant & en continuant leurs Etres, leurs Forces, leurs Arrangemens, & leurs Mouvemens; c'eſt preciſément ce que je ſoûtiens. Mais ſi l' on veut dire ſimplement, que Dieu en* conſervant *les choſes reſſemble à un Roi, qui créeroit des Sujets, leſquels ſeroient capables d' agir, ſans qu' il eut aucune part à ce qui ſe paſſeroit parmi eux; ſi c' eſt-là, dis-je, ce que l' on veut dire, Dieu ſera un* véritable Createur, *mais il n' aura que le* Titre *de* Gouverneur.

12. *Le raiſonnement que l' on trouve ici, ſuppoſe que tout ce que Dieu fait, eſt* Surnaturel *ou* Miraculeux; *& par conſéquent, il tend à exclure Dieu du Gouvernement actuel du Monde. Mais il eſt certain que le* Naturel *& le* Surnaturel *ne different en rien l' un de l' autre par rapport à Dieu: Ce ne ſont que des Diſtinctions, ſelon nôtre maniere de concevoir les choſes. Donner un mouvement réglé au Soleil (ou à la Terre,) c' eſt une choſe que nous appellons* Naturelle: *Arrêter ce mouvement pendant un jour, c' eſt une choſe* Surnaturelle *ſelon nos idées. Mais la derniere de ces deux choſes n' eſt pas l' effet d' une plus grande puiſſance que l' autre; & par rapport à Dieu, elles ſont toutes deux egalement* Naturelles *ou* Surna-

11. If God's *conſerving* all Things, means his *actual Operation and Government*, in preſerving and continuing the Beings, Powers, Orders, Diſpoſitions and Motions of all Things; this is *all that is contended for.* But if his *conſerving* Things, means no more than a King's creating ſuch Subjects, as ſhall be able to act well enough without his intermeddling or Ordering any thing amongſt them ever after; This is making him indeed a *real Creator*, but a *Governour only Nominal.*

12. The Argument in this Paragraph ſuppoſes, that whatſoever *God* does, is *Supernatural* or *Miraculous*; and conſequently it tends to exclude *All Operation* of *God* in the *Governing and Ordering* of the *Natural* World. But the Truth is; *Natural* and *Supernatural* are nothing at all different with regard to *God*, but diſtinctions merely in *Our* Conceptions of things. To cauſe the *Sun* [or *Earth*] to *move* regularly, is a thing we call *Natural*: To *ſtop* its Motion for a Day, we call *Supernatural*: But the *One* is the Effect of *no greater Power*, than the *Other*; nor is the *One*, with reſpect to *God*, more or leſs *Natural* or *Supernatural* than the *other.* God's

turelles. *Quoique Dieu ſoit* preſent *dans tout l'Univers, il ne s' enſuit point qu' il ſoit* * l'Ame du Monde. *L'Ame humaine eſt une partie d' un* Compoſé, *dont le Corps eſt l' autre partie ; & ces deux parties agiſſent mutuellement l' une ſur l' autre, comme étant les parties d' un même Tout. Mais Dieu eſt dans le Monde, non comme une* partie *de l' Univers, mais comme un* Gouverneur : *Il agit ſur tout, & rien n' agit ſur lui.* Il n' eſt pas loin de chacun de nous;

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* *Deus omnia regit, &c.* Dieu gouverne tout, non comme une *Ame du Monde*, mais comme le *Seigneur de l' Univers.* Le mot de *Dieu* eſt Rélatif : Il emporte une idée de Rélation à des *Serviteurs* ; & la *Divinité* de Dieu, eſt ſa *Domination*, qui ne reſſemble pas à celle de l' Ame ſur *ſon propre corps*, mais à celle d' un *Seigneur* ou d' un *Maitre ſur ſes Serviteurs.* —— Tout Subſiſte & ſe meut en Dieu ; mais ſans aucune paſſion mutuelle. Dieu n' eſt en aucune maniere affecté par le mouvement des corps ; & le mouvement des corps n' eſt point interrompu par la preſence de Dieu. — Dieu n' a ni Corps, ni figure corporelle : c' eſt pourquoi on ne ſçauroit le voir, l' entendre, ni le toucher ; & il ne doit être adoré ſous la reſſemblance d' aucune choſe corporelle. Nous avons des Idées de ſes *Attributs* ; mais les *Subſtances* des Etres, ſans aucune exception, nous ſont entierement inconnues. —— Nous ne ſçaurions même connoitre les *Subſtances* des *Corps* ni par quelqu'un de nos *Sens*, ni par quelque *Acte réflechi de notre Eſprit.* La *Subſtance de Dieu* nous eſt encore moins connue. Nous ne le connoiſſons que par ſes *proprietez* & ſes *Attributs*, par ſon *excellente* & *très-Sage diſpoſition des choſes*, & par les *Cauſes Finales* : Et nous l' adorons, & le ſervons, à cauſe de ſa *Domination.* Car un

Dieu

being *preſent In* or *To* the World, does not make him to be the * *Soul of the World.* A *Soul*, is *part* of a *Compound*, whereof *Body* is the *Other* part; and they *mutually Affect* each other, as *parts* of the *ſame whole.* But *God* is *preſent* to the *World*, not as a *Part*, but as a *Governor*; Acting upon all Things, himſelf acted upon by nothing.

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* Hic [*Deus*] omnia regit, non ut *Anima Mundi*, ſed ut niverſorum *Dominus.* —— *Deus* eſt vox relativa, & ad *ervos* refertur; & *Deitas* eſt Dominatio Dei, non in *corpus roprium*, ſed in *Servos.* —— In ipſo continentur & moentur univerſa, ſed abſq; mutuâ *paſſione*. Deus nihil atitur ex corporum Motibus; illa nullam ſentiunt reſiſtenam ex Omnipræſentiâ Dei. —— *Corpore omni* & figurâ rporeâ prorſus deſtituitur; ideoq; videri non poteſt, ec audiri, nec tangi, nec ſub ſpecie rei alicujus corpoi coli debet. Ideas habemus *Attributorum* ejus; ſed uid ſit rei alicujus *Subſtantia*, minimè cognoſcimus. —— Intimas [*corporum*] Subſtantias nullo Senſu, nulla ctione reflexâ cognoſcimus, & multò minus Ideam habeus Subſtantiæ Dei. Hunc cognoſcimus ſolummodò per roprietates ſuas & Attributa, & per ſapientiſſimas & ptimas rerum ſtructuras, & cauſas finales; veneramur utem & colimus ob dominium. Deus enim ſine Dominio, rovidentia, & Cauſis Finalibus, nihil aliud eſt quàm tum & Natura. i. e. *God Governs all Things, not as a* ul of the World, *but as the* Lord of the Univerſe. —— God, *is a relative Word, carrying in it the no-* n *of Relation to* Servants. *And the* Godhead *of God, is* s Dominion: *A Dominion, not like that of a Soul over* s own Body, *but that of a* Lord over his Servants. —— *Him all Things ſubſiſt and move, but without a mutual* ecting *of each other,* [ſuch as is between Soul and Body.] *d is no way affected by the Motions of Bodies; and the* otion *of Bodies meets with no Obſtruction from the Omni-* eſence *of God.* —— *He is altogether without* Body *or* odily Shape; *and therefore can neither be Seen, nor Heard,*

nous ; car en lui nous (*& toutes les choſes qui exiſtent*) avons la vie, le mouvement, & l' être.

Dieu ſans *Domination*, ſans *Providence*, & ſans *Cauſes Finales*, n' eſt autre choſe que le *Deſtin* & la *Nature*. *Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale ſub finem.*

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nothing. *He is not far from every one of Us, for in him We* (and all Things) *live and move and have our Beings.*

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nor Felt; nor ought to be worſhipped under the ſimilitude of any Corporeal Thing. We have Ideas of his Attributes; *but what the* Subſtance *of any Thing is, we know not at all.* ——— *The very* Subſtances themſelves, *even of* Bodies, *we cannot come at the knowledge of, either by any of our* Senſes, *or by any* reflex Act of the Mind: *much leſs have we any Idea of the* Subſtance of God. *Him we know, only by his* Properties *and* Attributes, *and by his moſt* Wiſe *and* Excellent Diſpoſition *of* Things, *and by* Final Cauſes: *And we adore and worſhip him, upon account of his* Dominion. *For a* God *without* Dominion, *without* Providence *and* Final Cauſes, *is nothing but* Fate and Nature. *Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale ſub finem.*

Troiſiéme Ecrit de Mr. LEIBNITZ, ou Réponſe au Second Ecrit Anglois.

1. *SElon la maniere de parler ordinaire,* les Principes Mathematiques *ſont ceux qui conſiſtent dans les* Mathematiques pures, *comme Nombres, Figures, Arithmetique, Geometrie. Mais* les Principes Metaphyſiques *regardent des* notions plus generales, *comme la Cauſe & l' Effect.*

2. *On m' accorde ce* Principe *important,* que rien n' arrive ſans qu' il y ait une raiſon ſuffiſante, pourquoy il en ſoit plûtôt ainſi qu' autrement. *Mais on me l' accorde* en paroles, *& on me le refuſe* en Effect. *Ce qui fait voir qu' on n' en a pas bien compris toute la force. Et pour cela on ſe ſert d' une inſtance qui tombe juſtement dans une de mes demonſtrations contre l'* Eſpace réel abſolu, *Idole de quelques Anglois Modernes. Je dis,* Idole, *non pas dans un ſens Theologique, mais Philoſophique ;* com-

me

Mr. LEIBNITZ's *Third Paper.*

BEING

An Anſwer to Dr. CLARKE's *Second Reply.*

1. ACcording to the uſual way of Speaking, *Mathematical* Principles concern only *mere Mathematicks*, viz. Numbers, Figures, Arithmetick, Geometry. But *Metaphyſical* Principles concern *more general Notions*, ſuch as are Cauſe and Effect.

2. The Author grants me this important *Principle*; that *Nothing happens without a ſufficient reaſon, why it ſhould be So, rather than otherwiſe.* But he grants it only in *Words*, and *in reality* denies it. Which ſhows that he does not fully perceive the Strength of it. And therefore he makes uſe of an Inſtance, which exactly falls in with one of my Demonſtrations againſt *real abſolute Space*, which is an *Idol* of ſome Modern *Engliſhmen.* I call it an *Idol*, not in a Theological Senſe, but in a Philo-

me le Chancelier Bacon *diſoit autres fois, qu'il y a* Idola Tribûs, Idola Specûs.

3. *Ces Meſſieurs ſoutiennent donc, que* l'Eſpace *eſt un* Etre réel abſolu ; *mais cela les mene à de grandes difficultés. Car il paroiſt que cet* Etre *doit être* eternel & infini. *C'eſt pourquoy il y en a qui ont crû que c'eſtoit* Dieu lui même, *ou bien ſon Attribut, ſon* Immenſité. *Mais comme il a des* parties, *ce n'eſt pas une choſe qui puiſſe convenir à Dieu.*

4. *Pour moy, j'ay marqué plus d'une fois, que je tenois* l'Eſpace *pour quelque choſe de* purement relatif, *comme* le Temps ; *pour un* Ordre des Coexiſtences, *comme* le Temps *eſt un* Ordre des Succeſſions. *Car* l'Eſpace *marque en termes de poſſibilité,* un Ordre *des choſes qui exiſtent en même temps, en tant qu'elles exiſtent* enſemble ; *ſans entrer dans leur manieres d'exiſter. Et lors qu'on voit pluſieurs choſes* enſemble, *on s'apperçoit de* cet Ordre des choſes entre elles.

5. *Pour refuter l'imagination de ceux qui prennent* l'Eſpace *pour une* Subſtance, *ou du moins pour quelque* Etre abſolu, *j'ay pluſieurs Demonſtrations. Mais je ne veux me ſervir à preſent, que de celle dont on me fournit icy l'occaſion. Je dis donc, que ſi* l'Eſpace *étoit un* Etre abſolu, *il arriveroit quelque choſe dont il ſeroit impoſſible qu'il*

ſophical one; As Chancellor *Bacon* ſays, that there are *Idola Tribûs*, *Idola Specûs*.

3. Theſe Gentlemen maintain therefore, that *Space* is a *real abſolute Being*. But this involves them in great Difficulties; For ſuch a *Being* muſt needs be *Eternal* and *Infinite*. Hence Some have believed it to be *God himſelf*, or, one of his Attributes, his *Immenſity*. But ſince Space conſiſts of *Parts*, it is not a thing which can belong to God.

4. As for my Own Opinion, I have ſaid more than once, that I hold *Space* to be ſomething *merely relative*, as *Time* is; that I hold it to be an *Order of Coexiſtences*, as *Time* is an *Order of Succeſſions*. For *Space* denotes, in Terms of Poſſibility, *an Order* of Things which exiſt at the ſame time, conſidered as exiſting *together*; without enquiring into their Manner of Exiſting. And when many Things are ſeen *together*, one perceives *That Order of Things among themſelves*.

5. I have many Demonſtrations, to confute the Fancy of Thoſe who take *Space* to be a *Subſtance*, or at leaſt an abſolute *Being*. But I ſhall only uſe, at the preſent, one Demonſtration, which the Author here gives me Occaſion to inſiſt upon. I ſay then, that if *Space* was an abſolute *Being*, there would Something happen, for which

y eut une raiſon ſuffiſante ; *ce qui eſt contre* notre *Axiome. Voicy comment je le prouve.* L'Eſpace *eſt quelque choſe d'* uniforme *abſolument* ; *& ſans les choſes y placées,* un point *de l'Eſpace ne differe abſolument en rien d'* un autre point *de l'Eſpace. Or il ſuit de cela (ſuppoſé que l'Eſpace ſoit quelque choſe en lui même outre l'* ordre *des corps entre eux,) qu'il eſt impoſſible qu'il y ait une* raiſon, *pourquoy Dieu, gardant les mêmes ſituations des corps entre eux, ait placé les corps dans l'Eſpace* ainſi *& non pas* autrement ; *& pourquoy tout n'a pas été pris* à rebours, (*par exemple,*) *par un Echange de l'*Orient *& de l'*Occident. *Mais ſi l'Eſpace n'eſt autre choſe que cet* Ordre *ou* Rapport, *& n'eſt rien du tout ſans les corps, que la poſſibilité d'en mettre ; ces deux Etats, l'un tel qu'il eſt, l'autre ſuppoſé à rebours, ne differeroient point entre eux. Leur* Difference *ne ſe trouve donc, que dans notre Suppoſition* chimerique, *de la* realité *de l'Eſpace en lui même. Mais dans la verité, l'un ſeroit* juſtement la même choſe *que l'autre, comme ils ſont abſolument* indiſcernables ; *& par conſequent, il n'y a pas lieu de demander la raiſon de la preference de l'un à l'autre.*

6. Il

which it * would be impoſſible there ſhould be a *ſufficient Reaſon*. Which is againſt my Axiom. And I prove it thus. *Space* is Something abſolutely *Uniform*; and, without the Things placed in it, *One Point* of Space does not abſolutely differ in any reſpect whatſoever from *Another Point* of Space. Now from hence it follows, (ſuppoſing Space to be Something in it ſelf, beſides the *Order of Bodies among themſelves*,) that 'tis impoſſible there ſhould be a *Reaſon*, why God, preſerving the ſame Situations of Bodies among themſelves, ſhould have placed them in Space after *one certain particular manner*, and not *otherwiſe*; why every thing was not placed the *quite contrary way*, for inſtance, by changing *Eaſt* into *Weſt*. But if Space is nothing elſe, but That *Order* or *Relation*; and is nothing at all without Bodies, but the Poſſibility of placing them; then thoſe two States, the *one* ſuch as it now is, the *other* ſuppoſed to be the quite contrary way, would not at all differ from one another. *Their Difference* therefore is only to be found in our *Chimerical* Suppoſition of the *Reality* of Space in it ſelf. But in truth the *one* would exactly be the ſame thing as the *other*, they being abſolutely *indiſcernible*; and conſequently there is no room to enquire after a Reaſon of the Preference of the one to the other.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 4.

6. The

6. *Il en eſt de même du* Temps. *Suppoſé que quelqu' un demande pourquoy Dieu n'a pas tout créé un An plûtôt ; & que ce meme perſonnage veuille inferer de là, que Dieu a fait quelque choſe dont il n'eſt pas poſſible qu'il y ait une* raiſon *pourquoy il l' a fait* ainſi *plûtôt qu'* autrement ; *On lui repondroit que ſon illation ſeroit vraye, ſi* le temps *étoit quelque choſe hors des choſes temporelles ; Car il ſeroit impoſſible qu'il y eut des* raiſons *pourquoy les choſes euſſent été appliquées plûtôt à de* tels *inſtans, qu'à d'*autres, *leur ſucceſſion demeurant la même. Mais cela même prouve que* les inſtans *hors des choſes ne ſont* rien, *& qu'ils ne conſiſtent que dans leur* ordre *ſucceſſif ; lequel demeurant le meme,* l'un *des deux Etats, comme celuy de l' anticipation imaginée, ne differeroit en rien, & ne ſauroit étre diſcerné de l'*autre *qui eſt maintenant.*

7. *On voit par tout ce que je viens de dire, que mon Axiome n'a pas été bien pris ; & qu'en ſemblant l' accorder, on le refuſe.* Il eſt vray, *dit on,* qu'il n'y a rien ſans une raiſon ſuffiſante pourquoy il eſt, & pourquoy il eſt ainſi plûtôt qu' autrement : *Mais on adjoute, que cette raiſon ſuffiſante eſt ſouvent* la ſimple [ou *mere*] Volonté *de Dieu : Comme lors qu'on demande pourquoy*

6. The Caſe is the ſame with reſpect to *Time*. Suppoſing any one ſhould ask, why God did not create every thing *a Year ſooner*; and the ſame Perſon ſhould infer from thence, that God has done ſomething, concerning which 'tis *not poſſible* there ſhould be a *Reaſon*, why he did it *ſo*, and not *otherwiſe*: The Anſwer is, That his Inference would be right, if *Time* was any thing diſtinct from Things exiſting in Time. For it would be *impoſſible* there ſhould be any *Reaſon*, why Things ſhould be applied to ſuch *particular Inſtants*, rather than to *others*, their Succeſſion continuing the ſame. But then the ſame Argument proves, that *Inſtants*, conſider'd without the Things, are *Nothing at all*; and that they conſiſt only in the ſucceſſive *Order* of Things: Which Order remaining the ſame, *one* of the two States, *viz.* that of a ſuppoſed Anticipation, would not at all differ, nor could be diſcerned from, the *other* which Now is.

7. It appears from what I have ſaid, that my Axiom has not been well underſtood; and that the Author denies it, tho' he ſeems to grant it. *'Tis true*, ſays he, *that there is nothing without a ſufficient Reaſon why it Is, and why it is Thus, rather than otherwiſe*: But he adds, that *This ſufficient Reaſon*, is often *the ſimple or mere Will of God*: As, when it is asked why

la Matiere n'a pas été placée autrement *dans l'Eſpace ; les mêmes ſituations entre les corps demeurant gardées. Mais c'eſt juſtement ſoutenir que Dieu* veut *quelque choſe, ſans qu'il y ait aucune* raiſon ſuffiſante de ſa Volonté ; *contre l'Axiome, ou la Regle generale de tout ce qui arrive. C'eſt retomber dans l'* Indifference vague ; *que j'ay amplement refutée, & que j'ay montrée* chimerique *abſolument, même dans les Creatures ; & contraire à la Sageſſe de Dieu, comme s'il pouvoit operer ſans agir par raiſon.*

8. *On m'objecte qu'en n'admettant point cette* ſimple [*& mere*] Volonté, *ce ſeroit ôter à Dieu le pouvoir de* choiſir, *& tomber dans la* Fatalité. *Mais c'eſt tout le contraire : On ſoutient en Dieu le pouvoir de choiſir, puiſqu'on le fonde ſur la* raiſon du choix *conforme à ſa Sageſſe. Et ce n'eſt pas* cette Fatalité *(qui n'eſt autre choſe que l'ordre le plus ſage de la Providence,) mais une* Fatalité ou Neceſſité brute, *qu'il faut eviter ; où il n'y a ny Sageſſe, ny Choix.*

9. *J'avois remarqué, qu'en diminuant la* Quantité de la Matiere, *on diminue la quantité des Objets où Dieu peut exercer ſa Bonté. On me repond, qu'au lieu de la Matiere, il y a d'autres choſes dans le vuide, où il ne laiſſe pas de l'exercer. Soit. Quoique*

why Matter was not placed *otherwhere* in Space; the ſame Situations of Bodies among themſelves being preſerved. But this is plainly maintaining, that God *Wills* Something, without any *ſufficient Reaſon* for his Will: Againſt the Axiom, or the general Rule of whatever happens. This is falling back into the *looſe Indifference*, which I have confuted at large, and ſhowed to be abſolutely *chimerical* even in Creatures, and contrary to the Wiſdom of God, as if he could operate without acting by Reaſon.

8. The Author objects againſt me, that if we don't admit this *ſimple and mere Will*, we take away from God the Power of *Chuſing*, and bring in a Fatality. But the quite contrary is true. I maintain that God has the Power of *Chuſing*, ſince I ground That Power upon the *Reaſon of a Choice* agreeable to his Wiſdom. And 'tis not *This Fatality*, (which is only the wiſeſt Order of Providence) but a *Blind Fatality* or *Neceſſity*, void of All Wiſdom and Choice, which we ought to avoid.

9. I had obſerved, that by leſſening the *Quantity of Matter*, the Quantity of Objects, upon which God may exerciſe his Goodneſs, will be leſſen'd. The Author anſwers, that inſtead of *Matter*, there are other things in the Void Space, on which God may exerciſe his Goodneſs. Be it ſo:

Tho'

que je n'en demeure point d'accord ; car je tiens que toute Subſtance créée eſt accompagnée de Matiere. Mais ſoit, dis-je ; je reponds, que plus de Matiere étoit compatible avec ces mêmes choſes ; & par conſequent, c'eſt tousjours diminuer le dit Objet. L'inſtance d'un plus grand nombre d'Hommes ou d'Animaux, ne convient point ; car ils ôteroient la Place à d'autres choſes.

10. *Il ſera difficile de nous faire accroire, que dans l'uſage ordinaire,* Senſorium *ne ſignifie pas l'Organe de la Senſation. Voicy les paroles de* Rudolphus Goclenius, *dans ſon* Dictionarium Philoſophicum, *v.* Senſiterium : Barbarum Scholaſticorum, *dit il,* qui interdum ſunt Simiæ Græcorum. Hi dicunt Αἰσθητήριον. Ex quo illi fecerunt *Senſiterium*, pro *Senſorio*, *id eſt*, *Organo Senſationis.*

11. *La* ſimple Preſence *d'une Subſtance, même animée, ne ſuffit pas pour la Perception. Un aveugle, & même un diſtrait, ne voit point. Il faut expliquer comment l'Ame s'apperçoit de ce qui eſt hors d'elle.*

12. *Dieu n'eſt pas preſent aux choſes par* Situation, *mais par* Eſſence ; *ſa Preſence ſe manifeſte par ſon* Operation *immediate. La Preſence de l'*Ame *eſt tout d'une autre nature. Dire qu'elle eſt diffuſe par le corps, c'eſt la rendre étendue & diviſible ; dire qu'elle*

Tho' I don't grant it; for I hold that every created Subſtance is attended with Matter. However, let it be ſo: I anſwer, that *More Matter* was conſiſtent with thoſe ſame Things; and conſequently the ſaid Objects will be ſtill leſſened. The Inſtance of a greater Number of *Men*, or *Animals*, is not to the purpoſe; for They would *fill up* Place, in Excluſion of other Things.

10. It will be difficult to make me believe, that *Senſorium* does not, in its *Uſual* Meaning, ſignify an *Organ* of Senſation. See the Words of *Rudolphus Goclenius*, in his *Dictionarium Philoſophicum*; *v.* Senſiterium. *Barbarum Scholaſticorum*, ſays he, *qui interdum ſunt Simiæ Græcorum. Hi dicunt* Αἰσθητήριον. *Ex quo illi fecerunt* Senſiterium *pro* Senſorio, *id eſt, Organo Senſationis.*

11. The *mere Preſence* of a Subſtance, even an animated one, is not ſufficient for Perception. A blind Man, and even a Man whoſe Thoughts are wandering, does not *See*. The Author muſt explain, how the Soul perceives what is *without* it ſelf.

12. God is not preſent to Things by *Situation*, but by *Eſſence*: His Preſence is manifeſted by his immediate *Operation*. The Preſence of the *Soul*, is quite of another Nature. To ſay that it is diffuſed all over the Body, is to make it extended and

qu'elle eſt toute entiere en chaque partie de quelque corps, c'eſt la rendre diviſible d'elle même. L'attacher à un Point, *la repandre par* pluſieurs Points, *tout cela ne ſont qu'expreſſions abuſives,* Idola Tribûs.

13. *Si la* Force active *ſe perdoit dans l'Univers par les Loix naturelles que Dieu y a établies, en ſorte qu'il eut beſoin d'une* nouvelle Impreſſion *pour reſtituer cette force, comme un Ouvrier qui remedie à l'imperfection de ſa Machine; le deſordre n'auroit pas ſeulement lieu à l'égard de* nous, *mais à l'égard de* Dieu lui même. *Il pouvoit le prevenir, & prendre mieux ſes meſures, pour éviter un tel inconvenient: Auſſi l'a-t-il fait en effect.*

14. *Quand j'ay dit que Dieu a oppoſé à de tels deſordres des remedes par avance, je ne dis point que Dieu laiſſe venir les deſordres, & puis les remedes; mais qu'il a trouvé moyen par avance d'empecher les deſordres d'arriver.*

15. *On s'applique inutilement à critiquer mon Expreſſion, que Dieu eſt* Intelligentia Supramundana. *Diſant qu'il eſt au deſſus du Monde, ce n'eſt pas nier qu'il eſt dans le Monde.*

16. *Je n'ay jamais donné ſujet de douter que la Conſervation de Dieu eſt une Preſervation*

diviſible. To ſay it is, the Whole of it, in every Part of the Body, is to make it divided from it ſelf. To fix it to a *Point*, to diffuſe it all over *many Points*, are only abuſive Expreſſions, *Idola Tribûs.*

13. If *active Force* ſhould *diminiſh* in the Univerſe, by the Natural Laws which God has eſtabliſhed; ſo that there ſhould be need for him to give a *new Impreſſion* in order to reſtore That Force, like an Artiſt's Mending the Imperfections of his Machine; the Diſorder would not only be with reſpect to *Us*, but alſo with reſpect to *God himſelf.* He *might have* prevented it, and taken better Meaſures to avoid ſuch an Inconvenience: And therefore, indeed, he has *actually* done it.

14. When I ſaid that God has provided Remedies before-hand againſt ſuch Diſorders, I did not ſay that God ſuffers Diſorders to happen, and then finds Remedies for them; but that he has found a way before-hand to prevent any Diſorders happening.

15. The Author ſtrives in vain to criticize my Expreſſion, that God is * *Intelligentia Supramundana.* To ſay that God is Above the World, is not denying that he is In the World.

* *See Appendix,* N°. 1.

16. I never gave any Occaſion to doubt, but that God's Conſervation is an actual

vation & Continuation actuelle des Etres, Pouvoirs, Ordres, Diſpoſitions & Motions; & je crois l'avoir peutetre mieux expliqué que beaucoup d'autres. Mais dit on; This is All that I contended for; *C'eſt en cela que conſiſte toute la Diſpute. A cela je reponds*, Serviteur tres humble. *Noſtre Diſpute conſiſte en bien d'autres choſes. La Queſtion eſt, Si Dieu n'agit pas le plus* Regulierement, *& le plus* Parfaitement? *Si ſa Machine eſt capable de tomber dans des* Deſordres, *qu'il eſt obligé de redreſſer par des voyes extraordinaires? Si la Volonté de Dieu eſt capable d'agir* ſans Raiſon? *Si l'Eſpace eſt un* Etre abſolu? *Sur la Nature du* Miracle; *& quantité de Queſtions ſemblables, qui ſont une grande Separation.*

17. *Les* Theologiens *ne demeureront point d'accord de la Theſe qu'on avance contre moy, qu'il n'y a point de difference par rapport à* Dieu, *entre le* naturel *&* ſurnaturel. *La plus part des* Philoſophes *l'approuveront encore moins. Il y a une difference infinie; mais il paroiſt bien qu'on ne l'a pas bien conſiderée. Le* ſurnaturel *ſurpaſſe* toutes les forces des Creatures. *Il faut venir à un Exemple: en voicy un, que j'ay ſouvent employé avec Succés. Si Dieu vouloit faire en ſorte qu'un corps libre ſe promenât dans l'Ether en rond à l'entour d'un certain Centre fixe, ſans que quelque autre Cre-*

Preſervation and Continuation of the Beings, Powers, Orders, Diſpoſitions, and Motions of all Things: And I think I have perhaps explained it better than many Others. But, ſays the Author, *This is all that I contended for.* To this I anſwer; *Your Humble Servant for That, Sir.* Our Diſpute conſiſts in many other Things. The Queſtion is, Whether God does not act in the moſt *regular* and moſt *perfect* Manner? Whether his Machine is liable to *Diſorders*, which he is obliged to mend by extraordinary Means? Whether the Will of God can act *without Reaſon*? Whether Space is an *abſolute Being*? Alſo concerning the Nature of *Miracles*; and many ſuch Things, which make a wide Difference between us.

17. *Divines* will not grant the Author's Poſition againſt me; *viz.* that there is no Difference, with reſpect to *God*, between *Natural* and *Supernatural*: And it will be ſtill leſs approved by moſt *Philoſophers*. There is a vaſt Difference between theſe two Things; but it plainly appears, it has not been duly conſider'd. That which is *Supernatural*, exceeds *all the Powers of Creatures.* I ſhall give an Inſtance, which I have often made uſe of with good Succeſs. If God would cauſe a Body to move free in the *Æther* round about a certain fixed Centre, without any other Creature

Creature agiſſe ſur lui ; Je dis que cela ne ſe peut que par Miracle, *n'étant pas explicable par les natures des corps. Car un corps libre s'écarte naturellement de la ligne courbe par la tangente. C'eſt ainſi que je ſoutiens que* l'attraction *proprement dite des corps, eſt une choſe* miraculeuſe, *ne pouvant pas être expliquée par leur Nature.*

acting upon it: I ſay, it could not be done without a *Miracle*; ſince it cannot be explained by the Nature of Bodies. For, a free Body does naturally recede from a Curve in the Tangent. And therefore I maintain, that * the *Attraction* of Bodies, properly ſo called, is a *Miraculous* Thing, ſince it cannot be explained by the Nature of Bodies.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 8. *and the* Note *on Dr.* Clarke's Fifth Reply, N°. 113.

Troiſiéme Réplique de Mr. CLARKE.

1. *CE que l' on dit ici, ne regarde que la* Signification *de certains* Mots. *On peut admettre les Définitions, que l' on trouve ici; mais cela n' empêchera pas qu' on ne puiſſe appliquer les Raiſonnemens* Mathematiques *à des Sujets* Phyſiques & Metaphyſiques.

2. *Il eſt indubitable, que rien n'* exiſte, *ſans qu' il y ait une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *de ſon exiſtence; & que rien n' exiſte d' une* certaine maniere *plûtôt que d'* une autre, *ſans qu' il y ait auſſi une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *de cette* maniere *d' exiſter. Mais à l' égard des choſes qui ſont indifférentes en elles mêmes, la* ſimple Volonté *eſt une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour leur donner l' exiſtence, ou pour les faire exiſter d' une certaine maniere; & cette Volonté n' a pas beſoin d' être déterminée par une Cauſe étrangere. Voici des Exemples de ce que je viens de dire. Lors que Dieu a créé ou placé une particule de Matiere dans* un lieu *plûtôt que dans* un autre, *quoique* tous les lieux *ſoient ſemblables; il n' en a eu aucune autre raiſon que ſa* Volonté. *Et ſuppoſé que l'*

Dr. CLARKE's *Third Reply.*

1. THIS relates only to the *Signification* of *Words.* The Definitions here given, may well be allowed; And yet *Mathematical* Reaſonings may be applyed to *Phyſical* and *Metaphyſical* Subjects.

2. Undoubtedly nothing *is*, without a *ſufficient* Reaſon *why* it *is*, rather than *not*; and *why* it is *Thus*, rather than *Otherwiſe.* But in things in their own Nature indifferent; *mere Will*, without any thing External to influence it, is alone *That ſufficient Reaſon.* As in the Inſtance of God's creating or placeing any particle of matter in *One* place rather than in *Another*, when *All* places are Originally alike. And the Caſe is the ſame, even though *Space* were nothing *real*, but only the *mere Order of Bodies:* For ſtill it would be abſolutely *indifferent*, and there could be *no other reaſon* but mere *Will*, why Three equal Particles ſhould be placed or ranged in the Order *a*, *b*, *c*, rather than in the *contrary* Order.

And

Eſpace *ne fût rien* de réel, *mais ſeulement un* Simple Ordre des Corps ; *la* Volonté *de Dieu ne laiſſeroit pas d' être la ſeule* poſſible *raiſon pour laquelle trois Particules égales auroient été placées ou rangées dans l' ordre* a, b, c, *plûtôt que dans un ordre contraire. On ne ſçauroit donc tirer de cette* Indifference *des* Lieux *aucun Argument, qui prouve qu' il n' y a point d'* Eſpace réel. *Car les* differens Eſpaces *ſont réellement* diſtincts *l' un de l' autre, quoiqu' ils ſoient parfaitement Semblables. D' ailleurs, ſi l' on ſuppoſe que l'* Eſpace *n' eſt point* réel, *& qu' il n' eſt ſimplement que* l' Ordre & l' Arrangement des Corps, *il s' enſuivra une abſurdité palpable. Car, ſelon cette idée; ſi la Terre, le Soleil, & la Lune, avoient été placez où les Etoiles fixes les plus éloignées ſe trouvent à preſent, (pourvû qu' ils euſſent été placez dans le même ordre, & à la meme diſtance l' un de l' autre ;) non ſeulement c' eut été* la même choſe, *comme le ſçavant Auteur le dit très-bien ; mais il s' enſuivroit auſſi que la Terre, le Soleil & la Lune, ſeroient* en ce cas-là *dans le* même Lieu, *où ils ſont preſentement : Ce qui eſt une Contradiction manifeſte.*

Les Anciens || *n' ont point dit que* tout

|| On a fait ces Remarques à l' occaſion d' un Endroit de la Lettre de Mr. *Leibnitz*, qui ſervoit d' Enveloppe au troiſiéme Ecrit, qu' il envoya.

Eſpace

And therefore no Argument can be drawn from this *Indifferency* of *All* places, to prove that *no Space* is *real*. For *different Spaces* are really *different* or *diſtinct* one from another, though they be perfectly *alike*. And there is This evident abſurdity in ſuppoſing *Space* not to be *real*, but to be merely the *Order of Bodies*; that, according to That Notion, if the Earth and Sun and Moon had been placed where the remoteſt fixt Stars now are, (provided they were placed in the ſame Order and Diſtance they now are *with regard one to another*,) it would not only have been, (as this Learned Author rightly ſays,) *la même choſe*, the *ſame Thing in effect*; which is very true: But it would alſo follow, that they would *Then* have been in the ſame *Place* too, as they are *Now*: Which is an expreſs Contradiction. The || *Ancients* did not call *All Space which is void of Bodies*, but only *extramundane* Space, by the Name of *Imaginary* Space. The meaning of which, is not,

|| *This was occaſioned by a Paſſage in the private Letter, wherein Mr.* Leibnitz's *Third Paper came incloſed.*

that

Eſpace deſtitué de Corps *étoit un* Eſpace Imaginaire : *Ils n' ont donné ce nom qu' à l'* Eſpace *qui eſt* au delà du Monde. *Et ils n' ont pas voulu dire par là, que cet Eſpace* n' eſt * pas réel ; *mais ſeulement que nous ignorons entierement* quelles ſortes *de choſes il y a dans cet Eſpace. J' ajoute que les Auteurs, qui ont quelquefois employé le mot d'* imaginaire *pour marquer que l' Eſpace n' étoit pas réel, n' ont point prouvé ce qu' ils avançoient par le ſimple uſage de ce Terme.*

3. *L' Eſpace n' eſt pas une* Subſtance, *un* Etre *eternel & infini ; mais une* Proprieté, *ou une* † *ſuite de l' exiſtence d' un Etre infini & éternel. L'* Eſpace infini *eſt l'* Immenſité : *Mais l'* Immenſité *n' eſt pas* Dieu : *donc l'* Eſpace infini *n' eſt pas* Dieu. *Ce que l' on dit ici des* parties *de l' Eſpace, n' eſt point une difficulté. L' Eſpace infini eſt abſolument & eſſentiellement* indiviſible ; *& c' eſt une Contradiction dans les termes, que de ſuppoſer qu' il ſoit* diviſé ; *car il faudroit qu' il y eut un Eſpace entre les parties que l' on ſuppoſe* diviſées ; *ce qui eſt ſuppoſer que l' Eſpace eſt* || di-

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* Le *Néant* n' a point de *Dimenſions*, de *Grandeur*, ni de *Quantité* : il n' a aucune *Proprieté*.

† Voïez ci-deſſous la Note ſur ma quatriéme Réplique, §. 10.

|| Voïez ci-deſſus, § 4. de ma *Seconde* Réplique.

viſé

that ſuch Space *is* * *not real*; but only that We are wholly ignorant *what* kinds of Things are *in that Space*. Thoſe Writers, who by the Word, *imaginary*, meant at any time to *affirm* that Space was not real; did not thereby *prove*, that it was not real.

3. *Space* is not a *Being*, an eternal and infinite *Being*, but a *Property*, or a † conſequence of the Exiſtence of a Being infinite and eternal. *Infinite Space*, is *Immenſity*: But *Immenſity* is *not God*: And therefore *Infinite Space*, is *not God*. Nor is there any Difficulty in what is here alledged about Space having *Parts*. For Infinite Space is *One*, abſolutely and eſſentially *indiviſible*: And to ſuppoſe it *parted*, is a contradiction in Terms; becauſe there muſt be Space in the *Partition it ſelf*; which is to ſuppoſe it || *parted*, and yet *not parted* at the ſame time. The

* *Of* Nothing, *there are no* Dimenſions, *no* Magnitude, *no* Quantity, *no* Properties.

† *See* below, *the* Note *on my Fourth Reply*, § 10.

|| *See above*, § 4. *of my* Second Reply.

Immenſity

viſé & non diviſé *en* même *temps. Quoique Dieu ſoit* Immenſe *ou* Preſent par tout, *ſa Subſtance n' en eſt pourtant pas plus diviſée en parties, que ſon Exiſtence l' eſt par la Durée. La difficulté que l' on fait ici, vient uniquement de l' abus du mot de* Parties.

4. *Si l' Eſpace n' étoit que l'* Ordre des choſes qui coëxiſtent, *il s' enſuivroit que ſi Dieu faiſoit mouvoir le Monde tout entier en ligne droite, quelque degré de viteſſe qu' il eut, il ne laiſſeroit pas d' être toûjours dans le* même lieu ; *& que rien ne recevroit aucun choc, quoique ce mouvement fut arrêté ſubitement. Et ſi le* Temps *n' étoit qu' un* Ordre de Succeſſion *dans les créatures ; il s' enſuivroit que ſi Dieu avoit créé le Monde quelques millions d' années plûtôt, il n' auroit pourtant pas eté créé* plûtôt. *De plus, l'* Eſpace *& le* Temps *ſont des* Quantitez ; *ce qu' on ne peut dire de la* Situation *& de l'* Ordre.

5. *On prétend ici, que parce que l'* Eſpace *eſt* uniforme *ou parfaitement* Semblable, *& qu' aucune de ſes parties ne differe de l' autre ; il s' enſuit que ſi les Corps qui ont été créez dans* un certain lieu, *avoient été créez dans* un autre lieu, (*ſuppoſé qu' ils conſervaſſent la même Situation entre eux,*) *ils ne laiſſeroient pas d' avoir été créez dans le* même lieu. *Mais c'eſt une Contradiction manifeſte.*

Immenſity or *Omnipreſence* of *God*, is no more a dividing of his Subſtance into *Parts*; than his *Duration*, or continuance of exiſting, is a dividing of his exiſtence into *Parts*. There is no difficulty here, but what ariſes from the *figurative* Abuſe of the Word, *Parts*.

4. If *Space* was nothing but the *Order of Things cöexiſting*; it would follow, that if God ſhould remove in a ſtreight Line the whole Material World Entire, with any ſwiftneſs whatſoever; yet it would ſtill always continue in the *ſame Place*: And that nothing would receive any Shock upon the moſt ſudden ſtopping of that Motion. And if *Time* was nothing but the *Order of Succeſſion* of created Things; it would follow, that if God had created the World Millions of Ages ſooner than he did, yet it would not have been created *at all the ſooner*. Further: *Space* and *Time* are *Quantities*; which *Situation* and *Order* are *not*.

5. The Argument in This Paragraph, is; That becauſe *Space* is *Uniform* or *Alike*, and *One Part* does not differ from *another*; therefore the Bodies created in *One place*, if they had been created in *Another* place, (ſuppoſing them to keep the ſame Situation with regard to each other,) would ſtill have been created in the *Same Place* as before: Which is a manifeſt Contradiction. The *Uniformity*

manifeſte. Il eſt vrai que l' Uniformité *de l'* Eſpace *prouve, que Dieu n' a pu avoir aucune raiſon* externe *pour créer les choſes dans* un lieu *plûtôt que dans* un autre : *Mais cela empêche-t-il que ſa* volonté *n' ait été une* raiſon ſuffiſante *pour agir en* quelque lieu que ce ſoit, *puiſque* tous les lieux *ſont indifferens ou ſemblables, & qu' il y a une* bonne raiſon *pour agir en* quelque lieu ?

6. *Le même raiſonnement, dont je me ſuis ſervi dans la ſection précédente, doit avoir lieu ici.*

7, & 8. *Lors qu' il y a quelque difference dans la* Nature des choſes, *la Conſideration de cette Difference détermine toûjours un Agent Intelligent & très-ſage. Mais lors que deux manieres d' agir ſont également bonnes, comme dans les cas dont on a parlé ci-deſſus ; dire que Dieu* * ne ſçauroit agir du tout, *& que ce n' eſt point une Imperfection de* ne pouvoir Agir *dans un tel cas, parce que Dieu ne peut avoir aucune raiſon* externe *pour agir d'* une certaine maniere *plûtôt que d'* une autre ; *dire une telle choſe, c' eſt inſinuer que Dieu n' a pas* en lui même *un* Principe d' Action, *& qu' il eſt toûjours, pour ainſi dire,* machinalement *déterminé par les choſes de dehors.*

* Voïez l' *Appendice*, N°. 4.

9. *Je ſuppoſe que* la Quantité déterminée de Matiere, *qui eſt à preſent dans le Monde, eſt* la plus convenable *à l'* Etat preſent des choſes ; *& qu' une* plus grande (*auſſi bien*

Uniformity of Space, does indeed prove, that there could be no (*External*) reaſon, why God ſhould create things in *One* place rather than in *another*: But does That hinder his own *Will*, from being to it ſelf a *ſufficient reaſon* of Acting in *Any* place, when *All* Places are Indifferent or Alike, and there be *Good reaſon* to Act in *Some* place?

6. The *Same Reaſoning* takes place here, as in the foregoing.

7 *and* 8. Where there is any *Difference* in the *Nature of things*, there the Conſideration of That Difference always determines an Intelligent and perfectly wiſe Agent. But when Two ways of Acting are equally and alike good, (as in the Inſtances before mentioned;) to affirm in ſuch caſe, that God * *cannot Act at all*, or that 'tis no Perfection in him to be *able to Act*, becauſe he can have no External Reaſon to move him to Act *one way* rather than *the other*, ſeems to be a denying God to have in himſelf any *Original* Principle or *Power* of *beginning* to act, but that he muſt needs (as it were *Mechanically*) be always determined by things extrinſick.

* *See Appendix*, N° 4.

9. I ſuppoſe, *That determinate Quantity* of *Matter*, which is *now* in the World, is the *moſt Convenient* for the *preſent Frame of Nature*, or the *Preſent State of Things*: And that a *Greater* (as well as a *Leſs*)

bien qu' une plus petite) *Quantité de Matiere, auroit été* moins convenable *à l'* Etat preſent *du Monde ; & que par conſéquent elle n' auroit pas été un plus grand Objet de la bonté de Dieu.*

10. *Il ne s' agit pas de ſçavoir ce que* Goclenius *entend par le mot de* Senſorium, *mais en quel ſens Mr. le Chevalier* * Newton *s' eſt ſervi de ce mot dans ſon Livre. Si* Goclenius *croit que l' Oeil, l' Oreille, ou quelque autre Organe des Sens, eſt le* Senſorium, *il ſe trompe. Mais quand un Auteur employe un Terme d' Art, & qu' il déclare en quel ſens il s' en ſert ; à quoi bon rechercher de quelle maniere d' autres Ecrivains ont entendu ce même Terme ?* Scapula *traduit le mot, dont il s' agit ici,* Domicilium, *c' eſt à dire, le* Lieu où l' Ame reſide.

11. *L' Ame d' un Aveugle ne voit point, parce que certaines obſtructions empêchent les Images d' être portées au* Senſorium, *où elle eſt preſente. Nous ne ſçavons pas* comment *l' Ame d' un homme qui voit, apperçoit les Images, auxquelles elle eſt preſente : Mais nous ſçavons qu' elle ne ſçauroit appercevoir les choſes, auxquelles elle n' eſt pas*

* Voïez la Note ſur § 3. de ma *Premiere Replique.*

preſente ;

Quantity of Matter, would have made the *Preſent Frame* of the World *leſs Convenient*; and conſequently would not have been a greater Object for God to have exerciſed his Goodneſs upon.

10. The Queſtion is not, what *Goclenius*, but what Sir *Iſaac Newton* means by the word *Senſorium*, when the Debate is about the Senſe of * Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s, and not about the Senſe of *Goclenius*'s Book. If *Goclenius* takes the *Eye*, or *Ear*, or any other *Organ* of Senſation, to be the *Senſorium*; he is certainly miſtaken. But when any Writer *expreſly explains* what he means by any Term of Art; of What Uſe is it, in this caſe, to enquire in what different Senſes perhaps ſome *other* Writers have ſometimes uſed the ſame Word? *Scapula* explains it by *domicilium*, the *place* where the Mind reſides.

11. The Soul of a Blind Man does for This reaſon not ſee, becauſe no Images are conveyed (there being ſome Obſtruction in the way) to the *Senſorium* where the Soul is preſent. *How* the Soul of a Seeing Man, ſees the Images to which it is *preſent*, we know not: But we are ſure it cannot perceive what it is *not preſent* to; becauſe no-

* *See the* Note on § 3. *in my* Firſt Reply.

preſente; *parce qu' un Etre ne ſçauroit ni* agir, *ni* recevoir des impreſſions, *dans un lieu où il n' eſt pas.*

12. *Dieu* étant par tout, *eſt actuellement preſent à tout*, Eſſentiellement & * Subſtantiellement. *Il eſt vrai que la Preſence de Dieu* ſe manifeſte *par ſon* Operation; *mais cette Operation ſeroit impoſſible ſans la* preſence actuelle *de Dieu. L' Ame n' eſt pas preſente à chaque partie du Corps*; *& par conſéquent elle n' agit, & ne ſçauroit agir pas elle même ſur toutes les parties du Corps, mais ſeulement ſur le Cerveau, ou ſur certains Nerfs & ſur les Eſprits, qui agiſſent ſur tout le Corps, en vertu des Loix du mouvement, que Dieu a établies.*

13, 14. *Quoique les* † Forces Actives, *qui ſont dans l' Univers*, diminuent, *& qu' elles*

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* *Deus omnipræſens eſt, &c.* C' eſt-à-dire: *Dieu eſt preſent par tout, non ſeulement* virtuellement, *mais encore* Subſtantiellement: *Car la* Force, [virtus] *ne ſçauroit ſubſiſter ſans une* Subſtance. Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale ſub finem.

† Le mot de *Force Active* ne ſignifie ici que le *Mouvement*, & l' *Impetus* ou la *Force impulſive & relative* des Corps, qui nait de leur mouvement, & qui lui eſt proportionnée. Car c' eſt le *Paſſage ſuivant*, qui a donné lieu à tout ce qu' on dit ſur ce ſujet dans cette Diſpute. *Apparet motum & naſci poſſe & perire*, &c. C' eſt-à-dire. *Il eſt évident que le Mouvement peut augmenter & diminuer. Mais la Tenacité des Corps Fluides, l' Attrition de leurs parties, & la foibleſſe de la Force Elaſtique dans les Corps Solides, font que le Mouvement tend toûjours beaucoup plus à* diminuer *qu' à* augmenter. ——— *Puis donc que*

thing can Act, or be Acted upon, where it Is not.

12. *God*, being *Omnipreſent*, is really *preſent* to every thing, *Eſſentially* and * *Subſtantially*. His Preſence *manifeſts* it ſelf indeed by its *Operation*, but it could not operate if it was not *There*. The *Soul* is not Omnipreſent to every part of the Body, and therefore does not and cannot it ſelf actually Operate upon every part of the Body, but only upon the Brain, or certain Nerves and Spirits, which, by Laws and Communications of God's appointing, influence the whole Body.

13. *and* 14. The † *Active Forces*, which are in the Univerſe, *diminiſhing themſelves* ſo

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* Deus Omnipræſens eſt, non per *virtutem* ſolam, ſed etiam per *Subſtantiam*: Nam virtus ſine Subſtantiâ ſubſiſtere non poteſt. i .e. *God is Omnipreſent, not only* virtually, *but* ſubſtantially: *For*, Powers *cannot ſubſiſt without a* Subſtance. *Newtoni Principia, Scholium generale ſub finem.*

† *Note: The word*, Active Force, *ſignifies here nothing but* Motion, *and the* Impetus *or* relative impulſive Force *of Bodies, ariſing from and being proportional to their Motion. For, the* Occaſion *of what has paſſed upon This Head, was the* following *Paſſage.* Apparet Motum & naſci poſſe & perire. Verùm, per tenacitatem corporum fluidorum, partiumq; ſuarum Attritum, viſq; elaſticæ in corporibus ſolidis imbecillitatem; multò magis in eam ſemper partem vergit natura rerum, ut pereat Motus, quàm ut naſcatur. ——— Quoniam igitur varij illi Motus, qui in Mundo conſpiciuntur, perpetuò decreſcunt univerſi; neceſſe eſt

elles ayent beſoin d' une nouvelle impreſſion ; ce n' eſt point un deſordre, ni une imperfection dans l' Ouvrage de Dieu : Ce n' eſt qu' une ſuite de la nature des créatures, qui ſont dans la dépendance. Cette dépendance n' eſt pas une choſe, qui ait beſoin d' être rectifiée. L'Exemple qu' on allegue d' un homme qui fait une Machine, n' a aucun rapport à la matiere dont il s' agit ici ; parce que les Forces, en vertu desquelles cette Machine continue de ſe mouvoir, ſont tout-à-fait indépendantes de l'Ouvrier.

15. On peut admettre les mots d' Intelligentia ſupramundana, de la maniere dont l' Auteur les explique ici : Mais ſans cette explication, ils pourroient aiſément faire naitre une fauſſe idée, comme ſi Dieu n' étoit pas réellement & ſubſtantiellement preſent par tout.

16. Je réponds aux Queſtions que l' on propoſe ici : Que Dieu agit toûjours de la maniere la plus réguliere & la plus parfaite:

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tous les differens mouvemens, qui ſont dans le monde, diminuent continuellement ; il eſt abſolument néceſſaire d' avoir recours à quelques Principes Actifs, pour conſerver & pour renouveller ces mouvemens. Newtoni Optice, Quæſt. ult. pag. 341. 343.

Qu'

ſo as to ſtand in need of *new impreſſions*; is no inconvenience, no diſorder, no imperfection in the Workmanſhip of the Univerſe; but is the conſequence of the Nature of *dependent* Things. Which Dependency of Things, is not a matter that wants to be rectified. The Caſe of a *Humane* Workman making a Machine, is quite another thing: Becauſe the *Powers* or *Forces* by which the Machine continues to move, are altogether *independent* on the Artificer.

15. The Phraſe, *Intelligentia ſupramundana*, may well be allowed, as it is here explained: But *without* this explication, the expreſſion is very apt to lead to a wrong Notion, as if God was not *really* and *ſubſtantially* preſent every where.

16. To the Queſtions here propoſed, the Anſwer is: *That* God does always act in the moſt *regular* and *perfect* manner: *That*

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prorſus, quo ij conſervari & recreſcere poſſint, ut ad *actuoſa* aliqua Principia recurramus. i. e. *Tis evident, that Motion can in the Whole both increaſe and diminiſh. But becauſe of the Tenacity of Fluid Bodies, and the Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakneſs of elaſtick Force in Solid Bodies; Motion is, in the Nature of things, always much more apt to* diminiſh, *than to* increaſe. ——— *Since therefore all the various Motions that are in the World, are perpetually* decreaſing; *'tis abſolutely neceſſary, in order to preſerve and renew thoſe Motions, that we have recourſe to ſome* Active *Principles.* Newtoni Optice, Quæſt. ult. pag. 341, 343.

Qu' il n' y a aucun déſordre *dans ſon Ouvrage ; & que les* changemens *qu' il fait dans l' Etat preſent de la Nature, ne ſont pas plus* extraordinaires, *que le ſoin qu' il a de conſerver cet Etat : Que lors que les choſes ſont en elles mêmes abſolument égales &* indifferentes, *la Volonté de Dieu peut ſe déterminer librement ſur le choix, ſans qu' aucune cauſe étrangere la faſſe agir ; & que le pouvoir que Dieu a d' agir de cette maniere, eſt une véritable Perfection. Enfin, je réponds que l' Eſpace ne dépend point de l'* Ordre *ou de la* Situation, *ou de l'* Exiſtence *des Corps.*

17. *A l' égard des Miracles ; Il ne s' agit pas de ſçavoir ce que les* Théologiens *ou les* Philoſophes *diſent communément ſur cette matiere, mais ſur* quelles raiſons *ils appuyent leurs ſentimens. Si un* Miracle *eſt toûjours* une Action, qui ſurpaſſe la puiſſance de toutes les Creatures ; *il s' enſuivra que ſi un homme marche ſur l' eau, & ſi le mouvement du Soleil (ou de la Terre) eſt arrêté, ce ne ſera point un Miracle, puiſque ces deux choſes ſe peuvent faire ſans l' intervention d' une Puiſſance* infinie. *Si un Corps ſe meut autour d' un Centre dans le Vuide, & ſi ce mouvement eſt une choſe* ordinaire, *comme celui des Planetes autour du Soleil ; ce ne ſera point un* Miracle, *ſoit que Dieu lui même produiſe ce mouvement immédiatement, ou qu' il ſoit produit par*

quelque

there are no *Diſorders* in the Workmanſhip of God; and *that* there is nothing more extraordinary in the *Alterations* he is pleaſed to make in the Frame of things, than in his *continuation* of it: *That* in things in their own nature abſolutely Equal and Indifferent, the Will of God can freely chooſe and determine it ſelf, *without any External Cauſe* to impell it; and *that* 'tis a *Perfection* in God, to be *able* ſo to do. *That* Space, does not at all depend on the *Order* or *Situation* or *Exiſtence* of Bodies. And as to the Notion of *Miracles*,

17. The Queſtion is not, *what* it is that *Divines* or *Philoſophers* uſually allow or not allow; but *what Reaſons* Men alledge for their Opinions. If a *Miracle* be That only, which *ſurpaſſes the Power of all Created Beings*; then for a Man to walk on the Water, or for the Motion of the Sun or the Earth to be ſtopped, is *no Miracle*; ſince none of theſe things require *infinite* Power to effect them. For a Body to move in a Circle round a Center *in Vacuo*; if it be *uſual* (as the *Planets* moving about the *Sun*,) 'tis *no Miracle*, whether it be effected immediately by *God himſelf*, or mediately by any *Created Power*: But if it be *unuſual*, (as, for a *heavy Body* to be ſuſpended, and move ſo in the *Air*,) tis equally a *Miracle*, whether it be effected immediately

quelque Créature. Mais ſi ce mouvement autour d' un Centre eſt rare & extraordinaire, *comme ſeroit celui d' un* Corps peſant *ſuſpendu dans l' air*; *ce ſera également un* Miracle, *ſoit que Dieu même produiſe ce mouvement, ou qu' il ſoit produit par une Créature inviſible. Enfin, ſi tout ce qui n' eſt pas l' effet des Forces naturelles des Corps, & qu' on ne ſçauroit expliquer par ces Forces, eſt un* Miracle; *il s' enſuivra que tous les mouvemens des Animaux ſont des* Miracles. *Ce qui ſemble prouver démonſtrativement, que le ſçavant Auteur a une fauſſe idée de la nature du* Miracle.

diately by *God himſelf*, or mediately by any inviſible *Created Power.* Laſtly; if whatever ariſes not from, and is not explicable by, the Natural Powers of Body, be a *Miracle*; then *Every animal-motion* whatſoever, is a *Miracle.* Which ſeems demonſtrably to ſhow, that this Learned Author's Notion of a *Miracle* is erroneous.

Mr. LEIB-

Quatriéme Ecrit de Mr. LEIBNITZ, ou Réponſe au Troiſiéme Ecrit Anglois.

1. *DAns les choſes* indifferentes *abſolument, il n' y a point de choix, & par conſequent point d' élection ny volonté; puisque le choix doit avoir quelque* raiſon *ou principe.*

2. *Une* ſimple volonté *ſans aucun motif,* (a mere Will,) *eſt une fiction non ſeulement contraire à la perfection de Dieu, mais encore chimerique & contradictoire, incompatible avec la Definition de la* volonté, *& aſſez refutée dans la* Theodicée.

3. *Il eſt* indifferent *de ranger trois corps égaux & en tout ſemblables, en quel ordre qu' on voudra; & par conſequent ils* ne ſeront jamais rangés, *par celuy qui ne fait rien qu' avec ſageſſe. Mais auſſi étant l' Auteur des choſes, il* n' en produira point, *& par conſequent* il n' y en a point *dans la Nature.*

4. *Il*

Mr. LEIBNITZ's *Fourth Paper*,

BEING

An Answer to Dr. CLARKE's *Third Reply*.

1. IN things *absolutely indifferent*, there is no [Foundation for] Choice; and consequently no Election, nor Will; since Choice must be founded on some *Reason*, or Principle.

2. *A mere Will* without any Motive, is a Fiction, not only contrary to God's Perfection, but also chimerical and contradictory; inconsistent with the Definition of the *Will*, and sufficiently confuted in my *Theodicæa*.

3. Tis a thing *indifferent*, to place three Bodies, equal and perfectly alike, in any order whatsoever; and consequently they will * *never be placed in Any order*, by Him who does nothing without Wisdom. But then, He being the Author of things, no such things will be *produced by him* at all; and consequently there *are no such things* in Nature.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 4, *and* 9.

4. There

4. *Il n' y a point* deux Individus indiſcernables. *Un Gentilhomme d' eſprit de mes amis, en parlant avec moy en preſence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de* Herrenhauſen, *crut qu' il trouveroit bien deux feuilles entierement ſemblables.* Madame l' Electrice *l' en defia, & il courut long temps en vain pour en chercher. Deux gouttes d' eau, ou de lait, regardées par le Microſcope, ſe trouveront diſcernables. C' eſt un argument contre les* Atomes, *qui ne ſont pas moins combattus que le* Vuide *par les Principes de la veritable Metaphyſique.*

5. *Ces grands Principes de la* Raiſon ſuffiſante *& de l'* Identité des indiſcernables, *changent l' état de la Metaphyſique ; qui devient réelle & demonſtrative par leur moyen : Au lieu qu' autres fois elle ne conſiſtoit preſque qu' en termes Vuides.*

6. *Poſer* deux *choſes* indiſcernables, *eſt poſer* la même choſe *ſous* deux noms. *Ainſi l' hypotheſe, que l' Univers auroit eu d' abord une* autre *poſition du* Temps *& du* Lieu *que celle qui eſt arrivée effectivement ; & que pourtant toutes le parties de l' Univers auroient eu la même poſition entre elles, que celle qu' elles ont receüe en effect ; eſt une fiction* impoſſible.

4. There is no ſuch thing as Two Individuals *indiſcernible* from each other. An Ingenious Gentleman of my Acquaintance, diſcourſing with me, in the preſence of Her *Electoral Highneſs the Princeſs* Sophia, in the Garden of *Herrenhauſen*; thought he could find two Leaves perfectly alike. The Princeſs defied him to do it, and he ran all over the Garden a long time to look for ſome; but it was to no purpoſe. Two Drops of Water, or Milk, viewed with a Microſcope, will appear diſtinguiſhable from each other. This is an Argument againſt *Atoms*; which are confuted, as well as a *Vacuum*, by the Principles of true Metaphyſicks.

5. Thoſe great Principles of a *ſufficient Reaſon*, and of the *Identity of Indiſcernibles*, change the State of Metaphyſicks. That Science becomes real and demonſtrative by means of theſe Principles; whereas before, it did generally conſiſt in empty Words.

6. To ſuppoſe *two* things *indiſcernible*, is to ſuppoſe the *ſame thing* under *two Names*. And therefore to ſuppoſe that the Univerſe could have had at firſt *another* poſition of *Time* and *Place*, than that which it actually had; and yet that all the Parts of the Univerſe ſhould have had the ſame Situation among themſelves, as that which they actually had; ſuch a Suppoſition, I ſay, is an *impoſſible* Fiction.

7. The

7. *La même raiſon qui fait que l'* Eſpace hors du monde *eſt* imaginaire, *prouve que* tout eſpace vuide *eſt une choſe* imaginaire; *car ils ne different que du grand au petit.*

8. *Si l'* Eſpace *eſt une* proprieté *ou un attribut, il doit être la proprieté de quelque* Subſtance. *L' Eſpace vuide* borné, *que ſes patrons ſuppoſent entre deux Corps, de* quelle Subſtance *ſera-t-il la proprieté ou l' Affection?*

9. *Si l'* Eſpace infini *eſt l'* immenſité; *l'* Eſpace fini *ſera l' oppoſé de l' immenſité, c' eſt à dire, la* menſurabilité, *ou l'* Etendue bornée. *Or l' Etendue doit etre l' affection d' un Etendu. Mais ſi cet Eſpace eſt vuide, il ſera un* attribut ſans ſujet, *une Etendue d' aucun Etendu. C' eſt pourquoy, en faiſant de l' Eſpace une* proprieté, *l' on tombe dans mon ſentiment qui le fait un Ordre des choſes, & non pas quelque choſe d' abſolu.*

10. *Si l'* Eſpace *eſt une* realité *abſolu; bien loin d' etre une* proprieté *ou* accidentalité *oppoſée à la Subſtance, il ſera* plus Subſiſtant *que les* Subſtances. *Dieu ne le ſauroit detruire, ny même changer en rien. Il eſt non ſeulement immenſe dans le tout, mais encore* Immuable *&* Eternel *en chaque partie. Il y aura une infinité de choſes Eternelles* hors de Dieu.

11. *Dire*

7. The ſame reaſon, which ſhows that *extramundane* Space is *imaginary*, proves that *All empty Space* is an *imaginary* thing; for they differ only as greater and leſs.

8. If *Space* is a *property* or Attribute, it muſt be the Property of ſome *Subſtance*. But *what Subſtance* will That *Bounded* empty Space be an Affection or Property of, which the Perſons I am arguing with, ſuppoſe to be between Two Bodies?

9. If *infinite Space* is *Immenſity*, *finite Space* will be the Oppoſite to Immenſity, that is, 'twill be *Menſurability*, or *limited Extenſion*. Now Extenſion muſt be the Affection of ſome thing extended. But if That Space be empty, it will be an Attribute *without a Subject*, an Extenſion without any thing extended. Wherefore by making Space a *Property*, the Author falls in with My Opinion, which makes it an Order of things, and not any thing abſolute.

10. If Space is an abſolute *reality*; far from being a *Property* or an Accident oppoſed to Subſtance, it will have a *greater reality* than *Subſtances* themſelves. God cannot deſtroy it, nor even change it in any reſpect. It will be not only immenſe in the whole, but alſo *Immutable* and *Eternal* in every part. There will be an infinite number of Eternal things *beſides God*.

11. *Dire que l'* Eſpace infini *eſt* ſans parties, *c' eſt dire que les Eſpaces* finis *ne le compoſent point ; & que l' Eſpace infini pourroit ſubſiſter, quand tous les Eſpaces finis ſeroient reduits à rien. Ce ſeroit comme ſi l' on diſoit dans la Suppoſition* Carteſienne *d' un Univers corporel étendu ſans bornes, que cet Univers pourroit ſubſiſter, quand tous les Corps qui le compoſent, ſeroient reduits à rien.*

12. *On attribue des* parties *à l' Eſpace,* p. 19. 3^eme^ Edition *de la* Defenſe de l' Argument contre M. Dodwell ; *& on les fait inſéparables* l' une de l' autre. *Mais* p. 30, de la Seconde Defenſe, *on en fait des* parties improprement dites : *Cela ſe peut entendre dans un bon ſens.*

13. *De dire que Dieu faſſe* avancer *tout l' Univers, en ligne droite ou autre, ſans y rien changer autrement, c' eſt encore une Suppoſition* Chimerique. *Car* deux *états* indiſcernables *ſont* le même *état, & par conſequent c' eſt un changement qui ne change rien. De plus, il n' y a ny* rime *ny* raiſon. *Or Dieu ne fait rien ſans* raiſon ; *& il eſt* impoſſible *qu' il y en ait icy. Outre que ce ſeroit* agendo nihil agere, *comme je viens de dire, à cauſe de l' indiſcernabilité.*

11. To ſay that *infinite Space* has no *parts*, is to ſay that it does not conſiſt of *finite* Spaces; and that Infinite Space might ſubſiſt, though all finite Spaces ſhould be reduced to nothing. It would be, as if one ſhould ſay, in the *Carteſian* Suppoſition of a material extended unlimited World, that ſuch a World might ſubſiſt, though all the Bodies of which it conſiſts, ſhould be reduced to nothing.

12. The Author aſcribes *Parts* to Space, *p.* 19. *of the 3d Edition* of his *Defenſe of the Argument againſt Mr. Dodwell*; and makes them *inſeparable* one from another. But, *p.* 30. *of his Second Defenſe*, he ſays they are *parts improperly ſo called*: Which may be underſtood in a good ſenſe.

13. To ſay that God can cauſe the whole Univerſe to *move forward* in a Right Line, or in any other Line, without making otherwiſe any Alteration in it; is another * *Chimerical* Suppoſition. For, *two States indiſcernible* from each other, are the *ſame* State; and conſequently, 'tis a change without any change. Beſides, there is neither *Rhime* nor *Reaſon* in it. But God does nothing without *Reaſon*; And tis *impoſſible* there ſhould be any here. Beſides, it would be *agendo nihil agere*, as I have juſt now ſaid, becauſe of the Indiſcernibility.

* *See Appendix*, N° 10.

14. *Ce ſont* Idola Tribûs, *Chimeres toutes pures, & Imaginations ſuperficielles. Tout cela n' eſt fondé, que ſur la Suppoſition que l' Eſpace imaginaire eſt* réel.

15. *C' eſt une fiction ſemblable, c' eſt à dire* impoſſible, *de ſuppoſer que Dieu ait créé le Monde quelques Millions d' années* pluſtoſt. *Ceux qui donnent dans ces ſortes de Fictions, ne ſauroient répondre à ceux qui argumenteroient pour* l' Eternité *du Monde. Car Dieu ne faiſant rien ſans raiſon, & point de raiſon n' eſtant aſſignable pourquoy il n' ait point créé le monde pluſtoſt ; il s' enſuivra, ou qu' il n' ait rien crée du tout, ou qu' il ait produit le monde avant tout temps aſſignable, c' eſt à dire que le monde ſoit* Eternel. *Mais quand on montre que le commencement, quel qu' il ſoit, eſt tousjours la* même *choſe, la queſtion pourquoy il n' en a pas été autrement, ceſſe.*

16. *Si l'* Eſpace *& le* Temps *eſtoient quelque choſe d' abſolu, c' eſt à dire, s' ils eſtoient autre choſe que certains* Ordres *des choſes ; ce que je dis, ſeroit* Contradiction. *Mais cela n' étant point, l' Hypotheſe eſt contradictoire, c' eſt à dire, c' eſt une Fiction* impoſſible.

17. *Et c' eſt comme dans la* Geometrie, *où l' on prouve quelque fois par la Suppoſi-*

tion

14. Theſe are *Idola Tribûs*, mere Chimeras, and ſuperficial Imaginations. All this is only grounded upon the Suppoſition, that imaginary Space is real.

15. It is a like fiction, (that is) an *impoſſible* one, to ſuppoſe that God might have created the World ſome Millions of Years ſooner. They who run into ſuch kind of Fictions, can give no anſwer to one that ſhould argue for the *Eternity* of the World. For ſince God does nothing without Reaſon, and no Reaſon can be given why he did not create the World ſooner; it will follow, either that he has created nothing at all, or that he created the World before any aſſignable time, that is, that the World is *Eternal.* But when once it has been ſhown, that the Beginning, *whenever* it was, is always the *ſame thing*; the Queſtion, Why it was not otherwiſe ordered, becomes needleſs and inſignificant.

16. If *Space* and *Time* were any thing abſolute, that is, if they were any thing elſe, beſides certain *Orders* of things; then indeed my aſſertion would be a *Contradiction.* But ſince it is not ſo, the Hypotheſis [*that Space and Time are any thing abſolute*] is contradictory, that is, 'tis an *impoſſible* Fiction.

17. And the Caſe is the ſame as in *Geometry*; where by the very Suppoſition that a

tion même, qu' une Figure ſoit *plus grande, qu' en effet elle* n' eſt point *plus grande. C' eſt une* Contradiction ; *mais elle eſt dans l' Hypotheſe, laquelle pour cela même ſe trouve fauſſe.*

18. *L'* uniformité *de l' Eſpace fait qu' il n' y a aucune* Raiſon *ny* Interne *ny* Externe, *pour en diſcerner les parties, & pour y choiſir. Car cette Raiſon* Externe *de diſcerner, ne ſauroit être fondée que dans l'* Interne ; *autrement c' eſt diſcerner l' indiſcernable, ou c' eſt choiſir ſans diſcerner. La volonté ſans Raiſon, ſeroit le* Hazard *des* Epicuriens. *Un Dieu qui agiroit par une telle volonté, ſeroit un Dieu de nom. La ſource de ces erreurs eſt, qu' on n' a point de ſoin d' éviter ce qui déroge aux Perfections Divines.*

19. *Lors que* deux *choſes incompatibles ſont* également bonnes, *& que tant en elles que par leur combinaiſon avec d' autres, l' une n' a point d' avantage ſur l' autre ; Dieu n' en* produira aucune.

20. *Dieu n' eſt jamais determiné par les choſes* externes, *mais tousjours par ce qui eſt* en luy, *c' eſt à dire par ſes connoiſſances, avant qu' il y ait aucune choſe hors de luy.*

21. *Il n' y a point de raiſon* poſſible, *qui* puiſſe limiter *la quantité de la matiere. Ainſi cette limitation ne ſauroit avoir lieu.*

22. *Et*

Figure *is* greater than it really is, we ſometimes prove that it *is not* greater. This indeed is a *Contradiction*; but it lies in the Hypotheſis, which appears to be falſe for that very reaſon.

18. Space being *uniform*, there can be neither any *External* nor *Internal* Reaſon, by which to diſtinguiſh its parts, and to make any choice among them. For, any *External* Reaſon to diſcern between them, can only be grounded upon ſome *Internal* one. Otherwiſe we ſhould diſcern what is indiſcernible, or chuſe without diſcerning. A Will without Reaſon, would be the *Chance* of the *Epicureans*. A God, who ſhould act by ſuch a Will, would be a God only in Name. The cauſe of theſe Errors proceeds from want of care to avoid what derogates from the Divine Perfections.

19. When *two* things which cannot Both be together, are *equally good*; and neither in themſelves, nor by their combination with other things, has the one any advantage over the other; God will produce * *Neither of them.*

* *See Appendix* N° 4, *and* 9.

20. God is never determined by *external* things, but always by what is *in himſelf*; that is, by his Knowledge of things, before any thing exiſts *without* himſelf.

21. There is no *poſſible* Reaſon, that *can limit* the quantity of Matter; and therefore ſuch limitation can have no place.

22. *Et ſuppoſé cette limitation arbitraire, on pourroit tousjours adjouter quelque choſe ſans deroger à la Perfection des choſes qui ſont deja: Et par conſequent il faudra tousjours y adjouter quelque choſe, pour agir ſuivant le Principe de la Perfection des Operations Divines.*

23. *Ainſi on ne ſauroit dire que la preſente quantité de la matiere eſt la plus convenable pour leur preſente Conſtitution. Et quand méme cela ſeroit, il s' enſuivroit que cette preſente Conſtitution des choſes ne ſeroit point la plus convenable abſolument, ſi elle empeche d' employer plus de matiere ; il vaudroit donc en choiſir une autre, capable de quelque choſe de plus.*

24. *Je ſerois bien aiſe de voir le paſſage d' un Philoſophe, qui prenne* Senſorium *autrement que* Goclenius.

25. *Si* Scapula *dit que* Senſorium *eſt la* place *où l' entendement reſide, il entendra l'* Organe *de la ſenſation interne. Ainſi il ne s' éloignera point de* Goclenius.

26. Senſorium *a tousjours été l'* Organe *de la ſenſation. La glande pineale ſeroit ſelon* des Cartes, *le* Senſorium *dans le ſens qu' on rapporte de* Scapula.

27. *Il*

22. And ſuppoſing an arbitrary Limitation of the Quantity of Matter, ſomething might always be added to it without derogating from the Perfection of thoſe things which do already exiſt; and conſequently ſomething *muſt* always be added, in order to act according to the Principle of the Perfection of the divine Operations.

23. And therefore it cannot be ſaid, that the preſent quantity of Matter is the fitteſt for the preſent Conſtitution of Things. And ſuppoſing it were, it would follow that this preſent Conſtitution of things would not be the fitteſt abſolutely, if it hinders God from uſing more Matter. It were therefore better to chuſe another conſtitution of things, capable of ſomething more.

24. I ſhould be glad to ſee a paſſage of any Philoſopher, who takes *Senſorium* in any other Senſe than *Goclenius* does.

25. If *Scapula* ſays that *Senſorium* is the *place* in which the Underſtanding reſides, he means by it the *Organ* of internal Senſation. And therefore he does not differ from *Goclenius*.

26. *Senſorium* has always ſignified the *Organ* of Senſation. The *Glandula pinealis* would be, according to *Carteſius*, the *Senſorium*, in the above-mentioned ſenſe of *Scapula*.

27. There

27. *Il n' y a guéres d' Expreſſion moins convenable ſur ce ſujet, que celle qui donne à Dieu un* Senſorium. *Il ſemble qu' elle le fait* l' Ame *du Monde. Et on aura bien de la peine à donner à l' uſage que* M. Newton *fait de ce mot, un ſens qui le puiſſe juſtifier.*

28. *Quoy qu' il s' agiſſe du ſens de* M. Newton, *& non pas de celuy de* Goclenius, *on ne me doit point blamer d' avoir allegué le Dictionnaire Philoſophique de cet auteur ; parceque le but des Dictionnaires eſt de marquer l' uſage des termes.*

29. *Dieu s' apperçoit des choſes en luy même. L' Eſpace eſt le lieu des* choſes, *& non pas le lieu des* Ideés *de Dieu : A moins qu' on ne conſidere l' Eſpace comme quelque choſe qui faſſe l' Union de Dieu & des choſes, à l' imitation de l' Union de l' Ame & du Corps qu' on s' imagine ; ce qui rendroit encore Dieu* l' Ame du Monde.

30. *Auſſi a-t-on tort dans la Comparaiſon qu' on fait de la connoiſſance & de l' Operation de Dieu avec celle des ames. Les ames connoiſſent les choſes, parce que Dieu a mis en elles un* Principe Repreſentatif *de ce qui eſt hors d' elles. Mais Dieu connoiſt les choſes, parce qu' il les* produit *continuellement.*

31. *Les ames n'* operent *ſur les choſes ſelon moy, que parceque des Corps* s' accommodent

27. There is hardly any Expreſſion leſs proper upon this Subject, than that which makes God to have a *Senſorium.* It ſeems to make God the *Soul of the World.* And it will be a hard matter to put a juſtifiable ſenſe upon this Word, according to the Uſe Sir *Iſaac Newton* makes of it.

28. Though the queſtion be about the Senſe put upon that Word by Sir *Iſaac Newton*, and not by *Goclenius*; yet I am not to blame for quoting the Philoſophical Dictionary of that Author, becauſe the deſign of Dictionaries is to ſhew the uſe of Words.

29. God perceives things in himſelf. Space is the Place of *things*, and not the Place of God's *Ideas*: Unleſs we look upon Space as ſomething that makes an Union between God and Things, in imitation of the imagined Union between the Soul and the Body; which would ſtill make God the *Soul of the World.*

30. And indeed the Author is much in the wrong, when he compares *God*'s Knowledge and Operation, with the Knowledge and Operation of *Souls.* The *Soul* knows things, becauſe God has put into it a * *Principle Repreſentative* of *Things without.* But *God* knows things, becauſe he *produces* them continually.

* *See Appendix*, N°. II.

31. The Soul does not *act* upon things, according to my Opinion, any otherwiſe than becauſe

modent *à leur desirs en vertu de l'* harmonie *que Dieu y a* préétablie.

32. *Mais ceux qui s' imaginent que les ames peuvent donner une Force nouvelle au Corps, & que Dieu en fait autant dans le monde pour redresser les defauts de sa machine ; approchent trop Dieu de l' ame, en donnant trop à l' ame & trop peu à Dieu.*

33. *Car il n' y a que Dieu qui puisse donner à la nature de* nouvelles Forces, *mais il ne le fait que* surnaturellement. *S' il avoit besoin de le faire dans le cours* naturel, *il auroit fait un ouvrage tres imparfait. Il ressembleroit dans le monde à ce que le vulgaire attribue à l' Ame dans le Corps.*

34. *En voulant soutenir cette Opinion vulgaire de l'* influence *de l' Ame sur le Corps, par l' Exemple de Dieu operant hors de lui ; on fait encore que Dieu ressembleroit trop à l' Ame du Monde. Cette affectation encore de blâmer mon Expression d'* Intelligentia Supramundana, *y semble pancher aussi.*

35. *Les images dont l' Ame est affectée immediatement, sont en elle même ; mais elles repondent à celles du Corps. La presence de l' ame est imparfaite, & ne peut*

etre

becauſe the Body adapts it ſelf to the Deſires of the Soul, by virtue of the * *Harmony*, which God has *pre-eſtabliſhed* between them. * *See Appendix, N° 5.*

32. But They who fancy that the Soul can give a *new Force* to the Body; and that God does the ſame in the World, in order to mend the Imperfections of his Machine; make God too much like the Soul, by aſcribing too much to the Soul, and too little to God.

33. For, none but God can give a *new Force* to Nature; And *he* does it only *ſupernaturally*. If there was need for him to do it in the *natural* courſe of things; he would have made a very imperfect Work. At That rate, *He* would be with reſpect to the *World*, what the *Soul*, in the vulgar notion, is with reſpect to the Body.

34. Thoſe who undertake to defend the vulgar Opinion concerning the Soul's *influence* over the Body, by inſtancing in God's operating on things External; make God ſtill too much like a Soul of the World. To which I add, that the Author's affecting to find Fault with the Words, *Intelligentia Supramundana*, ſeems alſo to incline that way.

35. The Images, with which the Soul is immediately affected, are within it ſelf; but they correſpond to thoſe of the Body. The preſence of the Soul is imperfect, and can

être expliquée que par cette correſpondance. Mais celle de Dieu eſt parfaite, & ſe manifeſte par ſon Operation.

36. *L' on ſuppoſe mal contre moy, que la preſence de l' Ame eſt liée avec ſon* influence *ſur le Corps ; puis qu' on ſait que je rejette cette* influence.

37. *Il eſt auſſi inexplicable que l' Ame ſoit* diffuſe par le Cerveau, *que de faire qu' elle ſoit diffuſe par le Corps tout entier : La difference n' eſt que du plus au moins.*

38. *Ceux qui s' imaginent que les* Forces actives *ſe* diminuent *d' elles mêmes dans le Monde, ne connoiſſent pas bien les principales loix de la nature, & la beauté des ouvrages de Dieu.*

39. *Comment prouveront ils, que ce* defaut *eſt une ſuite de la dependance des choſes ?*

40. *Ce defaut de nos Machines, qui fait qu' elles ont beſoin d' être redreſſées, vient de cela même, qu' elles ne ſont pas aſſez dependantes de l' Ouvrier. Ainſi la dependance de Dieu qui eſt dans la Nature, bien loin d' être cauſe de ce* defaut, *eſt pluſtoſt cauſe que ce defaut n'y eſt point, parcequ' elle eſt ſi dependante d' un Ouvrier trop parfait pour faire un Ouvrage qui ait beſoin d' être redreſſé. Il eſt vray que chaque Machine particuliere de la nature, eſt en quelque façon ſujette à être detracquée ;*

can only be explained by That Correſpondence. But the preſence of God is perfect, and manifeſted by his Operation.

36. The Author wrongly ſuppoſes againſt me, that the preſence of the Soul is connected with its *influence* over the Body; for he knows, I reject That *influence*.

37. The Soul's being *diffuſed through the Brain*, is no leſs inexplicable, than its being diffuſed through the whole Body. The Difference is only in *more* and *leſs*.

38. They who fancy that * *active Force* leſſens of it ſelf in the World, do not well underſtand the principal Laws of Nature, and the beauty of the Works of God?

*See above, the Note, on § 13, of Dr. Clarke's Third Reply.

39. How will they be able to prove, that this *Defect* is a conſequence of the dependence of things?

40. The imperfection of our Machines, which is the reaſon why they want to be mended, proceeds from this very thing, that they do not ſufficiently depend upon the Workman. And therefore the dependence of Nature upon God, far from being the cauſe of ſuch an imperfection, is rather the reaſon why there is no ſuch imperfection in Nature, becauſe it depends ſo much upon an Artiſt, who is too perfect to make a work that wants to be mended. 'Tis true that every particular Machine of Nature,

mais non pas l' Univers *tout entier, qui* ne ſauroit diminuer en Perfection.

41. *On dit que l'* Eſpace *ne depend point de la* Situation *des Corps. Je reponds qu' il eſt vray qu' il ne depend point d' une* telle *ou* telle *Situation des Corps ; mais il eſt cet* Ordre *qui fait que les Corps ſont* Situables, *& par lequel ils ont une Situation entre eux en exiſtant enſemble, comme le* temps *eſt cet* Ordre *par rapport à leur poſition ſucceſſive. Mais s' il n' y avoit point de Creatures, l' Eſpace & le Temps ne ſeroient que dans les Idées de Dieu.*

42. *Il ſemble qu' on avoue icy que l' idée qu' on ſe fait du Miracle n' eſt pas celle qu' en ont* communement *les Theologiens & les Philoſophes. Il me ſuffit donc, que mes Adverſaires ſont obligés de recourir à ce qu' on appelle* Miracle *dans l'* uſage receu.

43. *J' ay peur qu' en voulant changer le* ſens receu *du Miracle, on ne tombe dans un ſentiment incommode. La nature du Miracle ne conſiſte nullement dans l'* uſualité *&* inuſualité ; *autrement les* Monſtres *ſeroient des Miracles.*

44. *Il y a des* Miracles *d' une* ſorte inferieure, *qu' un* Ange *peut produire ; car il peut, par Exemple, faire qu' un homme aille ſur l' eau ſans enfoncer. Mais il y a des*

Nature, is, in ſome meaſure, liable to be diſordered; but not the whole *Univerſe*, which *cannot diminiſh in Perfection.*

41. The Author contends, that *Space* does not depend upon the *Situation* of *Bodies.* I anſwer: 'Tis true, it does not depend upon *ſuch* or *ſuch* a ſituation of Bodies; but it is *That Order*, which renders Bodies capable of being ſituated, and by which they have a Situation among themſelves when they *exiſt together*; as *Time* is *That Order*, with reſpect to their *Succeſſive* poſition. But if there were no Creatures, Space and Time would be only in the Ideas of God.

42. The Author ſeems to acknowledge here, that his Notion of a Miracle is not the ſame with that which Divines and Philoſophers *uſually* have. It is therefore ſufficient for my purpoſe, that my Adverſaries are obliged to have recourſe to what is *commonly called* a Miracle.

43. I am afraid the Author, by altering the Senſe *commonly put* upon the Word *Miracle*, will fall into an inconvenient Opinion. The nature of a Miracle does not at all conſiſt in *Uſualneſs* or *Unuſualneſs*; For then *Monſters* would be *Miracles.*

44. There are *Miracles* of an *inferior* ſort, which an *Angel* can Work. He can, for inſtance, make a Man Walk upon the Water without ſinking. But there are Mi-

Miracles reſervés à Dieu, & qui ſurpaſſent toutes les Forces naturelles ; tel eſt celuy de créer ou d' annihiler.

45. *Il eſt ſurnaturel auſſi, que les Corps s'* attirent *de loin ſans aucun Moyen ; & qu' un Corps aille en rond, ſans s' écarter par la tangente, quoyque rien ne l' empéchât de s' écarter ainſi. Car ces effects ne ſont point explicables par les natures des choſes.*

46. *Pourquoy la Motion des animaux ne ſeroit elle point explicable par les Forces* naturelles ? *Il eſt vray que le* commencement *des animaux eſt auſſi inexplicable par leur Moyen, que le commencement du Monde.*

P. S.

TOUS ceux qui ſont pour le Vuide, *ſe laiſſent plus mener par l' Imagination que par la raiſon. Quand j' étois jeune garçon, je donnay auſſi dans le vuide & dans les Atomes ; mais la raiſon me ramena. L' Imagination étoit riante. On borne là ſes recherches ; on fixe la Meditation comme avec un clou ; on croit avoir trouvé les premiers Elemens, un* non plus ultra. *Nous voudrions que la Nature n' allât pas plus loin ; qu' elle fût finie, comme notre Eſprit : Mais ce n' eſt point connoitre la grandeur, & la Majeſté*

racles, which none but God can work; they exceeding all natural Powers. Of which kind, are *Creating* and *Annihilating*.

45. 'Tis alſo a ſupernatural thing, that Bodies ſhould *attract* one another at a diſtance, without any intermediate Means; and that a Body ſhould move round, without receding in the Tangent, though nothing hinder it from ſo receding. For theſe Effects cannot be explained by the Nature of things.

46. Why ſhould it be impoſſible to explain the Motion of Animals by *Natural* Forces? Tho' indeed, the *Beginning* of Animals is no leſs inexplicable by natural Forces, than the Beginning of the World.

P. S.

ALL thoſe who maintain a *Vacuum*, are more influenced by Imagination than by Reaſon. When I was a young Man, *I* alſo gave into the Notion of a *Vacuum* and *Atoms*; but Reaſon brought me into the right way. It was a pleaſing Imagination. Men carry their Inquiries no farther than thoſe two things: They (as it were) nail down their Thoughts to them: They fancy, they have found out the firſt Elements of Things, a *non plus ultra*. We would have Nature to go no farther; and

Majeſté de l' Auteur des choſes. Le moindre Corpuſcule eſt actuellement ſubdiviſé à l' infini, & contient un Monde de nouvelles Creatures, dont l' Univers manqueroit, ſi ce Corpuſcule étoit un Atome, c' eſt à dire, un corps tout d' une piece ſans Subdiviſion. Tout de même, vouloir du Vuide *dans la Nature, c' eſt attribuer à Dieu une Production tres imparfaite; c' eſt violer le grand Principe de la neceſſité d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante, *que bien des gens ont eu dans la bouche; mais, dont ils n' ont point connu la force, comme j' ay montré dernierement, en faiſant voir par ce Principe que l' Eſpace n' eſt qu' un Ordre des choſes, comme le Temps, & nullement un Eſtre abſolu. Sans parler de pluſieurs autres raiſons contre le* Vuide *& les* Atomes; *en voicy celles que je prends de la Perfection de Dieu, & de la raiſon ſuffiſante. Je poſe que toute perfection que Dieu a pû mettre dans les choſes ſans déroger aux autres Perfections qui y ſont, y a été miſe. Or figurons nous un Eſpace entierement* vuide, *Dieu y pouvoit mettre quelque matiere ſans déroger en rien à toutes les autres choſes: Donc il l' y a miſe: Donc il n' y a point d' Eſpace entierement* vuide: *Donc tout eſt* plein. *Le même raiſonnement prouve qu' il n' y a point de Corpuſcule, qui ne ſoit ſubdiviſé. Voicy encore l' autre raiſonnement pris de la neceſſité d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante. *Il n' eſt* point poſſible *qu' il y ait*

to be finite, as our Minds are: But this is being ignorant of the greatneſs and Majeſty of the Author of things. The leaſt Corpuſcle is actually ſubdivided *in infinitum*, and contains a World of other Creatures, which would be wanting in the Univerſe, if That Corpuſcle was an *Atom*, that is, a Body of one entire piece without Subdiviſion. In like manner, to admit a *Vacuum* in Nature, is aſcribing to God a very imperfect Work: 'Tis violating the grand Principle of the neceſſity of a *ſufficient Reaſon*; which many have talked of, without underſtanding its true meaning; as I have lately ſhown, in proving, by That Principle, that *Space* is only an *Order* of things, as *Time* alſo is, and not at all an abſolute Being. To omit many other Arguments againſt a *Vacuum* and *Atoms*, I ſhall here mention thoſe which I ground upon *God's Perfection*, and upon the *neceſſity of a ſufficient Reaſon.* I lay it down as a Principle, that every Perfection, which God * *could* impart to things without derogating from their other Perfections, has actually been imparted to them. Now, let us fancy a *Space* wholly *empty.* God * *could* have placed ſome Matter in it, without derogating in any reſpect from all other things:

* *See* Dr. Clarke's *Third Reply*, § 9; *and his Fourth Reply*, § 22.

un Principe de determiner la Proportion de la matiere, ou du rempli au vuide, ou du vuide au plein. On dira peut être que l' un doit être égal à l' autre ; Mais comme la matiere eſt plus parfaite que le vuide, la Raiſon veut qu' on obſerve la Proportion Geometrique, & qu' il y ait d' autant plus de plein, qu' il merite d' être preferé. Mais ainſi il n' y aura point de vuide *du tout ; car la Perfection de la matiere eſt à celle du vuide, comme quelque choſe à rien. Il en eſt de méme des Atomes : Quelle raiſon peut on aſſigner de borner la nature dans le progrés de la Subdiviſion ? Fictions purement Arbitraires, & indignes de la vraye Philoſophie. Les raiſons qu' on allegue pour le* vuide, *ne ſont que des Sophiſmes.*

Therefore he hath actually placed ſome Matter in That Space: Therefore, there is no Space wholly *Empty:* Therefore All is full. The ſame Argument proves that there is no Corpuſcle, but what is Subdivided. I ſhall add another Argument, grounded upon the neceſſity of a *ſufficient Reaſon.* 'Tis ‖ *impoſſible* there ſhould be any Principle to determine What Proportion of Matter there ought to be, out of all the poſſible degrees from a *Plenum* to a *Vacuum*, or from a *Vacuum* to a *Plenum.* Perhaps it will be ſaid, that the one ſhould be equal to the other: But, becauſe Matter is more perfect than a *Vacuum*, Reaſon requires that a Geometrical Proportion ſhould be obſerved, and that there ſhould be ‖ as much more Matter than *Vacuum*, as the former deſerves to have the preference before the latter. But then there muſt be *No Vacuum* at all; for the Perfection of Matter is to that of a *Vacuum*, as ‖ *Something* to *Nothing.* And the caſe is the ſame with *Atoms*: What reaſon can any one aſſign for *confining* Nature in the Progreſſion of Subdiviſion? Theſe are Fictions merely Arbitrary, and unworthy of true Philoſophy. The reaſons alledged for a *Vacuum*, are mere Sophiſms.

‖ *See Dr.* Clarke's *Third Reply*, § 9. *and his Fourth Reply*, § 22.

Quatriéme Réplique de Mr. CLARKE.

1, & 2. *LA Doctrine que l' on trouve ici, conduit à la* Neceſſité *& à la* Fatalité, *en ſuppoſant que les* Motifs *ont le même rapport à la* Volonté d' un Agent Intelligent, *que* * *les* Poids *à* † *une* Balance; *de ſorte que quand* deux choſes *ſont abſolument indifferentes, un Agent Intelligent ne* || *peut choiſir* l' une ou l' autre, comme *une Balance ne peut ſe mouvoir lors que les Poids ſont égaux des deux cotez. Mais voici en quoi conſiſte la Difference. Une* Balance *n' eſt pas un* Agent: *elle eſt tout-à-fait* Paſſive, *& les Poids* agiſſent ſur *elle*; *de ſorte que quand les* Poids *ſont égaux, il n' y a* rien *qui la* puiſſe mouvoir. *Mais les* Etres Intelligens *ſont des* Agents; *ils ne ſont point ſimplement* paſſifs, *& les* Motifs *n'* agiſſent *pas ſur eux, comme les* Poids *agiſſent ſur une* Balance: *Ils ont des* Forces Actives, *& ils* agiſſent, *quelque fois par de* puiſſans *Motifs, quelque fois par des Motifs* foibles, *& quelque fois lors que les choſes ſont* abſolument indifferentes. *Dans ce dernier cas, il peut y avoir de* très-bonnes raiſons pour agir, *quoique deux ou pluſieurs* manieres d' agir

* Voïez ci-deſſus le Second Ecrit de Mr. *Leibnitz*, § 1.

† Voïez l'Appendice, N°3.

|| Voyez l'Appendice, N°4.

Dr. CLARKE's *Fourth Reply.*

1, *and* 2. THIS Notion leads to univerſal *Neceſſity and Fate*, by ſuppoſing that *Motives* have the ſame relation to the *Will of an Intelligent Agent*, as * *Weights* have to † a *Balance*; ſo that of *two* things abſolutely indifferent, an Intelligent Agent can || no more chooſe *Either*, than a Balance can move it ſelf when the Weights on both ſides are Equal. But the Difference lies here. A *Balance* is no *Agent*, but is merely *Paſſive* and *acted upon* by the *Weights*; ſo that, when the *Weights* are equal, there is *nothing* to *move* it. But *Intelligent Beings* are *Agents*; not *paſſive*, in being *moved* by *Motives*, as a *Balance* is by *Weights*; but they have *Active Powers* and do *move Themſelves*, ſometimes upon the View of *ſtrong* Motives, ſometimes upon *weak* ones, and ſometimes where things are *abſolutely indifferent*. In which *latter caſe*, there may be *very good reaſon* to *act*, though two or more *Ways* of acting may be abſolutely *indifferent*. This learned Writer always *ſuppoſes* the contrary, as a *Principle*; but gives no *Proof* of it, either from

* *See above, Mr.* Leibnitz's *Second Paper*, § 1.

† *See Appendix*, N°. 3.

|| *See Appendix*, N° 4.

d' agir *puiſſent être abſolument* indifferentes. *Le ſçavant Auteur ſuppoſe toûjours le contraire, comme un* Principe ; *mais il n' en donne aucune* Preuve *tirée de la* Nature des Choſes, *ou des* Perfections de Dieu.

3, & 4. *Si le raiſonnement que l' on trouve ici, étoit bien fondé, il prouveroit que Dieu* n' a *créé aucune* Matiere, & *même qu' il eſt* * impoſſible qu' il en puiſſe créer. *Car les* parties *de Matiere, quelle qu' elle ſoit, qui ſont* parfaitement ſolides, *ſont auſſi parfaitement ſemblables, pourvû qu' elles ayent des Figures & des Dimenſions égales ; ce que l' on peut toûjours ſuppoſer, comme une choſe poſſible. Ces parties de Matiere pourroient donc occuper également bien un autre lieu que celui qu' elles occupent ; & par conſéquent il étoit impoſſible, ſelon le Raiſonnement du ſçavant Auteur, que Dieu les plaçât où il les a actuellement placées, parce qu' il auroit pû avec la même facilité les placer à rebours. Il eſt vrai qu' on ne ſçauroit voir* deux Feuilles, *ni peut-être* deux Goutes d'eau, *parfaitement ſemblables ; parce que ce ſont des* Corps fort compoſez. *Mais il n' en eſt pas ainſi des parties de la Matiere* ſimple & ſolide. *Et même dans les* Compoſez, *il n' eſt pas impoſſible que Dieu faſſe* deux Goutes d'eau *tout-à-fait ſemblables ; & nonobſtant cette parfaite reſſemblance, elles ne pourroient pas devenir une* ſeule & même Goute d'eau.

* Voïez l'Appendice, N° 9, and 4.

J' ajoute

from the *Nature of Things*, or the *Perfections of God.*

3, *and* 4. This Argument, if it was True, would prove that God neither *has created*, nor * *can poſſibly create* any *Matter at all.* For the *perfectly ſolid parts* of *all* Matter, if you take them of equal Figure and Dimenſions (which is always *poſſible* in Suppoſition,) are exactly alike; and therefore it would be perfectly indifferent if they were tranſpoſed in Place; and conſequently it was *impoſſible* (according to this Learned Author's Argument,) for God to place them in thoſe Places wherein he did actually place them at the Creation, becauſe he might as eaſily have tranſpoſed their Situation. 'Tis very true, that *no two Leaves*, and perhaps *no two drops of Water* are exactly alike; becauſe they are *Bodies very much compounded.* But the caſe is very different in the parts of *ſimple ſolid Matter.* And even in *Compounds*, there is no impoſſibility for God to make *two drops of Water* exactly alike. And if he *ſhould* make them *exactly alike*, yet they would never the more become *one and the ſame* drop of Water, becauſe they were *alike.* Nor would the *Place* of the *One*, be the *Place* of the *Other*; though it was abſolutely indifferent, *which* was placed in *which place.*

* *See Appendix, N°. 9, and 4.*

The

J' ajoute que le Lieu *de l'* une *de ces Goutes ne ſeroit pas le* Lieu *de l'* autre, *quoique leur Situation fût une choſe abſolument indifferente. Le même Raiſonnement a lieu auſſi par rapport à la prémiere* Détermination *du Mouvement d' un certain coté, ou du coté oppoſé.*

5, & 6. *Quoique* deux choſes *ſoient* parfaitement ſemblables, *elles ne ceſſent pas d' être* deux choſes. *Les parties du* Temps *ſont auſſi parfaitement ſemblables, que celles de l'* Eſpace ; *& cependant* deux Inſtants *ne ſont pas le* même Inſtant : *Ce ne ſont pas non plus* deux noms d' un ſeul & même Inſtant. *Si Dieu n' avoit créé le Monde que* dans ce moment, *il n' auroit pas été créé dans le temps qu' il l' a été. Et ſi Dieu* a donné, (*ou s' il* peut *donner*) *une* Etendue bornée *à l' Univers, il s' enſuit que l' Univers doit être naturellement* capable de mouvement ; *Car ce qui eſt borné, ne peut être* immobile. *Il paroit donc par ce que je viens de dire, que ceux qui ſoûtiennent que Dieu ne pouvoit pas créer le Monde dans un autre* Temps, *ou dans un autre* Lieu ; *font la Matiere néceſſairement infinie & éternelle, & réduiſent tout à la* Neceſſité *& au* Deſtin.

7. *Si l' Univers a une Etendue bornée, l'* Eſpace qui eſt au delà du Monde, *n' eſt point* imaginaire, *mais* réel. *Les Eſpaces vuides dans le Monde même ne ſont pas imagi-*

The ſame reaſoning holds likewiſe concerning the original *determination* of *Motion*, this way or the contrary way.

5. and 6. *Two things*, by being *exactly alike*, do not ceaſe to be *Two*. The parts of *Time*, are as exactly *like* to each other, as thoſe of *Space*: Yet *two Points* of *Time*, are not the *ſame Point* of Time, nor are they *two Names of only the ſame Point of Time*. Had God created the World *but This Moment*, it would not have been created at the Time it was created. And if God *has made* (or *can* make) Matter *Finite* in Dimenſions, the *material Univerſe* muſt conſequently be in its Nature *Moveable*; For nothing that is finite, is *immoveable*. To ſay therefore that God could not have altered the *Time* or *Place* of the exiſtence of Matter, is making Matter to be neceſſarily Infinite and Eternal, and reducing all things to *Neceſſity* and *Fate*.

7. *Extra-mundane Space*, (if the material World be *Finite* in its Dimenſions,) is not *imaginary*, but *real*. Nor are void Spaces *in* the World, merely imaginary. In an

* *exhauſted*

imaginaires. Quoi qu' il y ait des rayons de Lumiere, & peut-être quelque autre matiere en trés-petite quantité, dans un * Recipient ; *le* défaut de reſiſtance *fait voir clairement, que la* plus grande partie *de cet Eſpace eſt deſtituée de Matiere. Car la* Subtilité *de la matiere ne peut être la cauſe du* défaut de Reſiſtance. *Le* Mercure *eſt compoſé de parties, qui ne ſont pas moins Subtiles & Fluides que celles de l' Eau ; & cependant il fait plus de* dix fois *autant de Reſiſtance. Cette Reſiſtance vient donc de la* Quantité, *& non de la* Groſſiereté *de la Matiere.*

8. *L' Eſpace deſtitué de Corps, eſt une Proprieté d' une Subſtance immaterielle. L' Eſpace n' eſt pas* borné *par les Corps ; mais il exiſte également* dans *les Corps & hors des Corps. L' Eſpace n' eſt pas* renfermé *entre les Corps ; Mais les Corps, étant dans l' Eſpace immenſe, ſont eux-mémes bornez par leurs propres Dimenſions.*

9. *L'* Eſpace vuide *n' eſt pas un* Attribut ſans Sujet ; *car, par cet* Eſpace *nous n' entendons pas un* Eſpace où il n' y a rien, *mais un Eſpace* ſans Corps. *Dieu eſt certainement preſent dans tout l'Eſpace vuide ; & peut-être qu' il y a auſſi dans cet Eſpace*

* Un Paſſage de la Lettre de Mr. *Leibnitz*, qui ſervoit d' Envelope à ſon Ecrit, a donné lieu à ce que l' on dit ici.

pluſieurs

* *exhauſted Receiver*, though Rays of Light, and perhaps ſome Other Matter, be There in an exceeding ſmall Quantity; yet the *want of Reſiſtence* plainly ſhows, that the *greateſt part* of That Space is void of Matter. For *Subtleneſs* or *Fineneſs* of Matter, cannot be the cauſe of *want of Reſiſtence*. *Quick-ſilver* is as *ſubtle*, and conſiſts of as *fine* parts and as *fluid*, as *Water*; and yet makes more than *ten times* the reſiſtence: Which reſiſtence ariſes therefore from the *Quantity*, and not from the *Groſſneſs* of the Matter.

8. *Space* void of Body, is the Property of an *incorporeal* Subſtance. Space is not *Bounded* by *Bodies*, but exiſts equally *within* and *without* Bodies. *Space* is not *incloſed between* Bodies; but Bodies, exiſting in unbounded Space, are, *themſelves only*, terminated by their own Dimenſions.

9. Void Space, is not an *Attribute without a Subject*; becauſe, by *void Space*, we never mean *Space void of every thing*, but void of *Body* only. In All void *Space*, *God* is *certainly* preſent, and *poſſibly* many *other* Subſtances which are not Matter;

* *This was occaſioned by a Paſſage in the Private Letter, wherein Mr.* Leibnitz's *Paper came incloſed.*

being

pluſieurs autres Subſtances, qui ne ſont pas materielles, & qui par conſéquent ne peuvent être tangibles, *ni apperçues par aucun de nos ſens.*

10. *L'* Eſpace *n' eſt pas une* Subſtance, *mais un* Attribut ; *& ſi c' eſt un Attribut d' un Etre néceſſaire, il doit (comme tous les autres Attributs d' un Etre néceſſaire) exiſter* plus néceſſairement, *que les* Subſtances mêmes, *qui ne ſont pas* néceſſaires. *L' Eſpace eſt* immenſe, immuable, *&* éternel ; *& l' on doit dire la même choſe de la* Durée. *Mais il ne s' enſuit pas de là, qu' il y ait rien d' éternel* hors de Dieu. *Car l'* Eſpace *& la* Durée *ne ſont pas* hors de Dieu : *Ce ſont* * *des* ſuites immédiates *&* néceſſaires *de ſon Exiſtence, ſans leſquelles*

* *Deus æternus eſt*, &c. *C' eſt-à dire* : Dieu eſt Eternel & Infini, il eſt Tout-puiſſant, & rien n' échape à ſa connoiſſance ; je veux dire, que ſa durée n' a ni commencement, ni fin ; & que ſa Preſence eſt immenſe, & n' a point des bornes : Qu' il régle toutes les choſes qui exiſtent, & qu' il connoit tout ce qu' il eſt poſſible de connoitre. Il n' eſt pas l' *Eternité* ou l' *Infinité*, mais il eſt *Eternel* & *Infini*. Il n' eſt pas la *Durée*, ou l' *Eſpace* ; mais il *continue d' exiſter*, & il *eſt preſent*. Il exiſte *toujours*, & il eſt preſent *par tout* ; & en exiſtant toûjours & par tout, il conſtitue la *Durée* & l' *Eſpace*, l' Eternité & l' Infinité. Certainement, puiſque chaque particule de l' Eſpace exiſte *toûjours*, & que chaque Moment indiviſible de la Durée eſt *par tout*, on ne peut pas dire du Maitre & du Seigneur de toutes choſes, qu' il n' exiſte *ni en aucun temps, ni en aucun lieu*. Il eſt preſent par tout, non ſeulement *Virtuellement*,

being neither *Tangible*, nor Objects of Any of *Our* Senſes.

10. *Space* is not a *Subſtance*, but a *Property*; And if it be a *Property* of That which is neceſſary, it will conſequently (as all *other* Properties of That which is neceſſary muſt do,) exiſt *more neceſſarily*, (though it be not *itſelf* a Subſtance,) than thoſe *Subſtances Themſelves* which are *not neceſſary*. Space is *immenſe*, and *immutable*, and *eternal*; and ſo alſo is *Duration*. Yet it does not at all from hence follow, that any thing is eternal *hors de Dieu*. For *Space* and *Duration* are not *hors de Dieu*, but * are *cauſed by*, and are *immediate and neceſſary*

* Deus *Æternus* eſt & *Infinitus*, *Omnipotens* & *Omniſciens*; id eſt, durat ab æterno in æternum, & adeſt ab infinito in infinitum; omnia regit & omnia cognoſcit, quæ fiunt aut fieri poſſunt. Non eſt *Æternitas* vel *Infinitas*, ſed *Æternus* & *Infinitus*; non eſt *Duratio* vel *Spatium*, ſed *durat* & *adeſt*. Durat *Semper*, & Adeſt *Ubique*; & exiſtendo ſemper & ubique, *Durationem* & *Spatium*, æternitatem & infinitatem conſtituit. Cùm unaquæq; Spatij particula ſit *ſemper*, & unumquodq; Durationis indiviſibile momentum *Ubique*; certè rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus, non erit *nunquam nuſquam*. Omnipræſens eſt, non per *Virtutem* ſolam, ſed etiam per *Subſtantiam*: Nam Virtus ſine Subſtantiâ ſubſiſtere non poteſt. *i. e. God is* Eternal *and* Infinite, Omnipotent *and* Omniſcient: *That is, he endures from Everlaſting to Everlaſting, and is preſent from Infinity to Infinity: He governs all things which are, and knows all things*

quelles il ne ſeroit point Eternel & preſent par tout.

11, & 12. *Les* Infinis *ne ſont compoſez de* Finis, *que comme les* Finis *ſont compoſez d'* Infiniteſimes. *J'ai fait voir ci-deſſus,* (§ 3. de ma 3 Réplique,) *en quel ſens on peut dire que l'* Eſpace *a des parties, ou qu'il n'en a pas. Les* parties, *dans le ſens que l'on donne à ce mot lors qu'on l'applique aux Corps, ſont* ſeparables, compoſées, deſunies, indépendantes les unes des autres, & capables de mouvement. *Mais quoique l'Imagination puiſſe en quelque maniere concevoir des parties dans l'Eſpace infini; cependant, comme ces parties, improprement ainſi dites, ſont* eſſentiellement immobiles & inſeparables *les unes des autres,* (*Voïez ci-deſſus,* Réplique II, § 4. & Réplique III, § 3.) *il s'enſuit que cet Eſpace eſt* eſſentiellement *ſimple,* & abſolument indiviſible.

Virtuellement, mais encore *Subſtantiellement* : Car la *puiſſance* [virtus] ne ſçauroit ſubſiſter ſans une *Subſtance. Newtoni Principia, Schol. generale ſub finem.*

ſary Conſequences of His Exiſtence. And *without* them, his *Eternity* and *Ubiquity* [or *Omnipreſence*] would be taken away.

11, *and* 12. *Infinites* are compoſed of *Finites*, in no other ſenſe, than as *Finites* are compoſed of *infiniteſimals*. In what ſenſe Space *has* or *has not Parts*, has been explained before, *Reply* 3*d*, § 3. *Parts*, in the *corporeal* Senſe of the Word, are *ſeparable, compounded, ununited, independent on, and moveable from, each other*: But infinite Space, though it may by Us be *partially apprehended*, that is, may in our Imagination be conceived as compoſed of *Parts*; yet Thoſe *Parts* (*improperly* ſo called) being *eſſentially indiſcerpible* and *immoveable* from each other, and not *partable* without an expreſs Contradiction in Terms, [*See above*, *Reply* II, § 4. and *Reply* III, § 3;] *Space* conſequently is in itſelf *eſſentially One*, and *abſolutely indiviſible*.

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things which are poſſible to be known. He is not Eternity *or* Infinity, *but* Eternal *and* Infinite. *He is not* Duration, *or* Space; *but he* endures, *and* is Preſent. *He endures* always, *and is Preſent* every where; *and, by exiſting always and every where, conſtitutes* Duration *and* Space, *Eternity and Infinity. Seeing every particle of Space is* Always, *and every indiviſible Moment of Duration is* every where; *truely it cannot be ſaid of the Maker and Lord of all things, that he is* [at no Time, *and* in no Place,] Never *and* No-where. *He is Omnipreſent, not only* Virtually, *but* Subſtantially: *For* Power *cannot ſubſiſt without a* Subſtance. Newtoni Principia, Schol. generale ſub finem.

13. *Si le Monde a une Etendue* bornée, i *peut être* mis en mouvement *par la puiſſanc de Dieu*; *& par conſequent l' Argument qu je fonde ſur cette* Mobilité, *eſt une preuv concluante. Quoique* deux Lieux *ſoient* pa faitement ſemblables, *ils ne ſont pas* un ſeu & même Lieu. *Le* Mouvement *ou le* Re pos *de l' Univers, n' eſt pas non plus le* même Etat; *comme le* Mouvement *ou* Repos *d' un* Vaiſſeau, *n' eſt pas le* mêm Etat, *parce qu' un homme renfermé da la Cabane ne ſçauroit s' appercevoir ſi Vaiſſeau fait voile ou non, pendant qu ſon mouvement eſt uniforme. Quoique homme ne s' apperçoive pas du mouveme du Vaiſſeau, ce mouvement ne laiſſe pas être un* Etat réel & different, *& il produ des* Effets réels & differens; *& s' il étoit a* rêté tout d' un coup, *il auroit d'* autres e fets réels. *Il en ſeroit de même d' un mo vement imperceptible de l'* Univers. *On a point répondu à cet Argument; ſur lequ Mr. le Chevalier* Newton *inſiſte beauco dans ſes* Principes Mathematiques. *Apr avoir conſideré (dans ſa Definition* 8.) Proprietez, *les* Cauſes, *& les* Effets *Mouvement; cette conſideration lui ſer faire voir la difference qu' il y a entre* mouvement réel, *ou le tranſport d' un Co qui paſſe d' une partie de l' Eſpace d une autre; & le* Mouvement rélatif, *qui eſt qu' un changement de l'* Ordre *ou*

* Voïez l' Appendice, N° 10.

13. If the World be *Finite* in Dimenſions, it is *moveable* by the Power of God; and therefore my Argument drawn from that *moveableneſs*, is concluſive. Two *places*, though *exactly alike*, are not the *ſame place*. Nor is the *Motion* or *Reſt* of the Univerſe, the * *ſame State*; any more than the *Motion* or *Reſt* of a *Ship*, is the *ſame State*, becauſe a Man ſhut up in the Cabbin cannot perceive whether the Ship ſails or not, ſo long as it moves uniformly. The *Motion* of the *Ship*, though the Man perceives it not, is a *real different State*, and has *real different Effects*; and, upon a *ſudden ſtop*, it would have *Other real Effects*; And ſo likewiſe would an indiſcernable Motion of the *Univerſe*. To This Argument, no Anſwer has ever been given. It is largely inſiſted on by Sir *Iſaac Newton* in his *Mathematical Principles*, (*Definit.* 8.) where, from the Conſideration of the *Properties*, *Cauſes*, and *Effects* of Motion, he ſhows the difference between *real Motion*, or a Bodie's being carried from one part of Space to another; and *relative Motion*, which is merely a change of the *Order* or *Situation* of Bodies with *reſpect to each other*. This Argument is a Mathematical one; ſhowing, from *real Effects*, that there may be *real Motion* where there is *none relative*; and *relative Motion*, where there is

* *See Appendix*, N° 10.

la Situation *des Corps entre eux. C' eſt un Argument Mathematique, qui prouve par des* Effets réels, *qu' il peut y avoir un* mouvement réel, *où il n' y en a point de* rélatif; *& qu' il peut y avoir un* mouvement rélatif, *où il n' y en a point de* réel : *C' eſt, dis-je, un Argument Mathematique, auquel on ne répond pas, quand on ſe contente d' aſſurer le contraire.*

14. *La* réalité de l' Eſpace *n' eſt pas une ſimple* Suppoſition : *Elle a été prouvée par les Arguments rapportez ci-deſſus, auxquels on n' a point répondu. L' Auteur n' a pas répondu non plus à un autre Argument, ſçavoir, que l'* Eſpace *& le* Temps *ſont des* Quantitez ; *ce qu' on ne peut dire de la* Situation *& de l'* Ordre.

15. *Il n' étoit pas impoſſible que Dieu fît le Monde* plûtôt *ou* plus tard, *qu' il ne l' a fait. Il n' eſt pas impoſſible non plus, qu' il le détruiſe* plûtôt *ou* plus tard, *qu' il ne ſera actuellement détruit. Quant à la doctrine de l'* Eternité du Monde ; *ceux qui ſuppoſent que la* Matiere *& l'* Eſpace *ſont la même choſe, doivent ſuppoſer que le Monde eſt non ſeulement* infini *&* éternel, *mais encore que ſon immenſité & ſon éternité ſont* néceſſaires, *& même auſſi néceſſaires que l'* Eſpace *& la* Durée, *qui ne dépendent pas de la* Volonté *de Dieu, mais de ſon* * Exiſtence. *Au contraire, ceux qui croyent que Dieu a créé la Matiere en telle* quantité, *en tel* temps, *& en tels* Eſpaces *qu' il*

* Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur § 10.

none real: And is not to be anſwered, by barely *aſſerting* the contrary.

14. The *reality of Space* is not a *Suppoſition*, but is *proved* by the fore-going Arguments, to which no Anſwer has been given. Nor is any Anſwer given to That other Argument, that *Space* and *Time* are *Quantities*, which *Situation* and *Order* are *not*.

15. It was *no impoſſibility* for God to make the World *ſooner* or *later* than he did: Nor is it at all *impoſſible* for him to deſtroy it *ſooner* or *later* than it ſhall actually be deſtroyed. As to the Notion of the *World*'s *Eternity*; They who ſuppoſe *Matter* and *Space* to be the ſame, *muſt* indeed ſuppoſe the World to be not only *Infinite* and *Eternal*, but *neceſſarily* ſo; even as neceſſarily as *Space* and *Duration*, which depend not on the *Will*, but on the * *Exiſtence* of God. But they who believe that God created Matter in what *Quantity*, and at what particular *Time*, and in what particular *Spaces* he *pleaſed*, are here under no difficulty. For the Wiſdom of God may have *very good reaſons* for creating *This World*,

*See above, the Note on § 10.

qu' il lui a plû, ne ſe trouvent embaraſſez d' aucune difficulté. Car la Sageſſe de Dieu peut avoir eu de très-bonnes raiſons *pour créer* Ce Monde *dans un* certain temps : *elle peut avoir fait* d' autres choſes *avant que* Ce Monde *fût créé* ; *& elle peut faire* d' autres choſes *aprez que* Ce Monde *ſera détruit.*

16, *&* 17. *J' ai prouvé ci-deſſus, (Voïez ma Troiſiéme Réplique* § 4, *& la* 13, *de cette Quatriéme Réplique,) que l'* Eſpace *& le* Temps *ne ſont pas l'* Ordre des choſes, *mais des* Quantitez *réelles* ; *ce qu' on ne peut dire de l' Ordre & de la Situation. Le ſçavant Auteur n' a pas encore répondu à ces Preuves* ; *&, à moins qu' il n' y réponde, ce qu' il dit, eſt une* Contradiction, *comme il l' avouë lui-même ici.*

18. *L' Uniformité de* toutes *les parties de l' Eſpace, ne prouve pas que Dieu ne puiſſe agir dans* aucune *partie de l' Eſpace, de la maniere qu' il le veut. Dieu peut avoir de* bonnes raiſons *pour créer des* Etres finis ; *& des Etres finis ne peuvent exiſter qu' en des* Lieux particuliers. *Et comme* tous les Lieux *ſont originairement ſemblables, (quand même le* Lieu *ne ſeroit que la Situation des Corps* ;) *ſi Dieu place* un Cube de matiere *derriere* un autre Cube egal de matiere, *plûtôt qu' à rebours, ce choix n' eſt pas indigne des Perfections de Dieu, quoique* ces deux Situations *ſoient* parfaitement ſemblables ; *parce qu' il peut*

y avoir

at *That particular Time* he did; and may have made *other kinds of things* Before this *material World* began, and may make *other kinds of things* After *This World* is deſtroyed.

16. *and* 17. That *Space* and *Time* are not the *mere Order* of things, but real *Quantities*, (which Order and Situation are not;) has been proved *above*, (See *Third Reply*, § 4; and in *This Paper*, § 13,) and no Anſwer yet given to thoſe Proofs. And till an Anſwer be given to thoſe Proofs, this learned Author's aſſertion is (by *his own Confeſſion* in this place) a *Contradiction*.

18. The *Uniformity* of *all* the parts of Space, is no Argument againſt God's acting in *Any* part, after what manner he pleaſes. God may have *good reaſons* to create *finite* Beings, and Finite Beings can be but in *particular Places*. And, *all* places being originally alike, (even though *Place* were nothing elſe but the Situation of Bodies;) God's placing *one cube of matter* behind *another equal cube of matter*, rather than the *other* behind *That*; is a *choice* no way unworthy of the Perfections of God, though *Both theſe Situations* be *perfectly equal*: Becauſe there may be *very good reaſons* why *Both the Cubes* ſhould exiſt, and

y avoir de trés-bonnes raiſons *pour l' exiſtence de* ces deux Cubes, *& qu' ils ne ſçauroient exiſter que dans* l' une *ou* l' autre *de ces deux Situations également raiſonnables. Le* hazard *d'* Epicure *n' eſt pas un* Choix, *mais une* Néceſſité aveugle.

19. *Si l' Argument que l' on trouve ici, prouve quelque choſe, il prouve, (comme je l' ai déja dit ci-deſſus* § 3.) *que Dieu* n' a * créé, *& même qu' il* ne peut créer *aucune* matiere ; *parce que la* Situation *des parties égales & ſimilaires de la Matiere, étoit neceſſairement* indifferente *dés le commencement ; auſſi bien que la prémiere* Détermination *de leur* mouvement, *d' un certain coté, ou du coté oppoſé.*

* Voïez l' Appendice, N° 4. & 9.

20. *Je ne comprends point ce que l' Auteur veut prouver ici, par rapport au ſujet dont il s' agit.*

21. *Dire que* Dieu ne peut donner des bornes à la Quantité de la Matiere, *c' eſt avancer une choſe d' une trop grande Importance, pour l' admettre* ſans preuve. *Et ſi Dieu ne peut non plus donner des bornes à la* Durée *de la Matiere, il s' enſuivra que le Monde eſt infini & éternel* néceſſairement *&* indépendamment de Dieu.

22, & 23. *Si l' Argument que l' on trouve ici, étoit bien fondé, il prouveroit que Dieu* ne ſçauroit s' empêcher de faire *tout ce qu' il* peut faire ; *& par conſéquent qu' il* ne ſçauroit s' empêcher *de rendre* toutes les

and they cannot exiſt but in *one* or *other* of equally reaſonable Situations. The *Epicurean Chance*, is not a *Choice* of *Will*, but a *blind Neceſſity* of *Fate*.

19. This Argument, (as I now obſerved, § 3,) if it proves any thing, proves that God neither * *did* nor *can* create any *matter* at all; becauſe the *Situation* of equal and ſimilar parts of matter, could not but be originally *indifferent*: As was alſo the original *Determination* of their *Motions*, this way, or the contrary way.

* *See Appendix, N°. 4, and 9.*

20. What *This* tends to prove, with regard to the Argument before us; I underſtand not.

21. That *God Cannot limit the Quantity of Matter*, is an Aſſertion of too great conſequence, to be admitted without *Proof*. If he cannot limit the *Duration* of it neither, then the material World is both infinite and eternal *neceſſarily* and *independently upon God*.

22, *and* 23. This Argument, if it were good, would prove that Whatever God *can* do, he *cannot but do*; and conſequently that he *cannot but* make *every thing infinite*, and *every thing eternal*. Which is making him

Créatures infinies & éternelles. *Mais, ſelon cette Doctrine, Dieu ne ſeroit point le* Gouverneur *du Monde : il ſeroit un* Agent néceſſaire ; *c' eſt-à-dire qu' il ne ſeroit pas même un* Agent, *mais le* Deſtin, *la* Nature, *& la* Néceſſité.

24. ——— 28. *On revient encore ici à l' uſage du mot de* Senſorium, *quoique Mr.* Newton *ſe ſoit ſervi d' un Correctif, lors qu' il a employé ce mot. Il n' eſt pas néceſſaire de rien ajouter à ce que j' ai dit ſur cela. Voïez ma* Troiſiéme Réplique, § 10. *la* Séconde, § 3. *la* Premiere § 3.

29. *L'* Eſpace *eſt le* Lieu *de* toutes les Choſes *& de* toutes les Idées: *Comme la* Durée *eſt la* Durée *de* toutes les Choſes, *& de* toutes les Idées. *J' ai fait voir ci-deſſus* (Réplique II. § 12.) *que cette Doctrine ne tend point à faire Dieu l'* Ame du Monde. *Il n' y a point d'* Union *entre* Dieu *& le* Monde. *On pourroit dire avec plus de raiſon, que l' Eſprit de l' homme eſt* l' Ame des Images des choſes qu' il apperçoit, *qu' on ne peut dire que Dieu eſt l'* Ame *du Monde, dans lequel il eſt* preſent *par tout, &* ſur lequel il agit *comme il veut, ſans que le Monde* agiſſe ſur lui. *Nonobſtant cette Réponſe, qu' on a vû ci-deſſus,* (Réplique II. § 12.) *l' Auteur ne laiſſe pas de répeter la même Objection plus d' une fois, comme ſi on n' y avoit point répondu.*

30. *Je*

him no *Governor* at all, but a *mere neceſſary Agent*, that is, indeed *no Agent at all*, but mere *Fate* and *Nature* and *Neceſſity*.

24, —— 28. Concerning the Uſe of the word, *Senſory*; (though Sir *Iſaac Newton* ſays only, *as it were* the *Senſory*;) enough has been ſaid in my *Third Reply*, § 10; and *Second Reply*, § 3; and *Firſt Reply*, § 3.

29. *Space* is the *Place* of *All Things*, and of *All Ideas*: Juſt as *Duration* is the *Duration* of *All Things*, and of *All Ideas*. That This has no Tendency to make God *the Soul* of the World, *See above*, *Reply* II, § 12. There is no *Union* between *God* and the *World*. The *Mind of Man* might with greater propriety be ſtiled *The Soul of the Images of things which it perceives*, than *God* can be ſtiled the *Soul* of the *World*, to which he is *preſent* throughout, and *acts upon it* as he pleaſes, without being *acted upon by it*. Though this Anſwer was given before, (*Reply* II, § 12.) yet the ſame Objection is repeated again and again, without taking any Notice of the Anſwer.

30. What

30. *Je n' entends point ce que l' Auteur veut dire par* * *un* Principe répreſentatif. *L'* Ame *apperçoit les choſes, parce que les Images des choſes lui ſont portées par les Organes des Sens. Dieu apperçoit les choſes, parce qu' il eſt preſent dans les Subſtances des choſes mêmes. Il ne les apperçoit pas, en les* produiſant continuellement ; (*car il* ſe repoſe de l' Ouvrage de la Création ;) *mais il les apperçoit, parce qu' il eſt* continuellement preſent *dans toutes les choſes qu' il* a créées.

* Voïez l' Appendice, N°11.

31. *Si l' Ame* † n' agiſſoit point *ſur le Corps ; & ſi le Corps, par un ſimple mouvement méchanique de la Matiere, ſe conformoit pourtant à la volonté de l' Ame dans une* varieté infinie *de mouvemens ſpontanées, ce ſeroit un* Miracle perpetuel. *L'* Harmonie préétablie *n' eſt qu' un mot, ou un terme d' Art ; & elle n' eſt d' aucun uſage pour expliquer la cauſe d' un effet ſi miraculeux.*

† Voïez l' Appendice, N° 5.

32. *Suppoſer que dans le mouvement ſpontanée du Corps, l' Ame ne donne point un* nouveau mouvement *ou une* nouvelle Impreſſion *à la Matiere, & que tous les mouvemens ſpontanées ſont produits par une* impulſion méchanique de la Matiere ; *c' eſt reduire tout au Deſtin & à la Néceſſité. Mais quand on dit que Dieu* agit *dans le Monde ſur toutes les Créatures comme il le veut,* ſans aucune Union, & ſans qu' aucune

30. What is meant by * *repreſentative Principle*, I underſtand not. The *Soul* diſcerns things, by having the *Images* of things conveyed to it through the Organs of Senſe: *God* diſcerns things, by being preſent *to* and *in* the *Subſtances* of the Things themſelves. Not by *producing them continually*; (For he *reſts* now from his work of *Creation*:) but by being *continually* omnipreſent to every thing which he *created at the Beginning*. * *See Appendix*, N° 11.

31. That the Soul † ſhould *not operate* upon the Body; and yet the Body, by mere mechanical impulſe of Matter, conform itſelf to the Will of the Soul in all the *infinite variety* of ſpontaneous Animal-Motion; is a *perpetual Miracle*. *Pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, is a mere *Word* or Term of Art, and does nothing towards explaining the cauſe of ſo miraculous an effect. † *See Appendix*, N° 5.

32. To ſuppoſe that in ſpontaneous Animal-Motion, the Soul gives *no new Motion* or *Impreſſion* to Matter; but that all ſpontaneous Animal-Motion is performed by *mechanical impulſe of Matter*; is reducing all things to mere Fate and Neceſſity. God's *acting* in the World upon every thing, after what manner he pleaſes, *without* any *Union*, and *without* being *acted upon* by any thing; ſhows plainly the difference

aucune choſe agiſſe ſur lui ; *cela fait voir évidemment la difference qu' il y a entre un* Gouverneur *qui eſt* preſent par tout, *& une* Ame *imaginaire* du Monde.

33. *Toute* Action *conſiſte à donner une* nouvelle Force *aux choſes, ſur lesquelles elle s' exerce. Sans cela, ce ne ſeroit pas une* Action réelle, *mais une ſimple* Paſſion, *comme dans toutes les* Loix méchaniques *du mouvement. D' où il s' enſuit que ſi la* communication d' une nouvelle Force *eſt* ſurnaturelle, toutes les actions de Dieu *ſeront* ſurnaturelles, *& il ſera entierement exclu du Gouvernement du* Monde. *Il s' enſuit auſſi de là, que toutes les* actions des hommes *ſont* ſurnaturelles, *ou que l'* homme *eſt une pure* Machine, *comme une Horloge.*

34, & 35. *On a fait voir ci-deſſus la difference qu' il y a entre la véritable Idée de* Dieu, *& celle d' une* Ame du Monde. *Voiez ma* Seconde Réplique, § 12 ; *& dans cette* Quatriéme Réplique, § 29 & § 32.

36. *J' ai répondu ci-deſſus,* § 31. *à ce que l' on trouve ici.*

37. *L' Ame n' eſt pas* repandue dans le Cerveau ; *mais elle eſt preſente dans le Lieu, qui eſt le* Senſorium.

38. *Ce que l' on dit ici, eſt une ſimple* Affirmation *ſans* preuve. *Deux Corps, deſtituez d'* Elaſticité, *ſe rencontrant avec des forces contraires & égales, perdent leur*

difference between an *Omnipreſent Governor*, and an imaginary *Soul of the World.*

33. Every *Action* is (in the nature of things) the giving of a *new Force* to the thing *acted upon.* Otherwiſe 'tis not really *Action*, but mere *paſſiveneſs*; as in the caſe of all *mechanical and inanimate communications* of Motion. If therefore the *Giving a new Force*, be *ſupernatural*; then *every action* of *God* is *ſupernatural*, and he is quite excluded from the Government of the *natural World*: And every *action of Man*, is either *ſupernatural*, or elſe *Man* is as mere a *Machine* as a Clock.

34, *and* 35. The *difference* between the true Notion of *God*, and that of a *Soul of the World*, has been before ſhown: *Reply* II, § 12. and in *This Paper*, § 29 *and* 32.

36. This has been anſwered juſt above, § 31.

37. The Soul is not *diffuſed through the Brain*; but is preſent to That particular Place, which is the *Senſorium.*

38. This is a bare *Aſſertion*, without *Proof.* Two Bodies, void of Elaſticity, meeting each other with equal contrary Forces, Both loſe their Motion. And Sir *Iſaac*

leur Mouvement. Et Mr. le Chevalier Newton *a donné un Exemple Mathematique,* (*pag.* 341, *de l' Edition Latine de ſon* Optique,) *par lequel il paroit que le Mouvement* diminue *&* augmente *continuellement en* Quantité, *ſans qu' il ſoit communiqué à d' autres Corps.*

39. *Le Sujet, dont on parle ici, n' eſt point un* défaut, *comme l' Auteur le ſuppoſe: C' eſt la* véritable *nature de la* Matiere inactive.

40. *Si l' Argument que l' on trouve ici, eſt bien fondé, il prouve que l' Univers doit être* infini; *qu' il* a exiſté de toute éternité, *& qu' il ne ſçauroit* ceſſer d' exiſter; *que Dieu a* toûjours *crée* autant d' hommes, *& d' autres Etres, qu' il étoit* poſſible *qu' il en créât; & qu' il les a créez pour les faire exiſter auſſi* long temps, *qu' il lui étoit* poſſible.

41. *Je n' entends point ce que ces mots veulent dire:* Un Ordre, (*ou une Situation*) qui rend les Corps ſituables. *Il me ſemble que cela veut dire, que la* Situation eſt la cauſe de la Situation. *J' ai prouvé ci-deſſus* (Réplique III, §§ 2 & 4.) *que l'* Eſpace *n' eſt pas l'* Ordre des Corps: *Et j' ai fait voir dans cette* Quatriéme Réplique, §§ 13 & 14, *que l' Auteur n' a point répondu aux Arguments que j' ai propoſé. Il n' eſt pas moins évident, que le* Temps *n' eſt pas l'* Ordre des choſes qui ſuccedent l' une à l' autre; *puiſque la* Quantité *du Temps peut*

être

Newton has given a *Mathematical* Inſtance, (*page* 341, *of the Latin Edition of his Opticks*,) wherein *Motion* is continually *diminiſhing* and *increaſing* in *Quantity*, without any communication thereof to other Bodies.

39. This is no *Defect*, as is here ſuppoſed; but 'tis the *juſt and proper* Nature of *inert Matter*.

40. This Argument (if it be good,) proves that the *Material* World *muſt* be *infinite*, and that it *muſt have been from eternity*, and *muſt continue to eternity*: And that God *muſt Always* have created as *many Men*, and as *many* of all other things, as 'twas *poſſible* for him to create; and for as long a *time* alſo, as it was *poſſible* for him to do it.

41. What the meaning of theſe Words is; *An Order*, (or Situation,) *which makes Bodies to be Situable*; I underſtand not. It ſeems to me to amount to This, that *Situation* is the cauſe of *Situation*. That *Space* is not merely the *Order of Bodies*, has been ſhown before; *Reply* III, § 2 *and* 4. And that no Anſwer has been given to the Arguments there offered, has been ſhown in *This Paper*, § 13 *and* 14. Alſo that *Time* is not merely the *Order of things ſucceeding each other*, is evident; becauſe the *Quantity* of Time may be *greater* or

être plus grande *ou* plus petite, *& cependant* Cet Ordre *ne laiſſe pas d' être le* même. *L'* Ordre des choſes qui ſuccedent l' une à l' autre dans le Temps, *n' eſt pas le* Temps même : *Car elles peuvent ſucceder l' une à l' autre* plus vîte *ou* plus lentement *dans le même* Ordre de Succeſſion, *mais non dans le même* Temps. *Suppoſé qu' il n' y eut point de Créatures, l'* Ubiquité *de Dieu, & la* Continuation de ſon Exiſtence, *ſeroient* † *que l'* Eſpace *& la* Durée *ſeroient préciſément les mêmes qu'* à preſent.

* Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur § 10.

42. *On appelle ici de la* Raiſon *à l'* Opinion vulgaire. *Mais comme l' Opinion vulgaire n' eſt pas la* Régle *de la* Vérité, *les Philoſophes ne doivent point y avoir recours.*

43. *L' idée d' un* Miracle *renferme* néceſſairement *l' idée d' une choſe* rare & extraordinaire. *Car, d' ailleurs, il n' y a rien de* plus merveilleux, *& qui demande une* plus grande puiſſance, *que quelques unes des choſes que nous appellons* naturelles, *comme, par exemple, les Mouvemens des* Corps Celeſtes, *la* Géneration *& la* Formation *des* Plantes *& des* Animaux, *&c. Cependant ce ne ſont pas des* Miracles, *parce que ce ſont des choſes* communes. *Il ne s' enſuit pourtant pas de là, que* tout *ce qui eſt* rare *&* extraordinaire, *ſoit un* Miracle. *Car pluſieurs choſes de cette nature, peuvent être des Effets irreguliers & moins communs, des Cauſes* ordinaires ; *comme les* Eclipſes, *les* Monſtres, *la* Manie dans les hommes

leſs, and yet *That Order* continue the *ſame*. The *Order of things ſucceeding each other in Time*, is not *Time itſelf*: For they may ſucceed each other *faſter* or *ſlower* in the ſame *Order of Succeſſion*, but not in the ſame *Time*. If *no Creatures* exiſted, yet the *Ubiquity* of God, and the *Continuance of his Exiſtence*, would make * *Space* and *Duration* to be exactly the ſame as they are *Now*.

* *See above, the Note on* § 10.

42. This is appealing from *Reaſon* to *vulgar Opinion*; which *Philoſophers* ſhould not do, becauſe it is not the *Rule* of *Truth*.

43. *Unuſualneſs* is *neceſſarily* included in the Notion of a *Miracle*. For otherwiſe there is nothing more *wonderful*, nor that requires *greater Power* to effect, than ſome of thoſe things we call *natural*. Such as, the *Motions* of the *Heavenly-Bodies*, the *Generation* and *Formation* of *Plants and Animals*, &c. Yet theſe are for *This only reaſon* not *Miracles*, becauſe they are *common*. Nevertheleſs, it does not follow, that every thing which is *unuſual*, is *therefore* a Miracle. For it may be only the irregular and more *rare* effect of *uſual* Cauſes: Of which kind are *Eclipſes*, *Monſtrous Births*, *Madneſs in Men*, and innu-

hommes, *& une infinité d' autres choſes que le Vulgaire appelle des* Prodiges.

44. *On accorde ici ce que j' ai dit. On ſoûtient pourtant une choſe contraire au* ſentiment commun *des Théologiens, en ſuppoſant qu' un* Ange *peut faire des* Miracles.

45. *Il eſt vrai que ſi* un Corps *en* attiroit *un autre* ſans *l' intervention d' aucun moyen, ce ne ſeroit pas un* Miracle, *mais une* Contradiction ; *car ce ſeroit ſuppoſer qu' une choſe* agit *où elle* n' eſt pas. *Mais le Moyen par lequel deux Corps s' attirent l' un l' autre, peut être* inviſible *&* intangible, *& d' une nature differente du* Méchaniſme. *Ce qui n' empêche pas qu' une action réguliere & conſtante ne puiſſe être appellée* naturelle ; *puis qu' elle eſt beaucoup moins merveilleuſe, que le* mouvement des Animaux, *qui ne paſſe pourtant pas pour un* Miracle.

46. *Si par le terme de* Forces naturelles *on entend ici des Forces* Méchaniques ; *tous les* Animaux, *ſans en excepter les* hommes, *ſeront de pures* Machines, *comme une* Horloge. *Mais ſi ce terme ne ſignifie pas des* Forces Méchaniques ; *la* Gravitation *peut être produite par des Forces* régulieres & naturelles, *quoi qu' elles ne ſoient pas* Méchaniques.

N.B. On a déjà repondu ci-deſſus aux Arguments que Mr. *Leibnitz* a inſerez dans une Addition à ſon Quatriéme Ecrit. La ſeule choſe qu' il ſoit beſoin d' obſerver ici, c' eſt que Mr. *Leibnitz* en ſoutenant l' impoſſibilité des *Atomes Phyſiques*, (il ne s' agit pas entre nous des *Points Mathematiques*, ſoutien-

merable things which the Vulgar call *Prodigies*.

44. This is a *Conceſſion* of what I alleged. And yet 'tis *contrary* to the *common Opinion* of Divines, to ſuppoſe that an *Angel* can work a *Miracle*.

45. That *One Body* ſhould *attract* another *without any* intermediate *Means*, is indeed not a *Miracle*, but a *Contradiction*: For 'tis ſuppoſing ſomething to *act* where it *is not*. But the *Means* by which Two Bodies attract each other, may be *inviſible* and *intangible*, and of a different nature from *mechaniſm*; and yet, acting regularly and conſtantly, may well be called *natural*; being much leſs wonderful than *Animal-motion*, which yet is *never* called a *Miracle*.

46. If the word, *natural Forces*, means here *Mechanical*; then all *Animals*, and even *Men*, are as *mere Machines* as a *Clock*. But if the word does not mean, *mechanical Forces*; then *Gravitation* may be effected by *regular* and *natural* Powers, though they be *not Mechanical*.

N. B. *The Arguments alleged in the Poſtſcript to Mr.* Leibnitz's *Fourth Paper, have been already anſwered in the foregoing Replies. All that needs here to be obſerved, is, that his Notion concerning the Impoſſibility of* Phyſical Atomes, (*for the Queſtion is not about* Mathematical Atomes,) *is a manifeſt Abſurdity. For either there* are, *or there* are not *any* perfectly ſolid particles *of Matter. If there* are *any ſuch; then the* parts *of ſuch perfectly ſolid particles, taken of*

ſoutient une Abſurdité manifeſte. Car ou il y a des *parties parfaitement ſolides* dans la Matiere, ou il n' *y en a pas*. S' il y en a, & qu' en les ſubdiviſant on y prenne de nouvelles particules, qui ayent toutes la même Figure & les mêmes Dimenſions, (ce qui eſt toujours *poſſible*,) ces nouvelles particules ſeront des *Atomes Phyſiques parfaitement ſemblables*. Que s' il n' y a point des parties parfaitement ſolides dans la Matiere, il n' y a point de Matiere dans l' Univers. Car plus on Diviſe & Subdiviſe un Corps, pour arriver enfin à des parties parfaitement ſolides & ſans pores, plus la Proportion que les Pores ont à la matiere ſolide de ce Corps, plus, dis-je, cette Proportion augmente. Si donc, en pouſſant la Diviſion & la Subdiviſion à l' infini, il eſt impoſſible d' arriver à des parties parfaitement ſolides & ſans pores; il s' enſuivra que les Corps ſont uniquement compoſez de pores, (le rapport de ceux-ci aux parties ſolides, augmentant ſans ceſſe;) & par conſequent qu' il n' y a point de Matiere du tout: Ce qui eſt une Abſurdité manifeſte.

equal Figure and Dimensions, (which is always possible *in Supposition,) are* Physical Atoms perfectly alike. *But if there be* No such perfectly solid particles, *then there is no Matter at all in the Universe. For, the further the Division and Subdivision of the parts of any Body is carried, before you arrive at parts perfectly solid and without pores; the greater is the Proportion of Pores to solid matter in That Body. If therefore, carrying on the Division* in infinitum, *you never arrive at parts perfectly solid and without Pores; it will follow that All Bodies consist of* Pores only, *without* any Matter at all: *Which is a manifest Absurdity.*

Mr. LEIB-

Cinquième Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz,

ou

Réponse au Quatriéme Ecrit Anglois.

[Les differentes Leçons, imprimées à la Marge de l'Ecrit ſuivant, ſont des changemens faits de la *propre main* de Mr. *Leibnitz* dans une autre Copie de cet Ecrit, laquelle il envoya à un de ſes amis en *Angleterre* peu de temps avant ſa mort.]

Sur § 1 & 2, du Papier precedent.

1. *JE répondray cette fois plus amplement, pour éclaircir les difficultés, & pour eſſayer ſi l' on eſt d' humeur à ſe payer de raiſon, & de donner des marques de l' amour de la verité, ou ſi l' on ne fera que chicaner ſans rien éclaircir.*

2. *On s' efforce ſouvent à m' imputer la* neceſſité *& la* fatalité, *quoyque peut être perſonne n' ait mieux expliqué & plus à fond que j' ay fait dans la* Theodicée, *la veritable difference entre* Liberté, *Contingence, Spontaneité, d' un coté ; &* Neceſſité *abſolue, Hazard, Coaction, de l' autre. Je ne ſais pas encore ſi on le fait parce qu'*

Mr. LEIBNITZ's *Fifth Paper.*

BEING

An Answer to Dr. CLARKE's *Fourth Reply.*

To § 1 and 2, *of the foregoing Paper.*

1. I Shall at This Time make a *larger* Answer; to clear the difficulties; and to try whether the Author be willing to hearken to reason, and to show that he is a lover of truth; or whether he will only cavil, without clearing any thing.

2. He often endeavours to impute to me *Necessity and Fatality*; though perhaps no One has better and more fully explained, than I have done in my *Theodicæa*, the true difference between *Liberty*, *Contingency*, *Spontaneity*, on the one Side; and absolute *Necessity*, *Chance*, *Coaction*, on the other. I know not yet, whether

on le veut, quoyque je puiſſe dire ; ou ſi ces imputations viennent de bonne foy, de ce qu' on n' a point encore peſé mes ſentimens : j' experimenteray bien tôt ce que j' en dois juger, & je me regleray là deſſus.

3. *Il eſt vray que les* Raiſons *ſont dans l' Eſprit du Sage, & les* Motifs *dans quelque Eſprit que ce ſoit, ce qui répond à l' effect que les* Poids *ſont dans une* Balance. *On objecte, que cette notion mene à la* Neceſſité *& à la* Fatalité. *Mais on le dit ſans le prouver ; & ſans prendre connoiſſance des Explications que j' ay données autrefois pour lever toutes les difficultés qu' on peut faire là deſſus.*

4. *Il ſemble auſſi, qu' on ſe joüe d' équivoque. Il y a des* Neceſſités, *qu' il faut admettre. Car il faut diſtinguer entre une* Neceſſité abſolüe *& une* Neceſſité Hypothetique. *Il faut diſtinguer auſſi entre une* Neceſſité *qui a lieu parceque l' oppoſé implique Contradiction, & laquelle eſt appellée* Logique, Metaphyſique, *ou* Mathematique ; *& entre une* Neceſſité *qui eſt* Morale, *qui fait que le ſage choiſit le Meilleur, & que tout eſprit ſuit l' Inclination la plus grande.*

5. *La* Neceſſité Hypothetique *eſt celle, que la* Suppoſition *ou* Hypotheſe *de la préviſion & préordination de Dieu impoſe aux futurs*

the Author does this, becauſe he *will* do it, whatever I may ſay; or whether he does it, (ſuppoſing him ſincere in thoſe imputations,) becauſe he has *not yet* duly *conſidered* my Opinions. I ſhall ſoon find what I am to think of it, and I ſhall take my meaſures accordingly.

3. It is true, that *Reaſons* in the *Mind* of a Wiſe Being, and *Motives* in Any Mind whatſoever, do that which anſwers to the effect produced by *Weights* in * a *Balance*. The Author objects, that this Notion leads to *Neceſſity* and *Fatality*. But he ſays ſo, without proving it, and without taking notice of the explications I have formerly given, in order to remove the difficulties that may be raiſed upon that Head.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 3.

4. He ſeems alſo to play with *Equivocal* Terms. There are *Neceſſities*, which ought to be admitted. For we muſt diſtinguiſh between an *abſolute* and an *Hypothetical Neceſſity*. We muſt alſo diſtinguiſh between a *Neceſſity*, which takes place becauſe the Oppoſite implies a Contradiction; (which neceſſity is called *Logical*, *Metaphyſical*, or *Mathematical*;) and a *Neceſſity* which is *Moral*, whereby a Wiſe Being chuſes the Beſt, and every Mind follows the ſtrongeſt Inclination.

5. *Hypothetical Neceſſity* is that, which the Suppoſition or *Hypotheſis* of God's *Foreſight* and *Pre-ordination* lays upon *future*

futurs contingens. Et il faut l' admettre ſi ce n' eſt qu' avec les Socinieus *on refuſe à Dieu la preſcience des Contingens futurs, & la Providence qui regle & gouverne les choſes en detail.*

6. *Mais ny cette preſcience ny cette Preordination ne derogent point à la* Liberté. *Car Dieu porté par la Supreme Raiſon à choiſir, entre pluſieurs ſuites des choſes ou Mondes poſſibles, celuy où les Creatures libres prendroient telles ou telles Reſolutions, quoyque non ſans ſon concours; a rendu, par là, leur évenement certain & determiné une fois pour toutes; ſans deroger par là à la Liberté de ces Creatures. Ce ſimple decret du choix, ne changeant point, mais actualiſant ſeulement leur Natures libres qu' il y voyoit dans ſes Idees.*

7. *Et quant à la Neceſſité* Morale, *elle ne deroge point non plus à la* Liberté. *Car lors que le ſage, &, ſur tout, Dieu, (le ſage ſouverain,) choiſit le Meilleur, il n' en eſt pas moins libre; au contraire, c' eſt la plus parfaite Liberté, de n' être point empeché d' agir le mieux. Et lors qu' un autre choiſit ſelon le bien le plus apparent, & le plus inclinant; il imite en cela la Liberté du ſage à proportion de ſa diſpoſition. Et ſans cela, le choix ſeroit un hazard aveugle.*

8. *Mais*

ture Contingents. And This muſt needs be admitted, unleſs we deny, as the *Socinians* do, God's *Foreknowledge of future Contingents*, and his *Providence* which regulates and governs every particular thing.

6. But neither That *Foreknowledge*, nor That *Pre-Ordination*, derogate from *Liberty*. For God, being moved by his Supreme Reaſon to chuſe, among many Series of Things or Worlds poſſible, That, in which free Creatures ſhould take ſuch or ſuch Reſolutions, though not without his Concourſe; has thereby rendred every Event certain and determined once for all; without derogating thereby from the Liberty of thoſe Creatures: That ſimple decree of Choice, not at all changing, but only *actualizing* their free Natures, which he ſaw in his Ideas.

7. As for *Moral* Neceſſity, This alſo does not derogate from *Liberty*. For when a Wiſe Being, and eſpecially God, who has Supreme Wiſdom, chuſes what is Beſt, he is not the leſs free upon that account: On the contrary, it is the moſt perfect Liberty, not to be hindred from acting in the beſt manner. And when Any Other chuſes according to the moſt apparent and the moſt ſtrongly inclining Good, he imitates therein the Liberty of a truly Wiſe Being, in proportion to his diſpoſition. Without this, the Choice would be a blind Chance.

8. But

8. *Mais le bien, tant vray qu' apparent, en un mot le motif, incline ſans neceſſiter; C' eſt à dire, ſans impoſer une Neceſſité abſolue. Car lors que Dieu (pour exemple) choiſit le Meilleur; ce qu' il ne choiſit point, & qui eſt inferieur en Perfection, ne laiſſe pas d' être poſſible. Mais ſi ce que Dieu choiſit, eſtoit abſolument Neceſſaire, tout autre parti ſeroit impoſſible; contre l' Hypotheſe: Car Dieu choiſit parmy les poſſibles, c' eſt à dire parmy pluſieurs partis, dont pas un n' implique Contradiction.*

9. *Mais de dire que Dieu ne peut choiſir que le meilleur, & d' en vouloir inferer que ce qu' il ne choiſit point, eſt impoſſible; C' eſt confondre les termes; la* Puiſſance, *&* Volonté; *la* Neceſſité Metaphyſique, *&* Neceſſité Morale; *les* Eſſences, *&* Exiſtences. *Car ce qui eſt neceſſaire, l' eſt par ſon Eſſence, puiſque l' oppoſé implique Contradiction; mais le Contingent qui exiſte, doit ſon exiſtence au principe du Meilleur,* Raiſon ſuffiſante *des choſes. Et c' eſt pour cela que je dis, que les Motifs inclinent ſans neceſſiter; & qu' il y a une certitude & infallibilité, mais non pas une* Neceſſité abſoluë *dans les choſes contingentes. Joignez à cecy, ce qui ſe dira plus bas* Nomb. 73 & 76.

10. *Et j' ay aſſez montré dans ma* Theodicée *que cette* Neceſſité Morale *eſt heureuſe & conforme à la perfection Divine, conforme à*

8. But Good, either true or apparent; in a word, the Motive, inclines without neceſſitating; that is, without impoſing an *abſolute Neceſſity*. For when God (for Inſtance,) chuſes the Beſt; what he does not chuſe, and is inferior in Perfection, is nevertheleſs poſſible. But if what he chuſes, was abſolutely neceſſary; any other way would be impoſſible: Which is againſt the Hypotheſis. For God chuſes among Poſſibles, that is, among many ways, none of which implies a Contradiction.

9. But to ſay, that God can only chuſe what is *Beſt*; and to infer from thence, that what he does not chuſe, is impoſſible; this, I ſay, is confounding of Terms: 'Tis blending *Power* and *Will*, *Metaphyſical Neceſſity* and *Moral Neceſſity*, *Eſſences* and *Exiſtences*. For, what is *neceſſary*, is ſo by its Eſſence, ſince the Oppoſite implies a Contradiction; But a Contingent which exiſts, owes its Exiſtence to the *Principle of what is Beſt*, which is a *ſufficient Reaſon* for the Exiſtence of Things. And therefore I ſay, that Motives incline without neceſſitating; and that there is a Certainty and Infallibility, but not an abſolute Neceſſity in contingent Things. Add to this, what will be ſaid hereafter, *Numb.* 73, *and* 76.

10. And I have ſufficiently ſhown in my *Theodicæa*, that this *Moral Neceſſity* is a good Thing, agreeable to the Divine Per-

grand principe des Exiſtences, qui eſt celuy du beſoin d' une Raiſon ſuffiſante ; *au lieu que la Neceſſité abſolue & Metaphyſique, depend de l' autre grand principe de nos raiſonnemens, qui eſt celuy des Eſſences, c' eſt à dire celuy de l' Identité, ou de la Contradiction : Car ce qui eſt abſolument Neceſſaire, eſt ſeul poſſible entre les parties, & ſon contraire implique Contradiction.*

11. *J' ay fait voir auſſi, que notre* Volonté *ne ſuit pas tousjours preciſement l'* Entendement practique, *parcequ' elle peut avoir ou trouver des raiſons pour* ſuſpendre *ſa Reſolution juſqu' à une diſcuſſion ulterieure.*

12. *M' imputer aprés cela une* Neceſſité abſolue, *ſans avoir rien à dire contre des Conſiderations que je viens d' apporter, & qui vont juſqu' au fond des choſes, peut être au delà de ce qui ſe voit ailleurs ; ce ſera une obſtination déraiſonnable.*

13. *Pour ce qui eſt de la* Fatalité, *qu' on m' impute auſſi, c' eſt encore une Equivoque. Il y a* fatum Mahometanum, fatum Stoicum, fatum Chriſtianum. *Le* deſtin *à la Turque, veut que les Effets arriveroient quand on en éviteroit la cauſe comme s'il y avoit une Neceſſité abſolue. Le* deſtin Stoicien *veut qu' on ſoit tranquille, parce qu' il faut avoir patience par force*

fection; agreeable to the great Principle or Ground of *Exiſtences*, which is that of *the Want of a ſufficient Reaſon*: Whereas *Abſolute and Metaphyſical Neceſſity*, depends upon the Other great Principle of our Reaſonings, *viz.* that of *Eſſences*; that is, the Principle of Identity or Contradiction: For, what is abſolutely neceſſary, is the only poſſible Way, and its contrary implies a Contradiction.

11. I have alſo ſhown, that our *Will* does *not* always exactly *follow* the *Practical Underſtanding*; becauſe it may have or find *Reaſons* to *ſuſpend* its Reſolution till a further Examination.

12. To impute to me after this, the Notion of an *abſolute Neceſſity*, without having any thing to ſay againſt the *Reaſons* which I have juſt now alledged, and which go to the Bottom of Things, perhaps beyond what is to be ſeen elſewhere; This, I ſay, will be an unreaſonable Obſtinacy.

13. As to the Notion of *Fatality*, which the Author lays alſo to my Charge; this is another Ambiguity. There is a *Fatum Mahometanum*, a *Fatum Stoicum*, and a *Fatum Chriſtianum*. The *Turkiſh Fate* will have an Effect to happen, even though its Cauſe ſhould be avoided; as if there was an *Abſolute Neceſſity*. The *Stoical Fate* will have a Man to be quiet, becauſe he

force, puiſqu' on ne ſauroit regimber contre la ſuite des choſes. Mais on convient qu' il y a fatum Chriſtianum, *une deſtinée certaine de toutes choſes, reglée par la Preſcience & par la Providence de Dieu.* Fatum *eſt derivé de* fari, *c' eſt à dire,* prononcer, decerner; *& dans le bon ſens, il ſignifie le decret de la Providence. Et ceux qui s' y ſousmettent par la connoiſſance des Perfections Divines, dont l' amour de Dieu eſt une ſuite, * ne prennent pas ſeulement patience comme les Philoſophes Payens, mais ils ſont même contents de ce que Dieu ordonne, ſachans qu' il fait tout pour le mieux, & non ſeulement pour le plus grand bien en general, mais encore pour le plus grand bien particulier de ceux qui l' aiment.*

14. *J' ay été obligé de m' étendre, pour detruire une bonne fois les imputations mal fondées, comme j' eſpere de pouvoir faire par ces Explications dans l' Eſprit de Perſonnes équitables. Maintenant je viendray à une Objection qu' on me fait icy contre la comparaiſon des* Poids *d' une* Balance *avec les* Motifs *de la* Volonté. *On objecte que la* Balance *eſt purement paſſive, & pouſſée par les* Poids, *au lieu que les Agens intelligens & doués de volonté ſont* actifs. *A cela je reponds, que le Principe du beſoin d' une*

* (Puiſq; il conſiſte dans le plaiſir que donne cette connoiſſance;)

Raiſon

muſt have Patience whether he will or not, ſince 'tis impoſſible to reſiſt the Courſe of Things. But 'tis agreed, that there is *Fatum Chriſtianum*, a *Certain Deſtiny* of every Thing, regulated by the Foreknowledge and Providence of God. *Fatum* is derived from *Fari*; that is, *to Pronounce*, to *Decree*; and in its right Senſe, it ſignifies the Decree of Providence. And thoſe who ſubmit to it through a Knowledge of the Divine Perfections, whereof the Love of God is a Conſequence; have not only Patience, like the Heathen Philoſophers, but are alſo contented with what is ordained by God, knowing he does every thing for the beſt; and not only for the greateſt Good in general, but alſo for the greateſt particular Good of thoſe who love him.

14. I have been obliged to enlarge, in order to remove ill-grounded Imputations once for all; as I hope I ſhall be able to do by theſe Explications, ſo as to ſatisfy equitable Perſons. I ſhall now come to an *Objection* raiſed here, againſt my comparing the *Weights* of a *Balance* with the *Motives* of the *Will*. 'Tis objected, that a *Balance* is merely *Paſſive*, and mov'd by the Weights; whereas Agents intelligent, and endowed with Will, are *Active*. To this I anſwer, that the * *Principle of the*

* See Appendix N°. 3.

Raiſon ſuffiſante *eſt commun aux* Agens *& aux* Patiens ; *Ils ont beſoin d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *de leur* Action, *auſſi bien que de leur* Paſſion. *Non ſeulement la* Balance *n' agit pas, quand elle eſt pouſſée Egalement de part & d' autre ; mais les* Poids Egaux *auſſi n' agiſſent point quand ils ſont en Equilibre, en ſorte que l' un ne peut deſcendre ſans que l' autre monte autant.*

15. *Il faut encore conſiderer qu' à proprement parler, les Motifs n' agiſſent point ſur l' Eſprit comme les Poids ſur la Balance ; mais c' eſt plûtôt l' Eſprit qui agit en vertu des Motifs, qui ſont* ſes Diſpoſitions *à agir. Ainſi vouloir, comme l' on veut icy, que l' Eſprit prefere quelques fois les Motifs foibles aux plus forts, & même l' indifferent aux Motifs ; c' eſt ſeparer l'* Eſprit *des* Motifs, *comme s' ils étoient* hors de luy, *comme le Poids eſt diſtingué de la Balance ; & comme ſi* dans l' Eſprit *il y avoit d' autres* Diſpoſitions *pour agir que les* Motifs, *en vertu desquelles l' Eſprit rejetteroit où accepteroit les Motifs. Au lieu que dans la verité* les Motifs *comprennent* toutes les Diſpoſitions *que l' Eſprit peut avoir pour agir volontairement ; Car ils ne comprennent pas ſeulement les* Raiſons, *mais encore les* Inclinations *qui viennent des Paſſions ou d' autres impreſſions precedentes. Ainſi ſi l' Eſprit preferoit l' Inclination foible à la forte, il agiroit contre ſoy même, & autrement qu' il eſt* diſpoſé *d' agir. Ce qui fait voir que*

Want of a ſufficient Reaſon is common both to *Agents* and *Patients* : They want a *ſufficient Reaſon* of their *Action*, as well as of their *Paſſion*. A *Balance* does not only not act, when it is equally *pulled* on both Sides ; but the *equal Weights* likewiſe do not act when they are in an *Æquilibrium*, ſo that one of them cannot go down without the others riſing up as much.

15. It muſt alſo be conſidered, that, properly ſpeaking, Motives do not act upon the Mind, as Weights do upon a Balance ; but 'tis rather the Mind that acts by virtue of the Motives, which are *its Diſpoſitions* to act. And therefore to pretend, as the Author does here, that the Mind prefers ſometimes weak Motives to ſtrong ones, and even that it prefers that which is *indifferent* before *Motives* : This, I ſay, is to *divide* the *Mind* from the *Motives*, as if they were *without* the *Mind*, as the Weight is diſtinct from the Balance ; and as if the *Mind* had, beſides *Motives*, other *Diſpoſitions* to act, by Virtue of which it could reject or accept the *Motives*. Whereas, in truth, the *Motives* comprehend *all the Diſpoſitions*, which the Mind can have to act voluntarily ; for they *include* not only the *Reaſons*, but alſo the *Inclinations* ariſing from Paſſions, or other preceding Impreſſions. Wherefore, if the Mind ſhould prefer a weak *Inclination* to a ſtrong one, it would act againſt it ſelf, and otherwiſe

les Notions contraires icy aux miennes, ſont ſuperficielles, & ſe trouvent n' avoir rien de ſolide, quand elles ſont bien conſiderées.

16. *De dire auſſi que l'* Eſprit peut avoir de bonnes Raiſons pour agir, *quand il n' a* aucuns Motifs, *& quand les choſes ſont* abſolument indifferentes, *comme on s' explique icy ; c' eſt une Contradiction manifeſte. Car s' il a de bonnes Raiſons pour le parti qu' il prend, les choſes ne luy ſont point indifferentes.*

17. *Et de dire qu' on agira quand on a* des Raiſons *pour agir*, quand meme les voyes d' agir ſeroient abſolument indifferentes ; *c' eſt encore parler fort ſuperficiellement, & d' une maniere tres inſoutenable. Car on n' a jamais une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour* agir, *quand on n' a pas auſſi une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour agir* tellement ; *toute action eſtant individuelle, & non generale ny abſtraite des ſes Circonſtances, & ayant beſoin de quelque voye pour être Effectuée. Donc quand il y a une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour agir* tellement, *il y en a auſſi pour agir par une telle* voye ; *& par conſequent les voyes ne ſont point* indifferentes. *Toutes les fois qu' on a des* Raiſons ſuffiſantes *pour une action ſinguliere, on en a pour ſes requiſits. Voyés encore ce qui ſe dira plus bas,* Num. 66.

18. *Ces*

than it is diſpoſed to act. Which ſhows that the Author's Notions, contrary to mine, are ſuperficial, and appear to have no Solidity in them, when they are well conſidered.

16. To aſſert alſo, that the *Mind may have good Reaſons to act*, when it has *no Motives*, and *when Things are abſolutely indifferent*, as the Author explains himſelf here; this, I ſay, is a manifeſt Contradiction. For if the Mind has *good Reaſons* for taking the *Part* it takes, then the Things are not *indifferent* to the Mind.

17. And to affirm that the Mind will act, when it has *Reaſons* to act, *even though the Ways of acting were abſolutely indifferent*: This, I ſay, is to ſpeak again very ſuperficially, and in a manner that cannot be defended. For a Man never has a ſufficient Reaſon *to act*, when he has not alſo a ſufficient Reaſon to act *in a certain particular manner*; every Action being Individual, and not general, nor abſtract from its Circumſtances, but always needing ſome particular way of being put in Execution. Wherefore, when there is a ſufficient Reaſon to do any particular Thing, there is alſo a ſufficient Reaſon to do it in a certain particular manner; and conſequently, ſeveral manners of doing it are not *indifferent*. As often as a Man has ſufficient Reaſons for a ſingle Action, he has alſo ſufficient Reaſons for all its Requiſites. See alſo what I ſhall ſay below, *Numb.* 66.

18. Theſe

18. *Ces raiſonnemens ſautent aux yeux; & il eſt bien eſtrange de m' imputer que j' avance mon principe du beſoin d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante, *ſans aucune preuve tirée ou de la Nature des choſes, ou des perfections Divines. Car la* nature des choſes *porte que tout évenement ait preallablement ſes Conditions, Requiſits, Diſpoſitions convenables, dont l' exiſtence en fait la Raiſon ſuffiſante.*

19. *Et la* perfection de Dieu *demande que toutes ſes actions ſoyent conformes à ſa ſageſſe, & qu' on ne puiſſe point luy reprocher d' avoir agi ſans Raiſon, ou méme d' avoir preferé une Raiſon plus foible à une Raiſon plus forte.*

20. *Mais je parleray plus amplement ſur la fin de ce papier, de la ſolidité & de l' importance de ce grand Principe du* beſoin d' une Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour tout évenement; dont le renverſement renverſeroit la meilleure partie de toute la Philoſophie. Ainſi il eſt bien étrange qu' on veut icy qu' en cela je commets une* Petition de Principe; *& il paroiſt bien qu' on veut ſoutenir des ſentimens inſoutenables, puiſqu' on eſt reduit à me refuſer ce grand Principe, un des plus eſſentiels de la Raiſon.*

Sur

18. Theſe Arguments are very obvious; and 'tis very ſtrange to charge me with advancing my Principle of *the Want of a ſufficient Reaſon*, without any Proof drawn either from the Nature of Things, or from the Divine Perfections. For the *Nature of Things* requires, that every Event ſhould have before-hand its proper Conditions, Requiſites, and Diſpoſitions, the Exiſtence whereof makes the ſufficient Reaſon of ſuch Event.

19. And *God's Perfection* requires, that all his Actions ſhould be agreeable to his Wiſdom; and that it may not be ſaid of him, that he has acted without Reaſon; or even that he has prefer'd a weaker Reaſon before a ſtronger.

20. But I ſhall ſpeak more largely at the Concluſion of this Paper, concerning the Solidity and Importance of this great Principle, of the *want of a ſufficient Reaſon* in order to every Event; the overthrowing of which Principle, would overthrow the beſt part of all Philoſophy. 'Tis therefore very ſtrange that the Author ſhould ſay, I am herein guilty of a *Petitio Principii*; and it plainly appears he is deſirous to maintain indefenſible Opinions, ſince he is reduced to deny That great Principle, which is one of the moſt eſſential Principles of Reaſon.

Sur §§ 3 & 4.

21. *Il faut avouer que ce grand Principe, quoyqu' il ait été reconnu, n' a pas été aſſez employé. Et c' eſt en bonne partie la Raiſon pourquoy juſqu' icy la* Philoſophie première *a été ſi peu feconde, & ſi peu Demonſtrative. J' en infére entre autres conſequences, qu' il n' y a point dans la Nature* deux *Etres réels abſolus* indiſcernables; *parceque s' il y en avoit, Dieu & la Nature agiroient ſans Raiſon, en traitant l' un autrement que l' autre; & qu' ainſi Dieu ne produit point* deux *portions de matiere parfaitement* égales *&* ſemblables. *On repond à cette Concluſion, ſans en refuter la Raiſon; & on y repond par une Objection bien foible.* Cet Argument (*dit on*) s' il eſtoit bon, prouveroit, qu' il ſeroit impoſſible à Dieu de créer aucune matiere. Car les parties de la matiere parfaitement ſolides eſtant priſes égales & de la même Figure (ce qui eſt une Suppoſition poſſible,) ſeroient exactement faites l' une comme l' autre. *Mais c' eſt une Petition de principe trop manifeſte, de ſuppoſer cette parfaite convenance, qui ſelon moy ne ſauroit être admiſe. Cette Suppoſition de* deux indiſcernables *comme de deux portions de matiere qui conviennent parfaitement entre elles, paroiſt poſſible en termes abſtraits; mais elle n' eſt point compatible avec l' ordre des choſes.*

To § 3, and 4.

21. It muſt be confeſſed, that though this great Principle has been acknowledged, yet it has not been ſufficiently made uſe of. Which is, in great meaſure, the Reaſon why the *Prima Philoſophia* has not been hitherto ſo fruitful and demonſtrative, as it ſhould have been. I infer from that Principle, among other Conſequences, that there are not in Nature *two* real, abſolute Beings, *indiſcernible* from each other; becauſe if there were, God and Nature would act without Reaſon, in ordering the one otherwiſe than the other; and that therefore God does not produce *Two* Pieces of Matter perfectly *equal* and *alike*. The Author anſwers this Concluſion, without confuting the Reaſon of it; and he anſwers with a very weak Objection. *That Argument*, ſays he, *if it was good, would prove that it would be impoſſible for God to create any Matter at all. For, the perfectly ſolid Parts of Matter, if we take them of equal Figure and Dimenſions, (which is always poſſible in Suppoſition,) would be exactly alike.* But 'tis a manifeſt *Petitio Principii* to ſuppoſe *That perfect Likeneſs*, which, according to me, cannot be admitted. This Suppoſition of two *Indiſcernibles*, ſuch as two Pieces of Matter perfectly alike, ſeems indeed to be *poſſible* in abſtract Terms; but

it

ny avec la ſageſſe Divine, où rien n'eſt admis ſans Raiſon. Le vulgaire s' imagine de telles choſes, parce qu' il ſe contente de Notions incompletes. Et c' eſt un des defauts des Atomiſtes.

22. Outre que je n' admets point dans la matiere des portions parfaitement ſolides, ou qui ſoyent tout d' une piece, ſans aucune varieté ou mouvement particulier dans leurs parties, comme l' on conçoit les pretendus Atomes. Poſer de tels Corps, eſt encore une Opinion populaire mal-fondée. Selon mes demonſtrations, chaque portion de matiere eſt actuellement ſous-diviſée en parties differemment mües, & pas une ne reſſemble entierement à l' autre.

23. J' avois allegué, que dans les choſes ſenſibles on n' en trouve jamais deux indiſcernables, & que (par exemple) on ne trouvera point deux feuilles dans un jardin, ny deux gouttes d' eau parfaitement ſemblables. On l' admet à l' egard des feuilles, & peut etre (perhaps) à l' égard des gouttes d' eau. Mais on pouvoit l' admettre ſans balancer, ou ſans perhaps, (ſenza forſe, diroit un Italien,) encore dans les gouttes d' eau.

24. Je crois que tes Obſervations generales qui ſe trouvent dans les choſes ſenſibles, ſe trouvent encore à proportion dans les inſenſibles. Et qu' à cet egard on peut dire

comme

it is not consistent with the Order of Things, nor with the Divine Wisdom, by which nothing is admitted without Reason. The Vulgar fancy such Things, because they content themselves with incomplete Notions. And this is one of the Faults of the *Atomists*.

22. Besides; I don't admit in Matter, Parts perfectly *Solid*, or that are the same throughout, without any Variety or particular *Motion* in their Parts, as the pretended Atoms are imagined to be. To suppose such Bodies, is another popular Opinion ill-grounded. According to my Demonstrations, every Part of Matter is *actually* subdivided into Parts differently *moved*, and no one of them is perfectly *like* another.

23. I said, that in *sensible* Things, *two*, that are *indiscernible* from each other, can never be found; that (for Instance) two *Leaves* in a Garden, or two *Drops* of Water, perfectly alike, are not to be found. The Author acknowledges it as to *Leaves*, and *perhaps* as to *Drops* of Water. But he might have admitted it, without any Hesitation, without a *perhaps*, (an *Italian* would say, *Senza Forse*,) as to *Drops* of Water likewise.

24. I believe that these general Observations in Things *sensible*, hold also in proportion in Things *insensible*, and that one may say, in this Respect, what *Har-*

comme disoit Arlequin dans l'Empereur de la Lune, que c'est tout comme icy. Et c'est un grand prejugé contre les indiscernables, qu'on n'en trouve aucun exemple. Mais on s'oppose à cette consequence, parce que (dit on) les Corps sensibles sont Composés, au lieu qu'on soutient qu'il y en a d'insensibles qui sont Simples. Je reponds encore, que je n'en accorde point. Il n'y a rien de Simple selon moy, que les veritables Monades, qui n'ont point de Parties ny d'Etendue. Les Corps Simples, et même les parfaitement similaires, sont une suite de la fausse Position du Vuide & des Atomes, ou d'ailleurs de la Philosophie paresseuse, qui ne pousse pas assez l'analyse des choses, & s'imagine de pouvoir parvenir aux premiers Elemens Corporels de la Nature, parceque cela contenteroit nostre Imagination.

25. Quand je nie qu'il y ait deux gouttes d'eau entierement semblables, ou deux autres Corps indiscernables; Je ne dis point qu'il soit impossible absolument d'en poser, mais que c'est une chose contraire à la Sagesse Divine, & qui par consequent n'existe point.

Sur § 5 & 6.

26. J'avoue que si deux choses parfaitement indiscernables existoient, elles seroient Deux. Mais la Supposition est fausse, & contraire au grand Principe de la raison.

lequin ſays in the *Emperor of the Moon*; *'Tis there, juſt as 'tis here.* And 'tis a great Objection againſt *Indiſcernibles*, that no inſtance of them is to be found. But the Author oppoſes this Conſequence, becauſe (ſays he) *ſenſible* Bodies are *compounded*; whereas he maintains there are *inſenſible* Bodies, which are *ſimple*. I anſwer again, that I don't admit *ſimple* Bodies. There is nothing *ſimple*, in my Opinion, but true *Monads*, which have neither parts nor extenſion. Simple Bodies, and even perfectly ſimilar ones, are a conſequence of the falſe Hypotheſis of a *Vacuum* and of *Atoms*, or of *Lazy* Philoſophy, which does not ſufficiently carry on the *Analyſis* of things, and fancies it can attain to the firſt material Elements of Nature, becauſe our Imagination would be therewith ſatisfied.

25. When I deny that there are Two Drops of Water perfectly alike, or any two other Bodies *Indiſcernible* from each other; I don't ſay, 'tis abſolutely *impoſſible* to ſuppoſe them; but that 'tis a thing contrary to the divine *Wiſdom*, and which conſequently does not exiſt.

To § 5 and 6.

26. I own, that if two things perfectly *indiſcernible* from each other did exiſt, they would be *Two*; but That Suppoſition is falſe, and contrary to the Grand Principle

Les Philoſophes vulgaires ſe ſont trompés lors qu' ils ont crû qu'il y avoit des choſes differentes ſolo numero, *ou ſeulement parce qu' elles ſont* Deux ; *& c' eſt de cette erreur que ſont venues leurs perplexités ſur ce qu' ils appelloient le* principe d'individuation. *La Metaphyſique a été traitée ordinairement en ſimple Doctrine des* Termes, *comme un Dictionnaire Philoſophique, ſans venir à la diſcuſſion des Choſes. La Philoſophie ſuperficielle, comme celle des Atomiſtes & Vacuiſtes, ſe forge des choſes que les raiſons ſuperieures n' admettent point. J'eſpere que mes Demonſtrations feront changer de face à la Philoſophie, malgré les foibles contradictions telles qu' on m' oppoſe icy.*

27. *Les Parties du Temps ou du Lieu, priſes* en elles mêmes, *ſont des choſes Idéales ; ainſi elles ſe reſſemblent parfaitement, comme deux* Unités abſtraites. *Mais il n'en eſt pas de même de deux* uns concrets, *ou de deux Temps* effectifs, *ou de deux Eſpaces* remplis, *c'eſt à dire veritablement* actuels.

28. *Je ne dis pas que* deux *points de l' Eſpace ſont un* même *point, ny que* deux *Inſtans du temps ſont un* même *Inſtant, comme il ſemble qu' on m' impute : Mais on peut s' imaginer, faute de connoiſſance, qu'il y a* Deux *Inſtans differens, où il n' y en a qu'* Un ; *Comme j'ay remarqué dans l' Article* 17 *de la precedente Reponſe, que ſouvent en Geometrie on ſuppoſe* Deux, *pour repreſenter l' erreur d' un contrediſant, &*

of Reaſon. The vulgar Philoſophers were miſtaken, when they believed that there are things different *ſolo numero*, or only becauſe they are *two*; And from this error have ariſen their perplexities about what they called *the Principle of Individuation*. Metaphyſicks have generally been handled like a Science of mere *Words*, like a Philoſophical Dictionary, without entring into the diſcuſſion of *Things*. Superficial Philoſophy, ſuch as is that of the *Atomiſts* and *Vacuiſts*, forges things, which ſuperior Reaſons do not admit. I hope My Demonſtrations will change the Face of Philoſophy, notwithſtanding ſuch weak Objections as the Author raiſes here againſt me.

27. The *Parts* of *Time* or *Place*, conſidered *in themſelves*, are *ideal* things; and therefore they perfectly reſemble one another, like two *abſtract Units*. But it is not ſo with two *concrete Ones*, or with two *real Times*, or two *Spaces filled up*, that is, truly *actual*.

28. I don't ſay that *two* Points of Space are *one and the ſame* point, nor that *two* Inſtants of Time are *one and the ſame* Inſtant, as the Author ſeems to charge me with ſaying. But a Man may fancy, for want of Knowledge, that there are two different Inſtants, where there is but one: In like manner as I obſerved in the 17th Paragraph of the foregoing Anſwer, that frequently in Geometry we ſuppoſe *Two*, in

on n' en trouve qu' Un. *Si quel qu'un ſuppoſoit qu' une ligne droite coupe l' autre en* deux *points, il ſe trouvera au bout du compte, que ces* deux *points pretendus doivent coincider, & n' en ſauroient faire qu'* Un.

29. *J'ay demontré que l' Eſpace n'eſt autre choſe qu' un* ordre *de l' Exiſtence des Choſes, qui ſe remarque dans leur ſimultaneité. Ainſi la Fiction d' un Univers materiel* fini, *qui ſe promene tout entier dans un Eſpace vuide infini, ne ſauroit être admiſſe. Elle eſt tout à fait deraiſonnable &* impracticable. *Car outre qu'il n'y a point d' Eſpace réel hors de l' Univers materiel ; une telle Action ſeroit ſans but, ce ſeroit travailler ſans rien faire,* agendo nihil agere. *Il ne ſe produiroit aucun changement obſervable par qui que ce ſoit. Ce ſont des Imaginations des* Philoſophes à Notions incompletes, *qui ſe font de l' Eſpace une realité abſolue. Les Simples Mathematiciens, qui ne s' occupent que de jeux de l' Imagination, ſont capables de ſe forger de telles Notions ; mais elles ſont detruites par des Raiſons Superieures.*

30. *Abſolument parlant, il paroiſt que Dieu* peut *faire l' Univers materiel* fini *en Extenſion ; mais le contraire paroiſt plus conforme à ſa Sageſſe.*

31. *Je n' accorde point que tout* fini *eſt* mobile. *Selon l' Hypotheſe même des Adverſaires, une* Partie *de l' Eſpace, quoyque* fini *n' e*

order to repreſent the error of a gainſayer, when there is really but *One*. If any Man ſhould ſuppoſe that a right Line cuts another in *two* Points; it will be found after all, that thoſe *two* pretended Points muſt co-incide, and make but *One* Point.

29. I have demonſtrated, that *Space* is nothing elſe but an *Order* of the exiſtence of things, obſerved as exiſting Together; And therefore the Fiction of a material finite Univerſe, moving forward in an infinite empty Space, * cannot be admitted. It is altogether unreaſonable and *impracticable*. For, beſides that there is *no real Space* out of the material Univerſe; ſuch an Action would be without any Deſign in it: It would be working without doing any thing, *agendo nihil agere*. There would happen *no Change*, which could be obſerved by Any Perſon whatſoever. Theſe are Imaginations of *Philoſophers who have incomplete notions*, who make Space an abſolute Reality. Mere Mathematicians, who are only taken up with the Conceits of Imagination, are apt to forge ſuch Notions; but they are deſtroyed by ſuperior Reaſons.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 10.

30. Abſolutely ſpeaking, it appears that God *can* make the material Univerſe *finite* in Extenſion; but the contrary appears more agreeable to his Wiſdom.

31. I don't grant, that *every Finite* is *moveable*. According to the Hypotheſis of my Adverſaries themſelves, a *part* of *Space*,

n' eſt point mobile. *Il faut que ce qui eſt* mobile, *puiſſe changer de Situation par rapport à quelque autre choſe, & qu'il puiſſe arriver un Etat nouveau* diſcernable *du premier : Autrement le changement eſt une fiction. Ainſi il faut qu' un ſini mobile faſſe partie d' un autre, afin qu'il puiſſe arriver un* changement obſervable.

32. Des Cartes *a ſoutenu que la Matiere n' a point de bornes, & je ne crois pas qu' on l' ait ſuffiſamment* refuté. *Et quand on le luy accorderoit, il ne s' enſuit point, que la Matiere ſeroit neceſſaire, ny qu' elle ait été de toute éternité ; puiſque cette Diffuſion de la Matiere ſans Bornes, ne ſeroit qu' un effect du Choix de Dieu, qui l' auroit trouvé mieux ainſi.*

Sur §. 7.

33. *Puiſque l' Eſpace en ſoy eſt une choſe ideale comme le Temps, il faut bien que l' Eſpace hors du Monde ſoit imaginaire, comme les Scholaſtiques mêmes l' ont bien reconnu. Il en eſt de même de l' Eſpace vuide dans le Monde ; que je crois encore être imaginaire, par les Raiſons que j'ay produites.*

34. *On m' objecte le* vuide *inventé par M.* Guerike *de* Magdebourg, *qui ſe fait en pompant l' air d' un Recipient ; & on pretend qu' il y a veritablement du vuide parfait, ou de l' Eſpace ſans Matiere, en partie*

though *finite*, is not *moveable*. What is moveable, muſt be capable of changing its ſituation with reſpect to *ſomething elſe*, and to be in a new ſtate *diſcernible* from the firſt: Otherwiſe the Change is but a Fiction. A *moveable Finite*, muſt therefore make part of *another* Finite, that any Change may happen which can be *obſerved*.

32. *Carteſius* maintains, that *Matter* is *unlimited*; and I *don't* think he has been ſufficiently *confuted*. And though this be granted him, yet it does not follow that Matter would be *neceſſary*, nor that it would have exiſted from all *eternity*; ſince That unlimited diffuſion of Matter, would only be an effect of God's *Choice*, judging That to be the better.

To § 7.

33. Since *Space* in it ſelf is an *Ideal* thing, like *Time*; Space *out of the World* muſt needs be imaginary, as the *Schoolmen* themſelves have acknowledged. The caſe is the ſame with empty Space *within* the World; which I take alſo to be imaginary, for the reaſons before alledged.

34. The Author objects againſt me the *Vacuum* diſcovered by Mr. *Guerike* of *Magdeburg*, which is made by pumping the Air out of a *Receiver*; And he pretends that there is truly a perfect *Vacuum*, or a

tie au moins, dans ce Recipient. Les Aristoteliciens *& les* Carteſiens, *qui n' admettent point le veritable vuide, ont repondu à cette Experience de M.* Guerike, *auſſi bien qu' à celle de M.* Torricelli *de* Florence *(qui vuidoit l' air d'un tuyau de verre par le moyen du Mercure,)qu'il n'y a point de vuide du tout dans le tuyau ou dans le Recipient; puiſque le verre a des Pores ſubtils, à travers deſquels les Rayons de la Lumiere, ceux de l' aimant, & autres matieres tres minces peuvent paſſer. Et je ſuis de leur Sentiment, trouvant qu' on peut comparer le Recipient à une caiſſe pleine de trous, qui ſeroit dans l' eau, dans laquelle il y auroit des Poiſſons, ou d' autres Corps groſſiers, leſquels en étant ôtés, la place ne laiſſeroit pas d' étre remplie par de l' eau : Il y a ſeulement cette difference, que l' eau, quoyqu' elle ſoit fluide & plus obeiſſante que ces Corps groſſiers, eſt pourtant auſſi peſante & auſſi maſſive, ou même d' avantage; au lieu que la Matiere qui entre dans le Recipient à la place de l' Air, eſt bien plus mince. Les nouveaux Partiſans du vuide repondent à cette Inſtance, que ce n' eſt pas la groſſiereté de la Matiere, mais ſimplement ſa quantité, qui fait de la Reſiſtence; & par conſequent qu'il y a néceſſairement plus de vuide, où il y a moins de reſiſtence. On adjoute que la ſubtilité n' y fait rien, & que les parties du vif argent ſont auſſi ſubtiles & fines que celles de l' eau, & que neantmoins le vif*

Space without Matter, (at leaſt in part,) in that *Receiver.* The *Ariſtotelians* and *Carteſians*, who do not admit a true *Vacuum*, have ſaid in anſwer to that Experiment of Mr. *Guerike*, as well as to that of *Torricellius* of *Florence*, (who emptied the Air out of a Glaſs-Tube by the help of Quick-Silver,) that there is no *Vacuum* at all in the Tube or in the Receiver; ſince Glaſs has ſmall Pores, which the Beams of Light, the *Effluvia* of the Load-Stone, and other very thin fluids may go through. I am of their Opinion: And I think the Receiver may be compared to a Box full of Holes in the Water, having Fiſh or other groſs Bodies ſhut up in it; which being taken out, their place would nevertheleſs be filled up with Water. There is only this difference; that though Water be fluid and more yielding than thoſe groſs Bodies, yet it is as heavy and maſſive, if not more, than they: Whereas the Matter which gets into the Receiver in the room of the Air, is much more ſubtile. The new Sticklers for a *Vacuum* allege in anſwer to this Inſtance, that it is not the *groſſneſs* of Matter, but its mere *quantity*, that makes reſiſtance; and conſequently that there is of neceſſity *more Vacuum*, where there is *leſs Reſiſtance.* They add, that the *ſubtleneſs* of Matter has nothing to do here; and that the particles of *Quick-Silver* are as *ſubtle* and *fine* as thoſe of *Water*; and yet that *Quick-Silver* reſiſts

le vif argent reſiſte plus de dix fois d' avantage. A cela je replique, que ce n' eſt pas tant la quantité de la Matiere, que la difficulté qu' elle fait de ceder, qui fait la reſiſtence. Par Exemple, le bois flottant *contient moins de Matiere peſante que l' eau de pareil volume, & neantmoins il reſiſte plus au bateau que l' eau.*

35. *Et quant au* vif Argent, *il contient à la verité environ quatorze fois plus de Matiere peſante que l' eau, dans un pareil Volume ; mais il ne s' enſuit point qu' il contienne quatorze fois plus de Matiere abſolument. Au contraire, l' eau en contient autant ; mais prenant enſemble tant ſa propre Matiere qui eſt peſante, qu' une Matiere étrangere non peſante, qui paſſe à travers de ſes pores. Car tant le vif Argent que l' Eau, ſont des Maſſes de Matiere peſante, percées à jour, à travers deſquelles paſſe beaucoup de Matiere non peſante *, comme eſt apparemment celle des Rayons de lumiere, & d' autres fluides inſenſibles ; tels que celuy ſur tout, qui cauſe luy même la peſanteur des Corps groſſiers, en s' écartant du centre où il les fait aller. Car c' eſt une étrange fiction que de faire toute la Matiere peſante, & même vers toute autre Matiere, comme ſi tout Corps attiroit également tout autre Corps ſelon les Maſſes & les Diſtances ; & cela par*

* (Et qui ne reſiſte point ſenſiblement,)

une

ſiſts above *Ten times more.* To this I reply, that it is not ſo much the *quantity* of Matter, as its *difficulty of giving place*, that makes *reſiſtance.* For inſtance; *floating Timber* contains *leſs* of heavy Matter, than an equal Bulk of *Water* does; and yet it makes *more reſiſtance* to a Boat, than the *Water* does.

35. And as for *Quick-Silver*; 'tis true, it contains about Fourteen times more of *heavy* Matter, than an equal Bulk of *Water* does; but it does not follow, that it contains Fourteen times more Matter abſolutely. On the contrary, *Water* contains as much Matter; if we include both its own Matter, which is heavy; and the extraneous Matter void of heavineſs, which paſſes through its Pores. For, both *Quick-Silver* and *Water*, are maſſes of heavy matter, full of Pores, through which there paſſes a great deal of Matter void of Heavineſs; ſuch as is probably that of the Rays of Light, and other inſenſible Fluids; and eſpecially that which is it ſelf the Cauſe of the gravity of groſs Bodies, by receding from the Center towards which it drives thoſe Bodies. For, it is a ſtrange Imagination to make all Matter gravitate, and That towards all other Matter, as if each Body did equally *attract* every other Body according to their Maſſes and diſtances; and this by an *Attraction* properly ſo called, which is not derived from an occult impulſe

une Attraction *proprement dite, qui ne ſoit point derivée d' une Impulſion occulte des Corps : Au lieu que la peſanteur des Corps ſenſibles vers le Centre de la terre, doit être produite par le mouvement de quelque fluide. Et il en ſera de même d' autres peſanteurs, comme de celles des Planetes vers le ſoleil, ou entre elles* †.

Sur §. 8, & 9.

36. *Comme j' avois objecté que l' Eſpace pris pour quelque choſe de réel & d' abſolu ſans les Corps, ſeroit une Choſe éternelle, impaſſible, independante de Dieu ; on a taché d' éluder cette difficulté, en diſant que l' Eſpace eſt une proprieté de Dieu. J'ay oppoſé à cela dans mon Papier precedent, que la proprieté de Dieu eſt l' immenſité ; mais que l' Eſpace, qui eſt ſouvent commenſuré avec les Corps, & l' immenſité de Dieu, n'eſt pas la même choſe.*

37. *J'ay encore objecté, ſi l' Eſpace eſt une proprieté, & ſi l' Eſpace* infini *eſt l' Immenſité de Dieu, que l' Eſpace* fini *ſera l' Etendue ou la menſurabilité de quelque choſe finie. Ainſi l' Eſpace occupé par un*

† Un Corps n' eſt jamais mû naturellement, que par un autre Corps qui le pouſſe en le touchant ; & aprés cela il continue juſqu' à ce qu' il ſoit empeché par un autre Corps qui le touche. Toute autre Operation ſur les Corps, eſt ou miraculeuſe ou imaginaire.

Corps,

pulſe of Bodies: Whereas the gravity of ſenſible Bodies towards the Centre of the Earth, ought to be produced by the motion of ſome Fluid. And the caſe muſt be the ſame with other gravities, ſuch as is that of the Planets towards the Sun, or towards each other.

To § 8, *and* 9.

36. I objected, that Space, taken for ſomething real and abſolute without Bodies, would be a thing eternal, impaſſible, and independent upon God. The Author endeavours to elude this Difficulty, by ſaying that Space is a property of God. In anſwer to this, I have ſaid, in my foregoing Paper, that the Property of God is *Immenſity*; but that *Space* (which is often commenſurate with Bodies,) and God's Immenſity, are not the ſame thing.

37. I objected further, that if Space be a property, and *infinite Space* be the *Immenſity* of *God*; *finite Space* will be the *Extenſion* or *Menſurability* of ſomething *finite*. And therefore the *Space* taken up by a *Body*, will be the *Extenſion of that Body*. Which is an abſurdity; ſince a Body

Corps, ſera l'Etendue de ce Corps : *Choſe abſurde, puiſqu'un Corps peut changer d'* Eſpace, *mais il ne peut point quitter* ſon Etendue.

38. *J'ay encore demandé, ſi l'Eſpace eſt une Proprieté, de quelle choſe ſera donc la Proprieté un Eſpace vuide* borné, *tel qu'on s'imagine dans le Recipient épuiſé d'air ? il ne paroiſt point raiſonnable de dire, que cet Eſpace vuide, rond ou quarré, ſoit une Proprieté de Dieu. Sera ce donc peut étre la Proprieté de quelques Subſtances immaterielles, étendues, imaginaires, qu'on ſe figure (ce ſemble) dans les Eſpaces imaginaires ?*

39. *Si l'Eſpace eſt la Proprieté ou l'Affection de la Subſtance qui eſt dans l'Eſpace, le même Eſpace ſera tantôt l'* Affection *d'* un Corps, *tantôt d'un* autre Corps, *tantoſt d'une Subſtance* immaterielle, *tantoſt peut étre de* Dieu, *quand il eſt vuide de toute autre Subſtance materielle ou immaterielle. Mais voilà une eſtrange Proprieté ou Affection, qui* paſſe de ſujet en ſujet. *Les ſujets quitteront ainſſi leurs accidens comme un habit, à fin que d'autres ſujets s'en puiſſent reveſtir. Aprés cela, comment diſtinguera t'on les Accidens & les Subſtances ?*

40. *Que ſi les* Eſpaces bornés *ſont les Affections des* Subſtances bornées *qui y ſont, & ſi l'*Eſpace infini *eſt la Proprieté de Dieu ; il faut (choſe étrange) que la Proprieté de Dieu*

Body can change *Space*, but cannot leave its *Extenſion.*

38. I asked alſo; If Space is a *Property*, What thing will an empty *limited Space*, (ſuch as that which my Adverſary imagines in an exhauſted Receiver,) be the Property of? It does not appear reaſonable to ſay, that this empty Space, either round or ſquare, is a Property of God. Will it be then perhaps the Property of ſome immaterial, extended, imaginary Subſtances, which the Author ſeems to fancy in the imaginary Spaces?

39. If Space is the Property or Affection of the Subſtance, which is in Space; the *ſame Space* will be ſometimes the *Affection* of *One Body*, ſometimes of *another Body*, ſometimes of an *immaterial* Subſtance, and ſometimes perhaps of *God* himſelf, when it is void of all other Subſtance material or immaterial. But this is a ſtrange *Property* or *Affection*, which *paſſes from one Subject to another.* Thus Subjects will leave off their Accidents, like Cloaths; that Other Subjects may put them on. At this rate, how ſhall we diſtinguiſh Accidents and Subſtances?

40. And if *limited Spaces* are the *Affections* of *limited Subſtances*, which are in them; and *infinite Space* be a Property of *God*; a Property of God muſt (which is very

Dieu ſoit compoſée des Affections des Creatures ; car tous les Eſpaces finis pris enſemble compoſent l' Eſpace infini.

41. *Que ſi l' on nie que l' Eſpace borné* * ſoit. * *eſt une Affection des choſes bornées ; il ne ſera pas raiſonnable non plus, que l' Eſpace infini ſoit l' Affection ou la Proprieté d' une choſe infinie. J' avois inſinué toutes ces difficultés dans mon papier precedent. Mais il ne paroiſt point qu' on ait taché d' y ſatisfaire.*

42. *J' ay encore d' autres Raiſons contre l' étrange Imagination que l' Eſpace eſt une Proprieté de Dieu. Si cela eſt, l' Eſpace entre dans l'* eſſence *de Dieu. Or l' Eſpace a des parties : donc il y auroit des parties dans l'* eſſence *de Dieu.* Spectatum admiſſi.

43. *De plus, les Eſpaces ſont tantoſt vuides, tantoſt remplis : donc il y aura dans l' eſſence de Dieu des parties tantôt vuides, tantôt remplies, & par conſequent ſujettes à un* changement *perpetuel. Les Corps rempliſſant l' Eſpace, rempliroient une partie de l' eſſence de Dieu, & y ſeroient commenſurés, &, dans la Suppoſition du vuide, une partie de l' eſſence de Dieu ſera dans le Recipient. Ce* Dieu à parties, *reſſemblera fort au Dieu Stoicien, qui eſtoit l' Univers tout entier conſideré comme un Animal divin.*

44. *Si l' Eſpace infini eſt l' immenſité de Dieu, le Temps infini ſera l' éternité de Dieu : Il faudra donc dire que ce qui eſt dans l'*

very ſtrange,) be made up of the Affections of Creatures; For All finite Spaces, taken together, make up infinite Space.

41. But if the Author denies, that *limited Space* is an *Affection* of *limited Things*; it will not be reaſonable neither, that *infinite Space* ſhould be the *Affection* or Property of an *infinite thing*. I have ſuggeſted all theſe difficulties in my foregoing Paper; but it does not appear that the Author has endeavoured to anſwer them.

42. I have ſtill other Reaſons againſt this ſtrange Imagination, that Space is a Property of God. If it be ſo, Space belongs to the *Eſſence* of God. But Space has *parts*: Therefore there would be *parts* in the *Eſſence* of God. *Spectatum admiſſi.*

43. Moreover, Spaces are ſometimes empty, and ſometimes filled up. Therefore there will be in the Eſſence of God, Parts ſometimes empty, and ſometimes full, and conſequently liable to a perpetual *Change*. Bodies, filling up Space, would fill up part of God's Eſſence, and would be commenſurate with it; and in the Suppoſition of a *Vacuum*, Part of God's Eſſence will be within the *Receiver*. Such a *God having Parts*, will very much reſemble the *Stoicks* God, which was the whole Univerſe conſidered as a Divine Animal.

44. If infinite *Space* is God's *Immenſity*, infinite *Time* will be God's *Eternity*; and therefore we muſt ſay, that what is in

*Eſpace, eſt dans l' immenſité de Dieu, & par conſequent dans ſon Eſſence ; & que ce qui eſt dans le Temps, * eſt auſſi dans l' eſſence de Dieu. Phraſes* etranges, *& qui font bien connoiſtre qu' on abuſe des termes.*

* eſt dans l' eternité de Dieu.

45. *En voicy encore une autre inſtance. L' immenſité de Dieu, fait que Dieu eſt dans tous les Eſpaces. Mais ſi Dieu eſt* dans *l' Eſpace, comment peut on dire que l' Eſpace eſt* en *Dieu, ou qu' il eſt ſa proprieté ? On a bien oüi dire que la Proprieté ſoit dans le Sujet, mais on n' a jamais oüi dire que le Sujet ſoit dans ſa Proprieté. De même, Dieu exiſte* en *chaque Temps : Comment donc le temps eſt il dans Dieu ; & comment peut il étre une Proprieté de Dieu ? Ce ſont des* Allogloſſies *perpetuelles.*

46. *Il paroiſt qu' on confond l' immenſité ou l'* étendue des choſes, *avec l'* Eſpace *ſelon lequel cette étendue eſt priſe. L' Eſpace infini n' eſt pas l' immenſité de Dieu, l' Eſpace fini n' eſt pas l' étendue des Corps ; comme le temps n' eſt point la durée. Les choſes gardent leur étendue, mais elles ne gardent point tousjours leur Eſpace. Chaque choſe a ſa propre étendue, ſa propre durée ; mais elle n' a point ſon propre temps, & elle ne garde point ſon propre Eſpace.*

47. *Voicy comment les hommes viennent à ſe former la notion de* l' Eſpace. *Ils conſiderent que pluſieurs choſes exiſtent à la fois, & ils y trouvent un certain* ordre *de coexiſtence*

Space, is in God's Immenſity, and conſequently in his Eſſence; and that what is in Time, is alſo in the Eſſence of God. *Strange* Expreſſions; which plainly ſhow, that the Author makes a wrong uſe of Terms.

45. I ſhall give another Inſtance of This. God's Immenſity makes him actually preſent in all Spaces. But now if God is *in* Space, how can it be ſaid that Space is *in* God, or that it is a Property of God? We have often heard, that a Property is in its Subject; but we never heard, that a Subject is in its Property. In like manner, God exiſts *in* all Time. How then can Time be *in* God; and how can it be a Property of God? Theſe are perpetual *Alloglosſies.*

46. It appears that the Author confounds Immenſity, or the *Extenſion of Things*, with the *Space* according to which that Extenſion is taken. Infinite Space, is not the Immenſity of God; Finite Space, is not the Extenſion of Bodies: As Time is not their Duration. Things keep their Extenſion, but they do not always keep their Space. Every Thing has its own Extenſion, its own Duration; but it has not its own Time, and does not keep its own Space.

47. I will here ſhow, *how* Men come to form to themſelves the Notion of *Space.* They conſider that many things exiſt at once, and they obſerve in them a certain

iſtence, ſuivant lequel le rapport des uns & des autres eſt plus ou moins ſimple. C' eſt leur Situation *ou diſtance. Lors qu' il arrive qu' un de ces coexiſtens change* * *de rapport à une multitude d' autres, ſans qu' ils en changent entre eux ; & qu' un nouveau venu acquiert le rapport tel que le premier avoit eu à d' autres ; on dit qu' il eſt venu à* ſa place, *& on appelle ce changement un* mouvement *qui eſt dans celuy où eſt la cauſe immediate du changement. Et quand pluſieurs, ou même tous, changeroient ſelon certaines regles connues de direction & de viſteſſe ; on peut tousjours determiner le rapport de Situation que chacun acquiert à chacun ; & même celuy que chaque autre auroit, ou qu' il auroit à chaque autre, s' il n' avoit point changé, ou s' il avoit autrement changé. Et ſuppoſant ou feignant que parmy ces coexiſtens il y ait un nombre ſuffiſant de quelques uns, qui n' ayent point eu de changement en eux ; on dira que ceux qui ont un rapport à ces exiſtens fixes tel que d' autres avoient auparavant à eux ont eu la même* place *que ces derniers avoient eue. Et ce qui comprend toutes ces places, s' appellé* Eſpace. *Ce qui fait voir que pour avoir l' idée de la place, & par conſequent de l'* Eſpace, *il ſuffit de conſiderer ces rapports & les regles de leurs changemens, ſans avoir beſoin de ſe figurer icy aucune realité abſolue hors des choſes dont on conſidere la Situation. Et, pour donner une Eſpece de defi-*

* de ce rapport,

Order of Co-Exiſtence, according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or leſs ſimple. This Order, is their *Situation* or Diſtance. When it happens that one of thoſe Co-exiſtent Things changes its *Relation* to a Multitude of others, which do not change their Relation among themſelves; and that another thing, newly come, acquires the ſame Relation to the others, as the former had; we then ſay, it is come into the *Place* of the former; And this Change, we call a *Motion* in That Body, wherein is the immediate Cauſe of the Change. And though Many, or even All the Co-exiſtent Things, ſhould change according to certain known Rules of Direction and Swiftneſs; yet one may always determine the Relation of Situation, which every Co-exiſtent acquires with reſpect to every other Co-exiſtent; and even That Relation, which any other Co-exiſtent would have to this, or which this would have to any other, if it had not changed, or if it had changed any otherwiſe. And ſuppoſing, or feigning, that among thoſe Co-exiſtents, there is a ſufficient Number of them, which have undergone no Change; then we may ſay, that Thoſe which have ſuch a *Relation* to thoſe fixed Exiſtents, as Others had to them before, have now the ſame *Place* which thoſe others had. And That which comprehends *all thoſe Places*, is called *Space*. Which

definition, Place *eſt ce qu' on dit être le même à* A *&* *à* B, *quand le rapport de coexiſtence de* B, *avec* C, E, F, G, &c. *convient entierement avec le rapport de coexiſtence qu' A a eu avec les mêmes ; ſuppoſé qu' il n' y ait eu aucune cauſe de changement dans* C, E, F, G, &c. *On pourroit dire auſſi, ſans* ecthese, *que* place *eſt ce qui eſt le même en momens differens à des exiſtens quoyque differens, quand leur rapports de coexiſtence avec certains exiſtens, qui depuis un de ces momens à l' autre ſont ſuppoſés* fixes, *conviennent entierement. Et* exiſtens fixes *ſont ceux dans leſquels il n' y a point eu cauſe du changement de l'* ordre *de coexiſtence avec d' autres ; ou (ce qui eſt le même) dans leſquels il n' y a point eu de mouvement. Enfin,* Eſpace *eſt ce qui reſulte des places priſes enſemble. Et il eſt bon icy de conſiderer la difference entre la Place, & entre le rapport de Situation qui eſt dans le Corps qui occupe la place. Car la place d' A & de B eſt la même ; au lieu que le rapport d' A aux corps fixes, n' eſt pas preciſement & individuellement le même que le rapport que* B *(qui prendra ſa place) aura aux memes fixes ; & * ils conviennent ſeulement. Car deux ſujets differens, comme A & B, ne ſauroient avoir preciſement la même affection individuelle ; un même accident individuel ne ſe pouvant point trouver en deux ſujets, ny*

* ces rapports conviennent

paſſer

ſhows, that in order to have an Idea of *Place*, and conſequently of *Space*, it is ſufficient to conſider theſe *Relations*, and the Rules of their Changes, without needing to fancy any abſolute Reality *out of* the Things whoſe Situation we conſider. And, to give a kind of a Definition: *Place* is That, which we ſay is the ſame to *A* and, to *B*, when the *Relation* of the Co-exiſtence of *B*, with *C*, *E*, *F*, *G*, *&c.* agrees perfectly with the Relation of the Co-exiſtence, which *A* had with the ſame *C*, *E*, *F*, *G*, *&c.* ſuppoſing there has been no cauſe of Change in *C*, *E*, *F*, *G*, *&c.* It might be ſaid alſo, without entring into any further Particularity, that *Place* is That, which is the Same in different moments to different exiſtent Things, when their *Relations of Co-exiſtence* with certain Other Exiſtents, which are ſuppoſed to continue fixed from one of thoſe Moments to the other, agree intirely together. And *fixed Exiſtents* are thoſe, in which there has been no cauſe of any Change of the *Order* of their Co-exiſtence with others; or (which is the ſame Thing,) in which there has been no *Motion*. Laſtly, *Space* is That which reſults from *Places taken together*. And here it may not be amiſs to conſider the Difference between *Place*, and the *Relation of Situation*, which is in the Body that fills up the Place. For, the *Place* of *A* and *B*, is the *ſame*; whereas

paſſer de ſujet en ſujet. Mais l' eſprit nno content de la convenance, cherche une identité, une choſe qui ſoit veritablement la même, & la conçoit comme hors de ces ſujets; & c' eſt ce qu' on appelle icy place & Eſpace. *Cependant cela ne ſauroit étre qu' ideal, contenant un certain* ordre *où l' eſprit conçoit l' application des rapports : Comme l' eſprit ſe peut figurer un ordre conſiſtant en* lignes Genealogiques, *dont les grandeurs ne conſiſteroient que dans le nombre des Generations, où chaque Perſonne auroit ſa place; Et ſi l' on adjoutoit la fiction de la metempsychoſe, & faiſoit revenir les mêmes ames humanes, les Perſonnes y pourroient changer de place; Celuy qui a été pere ou grand pere, pourroit devenir fils ou petit fils,* &c. *Et cependant ces places, lignes, &* Eſpaces Genealogiques, *quoy qu' elles exprimeroient des verités réelles, ne ſeroient que choſes ideales. Je donneray encore un exemple de l' uſage de l' eſprit de ſe former, à l' occaſion des accidens qui ſont dans les ſujets, quelque choſe qui leur reponde hors des ſujets. La Raiſon ou Proportion entre deux lignes,* L, *&* M, *peut etre concüe de trois façons : Comme Raiſon du plus grand* L, *au moindre* M; *comme Raiſon du moindre* M, *au plus grand* L; *& enfin comme quelque choſe d' abſtrait des deux, c' eſt à dire comme la Raiſon entre* L *&* M, *ſans conſiderer lequel eſt l' anterieur ou le poſterieur, le ſujet ou l' objet : Et c'*

eſt

the *Relation* of *A* to fixed Bodies, is not preciſely and individually the *ſame*, as the Relation which *B* (that comes into its Place) will have to the ſame fixed Bodies; But theſe Relations *agree* only. For, two different Subjects, as *A* and *B*, cannot have preciſely the *ſame* individual Affection; it being impoſſible, that the ſame individual Accident ſhould be in two Subjects, or paſs from one Subject to another. But the Mind not contented with an Agreement, looks for an Identity, for ſomething that ſhould be truly the ſame; and conceives it as being extrinſick to the Subjects: And this is what we here call *Place* and *Space*. But this can only be an Ideal Thing; containing a certain *Order*, wherein the Mind conceives the Application of Relations. In like manner, as the Mind can fancy to it ſelf an *Order* made up of *Genealogical Lines*, whoſe Bigneſs would conſiſt only in the Number of Generations, wherein every Perſon would have his Place: And if to this one ſhould add the Fiction of a *Metempſychoſis*, and bring in the *ſame* Human Souls again; the Perſons in thoſe Lines might change Place; he who was a Father, or a Grand-Father, might become a Son, or a Grand-Son, *&c.* And yet thoſe Genealogical *Places*, *Lines*, and *Spaces*, though they ſhould expreſs real Truths, would only be Ideal Things. I ſhall allege another Example, to ſhow how the

eſt ainſi que les proportions ſont conſiderées dans la Muſique. Dans la premiere conſideration, L *le plus grand, eſt le ſujet; Dans la ſeconde,* M *le moindre, eſt le ſujet de cet accident, que les Philoſophes appellent relation ou rapport : Mais quel en ſera le ſujet dans le troiſieme ſens? On ne ſauroit dire que tous les deux,* L *&* M *enſemble,* * *ſont le ſujet d' un tel accident; car ainſi nous aurions un accident en deux ſujets, qui auroit une jambe dans l' un, & l' autre dans l' autre; ce qui eſt contre la notion des accidens. Donc il faut dire, que ce rapport dans le troiſiéme ſens, eſt bien hors des ſujets; mais que n' étant ny ſubſtance ny accident, cela doit étre une choſe purement ideale, dont la conſideration ne laiſſe pas d' étre utile. Au reſte, j' ay fait icy à peu pres comme* Euclide, *qui ne pouvant pas bien faire entendre abſolument ce que c' eſt que* Raiſon *priſe dans le ſens des Geometres, definit bien ce que c' eſt que* mêmes Raiſons. *Et c' eſt ainſi que, pour expliquer ce que c' eſt que la* Place, *j' ay voulu definir ce que c' eſt que la* même Place. *Je remarque enfin, que les traces des mobiles, qu' ils laiſſent quelques fois dans les immobiles ſur leſquels ils exercent leur mouvement; ont donné à l' imagination des hommes l' occaſion de ſe former cette idée, comme s' il reſtoit encore quelque trace lors même qu' il n' y a aucune choſe immobile : Mais cela n' eſt qu' ideal, & porte ſeulement que* s' il y avoit

* ſoient le &c.

the Mind uſes, upon occaſion of Accidents which are *in* Subjects, to fancy to it ſelf ſomething anſwerable to thoſe Accidents, *out of* the Subjects. The *Ratio* or *Proportion* between two Lines *L* and *M*, may be conceived three ſeveral Ways; as a *Ratio* of the greater *L*, to the leſſer *M*; as a *Ratio* of the leſſer *M*, to the greater *L*; and laſtly, as ſomething abſtracted from Both, that is, as the *Ratio* between *L* and *M*, without conſidering which is the Antecedent, or which the Conſequent; which the Subject, and which the Object. And thus it is, that Proportions are conſidered in Muſick. In the firſt way of conſidering them, *L* the greater; in the ſecond, *M* the leſſer, is the Subject of That Accident, which Philoſophers call *Relation*. But, Which of them will be the Subject, in the Third way of conſidering them? It cannot be ſaid that both of them, *L* and *M* together, are the Subject of ſuch an Accident; for if ſo, we ſhould have an Accident in two Subjects, with one Leg in one, and the other in the other; Which is contrary to the Notion of Accidents. Therefore we muſt ſay, that this Relation, in this Third way of conſidering it, is indeed *out of* the Subjects; but being neither a Subſtance, nor an Accident, it muſt be a mere Ideal Thing, the conſideration of which is nevertheleſs uſeful. To conclude: I have here done much like *Euclid*, who not being

avoit là quelque immobile, on l' y pourroit deſigner. *Et c' eſt cette Analogie qui fait qu' on s' imagine des* Places, *des* Traces, *des* Eſpaces, *quoyque ces choſes ne conſiſtent que dans la verité des* Rapports, *& nullement dans quelque realité abſolue.*

48. *Au reſte, ſi l' Eſpace vuide de corps (qu' on s' imagine) n' eſt pas vuide tout à fait, de quoy eſt il donc plein? Y a-t-il peut étre des Eſprits étendus, ou des Subſtances immaterielles capables de s' étendre & de ſe reſſerrer, qui s' y promenent, & qui ſe penetrent ſans s' incommoder, comme les ombres de deux corps ſe penetrent ſur la ſurface d' une muraille? Je voy revenir les plaiſantes Imaginations de feu M.* Henry Morus *(homme ſavant & bien intentionné d' ailleurs,) & de quelques autres, qui ont crû que ces Eſprits ſe peuvent rendre impenetra-*

bles

ing able to make his Readers well understand what *Ratio* is absolutely in the Sense of Geometricians; defines what are the *same Ratio's*. Thus, in like manner, in order to explain what *Place* is, I have been content to define what is the *same Place*. Lastly; I observe, that the Traces of moveable Bodies, which they leave sometimes upon the immoveable ones on which they are moved; have given Men occasion to form in their Imagination such an Idea, as if some Trace did still remain, even when there is Nothing unmoved. But this is a mere Ideal Thing, and imports only, that *if there was any unmoved thing there, the Trace might be marked out upon it.* And 'tis This Analogy, which makes Men fancy *Places*, *Traces* and *Spaces*; though those things consist only in the Truth of *Relations*, and not at all in any absolute Reality.

48. To conclude. If the Space (which the Author fancies) void of all Bodies, is not altogether empty; what is it then full of? Is it full of extended Spirits perhaps, or immaterial Substances, capable of extending and contracting themselves; which move therein, and penetrate each other without any Inconveniency, as the Shadows of two Bodies penetrate one another upon the Surface of a Wall? Methinks I see the revival of the *odd* Imaginations of Dr. *Henry More* (otherwise a Learned and well-meaning Man,) and of some Others,

bles quand bon leur ſemble. Il y en a même eu, qui ſe ſont imaginé que l'homme dans l'état d'integrité, avoit auſſi le don de la penetration ; mais qu'il eſt devenu ſolide, opaque & impenetrable, par ſa cheute. N'eſt ce pas renverſer les Notions des choſes, donner à Dieu des parties, donner de l'étendue aux Eſprits ? Le ſeul principe du beſoin de la Raiſon ſuffiſante, *fait diſparoitre tous ces ſpectres d'Imagination. Les Hommes ſe font aiſement des fictions, faute de bien employer ce grand Principe.*

Sur § 10.

49. *On ne* * *ſauroit dire que la* Duration *eſt éternelle, mais que les* choſes *qui durent tousjours, ſont éternelles. Tout ce qui exiſte du Temps & de la Duration, perit continuellement : Et comment une choſe pourroit elle exiſter éternellement, qui à parler exactement n'exiſte jamais ? Car comment pourroit exiſter une choſe, dont jamais aucune partie n'exiſte ? Du Temps n'exiſtent jamais que des inſtans, & l'inſtant n'eſt pas même une partie du temps. Quiconque conſiderera*

* *peut point* dire qu'*une certaine durée* eſt eternelle ; mais *on peut dire* que les choſes qui durent tousjours, ſont eternelles, *en gagnant tousjours une durée nouvelle.* Tout ce qui exiſte du Temps & de la Duration, *etant ſucceſſif*, perit, &c.

who fancied that thoſe Spirits can make themſelves impenetrable whenever they pleaſe. Nay, ſome have fancied, that *Man*, in the State of Innocency, had alſo the Gift of Penetration; and that he became Solid, Opake, and Impenetrable by his Fall. Is it not overthrowing our Notions of Things, to make God have Parts, to make Spirits have Extenſion? The Principle of the *Want of a ſufficient Reaſon* does alone drive away all theſe Spectres of Imagination. Men eaſily run into Fictions, for want of making a right Uſe of that great Principle.

To § 10.

49. It cannot be ſaid, that *Duration* is Eternal; but that *Things*, which continue always, are Eternal. Whatever exiſts of Time and of Duration, periſhes continually: And how can a thing exiſt Eternally, which, (to ſpeak exactly,) does never exiſt at all? For, how can a thing exiſt, whereof no Part does ever exiſt? Nothing of Time does ever exiſt, but Inſtants; and an Inſtant is not even it ſelf a part of Time. Whoever conſiders theſe Obſervations, will eaſily apprehend that Time can only be an Ideal Thing. And the Analogy between Time and Space, will eaſily make it appear, that

conſiderera ces Obſervations, comprendra bien que le Temps ne ſauroit étre qu' une choſe ideale ; & l' analogie du Temps & de l' Eſpace fera bien juger, que l' un eſt auſſi ideal que l' autre. †

50. *Si la realité de l' Eſpace & du Temps eſt neceſſaire pour l' immenſité & l' éternité de Dieu ; s' il faut que Dieu ſoit dans des Eſpaces ; ſi étre dans l' Eſpace eſt une Proprieté de Dieu ; Dieu ſera en quelque façon dependant du Temps & de l' Eſpace, & en aura beſoin. Car l' échappatoire que l' Eſpace & le Temps* ‖ *ſont des Proprietés de Dieu, eſt deja fermé.*

Sur § 11 & 12.

51. *Comme j' avois objecté que l' Eſpace ne ſauroit étre en Dieu, parce que l' Eſpace a des* parties ; *on cherche un autre échappatoire en s' éloignant du ſens receu des termes, & ſoûtenant que l' Eſpace n' a point de parties, parceque ſes parties ne ſont point ſeparables, & ne ſauroient étre eloignées les unes des autres par diſcerption. Mais il ſuffit que l' Eſpace ait des parties, ſoit que*

† Cependant, ſi en diſant que la Duration d' une choſe eſt éternelle, on entend ſeulement que la choſe dure éternellement ; je n' ay rien à y redire.

‖ ſont en Dieu, & comme des proprietés de Dieu, eſt deja fermé. Pourroit on ſupporter l' Opinion qui ſoutiendroit que les Corps ſe promenent dans les parties de l' eſſence divine?

that the one is as merely Ideal as the other.

50. If the reality of Space and Time, is neceſſary to the Immenſity and Eternity of God; if God muſt be in Space; if being in Space, is a Property of God; he will, in ſome meaſure, depend upon Time and Space, and ſtand in need of them. For I have already prevented That Subterfuge, that Space and Time are *Properties* of God.

To §§ 11, *and* 12.

51. I objected that Space cannot be in God, becauſe it has *Parts*. Hereupon the Author ſeeks another Subterfuge, by departing from the received Senſe of Words; maintaining that Space has no parts, becauſe its parts are not ſeparable, and cannot be removed from one another by diſcerption. But 'tis ſufficient that Space has parts, whether thoſe parts be ſeparable or not; And they may be aſſigned in Space, either by the Bodies that are in it, or by Lines

que ces parties ſoyent ſeparables ou non; & on les peut aſſigner dans l' Eſpace, ſoit par les corps qui y ſont, ſoit par les lignes ou ſurfaces qu' on y peut mener.

Sur § 13.

52. *Pour prouver que l' Eſpace ſans les corps, eſt quelque realité abſolue; on m' avoit objecté que l' Univers materiél fini, ſe pourroit promener dans l' Eſpace. J' ay repondu, qu'il ne paroiſt point* raiſonnable *que l' Univers materiel ſoit* fini; *Et quand on le ſuppoſeroit, il eſt deraiſonnable qu'il ait de* mouvement *autrement qu' entant que ſes parties changent de Situation entre elles; parce qu' un tel mouvement ne produiroit aucun* changement obſervable, *& ſeroit ſans but. Autre choſe eſt quand ſes Parties changent de Situation entre Elles; car alors on y reconnoiſt un mouvement dans l' Eſpace, mais* * *qui conſiſte dans l'* ordre des rapports *qui ſont changés. On replique maintenant que la verité du mouvement eſt independante de l'* Obſervation, *& qu' un Vaiſſeau peut avancer, ſans que celuy qui eſt dedans s' en apperçoive. Je reponds que le mouvement eſt independant de l'* Obſervation, *mais qu'il n'eſt point independant de l'* obſervabilité. *Il n'y a point de* mouvement, *quand il n'y a point de* changement obſervable. *Et même quand il n'y a point de* changement obſervable, *il n'y a point de* changement du tout. *Le Contrai-*

* conſiſtant dans &c.

Lines and Surfaces that may be drawn and deſcribed in it.

To § 13.

52. In order to prove that Space, without Bodies, is an abſolute reality; the Author objected, that a finite material Univerſe might *move forward* in Space. I anſwered, it does not appear *reaſonable* that the material Univerſe ſhould be *finite*; and, though we ſhould ſuppoſe it to be finite; yet 'tis *unreaſonable* it ſhould have *motion* any otherwiſe, than as its parts change their Situation among themſelves; becauſe ſuch a motion would * produce *no Change* that could be obſerved, and would be without Deſign. 'Tis another thing, when its parts change their Situation among themſelves; For then there is a *motion in Space*; but it conſiſts in the *order of Relations* which are changed. The Author replies now, that the reality of Motion does not depend upon being *obſerved*; and that a Ship may go forward, and yet a Man, who is in the Ship, may not perceive it. I anſwer, Motion does not indeed depend upon being *Obſerved*; but it does depend upon being *poſſible to be Obſerved.* There is no *Motion*, when there is no *Change that can be Obſerved.* And when there

* *See Appendix*, N°. 10.

traire est fondé sur la supposition d' un Espace réel absolu, que j'ay refuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d' une raison suffisante *des choses.*

53. *Je ne trouve rien dans la* definition huitiéme des Principes Mathematiques de la Nature, *ny dans le* Scholie de cette Definition, *qui prouve ou puisse prouver la réalité de l' Espace en soy. Cependant j' accorde qu' il y a de la difference entre un* Mouvement absolu veritable d'un corps, *& un* simple changement relatif de sa Situation par rapport à un autre Corps. *Car lors que la Cause immediate du changement est dans le Corps, il est veritablement en mouvement ; & alors la Situation des autres par rapport à luy, sera changée par consequence, quoyque la Cause de ce changement ne soit point en eux. Il est vray qu' à parler exactement, il n' y a point de Corps qui soit parfaitement & entierement en repos ; mais c'est de quoy on fait Abstraction, en considerant la chose Mathematiquement. Ainsi je n' ay rien laissé sans reponse, de tout ce qu' on a allegué pour la réalité absolue de l' Espace. Et j'ay demontré la fausseté de cette réalité, par un principe fondamental des plus raisonnables & des plus éprouvés, contre lequel on ne sauroit trouver aucune Exception ny Instance. Au reste, on peut juger par tout ce que je viens de*

is no *Change that can be Obſerved*, there is *no Change at all.* The contrary Opinion is grounded upon the Suppoſition of a real abſolute Space, which I have demonſtratively confuted by the Principle of the *want of a ſufficient Reaſon* of things.

53. I find nothing in the *Eighth Definition of the Mathematical Principles of Nature*, nor in the *Scholium belonging to it*, that proves, or can prove, the reality of Space in it ſelf. However, I grant there is a *difference* between *an abſolute true motion of a Body*, and a *mere relative Change of its Situation with reſpect to another Body.* For when the immediate Cauſe of the Change is in the Body, That Body is truly in Motion; and then the Situation of other Bodies, with reſpect to it, will be changed conſequently, though the Cauſe of that Change be not in Them. 'Tis true that, exactly ſpeaking, there is not any one Body, that is perfectly and intirely at Reſt; but we frame an abſtract Notion of Reſt, by conſidering the thing Mathematically. Thus have I left nothing unanſwered, of what has been alledged for the abſolute reality of Space. And I have demonſtrated the falſhood of that reality, by a fundamental Principle, one of the moſt certain both in Reaſon and Experience; againſt which, no Exception or Inſtance can be alledged. Upon the whole, one may judge from what has been ſaid,

dire, que je ne dois point admettre un Univers mobile, *ny aucune Place hors de l'Univers materiel.*

Sur § 14.

54. *Je ne connois aucune Objection à laquelle je ne crois d'avoir repondu ſuffiſamment. Et quant à cette Objection, que l'Eſpace & le Temps ſont des* Quantités, *ou pluſtoſt des choſes douées de quantité, & que la Situation & l'Ordre ne le ſont point; Je reponds que l'*Ordre *a auſſi ſa* quantité; *il y a ce qui precede & ce qui ſuit; il y a diſtance ou intervalle. Les choſes Relatives ont leur* Quantité, *auſſi bien que les abſolues. Par Exemple, les* Raiſons *ou Proportions dans les Mathematiques, ont leur* quantité, *& ſe* meſurent *par les* Logarithmes; *& cependant ce ſont des Relations. Ainſi quoyque le Temps & l'Eſpace conſiſtent en* rapports, *ils ne laiſſent pas d'avoir leur* quantité.

Sur § 15.

55. *Pour ce qui eſt de la Queſtion, ſi Dieu a pû créer le monde* pluſtoſt, *il faut ſe bien entendre. Comme j'ay demontré que le* Temps *ſans les Choſes n'eſt autre choſe qu'une ſimple poſſibilité idéale, il eſt manifeſte que ſi quelqu'un diſoit que ce même monde*

that I ought not to admit a *moveable Univerſe*; nor any *Place* out of the material Univerſe.

To § 14.

54. I am not ſenſible of any objection, but what I think I have ſufficiently anſwered. As for the objection that *Space* and *Time* are *Quantities*, or rather things *endowed with Quantity*; and that *Situation* and *Order* are not ſo: I anſwer, that *Order* alſo has its Quantity; There is in it, that which goes before, and that which follows; There is Diſtance or Interval. *Relative* things have their *Quantity*, as well as *abſolute* ones. For inſtance, *Ratios* or *Proportions* in Mathematicks, have their *Quantity*, and are *meaſured* by *Logarithms*; and yet they are *Relations*. And therefore though *Time* and *Space* conſiſt in *Relations*, yet they have their *Quantity*.

To § 15.

55. As to the Queſtion, Whether God could have created the World *ſooner*; 'tis neceſſary here to underſtand each other rightly. Since I have demonſtrated, that *Time*, without Things, is nothing elſe but a mere ideal Poſſibility; 'tis manifeſt, if any one ſhould ſay that this Same World, which

monde qui a été créé effectivement, * *ſans aucun autre changement ait pû être créé* pluſtoſt, *il ne dira* rien d' intelligible. *Car il n' y a aucune marque ou difference, par laquelle il ſeroit poſſible de connoiſtre qu'il eût été créé* pluſtoſt. *Ainſi, comme je l' ay deja dit, ſuppoſer que Dieu ait créé le même monde* pluſtoſt, *eſt ſuppoſer quelque choſe de chimerique. C'eſt faire du Temps une choſe abſolue independante de Dieu ; au lieu* † *que le Temps ne coëxiſte qu' aux Creatures, & ne ſe conçoit que par l' ordre & la* quantité *de leurs changemens.*

56. *Mais abſolument parlant,* on peut concevoir *qu' un Univers ait commencé* pluſtoſt *qu'il n' a commencé effectivement. Suppoſons que noſtre Univers, ou quelque autre, ſoit repreſenté par la Figure* A F; *que l' Ordonnée* A B, *repreſente ſon premier eſtat ; & que les Ordonnées* C D, E F, *repreſentent des Eſtats ſuivans. Je dis qu' on* peut concevoir *qu'il ait commencé* pluſtoſt, *en concevant la Figure prolongée en arriere, & en y adjoutant* S R A B S. *Car ainſi, les choſes eſtant augmentées, le*




* ait, ſans aucun autre changement, pû être &c.
† que le temps doit coexiſter aux &c.

temps

has been actually created, might have been created *ſooner*, without any other Change; he would ſay *nothing that is intelligible*. For there is no mark or difference, whereby it would be poſſible to know, that this World was created *ſooner*. And therefore, (as I have already ſaid,) to ſuppoſe that God created the ſame World *ſooner*, is ſuppoſing a Chimerical Thing. 'Tis making *Time* a thing abſolute, independent upon God; whereas *Time* does only co-exiſt with Creatures, and is only conceived by the *Order* and *Quantity* of their Changes.

56. But yet, abſolutely ſpeaking, one *may conceive* that an Univerſe began *ſooner*, than it actually did. Let us ſuppoſe our Univerſe, or any other, to be repreſented by the Figure *A F*; and that the Ordinate *A B* repreſents its firſt State; and the Ordinates *C D*, *E F*, its following States: I ſay, one *may conceive* that ſuch a World began *ſooner*, by conceiving the Figure prolonged backwards, and by adding to it *S R A B S*. For thus, *Things* being encreaſed, *Time* will be alſo encreaſed. But whether ſuch an augmentation be *reaſonable* and agreeable to God's Wiſdom, is another



temps ſera augmenté auſſi. Mais ſi une telle Augmentation eſt raiſonnable *& conforme à la ſageſſe de Dieu, c' eſt une autre Queſtion ; & il faut dire que non, autrement Dieu l' auroit faite. Ce ſeroit comme,*

Humano capiti cervicem Pictor equinam
Jungere ſi velit.

Il en eſt de même de la Deſtruction. Comme on pourroit concevoir quelque choſe d' adjouté au commencement, on pourroit concevoir de même quelque choſe de retranché vers la fin. Mais ce retranchement encore ſeroit deraiſonnable.

57. *C'eſt ainſi qu'il paroiſt comment on doit entendre que Dieu a créé les choſes en* quel temps *il luy a* plû ; *car cela depend des* choſes *qu'il a reſolu de créer. Mais les choſes étant reſolues avec leurs rapports, il n'y a plus de choix ſur le* Temps *ny ſur la* Place ; *qui n' ont rien de réel en eux à part, & rien de determinant, ou même rien de diſcernable.*

58. *On ne peut donc point dire, comme l' on fait icy, que la ſageſſe de Dieu peut avoir de* bonnes Raiſons *pour créer ce Monde* (this World) *dans un* tel temps particulier ; *ce temps particulier pris ſans les choſes, eſtant une fiction* impoſſible ; *&* de bonnes Raiſons *d' un choix ne ſe pouvant point trouver là où tout eſt indiſcernable.*

59. *Quand*

another Queſtion, to which we anſwer in the Negative; otherwiſe God *would* have made ſuch an Augmentation. It would be like as

Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
Jungere ſi velit.

The caſe is the ſame with reſpect to the *deſtruction* of the Univerſe. As one *might conceive* ſomething added to the Beginning, ſo one *might alſo conceive* ſomething taken off towards the End. But ſuch a Retrenching from it, would be alſo *unreaſonable.*

57. Thus it appears how we are to underſtand, that God created things at what *Time* he *pleaſed*; For this depends upon the *Things*, which he reſolved to create. But *Things* being once reſolved upon, together with their *Relations*; there remains no longer any choice about the *Time* and the *Place*, which of themſelves have nothing in them real, nothing that can diſtinguiſh them, nothing that is at all diſcernible.

58. One cannot therefore ſay, as the Author does here, that the Wiſdom of God may have *good reaſons* to create this World at *ſuch* or *ſuch a particular Time*: That particular Time, conſidered without the *things*, being an *impoſſible* fiction; and *good reaſons* for a choice, being not to be found, where every thing is indiſcernible.

59. When

59. *Quand je parle de ce Monde, j' entends tout l' Univers des Creatures materielles & immaterielles prises ensemble, depuis le commencement des choses ; mais si l' on n' entendoit que le commencement du monde materiel, & supposoit avant luy des creatures immaterielles, on se mettroit un peu plus à la Raison en cela. Car le* temps *alors estant* marqué *par des Choses qui existeroient dejà, ne seroit plus indifferent ; & il y pourroit avoir du choix. Il est vray qu' on ne feroit que differer la difficulté. Car supposant que l' Univers entier des Creatures immaterielles & materielles ensemble a commencé, il n' y a plus de choix sur le* temps *où Dieu le voudroit mettre.*

60. *Ainsi on ne doit point dire, comme l' on fait icy, que Dieu a créé les choses dans un* Espace, *ou dans un* Temps *particulier, qui* luy a plû. *Car tous les Temps, & tous les Espaces, en eux mêmes, estant parfaitement uniformes & indiscernables, l'un ne sauroit* plaire *plus que l' autre.*

61. *Je ne veux point m' arrester icy sur mon sentiment expliquée ailleurs, qui porte qu'il n' y a point de Substances créées entierement destituées de Matiere. Car je tiens avec les Anciens & avec la Raison, que les Anges ou les Intelligences, & les Ames separées du corps grossier, ont tousjours des Corps Subtils, quoyqu' elles mêmes soyent*

59. When I ſpeak of This *World*, I mean the whole *Univerſe* of material and immaterial Creatures taken together, from the beginning of Things. But if any one mean only the beginning of the *material* World, and ſuppoſe *immaterial* Creatures before it; he would have ſomewhat more Reaſon for his Suppoſition. For *Time* then being *marked* by things that exiſted already, it would be no longer indifferent; and there might be room for choice. And yet indeed, this would be only putting off the difficulty. For, ſuppoſing the whole Univerſe of immaterial and material Creatures together, to have a beginning; there is no longer any Choice about the *Time*, in which God would place that Beginning.

60. And therefore one muſt not ſay, as the Author does here, that God created things in what particular *Space*, and at what particular *Time* he *pleaſed*. For, All Time and All Spaces being in themſelves perfectly uniform and indiſcernible from each other, one of them cannot *pleaſe* more than another.

61. I ſhall not enlarge here upon my Opinion explained elſewhere, that there are no created Subſtances wholly deſtitute of Matter. For I hold with the Ancients, and according to Reaſon, that Angels or Intelligences, and Souls ſeparated from a groſs Body, have always ſubtil Bodies, though

ent incorporelles. La Philoſophie vulgaire admet aiſement toute ſorte de Fictions ; la mienne eſt plus ſevere.

62. *Je ne dis point que la Matiere & l' Eſpace eſt la même choſe ; je dis ſeulement qu' il n' y a point d' Eſpace, où il n'y a point de Matiere ; & que l' Eſpace en luy même n'eſt point une réalité abſolue. L' Eſpace & la Matiere different comme le temps & le mouvement. Cependant ces choſes, quoyque differentes, ſe trouvent* inſeparables.

63. *Mais il ne s' enſuit nullement que la Matiere ſoit éternelle & neceſſaire, ſi non en ſuppoſant que l'* Eſpace *eſt éternel & neceſſaire ; Suppoſition mal fondée en toutes manieres.*

Sur §. 16 & 17.

64. *Je crois d' avoir repondu à tout ; & j' ay repondu particulierement à cette Objection, qui pretend que l' Eſpace & le Temps ont une* Quantité, *& que l' Ordre n'en a point.* Voyés cydeſſus, n. 54.

65. *J' ay fait voir clairement, que la Contradiction eſt dans l' Hypotheſe du ſentiment oppoſé, qui cherche une difference là où il n' y en a point. Et ce ſeroit une iniquité manifeſte, d'en vouloir inferer, que j' ay reconnu de la Contradiction dans mon propre ſentiment.*

though they themſelves be incorporeal. The vulgar Philoſophy eaſily admits all ſorts of Fictions: Mine is more ſtrict.

62. I don't ſay that Matter and Space are the ſame Thing. I only ſay, *there is no Space, where there is no Matter*; and that Space in it ſelf is not an abſolute reality. Space and Matter differ, as Time and Motion. However, theſe things, though different, are *inſeparable.*

63. But yet it does not at all follow, that Matter is eternal and neceſſary; unleſs we ſuppoſe *Space* to be eternal and neceſſary: A Suppoſition ill grounded in all reſpects.

To § 16, *and* 17.

64. I think I have anſwered every thing; And I have particularly replied to That Objection, that *Space* and *Time* have *Quantity*, and that *Order* has none. *See above*, *Numb.* 54.

65. I have clearly ſhown that the Contradiction lies in the Hypotheſis of the oppoſite Opinion, which looks for a difference where there is none. And it would be a manifeſt Iniquity to infer from thence, that I have acknowledged a Contradiction in my own Opinion.

To

Sur § 18.

66. *Il revient icy un raiſonnement, que j'ay deja detruit cydeſſus,* Nomb. 17. *On dit que Dieu peut avoir de bonnes Raiſons pour placer deux Cubes parfaitement égaux & ſemblables : Et alors il faut bien, (dit on) qu'il leur aſſigne leurs Places, quoyque tout ſoit parfaitement égal. Mais la choſe ne doit point étre detachée des ſes Circonſtances. Ce raiſonnement conſiſte en Notions incompletes. Les Reſolutions de Dieu, ne ſont jamais abſtraites & imparfaites, comme ſi Dieu decernoit premierement à créer les deux Cubes, & puis decernoit à part où les mettre. Les Hommes bornés comme ils ſont, ſont capables de proceder ainſi ; ils reſoudront quelque choſe, & puis ils ſe trouveront embarraſſés ſur les moyens, ſur les voyes, ſur les Places, ſur les Circonſtances. Dieu ne prend jamais une Reſolution ſur les Fins, ſans en prendre en même temps ſur les Moyens, & ſur toutes les Circonſtances. Et même j'ay montré dans la* Theodicée, *qu'à proprement parler, il n'y a qu'Un Seul Decret pour l'Univers tout entier, par lequel il eſt reſolu de l'admettre de la poſſibilité à l'exiſtence. Ainſi Dieu ne choiſira point de Cube, ſans choiſir ſa Place en même temps ; & il* ne choiſira jamais *entre des* indiſcernables.

67. *Les*

To § 18.

66. Here I find again an Argument, which I have overthrown above, *Numb.* 17. The Author ſays, God may have *good Reaſons* to make two Cubes perfectly equal and alike: And then (ſays he) God muſt needs aſſign them their Places, though every other Reſpect be perfectly equal. But Things ought not to be ſeparated from their Circumſtances. This Argument conſiſts in incomplete Notions. God's Reſolutions are never abſtract and imperfect: As if God decreed, firſt, to create the two Cubes; and then, made another decree where to place them. Men, being ſuch limited Creatures as they are, may act in this manner. They may reſolve upon a thing, and then find themſelves perplexed about Means, Ways, Places, and Circumſtances. But God never takes a Reſolution about the Ends, without reſolving at the ſame time about the Means, and all the Circumſtances. Nay, I have ſhown in my *Theodicæa*, that, properly ſpeaking, there is but One Decree for the whole Univerſe, whereby God reſolved to bring it out of poſſibility into Exiſtence. And therefore God will not chuſe a Cube, without chuſing its Place at the ſame time; And he will *never* chuſe among *Indiſcernables*.

67. *Les parties de l' Eſpace ne ſont determinées & diſtinguées que par les choſes qui y ſont : Et la diverſité des choſes dans l' Eſpace, determine Dieu à agir differemment ſur differentes parties de l' Eſpace. Mais l' Eſpace pris ſans les choſes, n' a rien de determinant, & même il n' eſt rien d'* actuel.

68. *Si Dieu eſt reſolu de placer un certain Cube de matiere, il s' eſt auſſi determiné ſur la Place de ce Cube ; mais c' eſt par rapport à d' autres portions de matiere, & non pas par rapport à l' Eſpace detaché, où il n' y a rien de determinant.*

69. *Mais la ſageſſe ne permet pas qu' il place en même temps deux Cubes parfaitement égaux & ſemblables, parce qu' il n' y a pas moyen de trouver une Raiſon de leur aſſigner des places differentes. Il y auroit une* volonté ſans motif.

70. *J' avois comparé une* volonté ſans motif, *(telle que des raiſonnemens ſuperficiels aſſignent à Dieu,) au* hazard d'Epicure. *On y oppoſe que le* hazard d' Epicure *eſt une neceſſité aveugle, & non pas un choix de volonté. Je replique que le* hazard d' Epicure *n' eſt pas une neceſſité, mais quelque choſe d' indifferent.* Epicure *l' introduiſoit exprés pour éviter la neceſſité. Il eſt vray que le hazard eſt aveugle ; mais une* volonté ſans motif *ne ſeroit pas moins aveugle, & ne ſeroit pas moins due au* ſimple hazard.

67. The Parts of Space are not determined and diſtinguiſhed, but by the Things which are in it: And the Diverſity of Things in Space, determines God to act differently upon different Parts of Space. But Space without Things, has nothing whereby it may be diſtinguiſhed; and indeed not any thing *actual.*

68. If God is reſolved to place a certain Cube of Matter at all, he is alſo reſolved in what particular Place to put it. But 'tis with reſpect to Other Parts of Matter; and not with reſpect to bare Space it ſelf, in which there is nothing to diſtinguiſh it.

69. But Wiſdom does not allow God to place at the ſame time *two Cubes perfectly equal and alike*; becauſe there is no way to find any *Reaſon* for aſſigning them different Places. At this Rate, there would be * *a Will without a Motive.*

* *See Appendix,* N° 4.

70. A *Will without Motive*, (ſuch as ſuperficial Reaſoners ſuppoſe to be in God,) I compar'd to *Epicurus*'s *Chance.* The Author anſwers; *Epicurus's Chance* is a blind Neceſſity, and not a Choice of Will. I reply, that *Epicurus*'s *Chance* is not a Neceſſity, but Something indifferent. *Epicurus* brought it in on purpoſe to avoid Neceſſity. 'Tis true, Chance is Blind; But a *Will without Motive* would be no leſs Blind, and no leſs owing to mere Chance.

Sur § 19.

71. *On repete icy ce qui a dejà été refuté cy deſſus*, Nomb. 21; *que la matiere ne ſauroit étre créée, ſi Dieu ne choiſit point parmy les indiſcernables. On auroit Raiſon, ſi la matiere conſiſtoit en Atomes, en Corps ſimilaires, ou autres fictions ſemblables de la Philoſophie ſuperficielle. Mais ce même grand principe, qui combat le choix entre les indiſcernables, detruit auſſi ces fictions mal bâties.*

Sur § 20.

72. *On m' avoit objecté dans le* 3me Papier, (Nomb. 7 & 8.) *que Dieu n' auroit point en luy un principe d' agir, s' il étoit determiné par les* * externes. *J' ay repondu que les idées des choſes externes ſont en luy; & qu' ainſi il eſt determiné par des raiſons internes, c' eſt à dire par ſa ſageſſe. Maintenant on ne veut point entendre à propos de quoy je l' aye dit.*

* choſes externes;

Sur § 21.

73. *On confond ſouvent dans les objections qu' on me fait, ce que Dieu ne veut point, avec ce qu' il ne* peut *point.* Voyez ci-deſſus

To § 19.

71. The Author repeats here, what has been already confuted above, *Numb.* 21; that Matter cannot be created, without God's chuſing among Indiſcernibles. He would be in the right, if Matter conſiſted of Atoms, ſimilar Particles, or other the like Fictions of ſuperficial Philoſophy. But That great Principle, which proves there is no Choice among Indiſcernibles, deſtroys alſo theſe ill-contrived Fictions.

To § 20.

72. The Author objected againſt me in his *Third Paper*, (*Numb.* 7, *and* 8;) that God would not have in himſelf a Principle of Acting, if he was determined by Things *External*. I anſwered, that the Ideas of External Things are in him; and that therefore he is determined by Internal Reaſons, that is, by his Wiſdom. But the Author here will not underſtand, to what end I ſaid it.

To § 21.

73. He frequently confounds, in his Objections againſt me, what God *will not* do, with what he *cannot* do. *See above*, *Numb.* 9. For Example; God *can* do every

† & plus bas, N°76.

ci-deſſus, Nomb. 9 †. *Par Exemple*; *Dieu* peut *faire tout ce qui eſt poſſible, mais il ne* veut *faire que le Meilleur. Ainſi je ne dis point, comme on m' impute icy, que Dieu ne* peut *point donner des bornes à l' Etendue de la matiere, mais il y a de l' apparence qu' il ne le* veut *point, & qu' il a trouvé mieux de ne luy en point donner.*

74. *De l' étendue à la durée,* non valet conſequentia. *Quand l' étendue de la matiere n' auroit point de bornes, il ne s' enſuit point que ſa* durée *n' en ait pas non plus; pas même en arriere, c' eſt à dire qu' elle n' ait point eu de commencement. Si la nature des choſes dans le total eſt de croitre uniformément en perfection, l' Univers des creatures doit avoir commencé. Ainſi il y aura des Raiſons pour limiter la* durée *des choſes, quand même il n' y en auroit point pour en limiter l' étendue. De plus, le commencement du Monde ne deroge point à l' infinité de ſa durée à* parte poſt, *ou dans la ſuite; mais les bornes de l' Univers derogeroient à l' infinité de ſon étendue. Ainſi il eſt plus raiſonnable d' en poſer un commencement, que d' en admettre des bornes; à fin de conſerver dans l' un & dans l' autre le caractere d' un Auteur infini.*

75. *Cependant ceux qui ont admis l'* éternité *du Monde, ou, du moins, comme ont fait*

Thing that is poſſible, but he *will* do only what is beſt. And therefore I don't ſay, as the Author here will have it, that God *cannot* limit the Extenſion of Matter; but 'tis likely he *will not* do it, and that he has thought it better to ſet no Bounds to Matter.

74. From Extenſion to Duration, *non valet conſequentia.* Though the *Extenſion* of Matter were unlimited, yet it would not follow that its *Duration* would be alſo unlimited; nay, even *à parte ante*, it would not follow, that it had no Beginning. If it is the Nature of Things in the whole, to grow uniformly in Perfection; the Univerſe of Creatures muſt have had a Beginning. And therefore, there will be Reaſons to limit the *Duration* of Things, even though there were none to limit their Extenſion. Beſides, the World's having a Beginning, does not derogate from the Infinity of its Duration *à parte poſt*; but Bounds of the Univerſe would derogate from the Infinity of its Extenſion. And therefore it is more reaſonable to admit a Beginning of the World, than to admit any Bounds of it; that the Character of its infinite Author, may be in Both Reſpects preſerved.

75. However, thoſe who have admitted the *Eternity* of the World, or, at leaſt, (as ſome famous Divines have done,) the *poſſi-*

fait des Theologiens celebres, la poſſibilité de l' éternité du Monde; n' ont point nié pour cela ſa dependance de Dieu, comme on le leur impute icy ſans fondement.

Sur § 22 & 23.

76. *On m' objecte encore icy ſans fondement, que, ſelon moy, tout ce que Dieu peut faire, doit être fait neceſſairement. Comme ſi l' on ignoroit que j' ay refuté cela ſolidement dans la* Theodicée, *& que j' ay renverſé l' opinion de ceux qui ſoutiennent qu' il n' y a rien de poſſible que ce qui arrive effectivement; comme ont fait deja quelques anciens Philoſophes, &, entre autres,* Diodore *chez* Ciceron. *On confond la neceſſité morale, qui vient du choix du meilleur, avec la neceſſité abſolue; on confond la volonté avec la puiſſance de Dieu. Il peut produire tout poſſible, ou ce qui n' implique point de contradiction; mais il veut produire le meilleur entre les poſſibles.* Voyés ce qui a été dit cy-deſſus, N° 9. * *& N°74.

77. *Dieu n' eſt donc point un Agent Neceſſaire en produiſant les Creatures, puis qu' il agit par Choix. Cependant ce qu' on adjoute icy, eſt mal fondé, qu' un Agent Neceſſaire ne ſeroit point un Agent. On prononce ſouvent hardiment & ſans fondement,*

en

bility of its Eternity; did not, for all that, deny its dependence upon God; as the Author here lays to their Charge, without any Ground.

To § 22, 23.

76. He here further objects, without any Reaſon, that, according to my Opinion, whatever God *can* do, he *muſt needs* have done. As if he was ignorant, that I have ſolidly confuted this Notion in my *Theodicæa*; and that I have overthrown the Opinion of thoſe, who maintain that there is nothing poſſible but what really happens; as ſome ancient Philoſophers did, and among others *Diodorus* in *Cicero*. The Author confounds *Moral Neceſſity*, which proceeds from the Choice of what is *Beſt*, with *Abſolute Neceſſity*: He confounds the *Will* of God, with his *Power*. God *can* produce every Thing that is poſſible, or whatever does not imply a Contradiction; but he *wills* only to produce what is the *Beſt* among Things poſſible. *See what has been ſaid above, Numb.* 9.

77. God is not therefore a *neceſſary Agent* in producing Creatures, ſince he acts with Choice. However, what the Author adds here, is ill-grounded, *viz.* that a *Neceſſary Agent* would not be an Agent at all. He frequently affirms Things boldly,

† contre moy des theſes

en avançant † *des theſes qu' on ne ſauroit prouver.*

Sur § 24 —— 28.

78. *On s' excuſe de n' avoir point dit que l' Eſpace eſt le* ſenſorium *de Dieu, mais ſeulement* comme *ſon* ſenſorium. *Il ſemble que l' un eſt auſſi peu convenable, & auſſi peu intelligible que l' autre.*

Sur § 29.

79. *L'* Eſpace *n' eſt pas la place de toutes choſes, car il n' eſt pas la place de* Dieu; *autrement voilà une choſe coëternelle à Dieu, & independante de luy, & même de laquelle il dependroit s' il a beſoin de place.*

80. *Je ne voy pas auſſi comment on peut dire, que l'* Eſpace *eſt la* place des idées; *car les* idées *ſont dans l'* Entendement.

81. *Il eſt fort étrange auſſi de dire que l'* Ame de l' Homme *eſt* l' Ame des images. *Les images qui ſont dans l' Entendement, ſont dans l' Eſprit; mais s' il étoit l' Ame des images, elles ſeroient hors de luy. Que ſi l' on entend des Images corporelles, comment veut on que noſtre Eſprit en ſoit l' Ame, puiſque ce ne ſont que des impreſſions paſſageres dans le Corps dont il eſt l' Ame?*

82. *Si*

boldly, and without any ground; advancing Notions which cannot be proved.

To § 24 —— 28.

78. The Author alledges, it was not affirmed that Space is God's *Senſorium*, but only *as it were* his *Senſorium*. The latter ſeems to be as improper, and as little intelligible, as the former.

To § 29.

79. *Space* is not the Place of all Things; for it is not the Place of *God*. Otherwiſe there would be a thing co-eternal with God, and independent upon him; nay, he himſelf would depend upon *it*, if he has need of *Place*.

80. Nor do I ſee, how it can be ſaid, that *Space* is the *Place of Ideas*; for *Ideas* are in the *Underſtanding*.

81. 'Tis alſo very ſtrange to ſay, that the *Soul of Man* is the *Soul of the Images* it perceives. The *Images*, which are in the Underſtanding, are in the Mind: But if the Mind was the *Soul of the Images*, they would then be extrinſick to it. And if the Author means *corporeal Images*, how then will he have a *human Mind* to be the *Soul of thoſe Images*, they being only tranſient Impreſſions in a Body belonging to that Soul?

82. If

82. *Si Dieu ſent ce qui ſe paſſe dans le Monde, par le* moyen *d'* un ſenſorium ; *il ſemble que les choſes agiſſent ſur luy, & qu' ainſi il eſt comme on conçoit l'* Ame du Monde. *On m' impute de repeter les objections, ſans prendre connoiſſance des reponſes ; mais je ne voy point qu' on ait ſatisfait à cette difficulté ; on feroit mieux de* renoncer tout à fait *à ce* ſenſorium *pretendu.*

Sur § 30.

83. *On parle comme ſi l' on n' entendoit point comment ſelon moy* l' Ame *eſt* un principe repreſentatif, *c' eſt à dire, comme ſi l' on n' avoit jamais oüi parler de mon* harmonie préétablié.

84. *Je ne demeure point d' accorde des notions vulgaires, comme ſi les* Images des choſes *étoient* tranſportées, (conveyed) *par les* Organes *juſqu' à* l' Ame. *Car il n' eſt point concevable par quelle ouverture, ou par quelle voiture, ce tranſport des images depuis l' Organe juſques dans l' Ame ſe peut faire. Cette notion de la Philoſophie vulgaire, n' eſt point intelligible ; comme les nouveaux* Carteſiens *l' ont aſſez montré. L' on ne ſauroit expliquer comment la Subſtance* immaterielle *eſt affectée par la* matiere : *& ſoutenir une choſe non intelligible là deſſus, c' eſt recourir à la notion Scholaſtique chimerique de je ne ſay quelles*

82. If 'tis by *means* of a *Senſorium*, that God perceives what paſſes in the World; it ſeems that Things act upon him; and that therefore he is what we mean by *a Soul of the World.* The Author charges me with repeating Objections, without taking notice of the Anſwers; but I don't ſee that he has anſwered this Difficulty. They had better *wholly lay aſide* this pretended *Senſorium.*

To § 30.

83. The Author ſpeaks, as if he did not underſtand, how, according to my Opinion, the *Soul* is a *Repreſentative Principle.* Which is, as if he had never heard of my † *Pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony.*

† *See Appendix,* N° 5.

84. I don't aſſent to the vulgar Notions, that the *Images of Things* are *conveyed* by the *Organs* [of Senſe] to the *Soul.* For, it is not conceivable by what Paſſage, or by what Means of Conveyance, theſe Images can be carried from the Organ to the Soul. This Vulgar Notion in Philoſophy is not intelligible, as the new *Carteſians* have ſufficiently ſhown. It cannot be explained, how *Immaterial* Subſtance is affected by *Matter*: And to maintain an unintelligible Notion thereupon, is having recourſe to the Scholaſtick Chimerical Notion of I know not what inexplicable *Species Intentionales*, paſſing from the Organs

Eſpeces intentionelles *inexplicables, qui paſſent des Organes dans l' Ame. Ces* Carteſiens *ont vû la difficulté, mais ils ne l' ont point reſolue ; ils ont eu recours à un concours* * *de Dieu, qui ſeroit miraculeux en effect : Mais je crois d' avoir donné la* veritable ſolution *de cet Enigme.*

85. *De dire que Dieu diſcerne les choſes qui ſe paſſent, parce qu' il eſt* preſent *aux Subſtances, & non pas* † *par une* production continuelle, *c' eſt dire des choſes non intelligibles. La ſimple* preſence, *ou la proximité de coëxiſtence, ne ſuffit point pour entendre comment ce qui ſe paſſe dans un Etre, doit repondre à ce qui ſe paſſe dans un autre Etre.*

86. *Par aprés c' eſt donner juſtement dans la doctrine qui fait de Dieu l'* Ame du Monde, *puiſqu' on le fait ſentir les choſes non pas par la dependance qu' elles ont de luy, c' eſt à dire par la* production continuelle *de ce qu' il y a de bon & de parfait en elles ; mais par une maniere de ſentiment comme l' on s' imagine que* noſtre Ame *ſent ce qui ſe paſſe dans le Corps. C' eſt bien degrader la connoiſſance divine.*

87. *Dans la verité des choſes, cette maniere de ſentir eſt entierement chimerique, &*

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* de Dieu tout particulier,

† par la dependance que la continuation de leur exiſtence a de luy, & qu' on peut dire d' envelopper une production *&c.*

to the Soul. Thoſe *Carteſians* ſaw the Difficulty; but they could not explain it. They had recourſe to a Concourſe of God, which would really be miraculous. But, I think, *I have given* the *true Solution* of that *Ænigma.*

85. To ſay that God perceives what paſſes in the World, becauſe he is *preſent* to the Things, and not by a *continual Production* of them; is ſaying ſomething unintelligible. A mere *Preſence* or Proximity of Co-exiſtence, is not ſufficient to make us underſtand, how that which paſſes in One Being, ſhould anſwer to what paſſes in another.

86. Beſides; This is exactly falling into That Opinion, which makes God to be the *Soul of the World*; ſeeing it ſuppoſes God to perceive Things, not by their dependence upon him, that is, by a *continual Production* of what is good and perfect in them; but by a Kind of Perception, ſuch as that by which Men fancy Our Soul perceives what paſſes in the Body. This is a degrading of God's Knowledge very much.

87. In Truth and Reality, this way of Perception is wholly Chimerical, and has no place even in *Human Souls.* They perceive what paſſes *without* them, by what paſſes *within* them, anſwering to the Things

& n' a pas même lieu dans les Ames. *Elles ſentent ce qui ſe paſſe* hors *d' elles, par ce qui ſe paſſe* en *elles, repondant aux choſes de dehors ; en vertu de l'* harmonie *que Dieu a préétablie, par la plus belle & la plus admirable de toutes ſes productions ; qui fait que* chaque ſubſtance ſimple, *en vertu de ſa nature, eſt, pour dire ainſi, une* concentration *& un* miroir vivant de tout l' Univers *ſuivant* ſon point de veue. *Ce qui eſt encore une des plus belles, & des plus inconteſtables Preuves de l' Exiſtence de Dieu ; puiſqu' il n' y a que Dieu, c' eſt à dire la cauſe commune, qui puiſſe faire cette harmonie des choſes. Mais Dieu même ne peut ſentir les choſes par le moyen par lequel il les fait ſentir aux autres. Il les ſent, parce qu' il eſt capable de produire ce moyen ; & il ne les feroit point ſentir aux autres, s' il ne les produiſoit luy même toutes* conſentantes, *& s' il n' avoit ainſi en ſoy leur repreſentation, non comme venant d' elles, mais parce qu' elles viennent de luy, & parce qu' il en eſt la cauſe efficiente & exemplaire. Il les ſent parce qu' elles viennent de luy, s' il eſt permis de dire qu' il les ſent ; ce qui ne ſe doit, qu' en depouillant le terme de ſon imperfection, qui ſemble ſignifier qu' elles agiſſent ſur luy. Elles ſont, & luy ſont connues, parce qu' il les entend & veut ; & parce que ce qu' il veut, eſt autant que ce qui exiſte. Ce qui paroiſt d' autant plus, parce qu' il les fait ſentir les unes aux autres ;*

Things without; in virtue of the † *Harmony*, which God has pre-eſtabliſhed by the moſt beautiful and the moſt admirable of all his Productions; whereby || *every ſimple Subſtance* is by its nature, (if one may ſo ſay,) a *concentration*, and a *living mirror* of the *whole Univerſe*, * according to its *Point of view*. Which is likewiſe one of the moſt beautiful and moſt undeniable Proofs of the exiſtence of God; ſince none but God, *viz.* the univerſal Cauſe, can produce ſuch a Harmony of things. But God himſelf cannot perceive things by the ſame Means whereby he makes other Beings perceive them. He perceives them, becauſe he is able to produce That Means. And Other Beings would not be cauſed to perceive them, if he himſelf did not produce them all *harmonious*, and had not therefore in himſelf a repreſentation of them; Not as if that Repreſentation came from the Things, but becauſe the Things proceed from Him, and becauſe he is the Efficient and Exemplary Cauſe of them. He perceives them, becauſe they proceed from him; if one may be allowed to ſay, that he *perceives* them: Which ought not to be ſaid, unleſs we diveſt That Word of its imperfection; for elſe it ſeems to ſignify, that things act upon him. They exiſt, and are known to him, becauſe he underſtands and wills them; and becauſe what he wills, is the ſame, as what exiſts. Which ap-

† *See Appendix*, N°. 5.

|| *See Appendix*, N° 2.

* *See Appendix*, N°. 11.

autres ; & qu' il les fait ſentir mutuellement par la ſuite des Natures, qu' il leur a données une fois pour toutes, & qu' il ne fait qu' entretenir ſuivant les loix de chacune à part, les quelles bien que differentes aboutiſſent à une correſpondence exacte des reſultats. Ce qui paſſe toutes les Idées qu' on a eu vulgairement de la Perfection Divine & des Ouvrages de Dieu, & † l' éleve au plus haut degré ; comme M. Bayle *a bien reconnu, quoy qu' il ait crû ſans ſujet que cela paſſe le poſſible.*

† les éleve

88. *Ce ſeroit bien abuſer du Texte de la Sainte Ecriture, ſuivant lequel Dieu repoſe des ſes Ouvrages ; que d' en inferer qu' il n'y a plus de* production continuée. *Il eſt vray qu' il n'y a point de Production de Subſtances ſimples nouvelles ; mais on auroit tort d' en inferer que Dieu n'eſt maintenant dans le Monde, que comme l' on conçoit que* l' Ame *eſt dans le Corps, en le* gouvernant ſeulement *par ſa Preſence, ſans un concours neceſſaire pour lui faire continuer ſon Exiſtence.*

pears ſo much the more, becauſe he makes them to be perceived by one another; and makes them perceive one another in conſequence of the Natures which he has given them once for all, and which he Keeps up only, according to the laws of every one of them ſeverally; which, though different one from another, yet terminate in an exact correſpondence of the Reſults of the whole. This ſurpaſſes all the Ideas, which Men have generally framed concerning the divine Perfections, and the works of God; and raiſes [*our notion of*] them, to the higheſt degree; as Mr. *Bayle* has acknowledged, though he believed, without any ground, that it exceeded poſſibility.

88. To infer from That paſſage of Holy Scripture, wherein God is ſaid to have reſted from his Works, that there is no longer a *continual Production* of them; would be to make a very ill uſe of that Text. 'Tis true, there is no production of *New* Simple Subſtances: But it would be wrong to infer from thence, that God is now in the World, only as the Soul is conceived to be in the Body, *governing it merely* by his preſence, without any concourſe being neceſſary to continue its Exiſtence.

Sur § 31.

89. *L'* Harmonie *ou Correſpondence entre l'* Ame *& le* Corps, *n' eſt pas un* Miracle *perpetuel, mais l' Effect ou ſuite d' un Miracle primigene fait dans la Creation des choſes, comme ſont toutes les choſes naturelles. Il eſt vray que c' eſt une* Merveille *perpetuelle, comme ſont beaucoup de choſes naturelles.*

90. *Le mot d'* Harmonie préétablie *eſt un Terme de l' Art, je l' avoue ; mais non pas un Terme qui n' explique rien ; puiſqu' il eſt expliqué fort intelligiblement, & qu' on n' oppoſe rien qui marque qu' il y ait de la difficulté.*

91. *Comme la nature de* chaque Subſtance ſimple, Ame *ou* veritable Monade, *eſt telle que ſon état ſuivant eſt une Conſequence de ſon état precedent ; voilà la cauſe de l'* Harmonie *toute trouvée. Car Dieu n' a qu' à faire que la* Subſtance ſimple *ſoit une fois & d' abord une* Repreſentation de l' Univers *ſelon ſon* point de veue : *Puiſque de cela ſeul il ſuit qu' elle le ſera perpetuellement ; & que* toutes les Subſtances ſimples *auront tousjours une* Harmonie *entre elles, parcequ' elles* repreſentent *tousjours le* même Univers.

Sur

To § 31.

89. The *Harmony*, or Correſpondence between the *Soul* and the *Body*, is not a perpetual *Miracle*; but the effect or conſequence of an original Miracle worked at the Creation of things; as all natural things are. Though indeed it is a perpetual *Wonder*, as many natural things are.

90. The word, *Pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, is a Term of Art, I confeſs; but 'tis not a Term that explains nothing, ſince it is made out very intelligibly; and the Author alledges nothing, that ſhows there is any difficulty in it.

91. The nature of * *every ſimple Subſtance*, *Soul*, or *true Monad*, being ſuch, that its following State is a conſequence of the preceding one; here now is the cauſe of the *Harmony* found out. For God needs only to make a *ſimple Subſtance* become *once* and from the beginning, a *repreſentation of the Univerſe*, * according to its *Point of view*; Since from thence alone it follows, that it will be ſo *perpetually*; and that *all ſimple Subſtances* will always have a *Harmony* among themſelves, becauſe they always *repreſent* the ſame *Univerſe*.

* *See Appendix*, N° 2.

* *See Appendix*, N° 11.

Sur § 32.

92. *Il eſt vray que, ſelon moy,* l' Ame *ne trouble point les loix du* Corps, *ny le* Corps *celles de l'* Ame ; *& qu' ils s' accordent ſeulement ; l' un agiſſant librement, ſuivant les Regles des Cauſes finales ; & l' autre agiſſant machinalement, ſuivant les Loix des Cauſes efficientes. Mais cela ne deroge point à la Liberté de nos Ames, comme on le prend icy. Car tout Agent qui agit ſuivant les cauſes finales, eſt libre, quoyqu' il arrive qu' il s' accorde avec celuy qui n' agit que par des Cauſes efficientes ſans connoiſſance, ou par* Machine ; *parceque Dieu prevoyant ce que la cauſe libre feroit, a reglé d' abord ſa* Machine *en ſorte qu' elle ne puiſſe manquer de s' y accorder. Monſieur* Jaquelot *a fort bien reſolu cette difficulté dans un de ſes Livres contre M.* Bayle ; *& j'en y cite le Paſſage dans la* Theodicée, Part I. § 63. *J' en parleray encore plus bas,* Nomb. 124.

Sur § 33.

93. *Je n' admets point que toute* Act on *donne une* nouvelle force *à ce qui patit. Il arrive ſouvent dans le concours des Corps, que chacun garde ſa force ; comme lors que*

To § 32.

92. 'Tis true, that, according to Me, the *Soul* * does not diſturb the Laws of the *Body*, nor the *Body* thoſe of the *Soul*; and that the *Soul* and *Body* do *only agree* together; the one acting freely, according to the rules of Final Cauſes; and the other acting † *mechanically*, according to the laws of Efficient Cauſes. But this does not derogate from the Liberty of our Souls; as the Author here will have it. For, every Agent which acts according to Final Cauſes, is free, though it happens to agree with an Agent acting only by Efficient Cauſes without Knowledge, or *mechanically*; becauſe God, foreſeeing what the free Cauſe would do, did from the beginning regulate the *Machine* in ſuch manner, that it cannot fail to *agree* with that free Cauſe. Mr. *Jaquelot* has very well reſolved this difficulty, in one of his Books againſt Mr. *Bayle*; and I have cited the Paſſage, in my *Theodicæa*, Part I. § 63. I ſhall ſpeak of it again below, *Numb.* 124.

* *See Appendix*, N° 5.

† *See Appendix*, N° 13.

To § 33.

93. I don't admit, that every *action* gives a *new force* to the *Patient*. It frequently happens in the concourſe of Bodies, that each of them preſerves its *force*; as

que deux corps durs égaux concourent directement. Alors la ſeule Direction eſt changée, ſans qu' il y ait du changement dans la force; chacun des Corps prenant la Direction de l' autre, & retournant avec la même viteſſe *qu'il avoit deja eue.*

94. *Cependant je n' ay garde de dire qu'il ſoit ſurnaturel de donner une nouvelle* force *à un Corps; car je reconnois qu' un Corps reçoit ſouvent une nouvelle* force *d' un autre Corps, qui en perd autant de la ſienne: Mais je dis ſeulement qu' il eſt ſurnaturel que tout* l' Univers *des Corps reçoive une nouvelle* force; *& ainſi qu' un corps gagne de la* Force, *ſans que d' autres en perdent autant. C'eſt pourquoy je dis auſſi, qu' il eſt inſoutenable que* l' Ame *donne de la* Force *au* Corps; *car alors tout l' Univers des Corps recevroit une nouvelle* force.

95. *Le Dilemme qu' on fait icy, eſt mal fondé, que ſelon moy il faut ou que l' Homme agiſſe ſurnaturellement, ou que l' Homme ſoit une pure* Machine *comme une Montre. Car l' Homme n' agit point ſurnaturellement, & ſon Corps eſt veritablement* une Machine, *& n' agit que* machinalement; *mais ſon* Ame *ne laiſſe pas d' être une cauſe libre.*

Sur

when two equal hard Bodies meet directly. Then the Direction only is changed, without any change in the *Force*; each of the Bodies receiving the Direction of the other, and going back with the ſame *ſwiftneſs* it came.

94. However, I am far from ſaying that it is *ſupernatural* to give a *new force* to a Body; for I acknowledge that One Body does frequently receive a new *Force* from another, which loſes as much of its own. But I ſay only, 'tis *Supernatural* that the whole *Univerſe of Bodies* ſhould receive a *new force*; and conſequently that one body ſhould acquire any new *force*, without the loſs of as much in others. And therefore I ſay likewiſe, 'tis an indefenſible opinion to ſuppoſe the *Soul* gives *force* to the *Body*; for then the whole Univerſe of Bodies would receive a *new force*.

95. The Author's *Dilemma* here, is ill grounded; *viz.* that according to Me, either a Man muſt act Supernaturally, or be a mere *Machine*, like a Watch. For, Man does not act Supernaturally: And his Body is truely a *Machine*, acting only *mechanically*; and yet his *Soul* is a free Cauſe.

To

Sur § 34 & 35.

96. *Je me remets auſſi à ce qui a été ou ſera dit dans ce preſent Papier*, Nomb. 82, 86, & 111 ; *touchant la comparaiſon entre* Dieu *& l'* Ame du Monde ; *& comment le ſentiment qu' on oppoſe au mien, fait trop approcher l' un à l' autre.*

Sur § 36.

97. *Je me rapporte auſſi à ce que je viens de dire touchant l'* Harmonie *entre l'* Ame *& le* Corps. Nomb. 89, *& ſeqq* ;

Sur § 37.

98. *On me dit que l' Ame n'eſt pas dans le Cerveau, mais dans le* Senſorium, *ſans dire ce que c' eſt que ce* Senſorium. *Mais ſuppoſé que ce* Senſorium *ſoit étendu, comme je crois qu' on l' entend ; c' eſt tousjours la même difficulte, & la Queſtion revient ſi l' Ame eſt diffuſe par tout cet Etendu, quelque grand ou quelque petit qu' il ſoit. Car le plus ou moins de grandeur, n'y fait rien.*

Sur § 38.

99. *Je n' entreprends pas icy d' établir ma* Dynamique, *ou ma Doctrine des* Forces :

Ce

To § 34, *and* 35.

96. I here refer to what has been or ſhall be ſaid in this Paper, *Numb.* 82, 86, *and* 111; concerning the compariſon between *God* and a *Soul of the World*; and how the opinion contrary to mine, brings the one of theſe too near to the other.

To § 36.

97. I here alſo refer to what I have before ſaid, concerning the *Harmony* between the *Soul* and the *Body*, Numb. 89, *&c.*

To § 37.

98. The Author tells us, that the Soul is not in the Brain, but in the *Senſorium*; without ſaying What that *Senſorium* is. But ſuppoſing That *Senſorium* to be extended, as I believe the Author underſtands it; the ſame difficulty ſtill remains, and the Queſtion returns, Whether the Soul be diffuſed through that whole Extenſion, be it great or ſmall. For, more or leſs in bigneſs, is nothing to the purpoſe here.

To § 38.

99. I don't undertake here to eſtabliſh my *Dynamicks*, or my Doctrine of *Forces*: This

Ce lieu n'y ſeroit point propre. Cependant je puis fort bien repondre à l' Objection qu' on me fait icy. J' avois ſoutenu que les Forces actives *ſe conſervent dans le Monde. On m' objecte, que deux Corps* Mols *ou non-élaſtiques, concourant entre eux, perdent de leur* force. *Je reponds que non. Il eſt vray que les Touts la perdent par rapport à leur mouvement total ; mais les Parties la reçoivent, étant* * *agitées par la force du concours. Ainſi ce defaut n' arrive qu'en apparence. Les* Forces *ne ſont point detruites, mais diſſipées parmy les Parties menuës. Ce n' eſt pas les perdre, mais c' eſt faire comme font ceux qui changent la groſſe Monnoye en petite. Je demeure cependant d' accord, que la* quantité du mouvement *ne demeure point la même ; & en cela j' approuve ce qui ſe dit,* pag. 341 de l' Optique de M. Newton, *qu' on cite icy. Mais j' ay montré ailleurs, qu' il y a de la difference entre la quantité du* mouvement *& la quantité de la* force.

* agitées interieurement

Sur § 39.

100. *On m' avoit ſoutenu que la Force* † *ſe diminuoit naturellement dans l' Univers corporel, & que cela venoit de la dependance des Choſes ;* (3me papier, ſur § 13 & 14.) *J' avois demandé dans ma* 3me *reponſe, qu' on prouvât que ce defaut eſt une ſuite de la dependance des Choſes. On eſquive*

† decroiſſoit

This would not be a proper Place for it. However, I can very well anſwer the Objection here brought againſt me. I have affirmed that * *Active Forces* are preſerved in the World [*without diminution.*] The Author objects, that two *Soft* or Un-elaſtick Bodies meeting together, loſe ſome of their *force.* I anſwer, No. 'Tis true, their *Wholes* loſe it with reſpect to their Total Motion; but their *Parts* receive it, being ſhaken by the force of the Concourſe. And therefore That loſs of *Force*, is only in appearance. The *forces* are not deſtroyed, but ſcattered among the ſmall parts. The Bodies do not *loſe* their *forces*; but the caſe here is the ſame, as when Men change great Money into ſmall. However, I agree that the *quantity of Motion* does not remain the ſame; And herein I approve what Sir *Iſaac Newton* ſays, *page* 341 of his *Opticks*, which the Author here quotes. But I have ſhown elſewhere, that there is a difference between the quantity of *Motion*, and the quantity of *Force.*

* *See above, the Note on* § 13, *of Dr.* Clarke's *Third Reply.*

To § 39.

100. The Author maintained againſt me, that *Force* does naturally *leſſen* in the material Univerſe; and that This ariſes from the dependence of things, (*Third Reply*, § 13 *and* 14.) In my † *Third Anſwer*, I deſired him to prove that this Imperfection

† *Which is Mr.* Leibnitz's Fourth Paper, *in this Collection.*

eſquive de ſatisfaire à ma demande, en ſe jettant ſur un incident ; & en niant que ce ſoit un defaut. Mais que ce ſoit un defaut ou non, il falloit prouver que c' eſt une ſuite de la dependance des Choſes.

101. *Cependant il faut bien, que ce qui rendroit la Machine du Monde auſſi imparfaite que celle d'un mauvais Horloger, ſoit un* defaut.

102. *On dit maintenant, que c'eſt une* ſuite *de l'* inertie *de la Matiere ; mais c'eſt ce qu' on ne prouvera pas non plus. Cette* inertie *miſe en avant, & nommée par* Kepler, *& repetée par* Des Cartes *, *& que j' ay employée dans la* Theodicée *ppur donner une* † *Image de l' Imperfection naturelle des Creatures ; fait ſeulement que les viteſſes ſont diminuées quand les Matieres ſont augmentées, mais c' eſt ſans aucune* diminution des Forces.

Sur § 40.

103. *J' avois ſoutenu, que la dependance de la Machine du monde d'un Auteur Divin, eſt pluſtoſt cauſe que ce defaut n'y eſt point ; & que l' ouvrage n' a point be-*

* dans ſes Lettres,

† Image, & en même temps un échantillon,

ſoin

fection is a conſequence of the dependence of things. He avoids anſwering my demand; by falling upon an Incident, and denying this to be an imperfection. But whether it be an imperfection, or not, he ſhould have proved that 'tis a conſequence of the dependence of things.

101. However; That which would make the Machine of the World as imperfect, as that of an unskilful Watchmaker; ſurely muſt needs be an imperfection.

102. The Author ſays now, that it is a Conſequence of the *Inertia* of Matter. But This alſo, he will not prove. That *Inertia*, alledged here by *him*, mentioned by *Kepler*, repeated by *Carteſius*, and made uſe of by *Me* in my *Theodicæa*, in order to give a notion of the natural imperfection of Creatures; has no other effect, than to make the Velocities diminiſh, when the Quantities of Matter are encreaſed: But this is without any *diminution of the Forces*.

To § 40.

103. I maintained, that the dependence of the Machine of the World upon its divine Author, is rather a reaſon why there can be no ſuch imperfection in it; and that the Work of God does not want to be ſet right again; that it is not liable to be diſordered; and laſtly, that it cannot leſſen in Perfection. Let any one gueſs now, how the

ſoin d' être redreſſé ; qu' il n' eſt point ſujet à ſe detraquer ; & enfin, qu'il ne ſauroit diminuer en Perfection. Je donne maintenant à deviner aux Gens, comment on en peut inferer contre moy, comme on fait icy, qu' il faut, ſi cela eſt, que le Monde materiel ſoit infini *&* éternel, *ſans aucun commencement ; & que Dieu doit tousjours avoir créé* autant *d' hommes & d' autres eſpeces, qu' il eſt* poſſible *de créer.*

Sur § 41.

104. *Je ne dis point que l' Eſpace eſt un* Ordre ou Situation *qui rend les choſes* situables ; *ce ſeroit parler galimatias. On n' a qu' à conſiderer mes propres paroles, & à les joindre à ce que je viens de dire cy deſſus,* Nomb. 47 ; *pour montrer comment l' Eſprit vient à ſe former l' idée de l' Eſpace, ſans qu' il faille qu' il y ait un être réel & abſolu qui y reponde hors de l' Eſprit & hors des rapports. Je ne dis donc point, que l' Eſpace eſt un* Ordre ou Situation, *mais un* Ordre des Situations, *ou ſelon lequel les Situations ſont rangées ; & que l' Eſpace abſtrait eſt cet* Ordre des Situations *conçues comme poſſibles. Ainſi c' eſt quelque choſe d' idéal. Mais il ſemble qu' on ne me veut point entendre. J' ay repondu deja icy,* Nomb. 54, *à l' Objection qui pretend qu' un* Ordre *n'eſt point capable de* quantité.

105. *On*

Author can hence infer againſt me, as he does, that, if this be the Caſe, then the material World muſt be *infinite* and *eternal*, without any beginning; and that God muſt always have created *as many* Men and other Kinds of Creatures, as *can poſſibly* be created.

To § 41.

104. I don't ſay, that Space is an *Order* or *Situation*, which makes Things capable of being *ſituated*: This would be Nonſenſe. Any one needs only conſider my own Words, and add them to what I ſaid above, (*Numb.* 47.) in order to ſhow how the Mind comes to form to it ſelf an Idea of *Space*, and yet that there needs not be any real and abſolute Being anſwering to that Idea, diſtinct from the Mind, and from all Relations. I don't ſay therefore, that *Space* is an *Order or Situation*, but an *Order of Situations*; or [an Order] according to which, Situations are diſpoſed; And that *abſtract Space* is *That Order of Situations*, when they are conceived as being poſſible. Space is therefore ſomething [*merely*] Ideal. But, it ſeems, the Author will not underſtand me. I have already, in this Paper, (*Numb.* 54.) anſwered the Objection, that *Order* is not capable of *Quantity*.

105. *On objecte icy, que le* Temps *ne ſauroit être un* Ordre des choſes ſucceſſives, *parce que la* quantité *du* temps *peut devenir plus grande ou plus petite*, l' ordre des ſucceſſions *demeurant le même. Je reponds que cela n' eſt point : Car ſi le* temps *eſt* plus grand, *il y aura* plus *d' états ſucceſſifs pareils interpoſés ; & s' il eſt* plus petit, *il y en aura* moins ; *puiſqu' il n' y a point de vuide ny de condenſation ou penetration, pour ainſi dire, dans les* temps, *non plus que dans les* lieux.

* Je ſoutiens que

106. * *Il eſt vray que ſans les Creatures, l' immenſité & l' éternité de Dieu ne laiſſeroient pas de ſubſiſter ; mais ſans aucune dependance ny des* temps *ny des* lieux. *S' il n' y avoit point de Creatures, il n' y auroit ny* Temps *ny* Lieu, *& par conſequent point d'* Eſpace *actuel. L' immenſité de Dieu eſt independante de l'* Eſpace, *comme l'éternité de Dieu eſt independante du* Temps. *Elles* † *portent que Dieu ſeroit preſent & coëxiſtant à toutes les choſes qui exiſteroient. Ainſi je n' admets point ce qu' on avance icy, que ſi Dieu ſeul exiſtoit, il y auroit* Temps *&* Eſpace, *comme à preſent. Au lieu qu' alors, à mon avis, ils ne ſeroient que dans les idées, comme des ſimples poſſibilités. L' immenſité & l' éternité de Dieu ſont quelque choſe de plus éminent que la durée & l' étendue des Creatures ;*

† portent ſeulement à l' egard de ces deux ordres des choſes, que Dieu &c.

105. The Author objects here, that *Time* cannot be an *Order of ſucceſſive Things*, becauſe the *Quantity of Time* may become *greater* or *leſs*, and yet the *Order of Succeſſions* continue the *ſame*. I anſwer; this is not ſo. For if the *Time* is *greater*, there will be *More* ſucceſſive and like States interpoſed; and if it be *leſs*, there will be *fewer*; ſeeing there is no *Vacuum*, nor Condenſation, or Penetration, (if I may ſo ſpeak,) in *Times*, any more than in *Places*.

106. 'Tis true, the Immenſity and Eternity of God would ſubſiſt, though there were no Creatures; but thoſe Attributes would have no dependence either on *Times* or *Places*. If there were no Creatures, there would be neither *Time* nor *Place*, and conſequently no actual *Space*. The Immenſity of God is independent upon *Space*, as his Eternity is independent upon *Time*. Theſe Attributes ſignify only, that God would be preſent and co-exiſtent with all the Things that ſhould exiſt. And therefore I don't admit what's here alledged, that if God exiſted alone, there would be *Time* and *Space* as there is now: Whereas then, in my Opinion, they would be only in the Ideas of God as mere Poſſibilities. The Immenſity and Eternity of God, are things more *tranſcendent*, than the Duration and Extenſion of Creatures; not only with reſpect to the *Greatneſs*, but alſo to

Creatures; *non ſeulement par rapport à la* grandeur, *mais encore par rapport à la* nature *de la choſe. Ces attributs Divins n' ont point beſoin de choſes hors de Dieu, comme ſont les* lieux *&* temps *actuels. Ces verités ont été aſſés reconnues par les* Theologiens *& par les* Philoſophes.

Sur § 42.

107. *J' avois ſoutenu que l' operation de Dieu, par laquelle il redreſſeroit la machine du monde corporel, prête par ſa nature (à ce qu' on pretend) à tomber dans le repos, ſeroit un* Miracle. *On a repondu, que ce ne ſeroit point une operation* Miraculeuſe, *parce qu' elle ſeroit* ordinaire, *& doit arriver aſſés ſouvent. J' ay repliqué, que ce n' eſt pas l'* uſuel *ou* non-uſuel, *qui fait le* Miracle *proprement dit, ou de la plus grande eſpece, mais de* ſurpaſſer les forces des creatures. *Et que c' eſt le ſentiment des* Theologiens *& des* Philoſophes. *Et qu' ainſi on m' accorde au moins, que ce qu' on introduit, & que je deſapprouve, eſt un Miracle de la plus grande Eſpece, ſuivant la* notion receue; *c' eſt à dire, qui* ſurpaſſe les forces créées; *& que c' eſt juſtement ce que tout le monde tâche d' eviter en Philoſophie. On me repond maintenant, que c' eſt appeller de la* Raiſon *à* opinion vulgaire. *Mais je replique encore que cette opinion vulgaire, ſuivant laquelle il faut éviter, en Philoſophant, autant qu'*

the *Nature* of the Things. Thoſe Divine Attributes do not imply the Suppoſition of Things extrinſick to God, ſuch as are actual *Places* and *Times*. Theſe Truths have been ſufficiently acknowledged by *Divines* and *Philoſophers*.

To § 42.

107. I maintained, that an Operation of God, by which he ſhould mend the Machine of the material World, * tending in its Nature (as this Author pretends) to loſe all its Motion, would be a *Miracle*. His Anſwer was; that it would not be a miraculous Operation, becauſe it would be *uſual*, and muſt frequently happen. I reply'd; that 'tis not *Uſualneſs* or *Unuſualneſs*, that makes a *Miracle* properly ſo called, or a Miracle of the higheſt Sort; but it's *ſurpaſſing the Powers of Creatures*; and that this is the [*general*] Opinion of *Divines* and *Philoſophers*: And that therefore the Author acknowledges *at leaſt*, that the thing He introduces, and I diſallow, is, according to the *received Notion*, a Miracle of the higheſt Sort, that is, one which ſurpaſſes all created Powers: And that this is the very Thing which all Men endeavour to avoid in Philoſophy. He anſwers now, that this is appealing from *Reaſon* to *vulgar Opinion*. But I reply again, that

* *See above, the Note on* § 13, *of* Dr. Clark's *Third Reply.*

ſe peut, ce qui ſurpaſſe les natures des creatures, eſt tres-raiſonnable. Autrement rien ne ſera ſi aiſé que de rendre raiſon de tout, en faiſant ſurvenir une Divinité, Deum ex machina, *ſans ſe ſoucier des natures des choſes.*

108. *D' ailleurs le ſentiment commun des* Theologiens *ne doit pas être traité ſimplement en* opinion vulgaire. *Il faut de* grandes raiſons *pour qu' on oſe y contrevenir, & je n' en vois aucune icy.*

109. *Il ſemble qu' on s' écarte de ſa propre notion, qui demandoit que le Miracle ſoit rare; en me reprochant (quoyque ſans fondement,)* ſur § 31, *que l'* harmonie préétablie *ſeroit un* Miracle *perpetuel; ſi ce n' eſt qu' on ait voulu raiſonner contre moy* ad hominem.

Sur § 43.

110. *Si le* Miracle *ne differe du* naturel *que dans l' apparence &* par rapport à Nous, *en ſorte que nous appellions ſeulement* miracle *ce que nous obſervons rarement, il n' y aura point de difference* interne réelle *entre le Miracle & le naturel; &, dans le fond des choſes, tout ſera également naturel*

this vulgar Opinion, according to which we ought in Philoſophy to avoid, as much as poſſible, what ſurpaſſes the Natures of Creatures; is a very reaſonable Opinion. Otherwiſe nothing will be eaſier than to account for Any thing by bringing in the Deity, *Deum ex Machina*, without minding the Natures of Things.

108. Beſides; the *common* Opinion of *Divines*, ought not to be looked upon merely as *vulgar Opinion*. A Man ſhould have *weighty Reaſons*, before he ventures to contradict it; and I ſee no ſuch Reaſons here.

109. The Author ſeems to depart from his own Notion, according to which a Miracle ought to be unuſual; when, in § 31, he objects to me, (though without any Ground,) that the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* would be a perpetual *Miracle*. Here, I ſay, he ſeems to depart from his own Notion; unleſs he had a Mind to argue againſt me *ad Hominem*.

To § 43.

110. If a *Miracle* differs from what is *Natural*, only in Appearance, and *with reſpect to Us*; ſo that we call That only a *Miracle*, which we ſeldom ſee; there will be no *internal real Difference*, between a *Miracle* and what is *natural*; and at the bottom, every thing will be either equally *natu-*

turel, ou tout ſera également miraculeux. Les Theologiens *auront ils raiſon de s' accommoder du premier, & les* Philoſophes *du ſecond ?*

111. *Cela n' irat-il pas encore à faire de* Dieu *l'* Ame du Monde, *ſi toutes ſes operations ſont* naturelles, *comme celles que l' Ame exerce dans le Corps ? Ainſi* Dieu *ſera une partie de la* Nature.

112. *En bonne Philoſophie, & en ſaine Theologie, il faut diſtinguer entre ce qui eſt explicable par les* Natures & Forces *des* Creatures, *& ce qui n' eſt explicable que par les forces de la* Subſtance Infinie. *Il faut mettre une diſtance infinie, entre l' operation de* Dieu *qui va au delà des* Forces *des* Natures ; *& entre les operations des choſes qui ſuivent les loix que Dieu leur a données, & qu' il les a rendu capables de ſuivre par leur* natures, *quoyqu' avec ſon aſſiſtance.*

113. *C' eſt par là que tombent les* Attractions *proprement dites, & autres operations inexplicables par les natures des creatures, qu' il faut faire effectuer par miracle, ou recourir aux abſurdités, c' eſt à dire, aux* qualités occultes *Scholaſtiques, qu' on commence à nous debiter ſous le ſpecieux nom de* forces, *mais qui nous ramenent dans le royaume des tenebres. C' eſt,* inventa fruge, glandibus veſci.

ral, or equally *miraculous*. Will *Divines* like the former, or *Philoſophers* the latter?

111. Will not this Doctrine, moreover, tend to make *God* the *Soul of the World*; if all his Operations are *natural*, like thoſe of our Souls upon our Bodies? And ſo *God* will be a part of *Nature*.

112. In good Philoſophy, and ſound Theology, we ought to diſtinguiſh between what is explicable by the *Natures* and *Powers* of *Creatures*, and what is explicable only by the *Powers* of the *Infinite Subſtance*. We ought to make an infinite Difference between the *Operation* of *God*, which goes beyond the Extent of *Natural Powers*; and the *Operations* of Things that follow the Law which God has given them, and which he has enabled them to follow *by their natural Powers*, though not without his Aſſiſtance.

113. This overthrows **Attractions*, properly ſo called, and other Operations inexplicable by the natural Powers of Creatures; which Kinds of Operations, the Aſſertors of them muſt ſuppoſe to be effected by *Miracles* or elſe have recourſe to Abſurdities, that is, to the *occult Qualities* of the Schools; which ſome Men begin to revive under the ſpecious Name of *Forces*; but they bring us back again into the Kingdom of Darkneſs. This is, *inventa fruge, glandibus veſci*.

* *See Appendix*, N° 8.

114. In

* de Monsieur *Boyle*,

114. *Du temps* * *du Chevalier* Boyle, *& d' autres excellens hommes qui fleuriſſoient en* Angleterre † *ſous* Charles II, *on n' auroit pas oſé nous debiter des notions ſi creuſes. J' eſpere que ce beau temps reviendra ſous un auſſi bon gouvernement que celuy d' à preſent* ||. *Le capital de M.* Boyle *étoit d' inculquer que tout ſe faiſoit* mechaniquement *dans la Phyſique. Mais c' eſt un malheur des hommes, de ſe degouter enfin de la raiſon même, & de s' ennuyer de la lumiere. Les chimeres commencent à revenir, & plaiſent parce qu' elles ont quelque choſe de merveilleux. Il arrive dans le pays Philoſophique ce qui eſt arrivé dans le pays Poëtique. On s' eſt laſſé des Romans raiſonnables, tels que la* Clelie Françoiſe, *ou l'* Aramene Allemande ; *& on eſt revenu depuis quelque temps aux* Contes des Fées.

115. *Quant aux* Mouvemens *des* corps celeſtes, *& plus encore quant à la* formation *des* plantes *& des* animaux ; *il n' y a rien qui tienne du* Miracle, *excepté le commencement de ces choſes. L' organiſme des animaux eſt un* mechaniſme *qui ſuppoſe une* Préformation *Divine : Ce qui en ſuit, eſt purement naturel, & tout à fait* mechanique.

116. Tout

† ſous les commencemens de

|| & que les eſprits un peu trop divertis par le malheur des temps, retourneront à mieux cultiver les connoiſſances ſolides. Le Capital *&c.*

114. In the time of Mr. *Boyle*, and other excellent Men, who flouriſhed in *England* under *Charles* the II^d, no Body would have ventured to publiſh ſuch Chimerical Notions. I hope, That happy time will return under ſo good a Government as the preſent. Mr. *Boyle* made it his chief Buſineſs to inculcate, that every thing was done *mechanically* in natural Philoſophy. But it is Men's Misfortune to grow, at laſt, out of Conceit with Reaſon it ſelf, and to be weary of Light. *Chimæra*'s begin to appear again, and they are pleaſing becauſe they have ſomething in them that is wonderful. What has happened in *Poetry*, happens alſo in the *Philoſophical World*. People are grown weary of rational *Romances*, ſuch as were the *French Clelia*, or the *German Aramene*; and they are become fond again of the *Tales of Fairies*.

115. As for the *Motions of the Celeſtial Bodies*, and even the *Formation* of *Plants* and *Animals*; there is nothing in them that looks like a *Miracle*, except their *Beginning*. The *Organiſm* of *Animals* is a *Mechaniſm*, which ſuppoſes a Divine *Preformation*. What follows upon it, is purely natural, and entirely *Mechanical*.

116. *What-*

116. Tout *ce qui ſe fait dans le* Corps de l' homme, *& de tout* animal, *eſt auſſi* mechanique *que ce qui ſe fait dans une* Montre. *La difference eſt ſeulement telle qu' elle doit étre entre une* Machine *d' une invention* Divine, *& entre la production d' un Ouvrier auſſi borné que l'* homme.

Sur § 44.

117. *Il n' y a point de difficulté chez les* Theologiens, *ſur les* miracles des Anges. *Il ne s' agit que de l' uſage du mot. On pourra dire que les* Anges *font des* miracles, *mais moins proprement dits, ou d' un ordre inferieur. Diſputer là deſſus ſeroit une queſtion de nom. On pourra dire que cet Ange qui tranſportoit* Habacuc *par les airs, qui remuoit le Lac de* Bethesda, *faiſoit un miracle. Mais ce n' eſtoit pas un miracle du premier rang; car il eſt explicable par les forces naturelles des Anges ſuperieures aux notres.*

Sur § 45.

118. *J' avois objecté, qu' un* Attraction *proprement dite, ou à la Scholaſtique, ſeroit une operation en diſtance,* ſans moyen. *On repond icy qu' une* Attraction ſans moyen *ſeroit une contradiction. Fort bien: mais comment l' entend on donc, quand on veut*

que

116. *Whatever* is performed in the *Body of Man*, and of every *Animal*, is * no leſs *Mechanical*, than what is performed in a *Watch*. The Difference is only ſuch, as ought to be between a *Machine* of *Divine* Invention, and the Workmanſhip of ſuch a limited Artiſt as *Man* is. † *See Appendix*, N° 13.

To § 44.

117. There is no Difficulty among Divines, about the *Miracles of Angels*. The Queſtion is only about the uſe of that Word. It may be ſaid that *Angels* work *Miracles*; but leſs properly ſo called, or of an inferior Order. To diſpute about this, would be a mere Queſtion about a Word. It may be ſaid that the *Angel*, who carried *Habakkuk* through the Air, and he who troubled the Water of the Pool of *Betheſda*, worked a *Miracle*. But it was not a Miracle of the higheſt Order; for it may be explained by the natural Powers of Angels, which ſurpaſs thoſe of Man.

To § 45.

118. I objected, that an *Attraction*, properly ſo called, or in the *Scholaſtic* Senſe, would be an Operation at a Diſtance, without any *Means* intervening. The Author anſwers here, that an *Attraction* without any *Means* intervening, would be indeed a Contra-

que le Soleil à travers d' un Eſpace vuide attire le globe de la Terre ? Eſt ce Dieu qui ſert de moyen ? *Mais ce ſeroit un* miracle, *s' il y en a jamais eu. Cela ſurpaſſeroit les forces des Creatures.*

119. *Ou ſont-ce peut-être quelques ſubſtances immaterielles, ou quelques rayons ſpirituels, ou quelque accident ſans ſubſtance, quelque Eſpece comme intentionnelle, ou quelque autre je* ne ſay quoy, *qui doit faire ce moyen pretendu ? choſes dont il ſemble qu' on a encore bonne proviſion en tête, ſans s' aſſés expliquer.*

120. *Ce moyen de communication eſt (dit on) inviſible, intangible, non mechanique. On pouvoit adjouter avec le même droit, inexplicable, non intelligible, precaire, ſans fondement, ſans exemple.*

121. *Mais il eſt* regulier, *(dit on,) il eſt* conſtant, *& par conſequent* naturel. *Je reponds, qu' il ne ſauroit être regulier ſans être raiſonnable ; & qu' il ne ſauroit être naturel, ſans être explicable par les natures des creatures.*

122. *Si ce* moyen *qui fait une veritable* Attraction, *eſt conſtant, & en même temps inexplicable par les forces des creatures, & s' il eſt veritable avec cela ; c' eſt un* Miracle *perpetuel : Et s' il n' eſt pas miraculeux,*

Contradiction. Very well! But then what does he mean, when he will have the Sun to attract the Globe of the Earth through an empty Space? Is it God himſelf that performs it? But this would be a *Miracle*, if ever there was any. This would ſurely exceed the Powers of Creatures.

119. Or, are perhaps ſome immaterial Subſtances, or ſome ſpiritual Rays, or ſome Accident without a Subſtance, or ſome kind of *Species Intentionalis*, or ſome other *I know not what*, the *Means* by which this is pretended to be performed? Of which ſort of things, the Author ſeems to have ſtill a good Stock in his Head, without explaining himſelf ſufficiently.

120. *That Means* of communication (ſays he) is inviſible, intangible, not Mechanical. He might as well have added, inexplicable, unintelligible, precarious, groundleſs, and unexampled.

121. But it is *regular*, (ſays the Author,) it is *conſtant*, and conſequently *natural*. I anſwer; it cannot be regular, without being reaſonable; nor natural, unleſs it can be explained by the Natures of Creatures.

122. If the *Means*, which cauſes an *Attraction* properly ſo called, be conſtant, and at the ſame time inexplicable by the Powers of Creatures, and yet be true; it muſt be a perpetual *Miracle*: And if it is not

leux, il eſt faux. C' eſt une choſe chimerique, une qualité occulte *Scholaſtique.*

123. *Il ſeroit comme le cas d' un corps allant en rond ſans s' écarter par la Tangente, quoyque rien d' explicable ne l' empechât de le faire. Exemple que j' ay deja allegué, auquel on n' a pas trouvé à propos de repondre, parce qu' il montre trop clairement la difference entre le veritable* naturel *d' un coté, & entre la* qualité occulte *chimerique des Ecoles de l' autre côté.*

Sur § 46.

124. *Les forces naturelles des Corps, ſont toutes ſoûmiſes aux* loix mecaniques ; *& les forces naturelles des Eſprits, ſont toutes ſoûmiſes aux loix morales. Les premieres ſuivent l' ordre des cauſes efficientes ; & les ſecondes ſuivent l' ordre des cauſes finales. Les premieres operent ſans liberté, comme une Montre ; les ſecondes ſont exercées avec liberté, quoyqu' elles s' accordent exactement avec cette eſpece de Montre, qu' une autre cauſe libre ſuperieure a accommodée avec elles par avance. J' en ay deja parlé,* N° 92.

125. *Je finis par un point qu' on m' a oppoſé au commencement de ce quatriéme Papier, où j' ay deja repondu cy deſſus,* Nomb. 18, 19, 20. *Mais je me ſuis reſervé d' en dire encore d' avantage en concluant.*

not miraculous, it is falſe. 'Tis a Chimerical Thing, a Scholaſtick *occult Quality*.

123. The Caſe would be the ſame, as in a Body going round without receding in the Tangent, though nothing that can be explained, hindered it from receding. Which is an Inſtance I have already alledged; and the Author has not thought fit to anſwer it, becauſe it ſhows too clearly the difference between what is truely *Natural* on the one ſide, and a *chimerical occult Quality* of the Schools on the other.

To § 46.

124. All the natural forces of *Bodies*, are ſubject to *Mechanical Laws*; and all the natural Powers of *Spirits*, are ſubject to *Moral Laws*. The former follow the Order of Efficient Cauſes; and the latter follow the Order of Final Cauſes. The former operate without liberty, like a Watch; the latter operate with liberty, though they exactly agree with That Machine, which Another Cauſe, Free and Superior, has adapted to them before-hand. I have already ſpoken of this, *above*, Nº 92.

125. I ſhall conclude with what the Author objected againſt me at the Beginning of this Fourth Reply: To which I have already given an Anſwer above, (*Numb.* 18, 19, 20.) But I deferred ſpeaking more fully

On a prétendu d' abord que je commets une Petition de Principe. *Mais de quel Principe, je vous en prie ? Plût à Dieu qu' on n' eut jamais ſuppoſé des Principes moins clairs. Ce Principe eſt celuy du* beſoin d' une Raiſon ſuffiſante, *pour qu' une choſe exiſte, qu'un évenement arrive, qu' une verité ait lieu. Eſt ce un Principe qui a beſoin de* preuve ? *On me l' avoit même accordé, ou fait ſemblant de l' accorder, au* ſecond Nombre du 3me papier : *Peut être, parce qu' il auroit paru trop choquant de le nier. Mais ou on ne l' a fait qu'en paroles, ou l' on ſe contredit, ou l' on ſe retracte.*

126. *J'oſe dire que ſans ce grand Principe, on ne ſauroit venir à la preuve de l' Exiſtence de Dieu, ny rendre raiſon de pluſieurs autres verités importantes.*

127. *Tout le monde ne s'en eſt il-point ſervi en mille occaſions ? Il eſt vray qu' on l' a oublié par negligence en beaucoup d' autres : Mais c'eſt là juſtement l' origine des Chimeres ; comme, par exemple, d' un* Temps ou *d' un* Eſpace *abſolu réel, du* Vuide, *de* Atomes, *d' une* Attraction *à la Scholaſtique, de l'* Influence Phyſique * *de l' Ame ſur le* Corps, *& de mille autres* Fictions, *tant de celles qui ſont reſtées de la fauſſe perſuaſion des Anciens, que de celles qu' on a inventées depuis peu.*

* entre l' Ame & le Corps,

128. N

upon That Head, to the Concluſion of this Paper. He pretended, that I have been guilty of a *Petitio Principii*. But, of *What* Principle, I beſeech you? Would to God, leſs clear Principles had never been laid down. The Principle in Queſtion, is the Principle of the *want of a ſufficient Reaſon*; in order to any thing's exiſting, in order to any Event's happening, in order to any truth's taking place. Is This a Principle, that wants to be *proved*? The Author granted it, or pretended to grant it, *Numb.* 2, *of his Third Paper*; Poſſibly, becauſe the denial of it would have appeared too unreaſonable. But either he has done it only in words, or he contradicts himſelf, or retracts his conceſſion.

126. I dare ſay, that without this great Principle, one cannot prove the exiſtence of God, nor account for many other important Truths.

127. Has not every body made uſe of This Principle, upon a thouſand occaſions? 'Tis true, it has been neglected, out of careleſneſs, on many occaſions: But That Neglect, has been the true cauſe of *Chimæras*; ſuch as are, (for inſtance,) an abſolute real *Time* or *Space*, a *Vacuum*, *Atoms*, *Attraction* in the Scholaſtick ſenſe, a *Phyſical Influence of the Soul over the Body*, and a thouſand other *fictions*, either derived from erroneous opinions of the Ancients, or lately invented by Modern Philoſophers.

128. *N' eſt ce pas à cauſe de la violation de ce grand Principe, que les Anciens ſe ſont déja moqués de la* Declinaiſon *ſans ſujet des* Atomes d' Epicure ? *Et j' oſe dire que l'* Attraction *à la Scholaſtique qu' on renouvelle aujourdhuy, & dont on ne ſe moquoit pas moins il y a* 30 *ans ou environ, n'a rien de plus raiſonnable.*

129. *J' ay ſouvent defié les gens de m' apporter une Inſtance contre ce grand Principe, un Exemple non conteſté, où il manque. Mais on ne l' a jamais fait, & on ne le fera jamais. Cependant il y a une infinité d' Exemples, où il* * *reuſſit dans tous les cas connus où il eſt employé. Ce qui doit faire juger raiſonnablement, qu' il reuſſira encore dans les cas inconnus, ou qui ne deviendront connus que par ſon moyen ; ſuivant la Maxime de la Philoſophie experimentale, qui procede* à poſteriori ; *quand même il ne ſeroit point d' ailleurs juſtifié par la pure Raiſon, ou* à priori.

* reuſſit, ou pluſtôt il reuſſit dans tous

130. *Me nier ce grand Principe, c'eſt faire encore d' ailleurs comme* Epicure, *reduit à nier cet autre grand Principe, qui eſt celuy de la Contradiction ; ſavoir, que toute Enontiation intelligible doit étre vraye, ou fauſſe.* Chryſippe *s' amuſoit à le prouver contre* Epicure ; *mais je ne crois pas avoir beſoin de l' imiter, quoyque j' aye déja dit*

128. Was it not upon account of *Epicurus*'s violating this great Principle, that the Ancients derided his groundleſs *Declination* of Atoms? And I dare ſay, the Scholaſtick *Attraction*, revived in our days, and no leſs derided about thirty Years ago, is not at all more reaſonable.

129. I have often defied People to alledge an Inſtance againſt that great Principle, to bring any one unconteſted Example wherein it fails. But they have never done it, nor ever will. 'Tis certain, there is an infinite number of Inſtances, wherein it ſucceeds in all the Known Caſes in which it has been made uſe of. From whence one may reaſonably judge, that it will ſucceed alſo in Unknown Caſes, or in ſuch caſes as can only by its means become known: According to the Method of Experimental Philoſophy, which proceeds *a poſteriori*; though the Principle were not perhaps otherwiſe juſtified by bare Reaſon, or *a priori*.

130. To deny this great Principle, is likewiſe to do as *Epicurus* did; who was reduced to deny That Other great Principle, *viz.* the *Principle of Contradiction*; which is, that every intelligible Enunciation muſt be either true, or falſe. *Chryſippus* undertook to prove That Principle againſt *Epicurus*; but I think I need not

dit cy dessus ce qui peut justifier le mien, & quoyque je puisse encore dire quelque chose là dessus, mais qui seroit peut être trop profond pour convenir à cette presente contestation. Et je crois que des Personnes raisonnables & impartiales m' accorderont, que d' avoir reduit son Adversaire à nier ce Principe, c' est l' avoir mené ad absurdum.

imitate him. I have already ſaid, what is ſufficient to juſtify mine: And I might ſay ſomething more upon it; but perhaps it would be too abſtruſe for this preſent Diſpute. And, I believe, reaſonable and impartial Men will grant me, that having forced an Adverſary to deny That Principle, is reducing him *ad abſurdum.*

Cinquiéme Réplique de Mr. CLARKE.

COmme un Diſcours diffus n' eſt pas une marque d'un Eſprit clair, ni un moyen propre à donner des idées claires aux Lectures; Je tâcherai de repondre à ce cinquiéme Ecrit d' une maniere diſtincte, & en auſſi peu de mots qu' il me ſera poſſible.

* § 3. 1,——20. *IL n'y a aucune* * *reſſemblance entre une* Balance *miſe en mouvement par des* Poids *ou par une* Impulſion, *& un* Eſprit *qui ſe meut, ou qui agit, par la Conſideration de certains* Motifs. *Voici en quoi conſiſte la Difference. La* Balance *eſt entierement* paſſive, *& par conſequent ſujette à une* néceſſité abſolue: *Au lieu que l'* Eſprit *non ſeulement* reçoit une Impreſſion, *mais encore* agit; *ce qui fait l'*

† § 14. *Eſſence de la* Liberté. *Suppoſer* † *que lors que differentes manieres d' agir paroiſſent* également bonnes, *elles ôtent* ‖ *entierement à l' Eſprit le* pouvoir d' agir, *comme les* Poids égaux *empêchent* néceſſairement *une Balance de* ſe mouvoir; *c'eſt nier qu' un Eſprit ait en lui-même un* principe d' Action; *& confondre le* pouvoir d' agir, *avec l'* Impreſſion que les Motifs font ſur l' Eſprit,

‖ Voiez l' Appendice, Nº. 4.

Dr. CLARKE's *Fifth Reply.*

AS *Multitudes of Words* are neither an Argument of *clear Ideas* in the *Writer*, nor a proper means of conveying *clear Notions* to the *Reader*; I ſhall endeavour to give a diſtinct Anſwer to this Fifth Paper, as *briefly* as I can.

1,——20. THERE is no * ſimilitude between a *Balance* being *moved* by *Weights* or *Impulſe*, and a *Mind moving itſelf*, or *acting* upon the View of certain Motives. The Difference is, that the one is *entirely paſſive*; which is being ſubject to *abſolute Neceſſity*: The other not only is *acted upon*, but *acts* alſo; which is the eſſence of *Liberty*. To † ſuppoſe that an *equal apparent Goodneſs in different Ways of acting*, takes away ‖ from the Mind *all Power of Acting at all*, as an *equality of Weights* keeps a Balance *neceſſarily at Reſt*; is denying the Mind to have in itſelf a *Principle of Action*; and is confounding the *Power of Acting*, with the *Impreſſion made upon the Mind by the Motive*, wherein the Mind is purely *paſſive*. The *Motive*, or thing *conſidered* as in *View*, is

* § 3.

† § 14.

‖ *See Appendix*, N° 4.

Eſprit, *en quoi il eſt tout à fait* paſſif. *Le* Motif, *ou la choſe que l' Eſprit* conſidere, *& qu'il a* en vûë, *eſt quelque choſe d'* Externe: *L'* Impreſſion *que ce motif fait ſur l' Eſprit, eſt la* qualité perceptive, *dans laquelle l' Eſprit eſt* paſſif. *Faire quelque choſe* aprez, *ou* en vertu *de cette Perception, eſt la* Faculté de ſe mouvoir de ſoi-même, *ou* d' agir. *Dans tous les* Agents animez, *c'eſt la* Spontaneïté; *& dans les* Agents intelligents, *c'eſt proprement ce que nous appellons* Liberté. *L' erreur où l' on tombe ſur cette matiere, vient de ce qu' on ne* diſtingue *pas ſoigneuſement ces deux choſes; de ce que*
* § 15. *l' on confond* * *le* motif *avec le* Principe d' action; *de ce que l' on pretend que l' Eſprit n' a point d' autre* Principe d' Action *que le* motif, *quoique l' Eſprit ſoit tout à fait* Paſſif en recevant l' Impreſſion du motif. *Cette Doctrine fait croire que l' Eſprit n' eſt pas plus* actif, *que le ſeroit une* Balance, *ſi elle avoit d' ailleurs la* Faculté d' appercevoir *les choſes: Ce que l' on ne peut dire ſans renverſer entierement l' idée de la Liberté. Une Balance* pouſſée *des deux cotez par une* force *égale, ou* preſſée *des deux cotez par des* Poids *égaux, ne peut avoir* aucun mouvement. *Et ſuppoſé que cette* Balance *reçoive la* faculté d' appercevoir, *en ſorte qu' elle* ſçache *qu'il lui eſt* impoſſible
* Voïez l' Appendice, N° 12. de ſe mouvoir, *ou qu' elle ſe* † *faſſe illuſion en s'imaginant qu' elle* ſe meut elle même, *quoi*

is ſomething *extrinſick* to the Mind: The *impreſſion* made upon the Mind by That Motive, is the *perceptive Quality*, in which the Mind is *paſſive*: The *Doing* of any thing, *upon* and *after*, or in conſequence of, that perception; this is the *Power of Self-Motion*, or *Action*: Which, in *All animate Agents*, is *Spontaneity*; and, in *moral* Agents, is what we properly call *Liberty*. The not carefully *diſtinguiſhing* theſe things, but confounding * the *Motive* with the *Principle of Action*, and denying the Mind to have *any Principle of Action* beſides the *Motive*, (when indeed *in receiving the impreſſion of the Motive*, the Mind is *purely paſſive*;) This, I ſay, is the Ground of the whole Error; and leads Men to think that the Mind is *no more Active*, than *a Balance* would be with the Addition of a *Power of Perception*: Which is wholly taking away the very Notion of Liberty. A Balance *puſhed* on Both ſides with equal *force*, or *preſſed* on Both ſides with equal *Weights*, cannot *move at all*: And ſuppoſing the *Balance* indued with a Power of *Perception*, ſo as to be *ſenſible* of its own *incapacity to move*; or ſo as to † deceive itſelf with an imagination that it *moves itſelf*, when indeed it is *only moved*; it would be exactly in the ſame ſtate, wherein this learned Author ſuppoſes a *free Agent* to be in all caſes of *abſolute Indifference*. But the Fallacy plainly lies here: The *Balance*, for

* § 15.

† *See Appendix*, N° 12.

quoi qu' elle n' ait qu' un mouvement communiqué; *elle ſe trouveroit préciſément dans le même état, où le ſçavant Auteur ſuppoſe que ſe trouve un* Agent libre, *dans tous les cas d' une* Indifference abſolue. *Voici en quoi conſiſte la fauſſeté de l' Argument, dont il s' agit ici. La* Balance, *faute d' avoir* en elle même *un* Principe d' action, *ne peut ſe mouvoir lors que les Poids ſont* égaux: *Mais un* Agent Libre, *lors qu'il ſe preſente deux ou pluſieurs manieres d' agir* également raiſonnables & parfaitement ſemblables, *conſerve encore* en lui même *le* pouvoir d' agir, *parce qu'il a la faculté de ſe mouvoir. De plus, cet Agent libre peut avoir de* très-bonnes & de très-fortes Raiſons, *pour ne pas* s' abſtenir entierement d' agir; *quoique peut être il n'y ait aucune Raiſon, qui puiſſe déterminer qu' une certaine* maniere *d' agir vaut mieux qu' une autre. On ne peut donc ſoûtenir* *que, ſuppoſé *que deux differentes manieres de placer certaines particules de Matiere fuſſent* également bonnes & raiſonnables, *Dieu ne pourroit* abſolument, ni conformément à ſa ſageſſe, *les placer d' aucune de ces deux manieres, faute d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *qui pût le déterminer à choiſir l' une préferablement à l' autre; on ne peut, dis-je, ſoûtenir une telle choſe, ſans faire Dieu un Etre purement* paſſif; *& par conſéquent il ne ſeroit point* Dieu, *ou le Gouverneur du Monde. Et quand on nie la poſſibilité de cette* Suppoſition, *ſçavoir, qu' il*

* § 16, 17, 18, 19; & 69.

peut

want of having *in itſelf* a *Principle* or *Power of Action*, cannot move at all when the Weights are *equal*: But a *Free Agent*, when there appear two, or more, *perfectly alike reaſonable* ways of acting; has ſtill *within itſelf*, by virtue of its Self-Motive Principle, a *Power of acting*: And it may have very *ſtrong and good Reaſons*, not to *forbear acting at all*; when yet there may be no poſſible reaſon to determine one particular *Way* of doing the thing, to be better than another. To affirm therefore, * that, *ſuppoſing* two different ways of placing certain particles of Matter were *equally good and reaſonable*, God could neither *wiſely* nor *poſſibly* place them in *either* of thoſe ways, for want of a *ſufficient Weight* to determine him *which way* he ſhould chuſe; is making God not an *Active*, but a *Paſſive* Being: Which is, not to be a *God*, or Governor, at all. And for denying the Poſſibility of the *Suppoſition*, that there *may* be two equal Parts of Matter, which may with equal fitneſs be tranſpoſed in ſituation; no other reaſon can be alleged, but this ‖ *petitio Principii*, that Then this Learned Writer's Notion of a *ſufficient Reaſon* would not be well-grounded. For otherwiſe, *how* can any Man ſay, that 'tis † *impoſſible* for God to have *wiſe* and *good reaſons* to create *many* particles of Matter *exactly alike* in different Parts of the Univerſe? In which caſe, the parts of Space being alike, 'tis evident

* § 16, 17, 18, 19; *and* 69.

‖ § 20.

† § 16, 17, 69, *and* 66.

peut y avoir deux parties égales de Matiere, dont la Situation peut être également bien transpoſée ; on n' en ſçauroit alleguer d' autre Raiſon, que cette * Petition de Principe, *ſçavoir, qu' en ce cas là, ce que le ſçavant Auteur dit d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante, *ne ſeroit pas bien fondé. Car ſans cela, comment peut-on dire qu' il eſt* † impoſſible *que Dieu puiſſe avoir de* bonnes Raiſons *pour créer* pluſieurs *particules de Matiere* parfaitement ſemblables *en differens lieux de l' Univers ? Et en ce cas là, puiſque les parties de l' Eſpace ſont ſemblables, il eſt évident que ſi Dieu n' a point donné à ces parties de Matiere des Situations differentes dès le commencement, il n' a pû en avoir d' autre Raiſon que ſa* ſeule Volonté. *Cependant on ne peut pas dire avec raiſon, qu' une telle Volonté eſt* || *une* Volonté ſans aucun motif ; *Car les* bonnes Raiſons *que Dieu peut avoir de créer* pluſieurs *particules de Matiere* parfaitement ſemblables, *doivent par conſéquent lui ſervir de Motif pour choiſir (ce qu' une* Balance *ne ſçauroit faire) l' une de deux choſes* abſolument indifferentes ; *c'eſt à dire, pour mettre ces particules dans une Certaine Situation, quoi qu' une Situation tout à fait contraire eut été également bonne.*

La Neceſſité, dans les Queſtions Philoſophiques, ſignifie toûjours une Neceſſité abſolue. *La* * Neceſſité † Hypothetique, *&*

* § 20.

† § 16, 17, 69, & 66.

|| § 16, & 69.

* § 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

† Voïez mes Diſcours ſur l' exiſtence de Dieu, la vérité de la Religion naturelle, &c. Part I. Pag. 106. quatriéme Edit.

la

evident there can be no reaſon, but *mere Will*, for not having originally *tranſpoſed* their Situations. And yet *even This* cannot be reaſonably ſaid to be a * *Will without Motive*; foraſmuch as the *wiſe reaſons* God may poſſibly have to create *many* particles of Matter *exactly alike*, muſt conſequently be a *Motive* to him to take (what a *Balance* could not do,) *one* out of *two abſolutely Indifferents*; that is, to place them in *one* Situation, when the *tranſpoſing* of them could not but have been *exactly alike good*. * § 16 *and* 69.

Neceſſity, in Philoſophical Queſtions, always ſignifies *abſolute Neceſſity*. † *Hypothetical Neceſſity**, and *Moral Neceſſity*, are † § 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

* *See my Sermons at Mr.* Boyle's *Lecture*, Part I. Pag. 106. Edit. 4.

only

la Neceſſité Morale, *ne ſont que des manieres de parler Figurées ; & à la rigueur Philoſophique, elles ne ſont point une* Néceſſité. *Il ne s' agit pas de ſçavoir ſi une choſe* doit *être, lors que l' on* ſuppoſe *qu' elle* eſt, *ou qu' elle* ſera : *C' eſt ce qu' on appelle une Neceſſité* Hypothetique. *Il ne s' agit pas non plus de ſçavoir, s' il eſt vrai qu' un* Etre bon, *& qui continue d' être* bon, *ne ſçauroit faire le* mal ; *ou ſi un Etre* ſage, *qui continue d' être* ſage, *ne ſçauroit agir d' une maniere contraire à la ſageſſe ; ou ſi une perſonne qui aime la* vérité, *& qui continue de l' aimer, peut dire un* menſonge : *C' eſt ce que l' on appelle une* Neceſſité Morale. *Mais la véritable & la ſeule Queſtion Philoſophique touchant la* Liberté, *conſiſte à ſçavoir, ſi la* Cauſe *ou le* Principe immédiat & phyſique de l' Action *eſt réellement dans celui que nous appellons l'* Agent ; *ou ſi c' eſt quelque* autre Raiſon ſuffiſante, *qui eſt la* véritable cauſe *de l' Action, en agiſſant ſur l' Agent, & en faiſant qu' il ne ſoit pas un véritable Agent, mais un ſimple* Patient.

On peut remarquer ici en paſſant, que le ſçavant Auteur contredit *ſa* propre Hypo-
* § 11. theſe, *lors qu' il dit que* * *la* Volonté ne ſuit pas *toûsjours* exactement l' Entendement pratique, parce qu' elle peut quelquefois trouver des raiſons pour ſuſpendre ſa reſolution. *Car* ces raiſons-là *ne ſont-elles pas le dernier jugement de l'* Entendement pratique ?

only *Figurative* Ways of Speaking, and in Philoſophical *ſtrictneſs* of Truth, are *no Neceſſity* at all. The Queſtion is not, whether a Thing *muſt* be, when it is *ſuppoſed* that it *is*, or that it is *to be*; (which is *Hypothetical* Neceſſity:) Neither is it the Queſtion whether it be True that a *good Being*, continuing to be *Good*, cannot *do Evil*; or a *wiſe* Being, continuing to be *Wiſe*, cannot act *unwiſely*; or a *veracious* Perſon, continuing to be *veracious*, cannot tell a *Lie*; (which is *moral* Neceſſity:) But the true and only Queſtion in Philoſophy concerning *Liberty*, is, whether the *immediate Phyſical Cauſe* or *Principle of Action* be indeed *in* Him whom we call the *Agent*; or whether it be ſome *other Reaſon ſufficient*, which is the *real Cauſe* of the Action, by operating upon the Agent, and making him to be, not indeed an *Agent*, but a mere *Patient*.

It may here be obſerved, by the way; that this learned Author *contradicts* his own *Hypotheſis*, when he ſays, that † *the Will does not always preciſely follow the practical Underſtanding, becauſe it may ſometimes find Reaſons to ſuſpend its Reſolution.* For are not *thoſe very Reaſons*, the laſt Judgment of the *practical Underſtanding*? † § 11.

21,——25. *S' il eſt* poſſible *que Dieu* produiſe *ou qu' il* ait produit *deux portions de Matiere* parfaitement ſemblables, *de ſorte que le* changement *de leur* Situation *ſeroit une choſe* indifferente; *ce que le ſçavant Auteur dit d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante, *ne prouve rien. En répondant à ceci, il ne dit pas* (*comme il le devroit dire,*) *qu' il eſt* † impoſſible *que Dieu faſſe deux portions de Matiere tout-à-fait ſemblables; mais que ſa* ſageſſe ne lui permet pas *de le faire. Comment ſçait-il cela? Pourra-t-il prouver qu' il* n' eſt pas poſſible *que Dieu puiſſe avoir de* bonnes raiſons *pour créer* pluſieurs *parties de Matiere* parfaitement ſemblables *en differents lieux de l' Univers? La ſeule preuve qu' il allegue, eſt, qu'il n'y auroit aucune* Raiſon Suffiſante, *qui pût déterminer la Volonté de Dieu à mettre une de ces* Parties *de Matiere dans une* certaine Situation *plûtôt que dans une* autre. *Mais ſi Dieu peut avoir* pluſieurs bonnes raiſons, (*on ne ſçauroit prouver le contraire,*) *ſi Dieu, dis-je, peut avoir pluſieurs* bonnes raiſons *pour créer pluſieurs parties de Matiere tout-a-fait ſemblables; l'* indifference *de leur Situation* ſuffira-t-elle *pour en rendre la* Création impoſſible, *ou* contraire à ſa Sageſſe? *Il me ſemble que c' eſt* * *formellement ſuppoſer ce*

* § 20.

† Voïez le Quatriéme Ecrit de Mr. *Leibnitz*, § 2, 3, 6, 13 & 15.

qui

21——25. If it is *possible* for God to *make* or to *have made* two Pieces of Matter *exactly alike*, so that the *transposing* them in *Situation* would be *perfectly indifferent*; this learned Author's Notion of a *sufficient Reason*, falls to the Ground. To this he answers; not, (as his Argument requires,) that 'tis * *impossible* for God to make two Pieces exactly alike; but, that 'tis *not Wise* for him to do so. But how does he know, it would not be *Wise* for God to do so? Can he prove that it is *not possible* God may have *Wise Reasons* for creating *Many* Parts of Matter *exactly alike* in different Parts of the Universe? The only Argument he alledges, is, that then there would not be a *sufficient Reason* to determine the Will of God, *which Piece* should be placed in *which Situation*. But if, for ought that any *otherwise* appears to the contrary, God may possibly have *many wise Reasons* for creating *many* Pieces exactly alike; will the *Indifference alone* of the *Situation* of such Pieces, make it *impossible that he should create*, or *impossible that it should be Wise in him to create* them? I humbly conceive, this is an † expres *Begging of the Question*. To the like Argument drawn by me from the *absolute Indifferency* of the original *particular Determination* of *Motion*, no Answer has been returned.

* *See Mr.* Leibnitz's *Fourth Paper*, § 2, 3, 6, 13, & 15.

† § 20.

qui eſt en Queſtion. On n'a point répondu à un autre Argument de la même Nature, que j' ai fondé ſur l' Indifference abſolue *de la premiere* Determination particuliere *du* Mouvement *au commencement du Monde.*

26, ——— 32. *Il ſemble qu' il y ait ici*

* § 26. pluſieurs *contradictions. On reconnoit* * *que* deux choſes *tout-à-fait* ſemblables, *ſeroient véritablement* deux *choſes*; *& nonobſtant cet aveu, on continue de dire qu' elles n' auroient pas le* principe d' Individuation: *& dans le* IV *Ecrit,* § 6, *on aſſure poſitivement, qu' elles ne ſeroient qu' une* même choſe ſous deux noms. *Quoi que l' on*

† § 26. *reconnoiſſe* † *que ma ſuppoſition eſt poſſible, on ne veut pas me permettre de faire cette*

‖ § 27. *ſuppoſition. On avouë* ‖ *que les parties du* Temps *& de l'* Eſpace *ſont parfaitement ſemblables* en elles-mêmes; *mais on nie cette reſſemblance* lors qu' il y a des Corps dans

* § 28. ces parties. *On compare* * *les differentes* parties de l' Eſpace qui coëxiſtent, *& les differentes* parties ſucceſſives du Temps, *à une* Ligne droite, *qui coupe une* autre Ligne droite *en* deux Points coïncidents, *qui ne*

† § 29. *ſont qu'* un ſeul Point. *On ſoûtient que* † *l'* Eſpace *n' eſt que l'* Ordre des choſes qui

‖ § 30. coëxiſtent; *& cependant on avouë* ‖ *que le Monde materiel* peut *être borné: d' où il s' enſuit qu' il faut néceſſairement qu' il y ait un* Eſpace vuide *au delà du Monde. On*

* § 30, & 8, & 73. *reconnoit* * *que* Dieu pouvoit *donner* des bornes *à l'* Univers; *& aprez avoir fait*

26,——32. In theſe Articles, there ſeem to be contained *many Contradictions*. It is allowed ‖ that *Two Things* exactly *alike*, would really be *Two*; and yet it is ſtill alledged, that they would want the *Principle of Individuation*; And in *Paper* 4th, § 6, it was expreſly affirmed, that they would be only the *ſame Thing under two Names*. A * Suppoſition is allowed to be *poſſible*, and yet I muſt not be allowed to make the Suppoſition. The † Parts of *Time* and *Space* are allowed to be exactly alike in *Themſelves*, but not ſo *when Bodies exiſt in them*. Different *co-exiſtent Parts of Space*, and different *ſucceſſive Parts of Time*, are * compared to a *ſtrait Line* cutting *another ſtrait Line* in *two coincident Points*, which are but *one Point only*. 'Tis affirmed, that † *Space* is nothing but the *Order* of *Things co-exiſting*; and yet it is ‖ confeſſed that the *material Univerſe* may *poſſibly* be *Finite*; in which Caſe there muſt neceſſarily be an *empty* extra-mundane *Space*. 'Tis * allowed, that *God could* make the *material Univerſe Finite*: And yet the *ſuppoſing* it to be *poſſibly Finite*, is ſtiled not only a Suppoſition *unreaſonable* and *void of Deſign*, but alſo an † *impracticable*

‖ § 25.

* § 26.

† § 27.

* § 28.

† § 29.

‖ § 30.

* § 30, & 8, & 73.

† § 29.

cet aveu, on ne laiſſe pas de dire que cette ſuppoſition eſt non ſeulement déraiſonnable
† § 29. & ſans But, *mais encore une* † Fiction im-
‖IV Ecrit, § 21. poſſible ; *& l' on aſſure* ‖ *qu'* il n' y a aucune raiſon poſſible, qui puiſſe limiter *la*
* § 29. *quantité de la Matiere. On ſoûtient* * *que le* mouvement *de l' Univers tout entier, ne produiroit* aucun changement ; *& cependant on ne répond pas à ce que j' avois dit, qu' une* augmentation *ou une* ceſſation *ſubite du mouvement du* Tout, *cauſeroit un* choc *ſenſible à toutes les parties : Et il n' eſt pas*
† Voïez l' Appendice, N° 10. *moins évident, qu' un* † *mouvement* circulaire *du Tout, produiroit une* Force Centrifuge *dans toutes les parties. J' ai dit que le Monde materiel doit être* mobile, *ſi le*
‖ § 31. Tout *eſt* borné : *On* ‖ *le nie, parce que les* parties de l' Eſpace *ſont* immobiles, *dont le* Tout *eſt* infini *&* exiſte néceſſairement. *On ſoûtient que le mouvement renferme néceſſairement un* * changement Rélatif de Situation
* § 31. *dans un corps, par rapport à d' autres corps : Et cependant on ne fournit aucun moyen d' éviter cette conſéquence abſurde, ſçavoir, que la* mobilité d' un corps *dépend de l'* exiſtence *d'* autres Corps ; *& que ſi un corps exiſtoit* ſeul, *il ſeroit* incapable de mouvement ; *ou que les parties d' un corps qui* circule, *(du Soleil, par exemple,) perdroient la* Force centrifuge *qui nait de leur mouvement circulaire, ſi toute la matiere exterieure, qui les environne, étoit annihilée. Enfin,*
† § 32. *on ſoûtient que* † *l' infinité* de la Matiere *eſt*

l' effet

Fiction; and 'tis affirmed, ‖ *there can be no poſſible Reaſon which can limit the Quantity of Matter.* 'Tis affirmed, that the *Motion* of the material Univerſe would produce * *no Change* at all; and yet no Anſwer is given to the Argument I alledged, that a ſudden *Increaſe* or *Stoppage* of the Motion of the *Whole*, would give a ſenſible *Shock* to all the *Parts*: And 'tis as evident, that † a *circular* Motion of the *Whole*, would produce a *vis centrifuga* in all the *Parts*. My Argument, that the material World muſt be *moveable*, if the *Whole* be *Finite*; is * denied, becauſe the Parts of Space are *immoveable*, of which the *Whole* is *Infinite* and *neceſſarily exiſting*. It is affirmed, that Motion neceſſarily implies a † *Relative Change of Situation in one Body, with regard to other Bodies*: And yet no way is ſhown to avoid this abſurd Conſequence, that then the *Mobility* of *one Body* depends on the *Exiſtence of other Bodies*; and that any *ſingle Body* exiſting *Alone*, would be *incapable of Motion*; or that the Parts of a *circulating* Body, (ſuppoſe the Sun,) would loſe the *vis centrifuga* ariſing from their circular Motion, if all the extrinſick Matter around them were annihilated. Laſtly, 'tis affirmed that the ‖ *Infinity of Matter* is an Effect of the *Will of God*; And yet *Carteſius*'s Notion is * approved as irrefragable; the *only Foundation* of which, all Men know to have been *this Suppoſition*,

† *Fourth Paper*, § 21.

* § 29.

† *See Appendix*, N°. 10.

* § 31.

† § 31.

‖ § 32.

* *Ibid.*

l' effet de la Volonté de Dieu ; *& cependant on* || *approuve la doctrine de* Des Cartes, *comme ſi elle étoit inconteſtable* ; *quoique tout le monde ſçache que le* ſeul fondement *ſur lequel ce Philoſophe l' a établie, eſt* cette Suppoſition, *Que la* Matiere *étoit* néceſſairement infinie, *puis que l' on ne ſçauroit la ſuppoſer finie ſans* contradiction. *Voici ſes propres termes*, Puto * implicare contradictionem, ut Mundus ſit finitus. *Si cela eſt vrai, Dieu n' a jamais pu* limiter *la* Quantité *de la Matiere* ; *& par conſéquent il n' en eſt point le* Créateur, *& il ne peut la* détruire.

|| Ibid.

* Epiſt. 69, Partis primæ.

Il me ſemble que le ſçavant Auteur n' eſt jamais d' accord avec lui même, *dans* tout *ce qu' il dit touchant la* Matiere *& l'* Eſpace. *Car tantôt il combat le* Vuide, *ou l'* Eſpace deſtitué de Matiere, *comme s' il étoit* * abſolument impoſſible, (*l' Eſpace & la Matiere étant* † inſeparables :) *& cependant il reconnoit ſouvent, que la* Quantité de la Matiere *dans l' Univers dépend de la* || Volonté de Dieu.

* § 29, 33, 34, 35, 62, 63.

† § 62.

|| § 30, 32, & 73.

33, —— 35. *Pour prouver qu' il y a du Vuide, j' ai dit que certains Eſpaces* ne font point de reſiſtance. *Le ſçavant Auteur répond que ces Eſpaces ſont remplis d' une* Matiere, *qui n' a point* † *de* Peſanteur. *Mais l' Argument n' étoit pas fondé ſur la* Peſanteur : *Il étoit fondé ſur la* Reſiſtance, *qui doit être proportionnée à la* || Quantité

† § 35.

|| Sans cela, pourquoi ſeroit-il plus difficile de mettre la Terre en *mouvement* (même du coté où tend ſa peſanteur,) que de faire mouvoir un *très-petit Globe ?*

de

that *Matter* was infinite *neceſſarily in the Nature of Things*, it being a *Contradiction* to ſuppoſe it Finite: His Words are, † *Puto implicare contradictionem, ut Mundus ſit finitus.* Which if it be true, it never was in the Power of God to *determine* the *Quantity* of Matter; and conſequently he neither was the *Creator* of it, nor can *deſtroy* it.

† *Epiſt.* 69, *Partis primæ.*

And indeed there ſeems to run a *continual Inconſiſtency* through the *Whole* of what this Learned Author writes concerning *Matter* and *Space.* For *ſometimes* he argues againſt a *Vacuum* (or *Space void of Matter,*) as if it was ‖ *abſolutely impoſſible in the Nature of Things*; ſpace and Matter being * *inſeparable*: And yet frequently he allows the *Quantity of Matter* in the Univerſe, to depend upon the † *Will of God.*

‖ § 29, 33, 34, 35, 62, 63.

* § 62.

† § 30, 32, & 73.

33,—35. To the Argument drawn againſt a *Plenum* of Matter, from the *Want of Reſiſtence* in certain Spaces; this Learned Author anſwers, that thoſe Spaces are filled with a *Matter* which has no * *Gravity.* But the Argument was not drawn from *Gravity*, but from *Reſiſtence*; which muſt be proportionable to the * *Quantity of*

* § 35.

* *Otherwiſe, What makes the* Body of the Earth *more difficult to be* moved, (*even the ſame way that its Gravity tends,*) *than the* ſmalleſt Ball *?*

Mat-

de la Matiere, *ſoit que la Matiere ait de la* peſanteur, *ou qu' elle n' en ait pas.*

* § 34. *Pour prévenir cette Réplique, l' Auteur dit que* * *la* Reſiſtance *ne vient pas tant de la* Quantité de la Matiere, *que de la* difficulté qu' elle a à céder. *Mais cet Argument eſt tout-à-fait hors d' oeuvre ; parce que la Queſtion, dont il s' agit, ne regarde que les corps* fluides *qui ont peu de tenacité, ou qui n' en ont point du tout, comme l'* Eau *& le* Vif Argent, *dont les parties n' ont de la* peine à céder, *qu' à propotion de la* Quantité de Matiere qu' elles contiennent. *L' Exemple*

† Ibid. *que l' on tire du* † bois flotant, *qui contient* moins de matiere peſante *qu' un* égal Volume d' Eau, *& qui ne laiſſe pas de faire une* plus grande reſiſtance ; *cet Exemple, diſ-je, n' eſt rien moins que Philoſophique. Car un* égal Volume d' eau *renfermée dans un Vaiſſeau, ou gélée & flotante, fait une* plus grande reſiſtance *que le* bois flotant ; *parce qu' alors la reſiſtance eſt cauſée par le Volume* entier *de l' eau. Mais lors que l' eau ſe trouve en liberté & dans ſon état de* fluidité, *la reſiſtance n' eſt pas cauſée par* toute la maſſe *du Volume égal d' eau, mais ſeulement par* une partie *de cette maſſe ; de ſorte qu' il n' eſt pas ſurprenant que dans ce cas l' eau ſemble faire moins de reſiſtance que le* bois.

36, ——— 48. *L' Auteur ne paroit pas raiſonner ſerieuſement dans cette partie de ſon Ecrit. Il ſe contente de donner un faux*

Matter, whether the Matter had any *Gravity*, or *no*.

To obviate this Reply, he alleges that * *Reſiſtence* does not ariſe ſo much from the *Quantity of Matter*, as from its *Difficulty of giving Place*. But this Allegation is wholly wide of the Purpoſe; becauſe the Queſtion related only to ſuch *Fluid* Bodies which have little or no Tenacity, as *Water* and *Quickſilver*, whoſe Parts have no other *Difficulty of giving Place*, but what ariſes from the *Quantity of the Matter they contain*. The Inſtance of a † *floating Piece of Wood*, containing *leſs of heavy Matter* than an *equal Bulk of Water*, and yet making *greater Reſiſtence*; is *wonderfully unphiloſophical*: For an *equal Bulk of Water* ſhut up in a Veſſel, or frozen into Ice, and floating, makes a *greater Reſiſtence* than the *floating Wood*; the Reſiſtence Then ariſing from the *whole* Bulk of the Water: But when the Water is looſe and at liberty in its State of *Fluidity*, the Reſiſtence Then is made not by the *whole*, but by *part only*, of the equal Bulk of Water; and then it is no wonder that it ſeems to make leſs Reſiſtence than the *Wood*.

* § 34.

† Ibid.

36,——48. Theſe Paragraphs do not ſeem to contain ſerious *Arguments*, but only repreſent in an *ill Light* the Notion of the

jour à l' idée de l' Immenſité *de Dieu, qui n' eſt pas une* Intelligentia ſupramundana, (ſemota à noſtris rebus ſejunctaque longè,)

‖Acts xvii. 27, 28. *& qui* ‖ n' eſt pas loin de chacun de nous; car en lui nous avons la vie, le mouvement, & l' être.

L' Eſpace occupé par un Corps *n' eſt pas*

* § 36, 37. * *l' Etendue de ce Corps; mais le* Corps étendu *exiſte* dans *cet* Eſpace.

† § 38. *Il n' y a aucun Eſpace* † borné; *mais notre Imagination conſidere dans l' Eſpace, qui n' a point de bornes, & qui n' en peut avoir, telle* partie *ou telle* quantité *qu' elle juge à propos d' y conſiderer.*

‖ § 39. *L'* Eſpace *n' eſt pas une* ‖ Affection d' un *ou de* pluſieurs corps, *ou d'* aucun Etre borné; *& il ne* paſſe point d' un Sujet à un autre; *mais il eſt toûjours &* ſans variation, *l'* Immenſité *d' un* Etre Immenſe, qui ne ceſſe jamais d' être le même.

* § 40. *Les* Eſpaces bornez *ne ſont point des* * proprietez des Subſtances bornées. *Ils ne ſont que des* parties *de l'* Eſpace infini, dans *leſquelles les Subſtances bornées exiſtent.*

Si la Matiere étoit infinie, *l'* Eſpace in-

† § 41. fini *ne ſeroit pas plus une* † Proprieté *de ce* Corps infini, *que les* Eſpaces finis *ſont des* Proprietez *des* Corps finis: *Mais en ce cas, la* Matiere infinie *ſeroit dans l'* Eſpace infini, *comme les Corps finis y ſont preſentement.*

L'

the *Immenſity* or *Omnipreſence of God*; who is not a mere *Intelligentia ſupramundana*, [Semota à noſtris rebus ſejunctaq; longè;] is *not far from every one of us*; *for in him we* (and all Things) *live and move and have our Being.* Acts xvii. 27, 28.

The *Space occupied by a Body*, is not the † *Extenſion of the Body*; but the *extended Body* exiſts *in* that *Space.* † § 36, 37.

There is no ſuch Thing in reality, as * *bounded Space*; but only we in our Imagination *fix our Attention* upon what *Part* or *Quantity* we pleaſe, of that which it ſelf is always and neceſſarily *unbounded.* * § 38.

Space is not an † *Affection* of *one Body*, or of *another* Body, or of *any finite Being*; nor *paſſes from Subject to Subject*; but is always *invariably* the *Immenſity* of *one only* and *always the ſame* Immenſum. † § 39.

Finite Spaces are not at all the || *Affections of Finite Subſtances*; but they are only *thoſe Parts* of *Infinite* Space, *in which* Finite Subſtances exiſt. || § 40.

If Matter was *infinite*, yet *infinite Space* would no more be an * *Affection* of that *infinite Body*, than *finite Spaces* are the *Affections* of *finite Bodies*; but, in that Caſe, the *infinite Matter* would be, as finite Bodies now are, *in* the *infinite Space.* * § 41.

Immenſity

‖ § 42. *L'* Immenſité *n'eſt pas moins* ‖ eſſentielle *à Dieu, que ſon Eternité. Les* * Parties *de l'* Immenſité *étant tout-a-fait differentes des Parties* materielles, ſeparables, diviſibles, *&* mobiles, *d'où naît la* corruptibilité ; *elles n'empêchent pas l'* Immenſité *d'être eſſéntiellement* ſimple, *comme les* Parties *de la* Durée *n'empêchent pas que la même* Simplicité *ne ſoit eſſentielle à l'* Eternité.

* Voïez ci-deſſus dans ma 3 Replique, § 3 ; & quatriéme Replique, § 11.

† § 43. *Dieu lui-même n'eſt ſujet à aucun* † Changement, *par la* diverſité *& les* changemens *des Choſes, qui ont* la vie, le mouvement, & l'être en lui.

‖ § 44. *Cette* ‖ *Doctrine, qui paroit ſi* étrange *à l'Auteur, eſt la Doctrine formelle de St.* Paul, *& la voix de la* Nature *&* de la Raiſon.

Act. xvii. 27, 28.

* § 45. *Dieu n'exiſte point* * dans *l'Eſpace, ni* dans *le Temps ; mais* ſon exiſtence † *eſt la* Cauſe de l'Eſpace & du Temps. *Et lorſque nous diſons, conformément au Langage du Vulgaire, que Dieu exiſte* dans tout l'Eſpace *&* dans tout le Temps ; *nous voulons dire ſeulement qu'il eſt* par tout *& qu'il eſt* éternel, *c'eſt-a-dire, que l'* Eſpace infini *&* de Temps *ſont des* Suites *néceſſaires de ſon Exiſtence ; & non, que l'Eſpace & le Temps ſont des Etres diſtincts de lui* DANS *leſquels il exiſte.*

† Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur ma IV Réplique, § 10.

* § 46. *J'ai fait voir ci-deſſus, ſur* § 40, * *que l'* † Eſpace borné *n'eſt pas l'* Etendue *de Corps*

† Voici, ce me ſemble, la principale raiſon de la *confuſion* & des *contradictions*, que l'on trouve dans ce que la plûpart

Immenſity, as well as Eternity, is † *eſſential* to God. The ‖ *Parts* of *Immenſity*, (being totally of a different kind from *corporeal*, *partable*, *ſeparable*, *diviſible*, *moveable* Parts, which are the ground of *Corruptibility*;) do no more hinder *Immenſity* from being eſſentially *One*, than the *Parts* of *Duration* hinder *Eternity* from being eſſentially *One*.

† § 42.

‖ *See above, in my Third Reply*, § 3; *and Fourth Reply*, § 11.

God himſelf ſuffers *no* * *Change* at all, by the *Variety* and *Changeableneſs* of Things which *live and move and have their Being in him.*

* § 43.

This † *ſtrange* Doctrine, is the expreſs Aſſertion of * St. *Paul*, as well as the plain Voice of *Nature and Reaſon.*

† § 44.

* *Acts* xvii. 27, 28.

God does not exiſt ‖ *In* Space, and *In* Time; but *His Exiſtence* * *cauſes Space and Time.* And when, according to the *Analogy* of *vulgar Speech*, we ſay that he exiſts *in All Space* and *in All Time*; the Words mean only that he is *Omnipreſent* and *Eternal*, that is, that *Boundleſs Space and Time* are neceſſary *Conſequences* of his Exiſtence; and not, that Space and Time are Beings diſtinct from him, and *IN which* he exiſts.

‖ § 45.

* *See above, the Note on my Fourth Reply*, § 10.

† How ‖ *Finite Space* is not the *exten-*

† § 46.

ſion

‖ Note: *The principal Occaſion or Reaſon of the* Confuſion and Inconſiſtencies, *which appear in what moſt Writers have advanced*

Corps. Et l' on n' a auſſi qu' à comparer les deux Sections ſuivantes (47 & 48) *avec ce que j'ai* déja † *dit.*

† Voiez auſſi ci-deſſous ſur la § 53, & ſur la § 54.

49, ——51. *Il me ſemble que ce que l'on trouve ici, n'eſt qu' une* chicane *ſur des mots.* Pour

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plûpart des Philoſophes ont avancé ſur la nature de l' *Eſpace*. Les hommes ſont naturellement portez, faute d' attention, à négliger une diſtinction très-néceſſaire, & ſans laquelle on ne peut raiſonner clairement : Je veux dire qu' ils n' ont pas ſoin de diſtinguer, quoi qu' ils le duſſent toûjours faire, entre les Termes *Abſtraits* & *Concrets*, comme ſont l' *Immenſité* & l' *Immenſe*. Ils négligent auſſi de faire une diſtinction entre les *Idées* & les *Choſes* ; comme ſont l' *Idée* de l' *Immenſité*, que nous avons *dans* notre Eſprit ; & l' *Immenſité réelle, qui exiſte actuellement hors de nous.*

Je crois que toutes les Notions qu' on a eu touchant la Nature de l' *Eſpace*, ou que l' on s' en peut former, ſe reduiſent à celles-ci. L' Eſpace eſt *un pur néant*, ou il n' eſt qu' une *ſimple Idée*, ou *une ſimple Rélation d' une choſe à une autre*, ou bien il eſt la *Matiere*, ou quelque autre *Subſtance*, ou la *Proprieté d' une Subſtance.*

Il eſt évident que l' *Eſpace* n' eſt pas un *pur néant*. Car le néant n' a ni *Quantité*, ni *Dimenſions*, ni *aucune Proprieté*. Ce Principe eſt le prémier Fondement de toute ſorte de Science ; & il fait voir la ſeule difference qu' il y a entre ce qui *exiſte*, & ce qui *n' exiſte pas*.

Il eſt auſſi évident que l' *Eſpace* n' eſt pas une *pure Idée*. Car il n' eſt pas poſſible de former une *Idée* de l' Eſpace, qui aille au delà du *Fini* ; & cependant la Raiſon nous enſeigne que c' eſt une contradiction que l' *Eſpace lui-même* ne ſoit pas actuellement *Infini*.

Il n' eſt pas moins certain que l' *Eſpace* n' eſt pas *une ſimple Rélation d' une choſe à une autre*, qui reſulte de leur *Situation*, ou de l' *Ordre* qu' elles ont *entre elles :* Puiſque l' *Eſpace* eſt une *Quantité* ; ce qu' on ne peut pas dire des Rélations, telles que la *Situation* & l' *Ordre*. C' eſt ce que je fais voir amplement ci-deſſous, ſur § 54. J' ajoute que ſi le Monde materiel *eſt*, ou *peut être*, borné ; il faut néceſſairement qu' il y ait un Eſpace *actuel* ou *poſſible* au delà de l' Univers. Voïez ſur § 31, 52, & 73.

Il

ſion of Bodies, I have ſhown juſt above, on § 40. And the two following Paragraphs alſo, (§ 47 & 48,) need only to be compared with what hath been *already* * ſaid.

49, ——51. Theſe ſeem to me, to be only a *quibbling* upon Words. Concerning the

* *See alſo* below, *on* § 53, & *on* § 54.

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advanced concerning the Nature of Space, *ſeems to be This*: *that* (*unleſs they attend carefully*,) *men are very apt to neglect That Neceſſary Diſtinction*, (*without which there can be no clear Reaſoning*,) *which ought always to be made between* Abſtracts *and* Concretes, *ſuch as are* Immenſitas *&* Immenſum; *& alſo between* Ideas *and* Things, *ſuch as are* The Notion (*which is* Within *our own Mind*) of Immenſity, *and the* real Immenſity actually exiſting Without us.

All the Conceptions (*I think*) *that ever have been or can be framed concerning* Space, *are theſe which follow. That it is either* abſolutely Nothing, *or a* mere Idea, *or* only a Relation of one thing to another, *or that it is* Body, *or ſome other* Subſtance, *or elſe a* Property of a Subſtance.

That it is not abſolutely Nothing, *is moſt evident. For of* Nothing *there is No* Quantity, *No* Dimenſions, *No* Properties. *This Principle is the Firſt Foundation of All Science whatſoever*; *expreſſing the Only Difference between what* does, *and what* does not, *exiſt*.

That it is not a mere Idea, *is likewiſe moſt manifeſt. For no* Idea *of Space, can poſſibly be framed larger than* Finite; *and yet Reaſon demonſtrates that 'tis a Contradiction for* Space itſelf *not to be actually* Infinite.

That it is not a bare Relation of one thing to another, *ariſing from their* Situation *or* Order among themſelves, *is no leſs apparent*: *Becauſe* Space *is a* Quantity, *which* Relations (*ſuch as* Situation *and* Order) *are not*; *As I have largely ſhown* below, *on* § 54. *Alſo becauſe, if the material Univerſe* is, *or* can poſſibly be, *Finite*; *there cannot but be*, actual *or* poſſible, *Extramundane Space*: See *on* § 31, 52, *and* 73.

That Space *is not* Body, *is alſo moſt clear. For then* Body *would be* neceſſarily infinite; *and* No Space could be

Pour ce qui eſt de la queſtion touchant les parties *de l'* Eſpace, *voïez ci-deſſus*, Réplique III, § 3; & Réplique IV, § 11.

52, & 53. *L'Argument dont je me ſuis ſervi ici pour faire voir que l'Eſpace eſt réellement indépendant des Corps, eſt fondé ſur ce qu'il eſt* poſſible *que le Monde materiel ſoit* borné & mobile. *Le ſçavant Auteur ne devoit donc pas ſe contenter de répliquer, qu'il ne croit pas que la* Sageſſe *de Dieu lui ait pû permettre de* donner des bornes *à l'Univers, & de le rendre* capable de mouvement. *Il faut que l'Auteur ſoûtienne qu'il étoit* impoſſible *que Dieu fît un Monde* borné & mobile; *ou, qu'il reconnoiſſe la force de mon Argument fondé ſur ce qu'il eſt* poſſible *que le Monde ſoit* borné & mobile. *L'Auteur ne devoit pas non plus ſe contenter de* repeter *ce qu'il avoit* avancé, *ſçavoir, que le* mouvement *d'un*

Il eſt auſſi trés-évident, que l'*Eſpace* n'eſt pas la *Matiere*. Car, en ce cas, la *Matiere* ſeroit *néceſſairement infinie*; & il n'y auroit *aucun* Eſpace, *qui ne reſiſtât au mouvement*. Ce qui eſt contraire à l'Experience.

Il n'eſt pas moins certain que l'Eſpace n'eſt *Aucune* ſorte de *ſubſtance*; *puiſque* l'*Eſpace-infini* eſt l'*Immenſité*, & non pas l'*Immenſe*: *au lieu qu'une* Subſtance infinie eſt l'Immenſe, *& non pas* l'Immenſité. Comme la *Durée* n'eſt pas une *Subſtance*; parce qu'une *Durée infinie* eſt l'*Eternité*, & non un Etre *Eternel*: mais une *ſubſtance infinie* eſt un Etre *Eternel*, & non pas l'*Eternité*.

Il s'enſuit donc néceſſairement de ce que l'on vient de dire, que l'*Eſpace* eſt une *Proprieté*, de la même maniere que la *Durée*. L'*Immenſité* eſt une Proprieté de l'Etre *Immenſe*, comme l'*Eternité* eſt une Proprieté de l'Etre *Eternel*.

the Queſtion about *Space* having *Parts*, ſee *above*; *Reply* 3, § 3; and *Reply* 4, § 11.

52, *and* 53. My Argument *here*, for the Notion of Space being really independent upon Body, is founded on the *Poſſibility* of the material Univerſe being *finite and moveable*: 'Tis not enough therefore for this Learned Writer to reply, that he thinks it would not have been *wiſe and reaſonable* for God to have made the material Univerſe *finite and moveable*. He muſt either affirm, that 'twas *impoſſible* for God to make the material World *finite and moveable*; or elſe he muſt of neceſſity allow the Strength of my Argument, drawn from the *Poſſibility* of the World's being *finite and moveable*. Neither is it ſufficient barely to *repeat* his *Aſſertion*, that the *Motion* of a finite material Univerſe would be *nothing*,

void of Reſiſtence *to Motion. Which is contrary to Experience.*

That Space *is not* Any kind *of* Subſtance, *is no leſs plain. Becauſe* infinite Space *is* Immenſitas, *not* Immenſum; *whereas* infinite Subſtance *is* Immenſum, *not* Immenſitas. *Juſt as* Duration *is not a* Subſtance: *becauſe* infinite Duration *is* æternitas, *not* æternum; *but infinite Subſtance is* æternum, *not* æternitas.

It remains therefore, by Neceſſary Conſequence, that Space *is a* Property, *in like manner as* Duration *is.* Immenſitas, *is* τὸ Immenſi; *juſt as* Æternitas *is* τὸ Æterni.

d' un Monde borné ne ſeroit rien, & que, faute d' Autres Corps avec leſquels on pût le comparer, il ne * produiroit aucun changement ſenſible. *Je dis que l' Auteur ne devoit pas ſe contenter de répeter cela, à moins qu'il ne fût en état de* réfuter *ce que j' avois dit d'un* fort grand changement *qui arriveroit dans le cas propoſé; ſçavoir, que* les Parties recevroient un choc ſenſible par une ſoudaine Augmentation du mouvement du Tout, ou par la Ceſſation de ce même mouvement. *On n'a pas entrepris de répondre à cela.*

* § 52.

53. *Comme le ſçavant Auteur eſt obligé de reconnoître ici, qu'il y a de la* difference *entre le* mouvement abſolu *& le* mouvement rélatif; *il me ſemble qu'il s' enſuit de là néceſſairement, que l'* Eſpace *eſt une choſe tout-à-fait differente de la* Situation *ou de l'* Ordre *des Corps. C'eſt de quoi les Lecteurs pourront juger, en comparant ce que l' Auteur dit ici avec ce que l' on trouve dans les* Principes *de Mr. le Chevalier* Newton, lib. 1. defin. 8.

54. *J' avois dit que le* Temps *& l'* Eſpace *étoient des* QUANTITEZ; *ce qu' on ne peut pas dire de la* Situation *& de l'* Ordre. *On réplique à cela, que l'* Ordre a ſa Quantité; *qu'* il y a dans l' Ordre quelque choſe qui précéde, & quelque choſe qui ſuit; *qu'* il y a une Diſtance ou un Intervalle. *Je réponds, que* ce qui précéde *&* ce qui ſuit, *conſtitue la* Situation *ou l'*

and (for want of other Bodies to compare it with) would † *produce no diſcoverable Change*: Unleſs he could *diſprove* the *Inſtance* which I gave of a *very great Change* that would happen; *viz.* that *the Parts would be ſenſibly ſhocked by a ſudden Acceleration, or ſtopping of the Motion of the Whole*: To which Inſtance, he has not attempted to give any Anſwer. † § 52.

53. Whether this learned Author's being forced here to acknowledge the *difference* between *abſolute real Motion* and *relative Motion*, does not neceſſarily infer that *Space* is really a quite different Thing from the *Situation* or *Order* of Bodies; I leave to the Judgment of thoſe who ſhall be pleaſed to compare what this learned Writer here alleges, with what Sir *Iſaac Newton* has ſaid in his *Principia*, *Lib.* 1, *Defin.* 8.

54. I had alleged that *Time* and *Space* were QUANTITIES, which *Situation* and *Order* were *not*. To this, it is replied; that *Order has its Quantity*; *there is that which goes before, and that which follows*; *there is Diſtance or Interval*. I anſwer: *Going before*, and *following*, conſtitutes *Situation* or *Order*: But the *Diſtance*, *Interval*, or *Quantity* of *Time* or

Ordre ; *mais la* Distance, *l'* Intervalle, *ou la* Quantité *du* Temps *ou de l'*Espace, *dans lequel une chose suit une autre, est une chose tout-a-fait distincte de la* Situation *ou de l'* Ordre, *& elle ne constitue aucune* Quantité *de* Situation *ou d'* Ordre. *La* Situation *ou l'* Ordre *peuvent être les* mêmes, *lors que la* Quantité du Temps *ou* de l'Espace, *qui intervient, se trouve* fort differente. *Le sçavant Auteur ajoute, que les* Raisons *& les* Proportions || *ont leur* Quantité; *& que, par conséquent, le* Temps *& l'* Espace *peuvent aussi avoir leur* Quantité, *quoi qu'ils ne soient que des* Rélations. *Je réponds*, Prémiérement, *que s'il étoit vrai que* quelques fortes de Relations, (*comme, par exemple, les* Raisons *ou les* Proportions,) *fussent des* Quantitez ; *il ne s'ensuivroit pourtant pas que la* Situation & l' Ordre, *qui sont des Rélations d' une* Nature tout-a-fait differente, *seroient aussi des Quantitez.* Secondement; *les* Proportions *ne sont pas des* Quantitez, *mais les* Proportions *de* Quantitez. *Si elles étoient des* Quantitez, *elles seroient* les Quantitez *de* Quantitez ; *ce qui est absurde. J' ajoute que si elles étoient des* Quantitez, *elles augmenteroient toûjours par l'* Addition, *comme* toutes les autres Quantitez. *Mais l' Addition de la Proportion de* 1 *à* 1, *à la Proportion de* 1 *à* 1, *ne fait pas plus que la Proportion de* 1 *à* 1 : *Et l' Addition de la Proportion de* $\frac{1}{2}$ *à* 1, *à la Proportion de* 1 *à* 1, *ne fait pas la*

|| § 54.

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Space, wherein one Thing follows another, is entirely a diſtinct Thing from the *Situation* or *Order*, and does not conſtitute any *Quantity of Situation or Order*: The *Situation* or *Order* may be the *ſame*, when the *Quantity of Time* or *Space intervening* is *very different*. This Learned Author further replies, that *Ratio*'s or *Proportions* † have their *Quantity*; and therefore ſo † § 54. may *Time* and *Space*, though they be nothing but *Relations*. I anſwer *1ſt*; If it had been true, that ſome *particular Sorts* of *Relations*, ſuch as *Ratio*'s or *Proportions*, were *Quantities*; yet it would not have followed, that *Situation* and *Order*, which are Relations of a *quite different Kind*, would have been *Quantities* too. But *2dly*; *Proportions* are not *Quantities*, but the *Proportions of Quantities*. If they were *Quantities*, they would be *the Quantities of Quantities*; which is abſurd. Alſo, if they were *Quantities*, they would (like *all other* Quantities) increaſe always by *Addition*: But the *Addition* of the Proportion of 1 to 1, to the Proportion of 1 to 1, makes ſtill no more than the Proportion of 1 to 1; and the *Addition* of the Proportion of *half* to 1, to the Proportion of 1 to 1, does not make the Proportion of 1 *and a half* to 1, but the Proportion only of *half* to 1. That which Mathematicians ſometimes *inaccurately* call the *Quantity* of *Proportion*, is (accurately and ſtrictly ſpeaking,) only

Proportion de $1\frac{1}{2}$ *à* 1, *mais ſeulement la Proportion de* $\frac{1}{2}$ *à* 1. *Ce que les Mathematiciens appellent quelquefois* avec peu d' exactitude *la* Quantité *de la* Proportion, *n' eſt, à parler proprement, que la* Quantité *de la* Grandeur Rélative *ou* Comparative *d' une choſe par rapport à une autre : Et la* Proportion *n' eſt pas la* Grandeur comparative *même, mais la* Comparaiſon *ou le* Rapport d' une Grandeur *à une autre. La Proportion de* 6 *à* 1, *par rapport à celle de* 3 *à* 1, *n' eſt pas une* double Quantité de Proportion, *mais la* Proportion d' une double Quantité. *Et en général, ce que l' on dit* Avoir une plus grande ou plus petite Proportion, *n' eſt pas*, avoir une plus grande ou plus petite Quantité de proportion ou de rapport, *mais*, avoir la proportion ou le rapport d' une plus grande ou plus petite Quantité *à une autre : Ce n' eſt pas une* plus grande ou plus petite Quantité de Comparaiſon, *mais la* Comparaiſon d' une plus grande ou plus petite Quantité. *L'*

* § 54. Expreſſion * Logarithmique *d' une Proportion, n' eſt pas* (*comme le ſçavant Auteur le dit*) *la* Meſure, *mais ſeulement l'* Indice *ou le* Signe artificiel *de la Proportion : Cet Indice ne deſigne pas une* Quantité *de la proportion ; il marque ſeulement* combien de fois *une Proportion eſt répetée ou compliquée. Le Logarithme de la* Proportion d' Egalité, *eſt* 0 ; *ce qui n' empêche pas que ce ne ſoit une Proportion auſſi* réelle *qu' aucune autre :*

the *Quantity* of the *Relative* or *Comparative Magnitude* of one Thing with regard to another: And *Proportion* is not the *comparative Magnitude* it ſelf, but the *Compariſon* or Relation *of the Magnitude* to Another. The Proportion of 6 to 1, with regard to that of 3 to 1, is not a *double Quantity of Proportion*, but the *Proportion of a double Quantity*. And in general, what they call *Bearing a greater or leſs Proportion*, is not *bearing a greater or leſs Quantity of Proportion or Relation*, but, *bearing the Proportion or Relation of a greater or leſs Quantity* to Another: 'Tis not a *greater or leſs Quantity of Compariſon*, but the *Compariſon of a greater or leſs Quantity*. The || *Logarithmick Expreſſion* of a Proportion, is not (as this learned Author ſtiles it) a *Meaſure*, but only an artificial *Index* or *Sign* of Proportion: 'Tis not the expreſſing a *Quantity* of Proportion, but barely a denoting the *Number of Times* that any Proportion is repeated or complicated. The Logarithm of the *Proportion of Equality*, is 0; and yet 'tis as *real* and as *much* a Proportion, as any other: And when the Logarithm is *negative*, as $\bar{1}$; yet the Proportion, of which it is the Sign or Index, is it ſelf *affirmative*. *Duplicate* or *Triplicate* Proportion, does not denote a double or triple *Quantity* of Proportion, but the *Number of Times* that the Proportion is repeated. The tripling of any Magnitude or Quantity *once*, produces || § 54.

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tre : Et lors que le Logarithme eſt negatif, *comme* $\bar{1}$; *la proportion, dont il eſt le Signe ou l' Indice, ne laiſſe pas d' être* affirmative. *La Proportion* doublée *ou* triplée, *ne deſigne pas une double ou triple* Quantité *de Proportion ; elle marque ſeulement* combien de fois *la Proportion eſt répetée. Si l' on triple* une fois *quelque Grandeur ou quelque Quantité, cela produit une Grandeur ou une Quantité, laquelle par rapport à la prémiere a la proportion de* 3 *à* 1. *Si on la triple une* ſeconde fois, *cela produit (non pas une* double Quantité de Proportion, *mais) une Grandeur ou une Quantité, laquelle par rapport à la prémiere a la proportion (que l' on appelle* doublée) *de* 9 *à* 1. *Si on la triple une* troiſiéme fois, *cela produit (non pas une* triple Quantité de proportion, *mais) une Grandeur ou une Quantité, laquelle par rapport à la prémiere a la proportion (que l' on appelle* triplée) *de* 27 *à* 1 : *Et ainſi du reſte.* Troiſiémement, *le* Temps *& l'* Eſpace *ne ſont point du tout de la Nature des* Proportions, *mais de la Nature des* Quantitez abſolues, *auxquelles les* Proportions *conviennent. Par exemple ; la Proportion de* 12 *à* 1, *eſt une* Proportion *beaucoup* plus grande * *que celle de* 2 *à* 1 ; *& cependant une ſeule & même* Quantité *peut avoir la proportion de* 12 *à* 1 *par rapport*

* C' eſt-à-dire, comme je viens de le remarquer, elle n' eſt pas une plus grande *Quantité de Proportion*, mais la *Proportion d' une plus grande Quantité comparative.*

duces a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion of 3 to 1. The tripling it a *ſecond* time, produces (not a *double Quantity of Proportion*, but) a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion (called *duplicate*) of 9 to 1. The tripling it a *third* time, produces (not a *triple Quantity of Proportion*, but) a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion (called *triplicate*) of 27 to 1: And ſo on. 3*dly*, *Time* and *Space* are not of the Nature of *Proportions* at all, but of the Nature of *abſolute Quantities* to which *Proportions belong*. As for Example: The Proportion of 12 to 1, is a much *greater Proportion*, (that is, as I now obſerved, not a greater *Quantity of Proportion*, but the *Proportion of a greater comparative Quantity*,) than that of 2 to 1; and yet one and the *ſame unvaried Quantity*, may to one Thing bear the Proportion of 12 to 1, and to another Thing at the ſame time the Proportion of 2 to 1. Thus the Space of a *Day*, bears a much greater Proportion to an *Hour*, than it does to *half a Day*; and yet it remains, notwithſtanding *Both the Proportions*, the *ſame unvaried Quantity* of *Time*. *Time* therefore, [and *Space* likewiſe by the ſame Argument,] is not of the Nature of a *Proportion*, but of an *abſolute and unvaried Quantity, to which different Proportions belong*. Unleſs this Reaſoning can be ſhown

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port à une choſe, & en même temps la proportion de 2 à 1 par rapport à une autre. C' eſt ainſi, que l' Eſpace d' un Jour *a une beaucoup plus grande proportion à une* Heure, *qu' à la* moitié d'un Jour ; *& cependant, nonobſtant* ces deux Proportions, *il continue d' être la* même Quantité de Temps ſans aucune variation. *Il eſt donc certain, que le* Temps [*& l' Eſpace auſſi par la même raiſon*] *n'eſt pas de la Nature des* Proportions, *mais de la Nature des* Quantitez abſolues & invariables, qui ont des Proportions differentes. *Le Sentiment du ſçavant Auteur ſera donc encore, de ſon* † *propre aveu, une Contradiction ; à moins qu'il ne faſſe voir la fauſſeté de ce Raiſonnement.*

† IV Ecrit, § 16.

55,——63. *Il me ſemble que tout ce que l' on trouve ici, eſt une* Contradiction *manifeſte. Les Sçavans en pourront juger. On ſuppoſe formellement dans* ‖ Un endroit, *que Dieu auroit pu créer l' Univers* plûtôt *ou* plus tard. *Et* *Ailleurs *on dit que ces termes mêmes* (plûtôt & plus tard) *ſont des termes* inintelligibles *& des* † Suppoſitions impoſſibles. *On trouve de ſemblables Contradictions dans ce que l' Auteur dit touchant l'* Eſpace *dans lequel la* Matiere *ſubſiſte: Voïez ci-deſſus, ſur* § 26, — 32.

‖ § 56.

* § 55, 57, 58,—63.

† IV Ecrit, § 15.

64, *&* 65. *Voïez ci-deſſus,* § 54.

66,—70. *Voïez ci-deſſus,* § 1,——20; *&* § 21, ——25. *J' ajouterai ſeulement ici, que l' Auteur, en* ‖ *comparant* la Volonté

‖ § 70.

to be falſe, our Learned Author's Opinion ſtill remains, by his * *own Confeſſion*, a *Contradiction.* * *Fourth Paper*, §16.

55, —— 63. All This, ſeems to me to be a plain *Contradiction*; and I am willing to leave it to the Judgment of the Learned. In † *one* Paragraph, there is a plain and diſtinct Suppoſition, that the Univerſe *might* be created as much *ſooner* or *later* as God pleaſed. In the ‖ *reſt*, the very Terms [*ſooner* or *later*] are treated as *unintelligible* Terms and * *impoſſible* Suppoſitions. And the like, concerning the *Space* in which *Matter* ſubſiſts; *See above, on* § 26 —— 32.

† § 56.

‖ § 55, 57, 58, —63.

* *Fourth Paper*, §15.

64, and 65. *See above* upon § 54.

66, —— 70. *See above*, on § 1, —— 20; *and* on § 21 —— 25. I ſhall here only add, that † *comparing* the *Will of God, when it chuſes*

† § 70.

lonté de Dieu *au* hazard d' Epicure, *lors qu'* entre pluſieurs manieres d' agir également bonnes elle en choiſit une, *compare enſemble* deux choſes, *qui ſont auſſi differentes que deux choſes le puiſſent être* ; *puis qu'* Epicure *ne reconnoiſſoit* aucune Volonté, aucune Intelligence, aucun Principe actif *dans la formation de l' Univers.*

71. Voïez ci-deſſus, § 21——25.

72. Voïez ci-deſſus, § 1——20.

73——75. *Quand on conſidere ſi l'* Eſpace *eſt* indépendant *de la* Matiere, *& ſi l'* Univers peut être borné & mobile ; (*voïez ci-deſſus*, § 1——20, *&* § 26——32 ;) *il ne s' agit pas de la* Sageſſe *ou de la* * Volonté *de* Dieu, *mais de la* Nature abſolue *&* néceſſaire *des* choſes. *Si l'* Univers *PEUT être* borné *&* mobile, *par la Volonté de Dieu* ; (*ce que le ſçavant Auteur eſt obligé d'* accorder *ici, quoi qu'il diſe continuellement que c'eſt une Suppoſition* impoſſible ;) *il s' enſuit évidemment que l'* Eſpace, *dans lequel ce mouvement ſe fait, eſt* indépendant *de la* Matiere. *Mais ſi, au contraire, l'* Univers † ne Peut être borné *&* mobile, *&* *ſi l'* Eſpace ne Peut être indépendant *de la* Matiere ; *il s' enſuit évidemment, que Dieu ne* Peut *ni ne* Pouvoit *donner des bornes à la* Matiere ; *& par conſéquent l'* Univers *doit être, non ſeulement* ſans bornes, *mais encore* ‖ éternel, *tant* à parte ante *qu'* à parte poſt, néceſſairement *&* indépendamment *de la* Volonté de Dieu.

* § 73.

† IV Ecrit, § 21 ; & V Ecrit, § 29.

‖ § 74.

chooſes one out of many equally good ways of acting, to *Epicurus's Chance*, who allowed *No Will, No Intelligence, No Active Principle at all* in the formation of the Univerſe; is comparing together *Two things*, than which *No Two things* can poſſibly be more different.

71. *See above*, on § 21, —— 25.

72. *See above*, on § 1, —— 20.

73, —— 75. In the conſideration whether *Space* be *independent* upon *Matter*, and whether the *material Univerſe Can be Finite and Moveable*, (See *above*, on § 1 —— 20, *and* on 26, —— 32;) the queſtion is not concerning the *Wiſdom* or * *Will* of *God*, but concerning the *abſolute* and *neceſſary Nature* of *Things*. If the *Material Univerſe CAN poſſibly*, by the Will of God, be *Finite* and *Moveable*; (which this learned Author here finds himſelf neceſſitated to *grant*, though he perpetually treats it as an *impoſſible* ſuppoſition;) then *Space*, (in which That Motion is performed,) is manifeſtly *independent* upon *Matter*. But if, on the contrary, the *material Univerſe* † *Cannot* be *finite* and *moveable*, and *Space cannot* be *independent* upon *Matter*; then (I ſay) it follows evidently, that God neither *Can* nor *ever Could* ſet Bounds to *Matter*; and conſequently the *material Univerſe* muſt be not only *boundleſs*, but || *eternal* alſo, both *a parte ante* and *a parte poſt*,

* § 73.

† *Fourth Paper*, § 21. and *Fifth Paper*, § 29.

|| § 74.

Car l' Opinion de ceux qui ſoutiennent que
* § 75. *le Monde* * pourroit *avoir exiſté de toute Eternité, par la* volonté *de Dieu qui exerçoit ſa Puiſſance éternelle ; cette Opinion, dis-je, n' a aucun rapport à la Matiere dont il s' agit ici.*

76 & 77. *Voiez ci-deſſus,* § 73——75, & § 1——20 ; & *ci-deſſous,* § 103.

78. *On ne trouve ici aucune nouvelle Objection. J'ai fait voir amplement dans les Ecrits précédens, que la* Comparaiſon *dont Mr. le Chevalier* Newton *s' eſt ſervi, & que l' on attaque ici, eſt juſte & intelligible.*

79,——82. *Tout ce que l' on objecte ici dans la Section* 79, & *dans la ſuivante, eſt une pure* Chicane *ſur des Mots. L'* Exiſtence *de* Dieu, *comme je l' ai déja dit pluſieurs fois, eſt la Cauſe de l'* Eſpace ; & Toutes les Autres choſes *exiſtent* dans *cet Eſpace. Il s' enſuit donc que l'* Eſpace *eſt*
† § 80. *auſſi* † *le* Lieu *des* Idées ; *parce qu'il eſt le Lieu des* Subſtances mêmes, *qui ont des Idées dans leur Entendement.*

J' *avois dit, par voye de* comparaiſon, *que le Sentiment de l' Auteur étoit* auſſi *déraiſonnable,* que ſi *quelqu'un ſoûtenoit*
‖ § 81. *que* ‖ *l'* Ame humaine *eſt l'* Ame des Images des choſes qu' elle apperçoit. *Le ſçavant Auteur raiſonne là deſſus* en plaiſantant, *comme ſi j' avois aſſuré que ce fût mon propre ſentiment.*

Dieu

poſt, neceſſarily and *independently on the Will of God.* For, the Opinion of thoſe who contend, that the World * *might poſſibly* be Eternal, by the *Will* of God exerciſing his Eternal Power; this has no Relation at all, to the Matter at preſent in Queſtion. * § 75.

76 and 77. *See above*, on § 73—75; and on § 1——20. And *below*, on § 103.

78. This Paragraph contains no new Objection. The Aptneſs and Intelligibleneſs of the *Similitude* made uſe of by Sir *Iſaac Newton*, and here excepted againſt, has been abundantly explained in the foregoing Papers.

79,——82. All that is objected in the † *two former* of theſe Paragraphs, is a mere *quibbling* upon Words. The *Exiſtence* of *God*, (as has often been already obſerved,) cauſes *Space*; and *In* that Space, *All other Things* exiſt. It is therefore ‖ the Place of *Ideas* likewiſe; becauſe it is the Place of the *Subſtances themſelves*, in whoſe Underſtandings Ideas exiſt. † § 79, 80. ‖ § 80.

The Soul of Man being * *the Soul of the Images of the Things which it perceives*, was alledged by me, in way of *compariſon*, as an *Inſtance* of a *ridiculous Notion*: And this learned Writer *pleaſantly* argues againſt it, as if I had affirmed it to be my *own* Opinion. * § 81.

* § 82. *Dieu apperçoit tout, non* * par le moyen d' un Organe, *mais parce qu'il eſt* lui-même *actuellement preſent par tout.* L' Eſpace univerſel *eſt donc le* Lieu *où il* apperçoit *les Choſes. J'ai fait voir amplement ci-deſſus ce que l' on doit entendre par le mot de* Senſorium, *& ce que c'eſt que l'* Ame du Monde. *C'eſt trop que de demander qu' on abandonne la* Conſequence *d' un Argument, ſans faire aucune nouvelle Objection contre les* Premiſſes.

83——88; *&* 89——91. *J' avouë que je n' entends point ce que l' Auteur dit,*

† § 83. *lors qu'il avance, que* † *l'* Ame *eſt un* Principe repreſentatif; *que* || chaque Subſtance

|| § 87. ſimple * *eſt par ſa propre nature* une concentration & un miroir vivant de tout l'

* Voiez l' Appendice, N°. 2. Univers; *qu' elle* † eſt une Repreſentation de

† § 91. l' Univers, || ſelon ſon Point de vûë; *& que* toutes les Subſtances Simples auront

|| Voyez l'Appendice, N° 11. toûjours une Harmonie entre elles, parce qu' elles repreſentent toûjours le même Univers.

* § 83, 87, 89, 90. *Pour ce qui eſt de* * *l'* Harmonie préétablie, *en vertu de laquelle on prétend que les* Affections de l' Ame, *& les* mouvemens méchaniques du Corps, *s' accordent ſans*

† Voïez l'Appendice, N° 5. † *aucune* influence *mutuelle*; *voïez ci-deſſous, ſur* § 110—— 116.

J' ai ſuppoſé que les Images des choſes ſont portées par les Organes des Sens dans le *Senſorium*, où l' Ame les apperçoit. *On*

God perceives every Thing, not * *by means* of any *Organ*, but by being *himself* actually present every where. This *every where* therefore, or *universal Space*, is the *Place* of his *Perception.* The Notion of *Sensorium*, and of *the Soul of the World*, has been abundantly explained *before.* 'Tis too much to desire to have the *Conclusion* given up, without bringing any further Objection against the *Premises.* * § 82.

83, ——88; *and* 89 —— 91. That † *the Soul* is a *Representative Principle*; † § 83.
That * *every simple Substance* || *is by its Nature a Concentration and living Mirror of the whole Universe*; That * *it is a representation of the Universe,* † *according to its Point of View*; and *that all simple Substances will always have a Harmony between themselves, because they always represent the same Universe*: All This, I acknowledge, I understand not at all. * § 87. || *See Appendix,* N° 2. * § 91. † *See Appendix,* N°. 11.

Concerning the || *Harmonia præstabilita*, by which the *Affections of the Soul*, and the *Mechanic Motions of the Body*, are affirmed to agree, without * at all influencing each other; *See below*, on § 110 ——116. || § 83, 87, 89, 90. * *See Appendix,* N° 5.

That the *Images of Things are conveyed by the Organs of Sense into the Sensory, where the Soul perceives them*; is affirmed,

* § 84. *ſoûtient que c'eſt une choſe* * inintelligible ; *mais on n' en donne aucune* preuve.

† § 84. *Touchant cette Queſtion, ſçavoir, ſi* † *une* Subſtance immaterielle agit ſur une Subſtance materielle, ou ſi celle-ci agit ſur l' autre ; *voïez ci-deſſous,* § 110——116.

‖ § 85. *Dire que Dieu* ‖ apperçoit & connoit toutes choſes, non par ſa preſence actuelle, mais parce qu'il les produit continuellement de nouveau ; *ce ſentiment, dis-je, eſt une pure Fiction des Scholaſtiques, ſans aucun Fondement.*

Pour ce qui eſt de l' Objection, qui porte
*§ 86, 87, 88, 82. *que Dieu ſeroit* * l' Ame du Monde ; *j'y ai répondu amplement ci-deſſus,* Réplique II, § 12 ; *&* Réplique IV, §. 32.

92. *L' Auteur ſuppoſe que tous les mouvemens de nos Corps ſont* néceſſaires, *& produits* † *par une* ſimple ‖ impulſion méchanique de la Matiere, *tout à fait indépendante de l' Ame : Mais je ne ſçaurois m' empêcher de croire que cette Doctrine conduit à la* Néceſſité *& au* Deſtin. *Elle tend à faire croire que les* hommes *ne ſont que de* purs Machines, (*comme* des Cartes *s' étoit imaginé que les* Bêtes *n' avoient point d' Ame* ;) *en detruiſant* ‖ *tous les Argumens fondez ſur les* Phénomenes, *c'eſt-à-dire, ſur les* Actions des hommes, *dont on ſe ſert pour prouver qu' ils ont des* Ames, *& qu' ils ne ſont pas des Etres* purement materiels. *Voïez ci-deſſous, ſur* § 110——116.

† § 92, 95, 116.

‖ Voïez l' Appendice, N° 13.

‖ Voïez l' Appendice, N° 12.

93, —— 95. *J' avois dit que chaque* Action *conſiſte à donner une* nouvelle force

aux

but not proved, to be an † *unintelligible* Notion. * § 84.

Concerning ‖ *immaterial Subſtance affecting, or being affected by, material Subſtance*; See below, on § 110 —— 116. ‖ § 84.

That God * *perceives and knows all Things, not by being Preſent to them, but by continually producing them anew*; is a mere Fiction of the Schoolmen, without any Proof. * § 85.

The Objection concerning God's being † *the Soul of the World*, has been abundantly anſwered *above*; *Reply II*, § 12; and *Reply IV*, § 32. † § 86, 87, 88, 82.

92. To ſuppoſe, that all the Motions of our Bodies are *neceſſary*, and cauſed entirely ‖ by *mere* * *mechanical Impulſes of Matter*, altogether independent on the Soul; is what (I cannot but think) tends to introduce *Neceſſity and Fate*. It tends to make *Men* be thought as *mere Machines*, as *Des Cartes* imagined *Beaſts* to be; by taking away † all Arguments drawn from *Phænomena*, that is, from the *Actions of Men*, to prove that there *is* any *Soul*, or any thing more than *mere Matter* in Men at all. *See below, on* § 110——116. ‖ 92, 95, *and* 116. * *See Appendix*, N° 13. † *See Appendix*, N°. 12.

93——95. I alledged, that every *Action* is the giving of a *New Force* to the Thing

aux choſes, qui reçoivent quelque impreſſion. *On répond à cela, que* deux Corps durs & égaux, pouſſez l' un contre l'autre, réjailliſſent avec la même force ; *& que par conſéquent leur* Action *reciproque ne donne point une* nouvelle force. *Il ſuffiroit de répliquer qu' aucun de ces deux Corps ne réjaillit avec ſa* propre *force ; que* chacun *d' eux* * *perd ſa* propre *force, & qu' il eſt repouſſé avec une* nouvelle force *communiquée par le Reſſort de l' autre : Car ſi ces deux Corps* n' ont point de Reſſort, *ils ne réjailliront pas. Mais il eſt certain que* toutes *les Communications de mouvement* purement méchaniques, *ne ſont pas une* Action, *à parler proprement : Elles ne ſont qu' une ſimple* Paſſion, *tant dans les Corps qui* pouſſent, *que dans ceux qui ſont* pouſſez. *L'* Action *eſt le commencement d'un mouvement qui n' exiſtoit point auparavant, produit par un Principe de* vie *ou d'* Activité : *Et ſi* Dieu *ou l'* Homme, *ou quelque* Agent vivant *ou* actif, agit *ſur quelque partie du* Monde materiel ; *ſi tout n' eſt pas un* ſimple méchaniſme ; *il faut qu' il y ait une* augmentation *& une* Diminution *continuelle de* toute la Quantité du mouvement qui eſt dans l' Univers. *Mais c'eſt ce que le ſçavant Auteur* * *nie en pluſieurs endroits.* 96, 97.

* Voïez la § 99. où cette matiere eſt traitée plus amplement.

* Tout ce que Mr. *Leibnitz* dit ſur cette matiere, paroit rempli de confuſion & de contradictions. Car le mot

acted upon. To this it is objected, that *two equal hard Bodies ſtriking each other, return with the ſame Force*; and that therefore their *Action* upon each other, gives *no New Force.* It might be ſufficient to reply, that the Bodies do *Neither* of them return with their *own* Force, but each of them * loſes its *own* Force, and *each* returns with a *new Force* impreſſed by the others *Elaſticity*: For if they are *not elaſtical*, they return not *at all.* But indeed, *all mere mechanical* Communications of Motion, are not properly *Action*, but mere *Paſſiveneſs*, both in the Bodies that *impell*, and that *are impelled.* *Action*, is the beginning of a Motion where there was none before, from a Principle of *Life* or *Activity*: And if *God* or *Man*, or *Any Living* or *Active Power*, ever *influences* any thing in the *material World*; and every thing be not *mere abſolute Mechaniſm*; there muſt be a continual *Increaſe* and *Decreaſe* of the *whole Quantity of Motion in the Univerſe.* Which this learned Gentleman * frequently denies.

*See more, on § 99.

* *There appears a great Confuſion and Inconſiſtency in Mr* Leibnitz's *whole Notion of this Matter. For the Word,* Force,

96, 97. *Il ſe contente ici de renvoyer à ce qu'il a dit ailleurs. Je ferai auſſi la même choſe.*

98. *Si*

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mot de *Force*, ou de *Force active*, ſignifie, dans la queſtion dont il s' agit ici, l' *Impetus* ou la *Force impulſive & rélative* des *Corps en mouvement*: Voiez § 13 de ma Troiſiéme Réplique. Mr. *Leibnitz* employe toûjours ce mot en ce ſens: Comme lors qu' il dit, [§ 93, 94, 99, & 107, *de cette derniere Réponſe,*] Que les Corps *ne changent point leur Force* aprez la *Réflexion*, parce qu' ils retournent *avec la même Viteſſe*: Que quand un *Corps reçoit une nouvelle Force d' un autre Corps, cet autre en perd autant de la ſienne*: Qu' il *eſt impoſſible qu' un Corps reçoive une nouvelle Force, ſans que les autres en perdent autant*: Que *l' Univers des Corps recevroit une nouvelle Force, ſi l' Ame donnoit de la Force au Corps*: Que les *Forces Actives continuent toûjours d' être les mêmes dans l' Univers, parce que la Force que les Corps ſans reſſort perdent dans leur Tout, eſt communiquée à leurs parties menuës, & diſſipée parmi elles.* Or il paroit clairement tant par la Raiſon que par l' Experience, que cet *Impetus*, ou cette *Force active impulſive* & *rélative* des *Corps en mouvement*, eſt toûjours proportionnée à la *Quantité du Mouvement*. Donc, ſelon les Principes de Mr. *Leibnitz*, puiſque cette *Force active* & *impulſive* eſt toûjours la même en Quantité, il faut *auſſi* néceſſairement que *la Quantité du Mouvement* ſoit toûjours la même dans l' Univers. Cependant il tombe en contradiction en reconnoiſſant ailleurs, [§ 99,] que la *Quantité du Mouvement* n' eſt pas *toûjours la même*: Et dans les *Acta Eruditorum, ad ann.* 1686. *pag.* 161, il tâche de *Prouver*, que la *Quantité du Mouvement* dans l' Univers *n' eſt pas toujours la même*; il tâche, dis-je, de le *prouver* par cette même & ſeule Raiſon, que la Quantité de la *Force impulſive* eſt toûjours *la même*. Mais ſi cela étoit vrai, il s' enſuivroit au contraire, que la *Quantité du Mouvement ſeroit toûjours & néceſſairement la même*. Ce qui a donné occaſion à Mr. *Leibnitz* de ſe contredire ſur cette matiere, c' eſt qu' il a ſupputé, par une mépriſe tout à fait indigne d' un Philoſophe, la Quantité de la *Force impulſive* dans un *Corps qui monte*, par la Quantité de ſa *Matiere* & de l' *Eſpace* qu' il décrit en montant, ſans conſiderer le *temps* que ce Corps employe à monter. *Suppono*, † dit-il, *tanta vi opus eſſe, &c.* C' eſt-à-dire: " Je ſuppoſe que " la

† Acta Erudit. ad ann. 1686. pag. 162.

96 *and* 97. Here this learned Author refers only to what he has ſaid elſewhere: And I alſo am willing to do the ſame.

98. If

Force, *and* Active Force, *ſignifies in the preſent Queſtion, the* Impetus *or relative* Impulſive Force of Bodies in Motion: *See my* Third Reply, § 13. *Mr.* Leibnitz *conſtantly uſes the Word in this Senſe: As when he ſpeaks* [§ 93, 94, 99, and 107, of this laſt Anſwer,] *of Bodies* not changing their Force *after Reflexion, becauſe they return* with the ſame Swiftneſs: *Of* a Body's receiving a new Force from another Body, which loſes as much of its own: *Of the impoſſibility, that* one Body ſhould acquire any new Force, without the Loſs of as much in Others: *Of the* new Force which the whole material Univerſe would receive, if the Soul of Man communicated any Force to the Body: *And of* Active Forces continuing always the ſame in the Univerſe, becauſe the Force which un-elaſtick Bodies loſe in their Whole, is communicated to and diſperſed among their ſmall Parts. *Now this* Impetus, *or relative* Impulſive Active Force *of* Bodies in Motion, *is evidently both in Reaſon and Experience, always proportional to the* Quantity of Motion. *Therefore, according to Mr.* Leibnitz's *Principles, this* impulſive active Force *being always the ſame in Quantity, the* Quantity of Motion alſo *muſt of neceſſity be always the ſame in the Univerſe. Yet elſewhere, he inconſiſtently acknowledges,* [§ 99,] *that the* Quantity of Motion is Not always the ſame: *And in the* Acta Eruditorum, ad Ann. 1686, pag. 161, *he endeavours to* Prove *that the* Quantity of Motion *in the Univerſe is* Not always the ſame, *from that very Argument, and from that ſingle Argument only, (of the Quantity of* Impulſive Force *being always the ſame,) which, if it was true, would neceſſarily infer on the contrary, that the* Quantity of Motion could not but be always the ſame. *The Reaſon of his Inconſiſtency in this Matter, was his computing, by a wonderfully unphiloſophical Error, the Quantity of* Impulſive Force *in an* Aſcending Body, *from the Quantity of its Matter and of the* Space *deſcribed by it in Aſcending, without conſidering the* Time *of its aſcending.* * "Suppono, *ſays he,* tantâ vi opus eſſe ad elevandum corpus *A* unius libræ uſq; ad altitudinem quatuor ulnarum, quantâ opus eſt ad elevan-

* *Acta Erudit. ad Ann.* 1686. *pag.* 162.

98. *Si l'* Ame *eſt une* Subſtance, *qui remplit le* Senſorium, *ou le* lieu dans lequel elle apperçoit les Images des choſes, qui y ſont

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" la même Force eſt réquiſe pour élever le Corps *A* du " poids d' Une Livre à la hauteur de quatre aunes, que " celle qui éleve le Corps *B* du poids de quatre Livres à " la hauteur d' une aune. C' eſt de quoi les *Carteſiens*, & " les autres Philoſophes & Mathematiciens de nôtre temps " conviennent. Or il s' enſuit de là, que le Corps *A* en " tombant de la hauteur de quatre aunes, acquiert pré- " ciſément la même Force, que le Corps *B* en tombant de " la hauteur d' Une aune ". Mais Mr. *Leibnitz* ſe trompe fort en faiſant cette ſuppoſition. Ni les *Carteſiens*, ni les autres Philoſophes ou Mathematiciens n' accordent jamais ce qu' il ſuppoſe, excepté dans les cas où les *Temps* que les Corps employent à monter ou à deſcendre, ſont égaux entre eux. Si une *Pendule* décrit une Cycloïde, l'*Arc* de la Cycloïde décrite en montant, ſera comme la *Force* avec laquelle le Corps ſuſpendu commence à monter du plus bas point ; parce que les *temps* qu' il employe à monter, ſont *égaux*. Et ſi des Corps égaux peſent le bras d' une *Balance*, à differentes diſtances de l' Axe de la Balance ; les *Forces* des Corps ſeront en proportion comme les *Arcs* qu' ils décrivent en peſant, parce qu' ils les décrivent en même *temps*. Et ſi deux Globes égaux placez ſur un Plan Horizontal, ſont pouſſez par des *Forces* inégales, ils décriront en *temps égaux* des *Eſpaces* proportionnels aux Forces qui les pouſſent. Ou ſi des *Globes inégaux* ſont pouſſez avec des *Forces égales*, ils décriront en *temps égaux* des *Eſpaces* reciproquement proportionnels à leurs Maſſes. Et dans tous ces cas, ſi des *Corps égaux* ſont pouſſez par des *Forces inégales* ; les *Forces* imprimées, les *Viteſſes* produites, & les *Eſpaces décrits en temps égaux*, ſeront proportionnels l' un à l' autre. Et ſi les Corps ſont *inégaux*, la *Viteſſe* des plus grands Corps ſera d' autant *plus petite*, que les *Corps* ſont *plus grands* ; Donc le *Mouvement* (qui reſulte de la maſſe & de la viteſſe priſes enſemble) ſera dans tous ces cas, & par conſéquent dans tous les autres cas, proportionnel à la *Force* imprimée. [D' où il s' enſuit clairement, pour le dire en paſſant, que ſi la *même Force im-*

pulſive

98. If the *Soul* be a *Subſtance* which fills the *Senſorium*, or *Place wherein it perceives the Images of Things conveyed to it*; yet

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" elevandum corpus *B* quatuor librarum uſq; ad altitudi-
" nem Unius Ulnæ. Omnia hæc à *Carteſianis* pariter ac cæ-
" teris Philoſophis & Mathematicis noſtri temporis conce-
" duntur. Hinc ſequitur, corpus *A* delapſum ex altitudi-
" ne quatuor ulnarum, præciſè tantum acquiſiviſſe virium,
" quantum *B* lapſum ex altitudine Unius Ulnæ". *That is:* " [I *ſuppoſe the ſame Force is requiſite to raiſe a Body* A *of one Pound Weight, to the Height of four Yards; which will raiſe the Body* B *of four Pounds Weight, to the Height of One Yard. This is* Granted *both by the* Carteſians, *and other Philoſophers and Mathematicians of our Times. And from hence it follows, that the Body* A, *by falling from the Height of four Yards, acquires exactly the ſame Force, as the Body* B *by falling from the Height of One Yard*".] But *in this Suppoſition, Mr.* Leibnitz *is greatly miſtaken. Neither the* Carteſians, *nor any other* Philoſophers *or* Mathematicians *ever grant this, but in ſuch Caſes only, where the* Times *of Aſcent or Deſcent are* equal. *If a* Pendulum *oſcillates in a Cycloid; the* Arch *of the Cycloid deſcribed in aſcending, will be as the* Force *with which the pendulous Body begins to aſcend from the loweſt Point; becauſe the* Times *of aſcending are* equal. *And if equal Bodies librate upon the Arm of a* Balance, *at various Diſtances from the Axis of the Balance; the* Forces *of the Bodies will be in Proportion as the* Arches *deſcribed by them in librating, becauſe they librate in the ſame* Time. *And if two* equal Globes *lying upon an Horizontal Plain, be impelled by unequal* Forces, *they will in* equal Times *deſcribe* Spaces *proportional to the* Forces *impelling them. Or if* unequal Globes *be impelled with* equal Forces, *they will in* equal Times *deſcribe* Spaces *reciprocally proportional to their Maſſes. And in all theſe Caſes, if* equal Bodies *be impelled by* Unequal Forces, *the* Forces *impreſſed, the* Velocities *generated, and the* Spaces deſcribed in equal Times, *will be proportional to one another. And if the Bodies be* unequal, *the* Velocity *of the bigger Bodies will be ſo much* leſs, *as the* Bodies *are* bigger; *And therefore the* Motion *(ariſing from the* Maſs *and* Velocity *together) will be*

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ſont portées ; *il ne s' enſuit point de là, qu' elle doit être compoſée de* Parties *ſemblables à celles de la* Matiere, (*Car les* Parties de la Matiere *ſont des* Subſtances diſtinctes

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pulſive ſubſiſte toûjours dans le Monde, comme Mr. *Leibnitz* le prétend ; il faut qu' il y ait toûjours le *même Mouvement* dans le Monde, ce qui eſt *contraire à ce qu' il affirme.*]

Mais Mr. *Leibnitz* confond les Cas où les *temps* ſont *égaux*, avec les Cas où les *temps* ſont *inégaux*. Il confond particulierement le Cas où des corps *montent* & *deſcendent aux extremitez des bras inégaux d' une Balance*, (*Acta Erudit. ad ann.* 1686. *pag.* 162 ; *& ad ann.* 1690, *pag.* 234 ; *& ad ann.* 1691, *pag.* 439 ; *& ad ann.* 1695, *pag.* 155 ;) il confond, diſ-je, ce Cas avec celui des corps qui *tombent en bas*, & que l' on *jette en haut*, ſans faire attention à l' *inégalité du temps*. Car un corps avec la même *Force* & la même *Viteſſe*, décrira un *plus grand Eſpace* dans un *temps plus long* : Il faut donc conſiderer le *temps* ; & l' on ne doit pas dire que les *Forces* ſont proportionnelles aux *Eſpaces*, à moins que les *temps* ne ſoient *égaux*. Lors que les *temps* ſont *inégaux*, les *Forces* des *Corps égaux* ſont comme les *Eſpaces appliquez aux temps*. C' eſt en quoi les *Carteſiens* & les autres Philoſophes & Mathematiciens s' accordent tous. Ils diſent tous que les *Forces impulſives des Corps* ſont proportionnelles à leurs *Mouvemens*, & ils meſurent leurs *Mouvemens* par leurs *maſſes* & leurs *Viteſſes* priſes enſemble, & leurs *Viteſſes* par les *Eſpaces* qu' ils décrivent, *appliquez aux temps* dans leſquels ils les décrivent. Si un Corps *jetté en haut* monte, en *doublant* ſa *Viteſſe*, *quatre fois* plus haut dans un temps *double* ; ſa *Force impulſive* ſera augmentée, non pas à proportion de l' *Eſpace* qu' il décrit en montant, mais à proportion de *cet Eſpace appliqué au temps* ; c' eſt-à-dire, à proportion de $\frac{4}{1}$ à $\frac{1}{1}$, ou de 2 à 1. Car ſi, dans *ce Cas*, la Force étoit augmentée à proportion de 4 à 1 ; & ſi le même corps, (ayant un mouvement d' Oſcillation dans une Cycloïde,) avec la *même viteſſe doublée*, ne décrit *qu' un Arc double*, & par conſequent ſi ſa *Force* n'eſt

yet it does not thence follow, that it muſt conſiſt of *corporeal Parts*, (for the *Parts* of *Body* are *diſtinct Subſtances* independent on each other ;) but the *Whole* Soul *ſees*, and

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in all theſe Caſes, and in all Other Caſes conſequently, proportional to the Force *impreſt.* [*From whence, by the way, it plainly follows, that if there be always the* ſame impulſive Force *in the World,* as *Mr.* Leibnitz affirms ; *there muſt be always the* ſame Motion *in the World,* contrary to what he affirms.]

But Mr. Leibnitz *confounds theſe Caſes where the* Times *are* equal, *with the Caſes where the* Times *are* unequal : *And chiefly That of Bodies* riſing and falling at the Ends of the unequal Arms of a Balance, [*Acta Erudit.* ad Ann. 1686, Pag. 162 ; & ad Ann. 1690, Pag. 234 ; & ad Ann. 1691, Pag. 439 ; & ad Ann. 1695, Pag. 155 ;] *is by him confounded with That of Bodies* falling downwards *and* thrown upwards, *without allowing for the* Inequality of the Time. *For a Body with one and the ſame* Force, *and one and the ſame* Velocity, *will in a* longer Time *deſcribe a* greater Space ; *and therefore the* Time *is to be conſidered ; and the* Forces *are* not *to be reckoned proportional to the* Spaces, *unleſs where the* Times *are* equal. *Where the* Times *are* unequal, *the* Forces *of* equal Bodies *are as the* Spaces applied to the Times. *And in This, the* Carteſians *and other* Philoſophers and Mathematicians *agree ; all of them making the* impulſive Forces of Bodies *proportional to their* Motions, *and meaſuring their* Motions *by their* Maſſes and Velocities *together, and their* Velocities *by the* Spaces *which they deſcribe,* applied to the Times *in which they deſcribe them. If a Body* thrown upwards *does, by* doubling *its* Velocity, *aſcend* four Times *higher in* twice the Time ; *its* impulſive Force *will be increaſed, not in the proportion of the* Space *deſcribed by its Aſcent, but in the Proportion of* that Space applied to the Time ; *that is, in the Proportion of* $\frac{4}{1}$ *to* $\frac{1}{1}$ or 2 *to* 1. *For if, in* this Caſe, *the* Force *ſhould be increaſed in the Proportion of* 4 *to* 1 ; *and, in oſcillating in a* Cycloid, *the ſame Body, with the* ſame Velocity doubled, *deſcribes* only a doubled Arch, *and its* Force *is therefore* only doubled ; *this Body, with* one and the ſame *Degree of* Velocity, *would have* twice as much

ſtinctes & *indépendantes l' une de l' autre*;) *mais l' Ame* toute entiere voit, entend, & penſe, *comme étant eſſentiellement* un ſeul Etre individuel.

99. *Pour*

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que doublée; ce Corps, avec le *même* degré de *viteſſe*, auroit *deux fois autant de Force* lors qu' il eſt *jetté en haut*, que lors qu' il eſt pouſſé horizontellement : Ce qui eſt une contradiction manifeſte. La contradiction eſt la même quand on aſſure, que quoi qu' un Corps à l' extremité des bras inégaux d' une *Balance*, en *doublant ſa viteſſe*, n' acquiere qu' une *double Force impulſive*, cependant, ſi on le *jette en haut* avec la *même viteſſe doublée*, il acquiert une *Force impulſive quadruple*; je dis que ce ſentiment renferme la même contradiction : Car des *Corps égaux* avec des *viteſſes égales*, ne peuvent pas avoir des *Forces impulſives inégales.*

Galilée, en ſuppoſant que la Gravité eſt *uniforme*, a démontré le mouvement des Corps *projettez* dans les Milieux qui ne font point de reſiſtance; & tous les Mathematiciens conviennent de ſes Propoſitions, ſans en excepter Mr. *Leibnitz* lui-même. Or ſi l'on ſuppoſe que le *temps* qu' un corps employe à tomber, eſt diviſé en parties égales; puiſque la Gravité eſt uniforme, & que par conſequent elle agit également dans les parties égales du temps, il faut que par ſon action elle imprime & communique au corps qui tombe, des *Forces*, des *Viteſſes*, & des *mouvemens* égaux, en *temps* égaux. Et par conſequent la *Force impulſive*, la *Viteſſe*, & le *Mouvement* du corps qui tombe, augmenteront à proportion du *temps* de ſa chute. Mais l' *Eſpace* décrit par le corps qui tombe, reſulte *en partie* de la *Viteſſe* du Corps, & *en partie* du *Temps* qu' il employe à tomber; de ſorte qu' il eſt en *raiſon compoſée* de la Viteſſe & du Temps, ou comme le *Quarré* de l' un ou de l' autre; & par conſequent comme le Quarré de la *Force impulſive.* Et par le même raiſonnement on peut prouver, que lors qu' un Corps eſt *jetté en haut* avec une *Force* impulſive, la *Hauteur* à laquelle il montera, ſera comme le *Quarré* de *cette Force :* Et que la *Force* réquiſe pour élever le Corps *B*, *du poids de quatre Livres*, à la hauteur d' *une aune*, elevera le Corps *A*, *du poids d' Une Livre*, (non pas

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and the *Whole hears*, and the *Whole thinks*, as being eſſentially *one Individual.*

99. In

much Force *when* thrown upwards, *as when* thrown horizontally: *Which is a plain Contradiction. And there is the ſame Contradiction in affirming, that although a Body at the end of the unequal Arms of a* Balance, *by* doubling its Velocity, *acquires only a* double impulſive Force, *yet, by being* thrown upwards *with the* ſame doubled Velocity, *it acquires a* quadruple impulſive Force; *in this Aſſertion, I ſay, there is the ſame Contradiction: For* equal Bodies *with* equal Velocities, *cannot have* unequal impulſive Forces.

Upon the Suppoſition of Gravity being Uniform, Galilæo *demonſtrated the Motion of* Projectiles *in Mediums void of Reſiſtence; and his Propoſitions are allowed by all Mathematicians, not excepting Mr.* Leibnitz *himſelf. Now, ſuppoſing the* Time *of a falling Body to be divided into equal Parts; ſince Gravity is uniform, and, by being ſo, acts equally in equal Parts of Time, it muſt by its Action impreſs and communicate to the falling Body,* equal impulſive Forces, Velocities, and Motions, *in* equal Times. *And therefore* the impulſive Force, *the* Velocity, *and the* Motion *of the falling Body, will increaſe in Proportion to the* Time *of falling. But the* Space *deſcribed by the falling Body, ariſes* partly *from the* Velocity *of the Body, and* partly *from the* Time *of its falling; and ſo is in a* compound ratio *of them* Both, *or as the* Square *of* either *of them; and conſequently as the* Square *of the* impulſive Force. *And by the ſame way of arguing, it may be proved, that when a Body is* thrown upwards *with* any *impulſive* Force, *the* Height *to which it will aſcend, will be as the* Square *of* that Force: *And that the* Force requiſite *to make the Body* B, *of* four Pounds Weight, *riſe up* one Yard, *will make the Body* A, *of* One Pound Weight, *riſe up, (not* four Yards, *as Mr.* Leibnitz *repreſents, but)* ſixteen Yards, *in* quadruple *the Time. For the Gravity of* four

99. *Pour faire voir que les* * Forces actives *qui ſont dans le Monde, c'eſt-à-dire, la* † Quantité du mouvement, *ou la* Force impulſive

* Voïez ci-deſſus *la Note*, § 13 de ma troiſiéme Réplique.

† Voïez ci-deſſus *la Note* ſur § 93, —95.

à la hauteur de *quatre aunes*, comme Mr. *Leibnitz* le dit, mais) à la hauteur de *ſeize aunes*, en *quatre fois* le même temps. Car la Gravité du *poids de quatre Livres* dans *une* partie du *temps*, agit autant que la Gravité du *poids d'Une Livre* en *quatre parties* du *temps*.

Mais Mr. *Herman*, dans ſa *Phoronomie*, pag. 113, ſoûtenant le parti de Mr. *Leibnitz* contre ceux qui diſent que les *Forces* acquiſes par les corps qui tombent, ſont proportionnelles aux *temps* qu' ils employent à tomber, ou aux *Viteſſes* qu' ils acquierent ; Mr. *Herman*, diſ-je, aſſure que cela eſt fondé ſur une *fauſſe ſuppoſition*, ſçavoir que les Corps *jettez en haut* reçoivent de la Gravité qui leur reſiſte, un *nombre égal d' impulſions* en *temps égaux*. C' eſt comme ſi Mr. *Herman* diſoit, que la Gravité *n' eſt pas uniforme* ; &, par conſequent, c' eſt renverſer la *Theorie de Galilée* touchant les corps *Projettez*, dont tous les Géometres conviennent. Je crois que Mr. *Herman* s' imagine que *plus* le mouvement des Corps a de *viteſſe en montant*, *plus* les Corps reçoivent d' *impulſions* ; parce qu' ils *rencontrent* les particules [*imaginaires*] qui cauſent la Gravité. Ainſi le *poids* des corps ſera *plus grand* lors qu' ils *montent*, & *plus petit* lors qu' ils *deſcendent*. Et cependant Mr. *Leibnitz* & Mr. *Herman* reconnoiſſent eux-mêmes, que la Gravité en *temps égaux* produit des *viteſſes égales* dans les corps qui *deſcendent*, & qu' elle ôte des *viteſſes égales* aux corps qui *montent* ; & que par conſéquent elle eſt *uniforme*. Ils reconnoiſſent qu' elle eſt *uniforme*, lors qu' elle agit ſur les Corps pour produire la *Viteſſe* ; & ils nient qu' elle ſoit *uniforme*, lors qu' elle agit ſur eux pour produire la *Force impulſive* : De ſorte qu' ils ne ſont point d' accord avec eux mêmes.

Si la *Force* qu' un Corps acquiert en tombant, eſt comme l' *Eſpace* qu' il décrit ; que l' on diviſe le *Temps* en parties *égales* ; & ſi dans la *premiere* partie du *temps* il acquiert *Une* partie de *Force* ; dans les *deux premieres* parties du *temps* il acquerra *quatre* parties de *Force* ; dans les *trois premieres* parties du *temps*, il acquerra *neuf* parties de *Force* ; & ainſi du reſte. Et par conſequent,

99. In order to ſhow that the * *Active Forces* in the World (meaning the † *Quantity of Motion* or *Impulſive Force* given to Bodies,)

*See above, the Note on my Third Reply, § 13.

†See above, the Note on § 93, 95.

four Pounds Weight *in* One *part of* Time, *acts as much as the Gravity of* one Pound Weight *in* Four Parts of Time.

But Mr. Herman, *in his* Phoronomia, Pag. 113, *(arguing for Mr.* Leibnitz *againſt Thoſe who hold that the* Forces *acquired by falling Bodies are proportional to the* Times *of falling, or to the* Velocities *acquired,) repreſents that this is founded upon a* Falſe Suppoſition, *that Bodies* thrown upwards *receive from the Gravity which reſiſts them, an* equal Number of Impulſes *in* equal Times. *Which is as much as to ſay, that Gravity is* not uniform; *and, by conſequence, to overthrow the* Theory *of* Galilæo *concerning* Projectiles, *allowed by all Geometers. I ſuppoſe, he means that the* ſwifter *the Motion of Bodies is* upwards, *the more* numerous *are the* Impulſes; *becauſe the Bodies* meet *the* [imaginary] *gravitating Particles. And thus the* Weight *of Bodies will be* greater *when they move* upwards, *and* leſs *when they move* downwards. *And yet Mr.* Leibnitz *and Mr.* Herman *themſelves allow, that Gravity in* equal Times *generates* equal Velocities *in* deſcending *Bodies, and takes away* equal Velocities *in* aſcending *Bodies; and therefore is* Uniform. *In its action upon Bodies for generating* Velocity, *they* allow *it to be* uniform; *in its action upon them for generating* impulſive Force, *they* deny *it to be* uniform: *And ſo are* inconſiſtent *with themſelves.*

If the Force *acquired by a Body in falling, be as the* Space deſcribed; *let the* Time *be divided into* equal *parts; and if in the firſt part of* Time *it gain* One *part of* Force, *in the* two firſt *parts of* Time *it will gain* four *parts of* Force, *in the* three firſt *parts of* Time *it will gain* nine *parts of* Force, *and ſo on. And by conſequence, in the* ſecond *part of* Time *it will gain* three *parts of* Force, *in the* third *part of* Time *it will gain* five *parts of Force, in the* fourth *part of* Time *it will gain* ſeven *parts of* Force, *and ſo on. And therefore if the* Action of Gravity *for* generating theſe Forces, *be ſuppoſed, in the middle of the* firſt *part of* Time, *to be of* One *degree; it will, in the middle of the* ſecond, third, *and* fourth *parts of* Time, *be of* three, five, *and* ſeven *degrees, and ſo on: That is, it will be proportional to*

impulſive *communiquée aux Corps* ; *pour faire voir, dis-je, que ces Forces actives ne diminuent point naturellement, le ſçavant Auteur*

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quent, dans la *ſeconde* partie du *temps* il acquerra *trois* parties de *Force*, dans la *troiſiéme* partie du *temps* il acquerra *cinq* parties de *Force*, dans la *quatriéme* partie du *temps* il acquerra *ſept* parties de *Force*, & ainſi du reſte. Si l' on ſuppoſe donc que l' *Action de la Gravité* pour *produire ces Forces*, a *un* degré au milieu de la *premiere* partie du *temps* ; elle aura, au milieu de la *ſeconde*, de la *troiſiéme*, & de la *quatriéme* parties du temps, *trois*, *cinq*, & *ſept* degrez, & ainſi du reſte ; c' eſt-à-dire, qu' elle ſera proportionnelle au *temps* & à la *viteſſe acquiſes* : &, par conſéquent, au *commencement du temps* il n' y aura point de Gravité ; de ſorte que, faute de Gravité, le Corps ne tombera pas. Et ſelon le même raiſonnement, lors qu' un Corps eſt jetté *en haut*, ſa Gravité diminuera à meſure que ſa viteſſe diminue, & elle ceſſera lors que le Corps ceſſe de monter ; & alors, faute de Gravité, le Corps demeurera dans l' air, & ne tombera plus. Tant il eſt vrai que le ſentiment du ſçavant Auteur ſur ce Sujet, eſt rempli d' abſurditez.

Pour décider cette Queſtion d' une maniere *démonſtrative* ; que l' on ſuſpende *deux* Globes d' Acier par des *Rayons* égaux, ou des *Filets* d' une égale longueur ; en ſorte que lors qu' ils ſont ſuſpendus, & qu' ils ſe touchent l' un l' autre, les *Rayons* ou les *Filets* ſoient Paralleles. Que l' *un* de ces Globes ſoit toûjours le même, & qu' il ſoit écarté de l' autre à la même diſtance dans toutes les Experiences ſuivantes. Que l' *autre* ſoit de telle groſſeur que l' on voudra, & qu' il ſoit écarté du coté oppoſé à une diſtance reciproquement proportionnelle à ſon poids. Qu' on lâche *ces deux* Globes dans le même moment, en ſorte qu' ils ſe puiſſent rencontrer dans le plus bas lieu de leur deſcente, où ils étoient ſuſpendus avant que d' être écartez. Le *premier* Globe rébondira toûjours *de la même maniere*, c' eſt-à-dire, à la même hauteur. Donc la *Force* de l' *autre* eſt toûjours la même, lors que ſa viteſſe eſt reciproquement proportionnelle à ſon poids. Et par conſéquent, ſi ſon poids continue d' être le même, ſa *Force* ſera proportionnelle à ſa *viteſſe*. Q. E. D.

Bodies,) do not naturally diminiſh; this Learned Writer urges, that two *ſoft* unelaſtick Bodies meeting together with equal

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the Time *and to the* Velocity acquired: *And, by conſequence, in the* Beginning of the Time *it will be none at all; and ſo the Body, for want of Gravity, will not fall down. And by the ſame way of arguing, when a Body is thrown* upwards, *its gravity will decreaſe as its velocity decreaſes, and ceaſe when the Body ceaſes to aſcend; and then, for want of gravity, it will reſt in the Air, and fall down no more. So full of* Abſurdities *is the Notion of this Learned Author in this particular.*

To decide this queſtion demonſtratively; *let* two *pendulous Globes of hardned Steel, be ſuſpended by equal* radij *or* Threads *of equal length: So that when they hang down and touch each other, the* Radij *or Threads may be parallel. Let* One *of the Globes be conſtantly the ſame, and be drawn aſide from the Other to one and the ſame diſtance in All the ſubſequent Trials. Let the* Other *be of Any Bigneſs, and be drawn aſide the contrary way to a Diſtance reciprocally proportional to its Weight. Let* Both of them *then be let go at one and the ſame Moment of Time, ſo that they may meet each other at the loweſt place of their Deſcent, where they hung before they were drawn aſide: And the* firſt *Globe will always rebound alike, from the Other. Wherefore the* Force *of the* Other *is always the ſame, when its Velocity is reciprocally proportional to its Weight. And by conſequence, if its Weight remains the ſame, its* Force *will be proportional to its* Velocity. *Q. E. D.*

Auteur ſoûtient, que deux Corps Mous & ſans Reſſort, ſe rencontrant avec des forces égales & contraires, perdent chacun tout leur mouvement, *parce que ce mouvement eſt communiqué aux* petites parties *dont ils ſont compoſez. Mais lors que deux Corps* tout-à-fait Durs *& ſans Reſſort perdent tout leur mouvement en ſe rencontrant, il s' agit de ſçavoir que devient ce mouvement, ou cette force active & impulſive? Il ne ſçauroit être diſperſé parmi les* parties *de ces Corps, parce que ces parties ne ſont ſuſceptibles d' aucun* tremouſſement, *faute de Reſſort. Et ſi on nie que ces Corps doivent perdre leur mouvement* total; *je réponds qu' en ce cas-là, il s' enſuivra que les Corps* durs & Elaſtiques *réjailliront avec une* double force, *ſçavoir, avec la force qui reſulte du Reſſort, & de plus avec toute la force directe & primitive, ou du moins avec une partie de cette force: ce qui eſt contraire à l' experience.*

Enfin, l' Auteur ayant conſideré la Démonſtration de Mr. Newton, *que j' ai citée*
* § 99. *ci-deſſus, eſt obligé de* * *reconnoitre, que la* Quantité du mouvement *dans le monde n'* eſt pas toûjours la même; *& il a recours à un autre ſubterfuge, en diſant que le* mouvement *& la* force *ne ſont pas toûjours les* mêmes *en* Quantité. *Mais ceci eſt auſſi contraire à l' Experience. Car la* Force *dont il s' agit ici, n' eſt pas cette force de la matiere.*

and contrary Forces, do for *this only Reaſon* loſe each of them the *Motion of their Whole*, becauſe it is communicated and diſperſed into a *Motion of their ſmall Parts*. But the Queſtion is; when two *perfectly HARD* un-elaſtick Bodies loſe their whole Motion by meeting together, what then becomes of the Motion or active impulſive Force? It cannot be diſperſed among the *Parts*, becauſe the parts are capable of no tremulous Motion for want of elaſticity. And if it be denied, that the Bodies would loſe the Motion of their *Wholes*; I anſwer: Then it would follow, that *Elaſtick Hard* Bodies would reflect with a *double Force*; viz. the force ariſing from the elaſticity, and moreover all (or at leaſt part of) the original direct force: Which is contrary to experience.

At length, (upon the *Demonſtration* I cited from Sir *Iſaac Newton*,) he is obliged to * allow, that the *Quantity of Motion* in the World, is *not always the ſame*; And goes to another refuge, that *Motion* and *Force* are not always the *ſame* in *Quantity*. But this alſo is contrary to experience. For the *Force* here ſpoken of, is not the

* § 99.

matiere, qu' on appelle † Vis inertiæ, *laquelle continue effectivement d' être toûjours la même, pendant que la* Quantité de la matiere *eſt la même ; mais la* Force *dont nous parlons ici, eſt la* Force active, impulſive, & rélative, *qui eſt* toûjours || *proportionnée à la* Quantité du mouvement rélatif. C' *eſt*

† La *Force* de la Matiere, qu' on appelle *Vis inertiæ*, eſt cette *Force paſſive*, par laquelle la Matiere continue d' elle-même dans l' état où elle eſt, & ne ſort jamais de cet état qu' à Proportion de la puiſſance contraire qui agit ſur elle. C'eſt une Force paſſive, non pas par laquelle (comme Mr. *Leibnitz* l' entend aprez *Kepler*, voïez l' *Appendice* N° 7,) la Matiere reſiſte au *mouvement* ; mais par laquelle la Matiere reſiſte également à tout ce qui pourroit changer l' état où elle eſt, ſoit qu' elle ſe trouve en *repos*, ou en *mouvement* : De ſorte que la même Force réquiſe pour donner une certaine *Viteſſe* à une certaine *Quantité de Matiere* qui eſt en *repos*, eſt auſſi toûjours réquiſe pour faire perdre ce même degré de viteſſe à la même Quantité de Matiere, & pour la reduire à l' état de repos où elle étoit auparavant. Cette *Vis inertiæ* eſt toûjours proportionnée à la *Quantité de la Matiere* ; & par conſéquent elle eſt toûjours *la même ſans aucune variation*, ſoit que la Matiere ſe trouve en *repos* ou en *mouvement* ; & elle ne paſſe jamais d'un Corps à un autre. Sans cette *Vis inertiæ*, la moindre Force mettroit en mouvement la Matiere qui eſt en repos, quelque grande qu' en fût la Quantité ; & cette même Quantité de Matiere étant en mouvement, quelque grande qu' en fût la viteſſe, ſeroit arrêtée par la moindre force, ſans aucun choc. De ſorte qu' à parler proprement, *toute la Force* de la Matiere, ſoit qu' elle ſe trouve en *repos* ou en *mouvement*, toute ſon *Action* & ſa *Ré-action*, toute ſon *Impulſion* & ſa *Reſiſtance*, n' eſt autre choſe que cette *Vis inertiæ* en differentes Circonſtances.

|| C' eſt-à-dire, proportionnée à la *Quantité de la Matiere* & à *la viteſſe*, & non (comme Mr. *Leibnitz* l' aſſure, *Acta Erudit.* ad Ann. 1695, pag. 156,) à la *Quantité de la Matiere* & au *Quarré de la Viteſſe*. Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur § 93——95.

† *Vis inertiæ* of Matter, (which continues indeed always the ſame, ſo long as the *Quantity of Matter* continues the ſame:) but the *Force* here meant, is *relative Active impulſive Force*; which is *always* ‖ proportional to the *Quantity of Relative Motion*;

† *The* Vis inertiæ *of Matter, is That* Paſſive Force, *by which it always continues of itſelf in the State 'tis in; and never changes That State, but in proportion to a contrary Power acting upon it. 'Tis That Paſſive Force, not by which (as Mr.* Leibnitz *from* Kepler *underſtands it,* See Appendix, N° 7,) *Matter reſiſts* Motion; *but by which it equally reſiſts* Any Change *from the State 'tis in, either of* Reſt *or* Motion: *So that the very ſame Force, which is requiſite to give any certain* Velocity *to any certain* Quantity of Matter *at* Reſt, *is always exactly requiſite to reduce the ſame Quantity of Matter from the ſame degree of Velocity to a ſtate of Reſt again. This* Vis inertiæ *is always proportional to the* Quantity of Matter; *and therefore continues* invariably the ſame, *in all poſſible States of Matter, whether at* Reſt *or in* Motion; *and is never transferred from One Body to another. Without this* Vis, *the Leaſt Force would give Any Velocity to the Greateſt Quantity of Matter at Reſt; and the Greateſt Quantity of Matter in Any Velocity of Motion, would be ſtopped by the Leaſt Force, without any the leaſt ſhock at all. So that, properly and indeed,* All Force *in Matter either at* Reſt *or in* Motion, *all its* Action *and* Reaction, *all* Impulſe *and all* Reſiſtence, *is nothing but this* Vis inertiæ *in different Circumſtances.*

‖ *That is; proportional to the* Quantity of Matter and the Velocity; *not (as Mr.* Leibnitz *affirms,* Acta Erudit. ad Ann. 1695, pag. 156,) *to the* Quantity of Matter and the Square of the Velocity. *See above, the* Note on § 93.

eſt ce qui paroît conſtamment par l' Experience, à moins que l' on ne tombe dans quelque erreur, *faute de bien* ſupputer *&* de déduire *la* Force contraire, *qui naît de la Reſiſtance que les Fluides font aux Corps de quelque maniere que ceux-ci ſe puiſſent mouvoir, & de l' Action contraire & continuelle de la Gravitation ſur les Corps jettez en haut.*

100—— 102. *J' ai fait voir dans la derniere Section, que la* * Force active, *ſelon la Définition que j' en ai donnée,* diminue *continuellement & naturellement dans le Monde materiel. Il eſt évident que ce n' eſt pas un* défaut, *parce que ce n' eſt qu' une ſuite de l'* inactivité *de la Matiere. Car cette* inactivité *eſt non ſeulement la cauſe, comme l' Auteur le remarque, de la diminution de la* Viteſſe *à meſure que la* Quantité de la Matiere *augmente ; (ce qui à la verité n' eſt point une* diminution de la Quantité du mouvement ;) *mais elle eſt auſſi la cauſe pourquoi des Corps* ſolides, *parfaitement* Durs, *& ſans Reſſort, ſe rencontrant avec des forces égales & contraires, perdent* tout *leur* mouvement *&* toute *leur* Force active, *comme je l' ai montré ci-deſſus ; & par conſéquent ils ont beſoin de quelque* autre Cauſe *pour recevoir un* nouveau *mouvement.*

103. *J'*

* Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur § 93——95 ; & la III Réplique, § 13.

As is conſtantly evident in Experience; except where ſome *Error* has been committed, in not rightly *computing* and *ſubducting* the *contrary* or *impeding Force*, which ariſes from the Reſiſtence of Fluids to Bodies moved *any way*, and from the continual contrary Action of Gravitation upon Bodies thrown *upwards*.

100——102. That † *Active Force*, in the Senſe above-defined, does naturally *diminiſh* continually in the material Univerſe; hath been ſhown in the laſt Paragraph. That this is no *Defect*, is evident; becauſe 'tis only a Conſequence of *Matter* being *lifeleſs*, *void of Motivity*, *unactive* and *inert*. For the *Inertia* of Matter, cauſeth, not only (as this learned Author obſerves,) that *Velocity* decreaſes in proportion as *Quantity of Matter* increaſes, (which is indeed no *decreaſe of the Quantity of Motion*;) but alſo that *ſolid* and perfectly *hard Bodies*, void of Elaſticity, meeting together with equal and contrary Forces, loſe their *whole Motion* and *Active Force*, (as has been above ſhown,) and muſt *depend* upon ſome *other Cauſe* for *new Motion*.

† *See above, the Note on* § 93——95; & *Third Reply*, § 13.

103. That

103. *J' ai fait voir amplement dans mes Ecrits précedens, qu' il n' y a aucun défaut dans les choſes dont on parle ici. Car pourquoi Dieu n' auroit-il pas eu la liberté de faire un Monde, qui continueroit dans l'état où il eſt preſentement, auſſi* long *temps ou auſſi* peu *de temps qu' il le jugeroit à propos, & qui ſeroit en ſuite changé, & recevroit telle forme qu' il voudroit lui donner, par un changement* ſage & convenable, *mais qui peut-être ſeroit tout-à-fait au deſſus des loix du* Méchaniſme ? *L' Auteur ſoû-*

†IV Ecrit, § 40, 20, 21, 22 ; & V Ecrit, § 29. *tient* † *que l'* Univers ne peut diminuer en perfection ; *qu' il* n' y a aucune raiſon qui puiſſe † borner la Quantité de la Matiere ; *que* * *les* Perfections de Dieu *l' obligent à produire toûjours* autant *de Matiere qu' il lui eſt poſſible ; & qu' un* Monde borné *eſt une* † Fiction impracticable. *J' ai inferé de cette doctrine, que le Monde doit être néceſſairement* infini & éternel. *C' eſt aux Sçavans à juger ſi cette Conſequence eſt bien fondée.*

104, ——106. *L' Auteur dit à preſent,*

‖ § 104. *que* ‖ *l'* Eſpace *n' eſt pas* un Ordre *ou une* Situation, *mais un* Ordre de Situations. *Ce qui n' empêche pas que la même Objection ne ſubſiſte toûjours, ſçavoir, qu' un* Ordre de Situations *n' eſt pas une* Quantité, *comme*

* Voïez ci-deſſus l' Apoſtille de Mr. *Leibnitz* à la fin de ſon IV Ecrit.

l' Eſpace

103. That none of the things here referred to, are *Defects*; I have largely ſhown in my former Papers. For *why* was not God at Liberty to make a World, that ſhould continue in its preſent Form as *long* or as *ſhort* a time as he thought fit, and ſhould then be altered (by ſuch Changes as may be *very wiſe* and *Fit*, and yet *Impoſſible* perhaps to be performed by *Mechaniſm*,) into whatever other Form he himſelf pleaſed? Whether my Inference from this Learned Author's affirming † that *the Univerſe cannot diminiſh in Perfection*, that *there is no poſſible Reaſon which can* † *limit the Quantity of Matter*, that * *God's Perfections* oblige him to produce always as *much* Matter as he can, and that a *Finite Material Univerſe* is an † *Impracticable Fiction*; whether (I ſay) my *Inferring*, that (according to theſe Notions) the World *muſt needs* have been both *Infinite* and *Eternal*, be a *juſt Inference* or no, I am willing to leave to the Learned, who ſhall compare the Papers, to judge.

† *Fourth Paper*, § 40, 20, 21, 22; and *Fifth Paper*, § 29.

104——106. We are *Now* told, that † *Space* is not *an Order* or *Situation*, but an *Order of Situations*. But ſtill the Objection remains; that an *Order of Situations* is not *Quantity*, as *Space* is. He re-

† § 104.

* *See above, Mr.* Leibnitz's *Poſtſcript to his Fourth Paper.*

fers

l' Eſpace l' eſt. L' Auteur renvoye donc à la Section 54, *où il croit avoir prouvé que l'* Ordre *eſt une* Quantité. *Et moi je renvoye à ce que j' ai dit ſur cette Section dans ce dernier Ecrit*; *où je crois avoir prouvé que l'* Ordre n' eſt pas une Quantité. *Ce*

*§ 105. *que l' Auteur dit auſſi touchant le* * Temps, *renferme évidemment cette Abſurdité : ſçavoir, que le* Temps n' eſt que l' Ordre des choſes ſucceſſives ; *& que cependant il ne laiſſe pas d' être une véritable* Quantité ; *parce qu' il eſt*, non ſeulement l' Ordre des choſes ſucceſſives, *mais* auſſi *la* Quantité *de la Durée qui* intervient entre *chacune des* choſes particulieres qui ſe ſuccedent dans cet Ordre. *Ce qui eſt une Contradiction manifeſte.*

†§ 106. *Dire que* † *l'* Immenſité *ne ſignifie pas un* Eſpace ſans bornes, *& que l'* Eternité *ne ſignifie pas une* Durée *ou* un Temps ſans fin, *c' eſt* (*ce me ſemble*) *ſoûtenir que les* mots *n' ont* aucune ſignification. *Au lieu de raiſonner ſur cet Article, l' Auteur nous renvoye à ce que certains* Théologiens *&* Philoſophes, (*qui étoient de ſon ſentiment,*) *ont penſé ſur cette matiere. Mais ce n' eſt pas là de quoi il s' agit entre lui & moi.*

107 —— 109. *J' ai dit que parmi les choſes poſſibles, il n' y en a aucune qui ſoit plus* miraculeuſe *qu' une autre, par rapport à Dieu ; & que par conſéquent le* Miracle *ne conſiſte dans aucune* difficulté *qui ſe trouve* dans la Nature d' une choſe qui doit

être

fers therefore to § 54, where he thinks he has proved that *Order* is a *Quantity*: And I refer to what I have ſaid *above* in this Paper, upon that Section; where I think I have proved, that it is *not a Quantity*. What he alledges concerning ‖ *Time* likewiſe, amounts plainly to the following Abſurdity: that *Time* is *only the Order of Things ſucceſſive*, and yet is truly a *Quantity*; becauſe it is, *not only* the *Order of Things ſucceſſive*, but *alſo* the *Quantity* of Duration *intervening between* each of the *Particulars ſucceeding in That Order*. Which is an expreſs Contradiction. ‖ § 105.

To ſay that * *Immenſity* does not ſignify *Boundleſs Space*, and that *Eternity* does not ſignify *Duration* or *Time without Beginning and End*, is (I think) affirming that *Words* have no *meaning*. Inſtead of *reaſoning* upon this Point, we are referred to what certain *Divines* and *Philoſophers* (that is, ſuch as were of this Learned Author's Opinion,) have *acknowledged*: Which is *not* the *Matter in Queſtion*. * § 106.

107——109. I affirmed, that, with regard to *God*, no one Poſſible thing is more *miraculous* than another; and that therefore a *Miracle* does not conſiſt in any *Difficulty in the Nature of the Thing to be done*, but merely in the *Unuſualneſs of God's*

être faite, *mais qu' il consiste simplement* en ce que Dieu le fait rarement. *Le mot de* Nature, *& ceux de* Forces de la Nature, *de* Cours de la Nature, *&c. sont des mots qui signifient simplement, qu' une chose arrive* ordinairement *ou* frequemment. *Lors qu' un* Corps humain reduit en poudre *est* ressuscité, *nous disons que c' est un* Miracle ; *lors qu' un* corps humain est engendré de la maniere ordinaire, *nous disons que c' est une* chose naturelle ; *& cette distinction est uniquement fondée sur ce que la* Puissance de Dieu *produit l' une de ces deux choses* ordinairement, *& l' autre* rarement. *Si le* soleil *(ou la Terre) est* arrêté *soudainement, nous disons que c' est un* Miracle ; *& le* mouvement *continuel du* soleil *(ou de la Terre) nous paroit une* chose naturelle : *c' est uniquement parce que l' une de ces deux choses est* ordinaire, *& l' autre* extraordinaire. *Si les hommes sortoient* ordinairement *du Tombeau, comme le Bled sort de la Semence, nous dirions certainement que ce seroit aussi une* chose naturelle : *Et si le* soleil *(ou la Terre) étoit toujours* immobile, *cela nous paroitroit* naturel ; *& en ce cas-là nous regarderions le* mouvement *du soleil (ou de la Terre,) comme une chose* miraculeuse. *Le sçavant Auteur ne dit rien contre ces Raisons* [ces † grandes raisons, *comme il les appelle,*] *qui sont si* évidentes. *Il se contente de nous renvoyer encore aux* manieres de parler *ordinaires de certains* Philosophes *& de certains*

† § 108.

God's doing it. The Terms, *Nature*, and *Powers of Nature*, and *Courſe of Nature*, and the like, are nothing but *empty Words*; and ſignify merely, that a thing *uſually* or *frequently* comes to paſs. The *Raiſing a Human Body out of the Duſt of the Earth*, we call a *Miracle*; the *Generation of a Human Body in the ordinary way*, we call *Natural*; for no other Reaſon, but becauſe the *Power of God* effects one *uſually*, the other *unuſually*. The ſudden *ſtopping* of the *Sun* (or Earth,) we call a *Miracle*; the continual *Motion* of the *Sun* (or Earth,) we call *Natural*; for the very ſame Reaſon only, of the one's being *uſual*, the other *unuſual*. Did Men *uſually* ariſe out of the Grave, as Corn grows out of Seed ſown, we ſhould certainly call *That* alſo *natural*: And did the *Sun* (or *Earth*) conſtantly *ſtand ſtill*, we ſhould then think *That* to be *natural*, and its *Motion at any time* would be *miraculous*. Againſt theſe *evident Reaſons*, [*ces* † *grandes Raiſons*,] this learned † § 108.
Writer offers nothing at all; but continues barely to refer us to the Vulgar *Forms of Speaking* of certain *Philoſophers* and *Divines*: Which (as I before obſerved) is *not* the *Matter in Queſtion*.

Théologiens ; *mais, comme je l' ai déjà remarqué ci-deſſus, ce n'eſt pas là de quoi il s' agit entre l' Auteur & moi.*

110——116. *Il eſt ſurprenant, que ſur une matiere qui doit être décidée par la* Raiſon *& non par l'* Autorité, *on nous* renvoye *encore à l'* Opinion *de certains* Philoſophes *&* Théologiens. *Mais, pour ne pas inſiſter ſur cela ; que veut dire le ſçavant Auteur par une* * difference réelle *&* interne *entre ce qui eſt* miraculeux, *& ce qui ne l' eſt pas ; ou entre* † *des* Operations naturelles *&* non naturelles, *abſolument, &* par rapport à Dieu ? *Croit-il qu'il y ait* en Dieu *deux* Principes d' action differents & réellement diſtincts ? *Ou qu'* une *choſe ſoit plus* difficile *à* Dieu *qu' une* autre ? *S' il ne le croit pas, il s' enſuit,* ou *que les mots d'* Action de Dieu naturelle *&* ſurnaturelle, *ſont des Termes dont la Signification eſt* uniquement rélative aux hommes ; *parce que nous avons accoutumé de dire qu' un effet* ordinaire *de la puiſſance de Dieu eſt une choſe* naturelle, *& qu' un effet* extraordinaire *de cette même puiſſance eſt une choſe* ſurnaturelle ; (*ce qu' on appelle les* * Forces de la Nature, *n' étant véritablement qu' un* mot ſans aucun ſens :) Ou bien *il s' enſuit que par une* Action de Dieu ſurnaturelle, *il faut entendre ce que* Dieu *fait* lui-même immédiatement ; *& par une* Action de Dieu naturelle, *ce qu'il fait par l'* intervention *des Cauſes ſecondes. L' Auteur ſe*

‖ § 110. * § 110. † § 111. * § 112.

110——116. It is here very ſurprizing, that, in a Point of *Reaſon* and not of *Authority*, we are ſtill *again* ‖ remitted to the *Opinions* of certain *Philoſophers and Divines*. But, to omit This: What does this Learned Writer mean by a * *real Internal Difference* between what is *miraculous*, and *not miraculous*; or between * *Operations natural*, and *not natural*; abſolutely, and with regard to *God*? Does he think there are *in God* two *different and really diſtinct Principles or Powers of Acting*, and that *one* thing is more *difficult* to *God* than *another*? If not: then either a *natural* and a *ſupernatural Action* of *God*, are Terms whoſe ſignification is *only relative* to *Us*; we calling an *uſual* Effect of God's Power, *natural*; and an *unuſual* one, *ſupernatural*; the * *force of Nature* being, in truth, nothing but an *empty word*: Or elſe, by the *One* muſt be meant That which *God* does *immediately Himſelf*; and by the *Other*, that which he does *mediately* by the *inſtrumentality of ſecond Cauſes*. The *former* of theſe Diſtinctions, is what this Learned Author is here profeſſedly oppoſing: The *latter* is what he expreſly diſclaims, § 117, where he allows that *Angels* may work *True Miracles*. And yet,

‖ § 110.

* § 110.

* § 111.

* § 112.

déclare ouvertement dans cette partie de son Ecrit, contre la premiere *de ces deux Distinctions ; & il rejette formellement la* seconde *dans la Section* 117, *où il reconnoit que les Anges peuvent faire de* véritables Miracles. *Cependant je ne crois pas que l' on puisse inventer une* troisiéme Distinction *sur la matiere dont il s' agit ici.*

‖ § 113, ‖ *Il est tout-à-fait déraisonnable d' appeller* l' Attraction *un* Miracle, *& de dire que c'est un Terme qui ne doit point entrer dans la Philosophie ; quoique nous ayons si souvent déclaré † d' une maniere distincte & formelle*

† *Quâ causâ efficiente hæ Attractiones peragantur*, &c. C'est-à-dire. " Je ne recherche point ici quelle est la " Cause *Efficiente* de ces Attractions. Ce que j' appelle " *Attraction*, est peut-être causé par quelque *impulsion*, ou " *de quelque autre maniere* qui nous est inconnue. Je ne me " sers du mot d' *Attraction* qu' en général, pour designer " la Force par laquelle les corps tendent l' un vers l' autre, quelle que soit la Cause de cette Force. Car il " faut que nous apprenions par les Phénomenes de la Nature, *quels Corps* s' attirent l' un l' autre, & *quelles* sont les " *Loix & les Proprietez* de cette Attraction, avant qu'il soit " convenable de rechercher *Quelle* est la *Cause efficiente* de " l' Attraction ". *Et ailleurs :* " Je considere ces Principes " non comme des *Qualitez Occultes* que l' on suppose devoir " naitre des *Formes Specifiques* des choses ; mais comme des " *Loix Universelles* de la Nature, selon lesquelles les choses " mêmes ont été formées. Car il paroit par les Phénomenes de la Nature, qu'il y a actuellement de tels Principes, " quoi qu' on ne puisse pas encore en expliquer les Causes. Soûtenir que chaque espece distincte des Choses, est " douée de *Qualitez occultes Specifiques*, par le moyen desquelles les choses ont certaines Forces Actives ; soûtenir, dis-je, une telle Doctrine, c'est ne *rien* dire. Mais de

beſides theſe *Two*, I think *no other* Diſtinction can poſſibly be imagined.

It is very unreaſonable to call * *Attraction* a *Miracle*, and an unphiloſophical Term; after it has been ſo often diſtinctly † declared, that by That Term we do not mean * § 113.

† Quâ causâ efficiente hæ Attractiones peragantur, in id verò hic non inquiro. Quam ego *Attractionem* appello, fieri ſanè poteſt ut ea efficiatur *Impulſu*, vel alio aliquo modo nobis ignoto. Hanc vocem *Attractionis* ita hic accipi velim, ut in univerſum ſolummodo vim aliquam ſignificare intelligatur, quâ corpora ad ſe mutuo tendant; cuicunq; demùm cauſæ attribuenda ſit illa vis. Nam ex phænomenis Naturæ illud nos prius edoctos oportet, quænam corpora ſe invicem Attrahant, & quænam ſint Leges & Proprietates iſtius Attractionis; quàm in id inquirere par ſit, quânam Efficiente Cauſâ peragatur Attractio. *Newtoni Optice, Qu.* 23, *pag.* 322. Atq; hæc quidem Principia conſidero, non ut *occultas Qualitates*, quæ ex *Specificis* rerum *Formis* oriri fingantur; ſed ut *univerſales* Naturæ *Leges*, quibus res ipſæ ſunt formatæ. Nam Principia quidem talia revera exiſtere, oſtendunt Phænomena Naturæ; licet ipſorum cauſæ quæ ſint, nondum fuerit explicatum. Affirmare ſingulas rerum ſpecies, ſpecificis prædictas eſſe qualitatibus occultis, per quas eæ Vim certam in Agendo habeant; hoc utiq; eſt Nihil dicere. At ex phænomenis Naturæ, duo vel tria derivare generalia Motus Principia; & deinde explicare quemadmodum proprietates & actiones rerum corporearum omnium ex Principiis iſtis conſequantur; id verò magnus eſſet factus in Philoſophiâ progreſſus, etiamſi Principiorum iſtorum Cauſæ nondum eſſent cognitæ: *Id. ibid. Pag.* 344. Phænomena Cœlorum & maris noſtri per Vim Gravitatis expoſui, ſed cauſam Gravitatis nondum aſſignavi. Oritur utique hæc

formelle, qu' en nous ſervant de ce Terme, nous ne prétendons pas exprimer la Cauſe qui

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" duire des Phénomenes de la Nature, deux ou trois Prin-
" cipes généraux de mouvement ; & enſuite expliquer
" comment les Proprietez & les Actions de toutes les cho-
" ſes materielles ſuivent de ces Principes ; ce ſeroit faire
" un grand progrès dans la Philoſophie, quoi que l' on
" ne connût pas encore les *Cauſes* de ces Principes." *Et dans un autre endroit :* " J'ai expliqué les Phénomenes des
" Cieux & de la Mer par la Force de la Gravité ; mais
" je n' en ai pas encore aſſigné la *Cauſe*. C'eſt une Force
" produite par quelque Cauſe, qui pénétre juſqu' aux
" Centres du Soleil & des Planetes, ſans rien perdre de ſa
" Force : Et elle n' agit pas proportionnellement aux
" *Surfaces* des Particules ſur leſquelles elle agit, comme
" les Cauſes *Mechaniques* ont accoutumé de le faire, mais
" proportionnellement à la Quantité de la *Matiere ſolide* :
" Et ſon Action s' étend de tous coтez à des diſtances im-
" menſes, diminuant toûjours en Raiſon doublée des di-
" ſtances. —— Mais je n' ai pas encore pû déduire des
" Phénomenes la *Cauſe* de ces proprietez de la Gravité :
" & je ne fais point d' *Hypotheſes*". *Newton. Optic. pag.* 322 & 344. & *Princip. Philoſoph. Schol. generale ſub finem.*

mean to expreſs the *Cauſe* of *Bodies tending towards each other*, but barely the *Effect*,

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Vis à cauſa aliqua, quæ penetrat ad uſque centra Solis & Planetarum, ſine virtutis diminutione; quæque agit non pro quantitate *Superficierum* particularum in quas agit, (ut ſolent cauſæ mechanicæ,) ſed pro quantitate *materiæ ſolidæ*; & cujus actio in immenſas diſtantias undique extenditur, decreſcendo ſemper in duplicatâ ratione diſtantiarum. Rationem verò harum Gravitatis proprietatum ex Phænomenis nondum potui deducere, & *Hypotheſes* non fingo: *Principia Philoſ. Schol. generale ſub finem.* i. e. *What the* efficient *Cauſe of theſe Attractions is, I do not here inquire. What I call* Attraction, *may poſſibly be cauſed by ſome* Impulſe, *or ſome other way unknown to us. I uſe the Word* Attraction, *only in general, to ſignify the Force by which Bodies tend towards each other; whatever be the Cauſe of that Force. For we muſt firſt learn from the Phænomena of Nature,* what Bodies *attract each other, and* what *are the* Laws *and* Properties *of that Attraction, before 'tis proper to inquire* what *the* efficient Cauſe *of Attraction is.* Again: *I conſider theſe Principles, not as* occult Qualities, *imagined to ariſe from the* ſpecifick Forms *of Things; but as* Univerſal Laws *of Nature, according to which the Things themſelves were formed. For, that ſuch Principles do really exiſt, appears from the Phænomena of Nature; though, what the* Cauſes *of them are, be not yet explained. To affirm that every diſtinct Species of Things, is indued with ſpecifick* occult *Qualities, by means whereof the Things have certain Active Forces; this indeed is ſaying* Nothing. *But to deduce from the Phænomena of Nature, two or three general Principles of Motion; and then to explain how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from thoſe Principles; This would be a great Progreſs in Philoſophy, though the* Cauſes *of thoſe Principles were not yet diſcovered.* Again: *I have explained the Phænomena of the Heavens and the Sea, by the Force of Gravity; but the* Cauſe *of Gravity I have not yet aſſigned. It is a Force ariſing from ſome Cauſe, which reaches to the very Centers of the Sun and Planets, without any diminution of its Force: And it acts, not proportionally to the* Surfaces *of the Particles it acts upon, as* Mechanical *Cauſes uſe to do; but proportionally to the Quantity of* Solid Matter: *And its Action reaches every way to immenſe Diſtances, decreaſing always in a duplicate ratio of the Diſtances. But the* Cauſe *of theſe* Properties *of Gravity, I have not yet found deducible from Phænomena: And* Hypotheſes *I make not.*

qui fait que les Corps tendent l' un vers l' autre, *mais ſeulement l'* Effet *de cette Cauſe, ou le* Phénomene *même, & les* Loix *ou* les Proportions ſelon leſquelles les Corps tendent l' un vers l' autre, *comme on les découvre par l' Experience, quelle qu' en puiſſe être la Cauſe. Il eſt encore plus déraiſonnable de ne vouloir point admettre la* Gravitation *ou l'* Attraction *dans le ſens que nous lui donnons, ſelon lequel elle eſt certainement un* Phénomene *de la Nature ; & de prétendre en même temps que nous admettions une* Hypotheſe *auſſi étrange que l' eſt celle de* † *l'* Harmonie préétablie, *ſelon laquelle* ‖ *l'* Ame *& le* Corps *d' un homme n' ont pas plus d' influence l' un ſur l' autre, que* deux Horloges, *qui vont* également bien, *quelque éloignées qu' elles ſoient l' une de l' autre, & ſans qu' il y ait entre elles aucune action reciproque. Il eſt vrai que l' Auteur dit, que Dieu* * *prévoyant les* inclinations *de chaque Ame, a formé dès le commencement la grande* Machine *de l'* Univers *d' une telle maniere, qu' en vertu des* ſimples Loix du Méchaniſme, *les Corps humains reçoivent des* mouvemens convenables, *comme étant des parties de cette grande Machine. Mais eſt-il poſſible, que de* † pareils mouvemens, *& autant* diverſifiez *que le ſont ceux des Corps humains, ſoient produits par un* pur Méchaniſme, *ſans que la* Volonté & l' Eſprit *agiſſent ſur ces Corps ? Eſt-il croyable, que lors qu' un homme*

† § 109 & 92; & 87, 89, 90.

‖ Voïez l' Appendice N° 5.

* § 92.

† Voïez l' Appendice, N° 13.

or the *Phænomenon it ſelf*, and the *Laws* or *Proportions of that Tendency* diſcovered by *Experience*; whatever *be* or *be not* the *Cauſe* of it. And it ſeems ſtill *more* unreaſonable, not to admit *Gravitation* or *Attraction* in *This ſenſe*, in which it is manifeſtly an *actual Phænomenon* of nature; and yet at the ſame time to expect that there ſhould be admitted ſo ſtrange an *Hypotheſis*, as the * *harmonia præſtabilita*; which is, † that the *Soul* and *Body* of a Man have no more Influence upon each others Motions and Affections, than *two Clocks*, which, at the greateſt *diſtance* from each other, *go alike*, without at all affecting each other. It is alleged indeed, that God, † foreſeeing the *Inclinations* of every Man's *Soul*, ſo contrived at firſt the great *Machine* of the *material Univerſe*, as that, by the *mere neceſſary Laws of Mechaniſm*, *ſuitable* Motions ſhould be excited in *Human Bodies*, as Parts of that great Machine. But is it *poſſible*, that ſuch || *Kinds* of *Motion*, and of ſuch *variety*, as thoſe in Human Bodies are; ſhould be performed by *mere Mechaniſm*, without any Influence of *Will and Mind* upon them? Or is it *credible*, that when a Man has it in his Power to reſolve and know *a Month before-hand*, what he will do upon ſuch a particular Day or Hour to come; is it *credible*, I ſay, that his *Body* ſhall by the mere Power of *Mechaniſm*, impreſſed originally upon the *material*

* § 109 *and* 92, *and* 87, 89, 90.
† *See Appendix*, N° 5.
† § 92.
|| *See Appendix*, N° 13.

homme forme une reſolution, & qu' il ſçait, un mois par avance, *ce qu' il fera un certain jour ou à une certaine heure ; eſt-il croyable, dis-je, que ſon Corps, en vertu d' un ſimple* Méchaniſme *qui a été produit dans le Monde Materiel dès le commencement de la Création, ſe conformera ponctuellement à toutes les reſolutions de l'* Eſprit *de cet homme au* temps marqué ? *Selon cette Hypotheſe,* tous les Raiſonnemens *Philoſophiques, fondez ſur les* Phénomenes *& ſur les* Experiences, *deviennent inutiles. Car, ſi l'* Harmonie préétablie *eſt véritable, un homme ne* voit, *n'* entend, *& ne* ſent *rien, & il ne meut point ſon Corps : Il* || *s' imagine ſeulement voir, entendre, ſentir, & mouvoir ſon corps. Et ſi les hommes étoient perſuadez que le Corps humain n' eſt qu' une* pure Machine, *& que tous ſes mouvemens qui* paroiſſent volontaires, *ſont produits par les Loix néceſſaires d' un* Méchaniſme materiel, *ſans aucune influence ou operation de l'* Ame *ſur le Corps ; ils concluroient bientôt que cette* Machine *eſt l'* Homme tout entier, *& que l'* Ame Harmonique, *dans l' Hypotheſe d' une* Harmonie préétablie, *n' eſt qu' une pure fiction & une vaine imagination. De plus : Quelle difficulté évite-t-on par le moyen d' une ſi étrange Hypotheſe ? On n' évite que celle-ci, ſçavoir, qu' il n' eſt pas poſſible de concevoir comment une* Subſtance immaterielle *peut agir ſur la* Matiere. *Mais* Dieu *n' eſt-il pas une* Subſtance immaterielle ?

|| Voïez l' Appendice, Nº 12.

terial Univerſe at its Creation, punctually conform it ſelf to the Reſolutions of the Man's *Mind* at the *Time appointed*? According to *This* Hypotheſis, *All Arguments* in Philoſophy, taken from *Phænomena and Experiments*, are at an end. For, if the *Harmonia præſtabilita* be true, a Man does not indeed *ſee*, nor *hear*, nor *feel* any thing, nor *moves his Body*; but * only *dreams* that he ſees, and hears, and feels, and moves his Body. And if the World can once be perſwaded, that a Man's Body is a *mere Machine*; and that all his *ſeemingly voluntary* Motions are performed by the mere neceſſary Laws of *corporeal Mechaniſm*, without any *Influence*, or *Operation*, or *Action at all* of the *Soul* upon the Body; they will ſoon conclude, that this *Machine* is the *whole Man*; and that the *harmonical Soul*, in the Hypotheſis of an *harmonia præſtabilita*, is merely a *Fiction* and a *Dream*. Beſides: *What Difficulty* is there *avoided*, by ſo ſtrange an *Hypotheſis*? This only; that it cannot be conceived (it ſeems,) how *immaterial Subſtance* ſhould *act* upon *Matter*. But is not *God* an *immaterial Subſtance*? And does not *He* act upon *Matter*? And *what greater Difficulty* is there in conceiving how an *immaterial Subſtance* ſhould act upon Matter, than in conceiving how *Matter* acts upon Matter? Is it not as eaſy to conceive, how certain

* *See Appendix*, N° 12.

Parts

materielle? *Et n' agit-il pas ſur la* Matiere? *D' ailleurs, eſt-il plus difficile de concevoir qu' une* Subſtance immaterielle *agit ſur la* Matiere, *que de concevoir que la* Matiere *agit ſur la* Matiere? *N' eſt-il pas auſſi aiſé de concevoir que certaines parties de Matiere peuvent être obligées de ſuivre les mouvemens & les inclinations de l' Ame ſans aucune impreſſion corporelle, que de concevoir que certaines portions de Matiere ſoient obligées de ſuivre leurs mouvemens reciproques à cauſe de l' Union ou* Adheſion *de leurs parties, qu' on ne ſçauroit expliquer par aucun Méchaniſme? Ou que les Rayons de la Lumiere ſoient réflechis régulierement par une ſurface qu' ils* * *ne touchent jamais? C' eſt de quoi Mr. le Chevalier* Newton *nous a donné diverſes Experiences oculaires dans ſon* Optique.

Il n' eſt pas moins ſurprenant, que l' Auteur repete encore en termes formels, que † *depuis que le Monde a été créé, la* continuation du mouvement des Corps celeſtes, *la* formation des Plantes & des Animaux, & tous les mouvemens des Corps humains & de tous les autres Animaux, ne ſont pas moins méchaniques que les mouvemens d' une Horloge. *Il me ſemble que ceux qui ſoûtiennent ce ſentiment, devroient expliquer* en détail *par* quelles Loix de Méchaniſme *les* Planetes & *les* Cometes *continuent de*

† § 115, 116.

ſe

* Voïez l' Optique de Mr. *Newton*, Edit. Lat. *Pag.* 224. Edit. Angloiſe *Lib.* 2. *Pag.* 65.

Parts of Matter may be obliged to follow the Motions and Affections of the *Soul*, without corporeal Contact; as that certain Portions of Matter ſhould be obliged to follow *each others* Motions by the *adhæſion of Parts*, which *no Mechaniſm* can account for? or that Rays of Light ſhould reflect regularly from a Surface which they † *never touch?* Of which, Sir *Iſaac Newton* in his Opticks has given us ſeveral evident and ocular *Experiments*.

Nor is it leſs ſurprizing, to find this Aſſertion again repeated in expreſs Words, that, after the firſt Creation of Things, ‖ *the continuation of the Motions of the heavenly Bodies*, and the *Formation of Plants and Animals*, and *every Motion of the Bodies both of Men and all other Animals, is as mechanical as the Motions of a Clock.* Whoever entertains this Opinion, is (I think) obliged in reaſon to be able to explain *particularly*, by *what Laws of Mechaniſm* the *Planets* and *Comets* can continue to move in the *Orbs* they do, thro' *unreſiſting Spaces*; and by *what mechanical Laws*, both *Plants and Animals* are formed; and how the infinitely various *ſpontaneous* * *Motions of Animals and Men*, are performed. Which, I am fully perſuaded, is as impoſſible

‖ § 115, 116.

* *See Appendix*, N° 13.

† *See Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Opticks*, *Latin Edition*, Pag. 224. *Engliſh Edition*, Book 3, Page 65.

ſe mouvoir dans les Orbes *où elles ſe meuvent, au travers d' un* Eſpace qui ne fait point de reſiſtance ; *par* quelles Loix Méchaniques *les* Plantes & les Animaux *ſont formez, & quelle eſt la cauſe des* || mouvemens Spontanées *des* Animaux *& des* Hommes, *dont la varieté eſt preſque infinie. Mais je ſuis fortement perſuadé, qu' il n' eſt pas moins impoſſible d' expliquer toutes ces choſes, qu' il le ſeroit de faire voir qu' une* Maiſon, *ou une* Ville, *a été bâtie par un* ſimple Méchaniſme, *ou que le* Monde même *a été* formé *dès le commencement ſans aucune Cauſe* Intelligente & Active. *L' Auteur reconnoit formellement, que les choſes ne pouvoient pas être* produites au commencement *par un* pur Méchaniſme. *Aprez cet aveu, je ne ſçaurois comprendre pourquoi il paroit ſi zélé à bannir Dieu du Gouvernement actuel du Monde, & à ſoûtenir que ſa Providence ne conſiſte que dans un ſimple* Concours (*comme on l' appelle,*) *par lequel* toutes les Créatures *ne font que ce qu' elles feroient d'* elles mêmes *par un* ſimple Méchaniſme. *Enfin, je ne ſçaurois concevoir pourquoi l' Auteur s' imagine que Dieu eſt obligé, par ſa* Nature *ou par ſa* Sageſſe, *de ne rien produire dans l' Univers, que ce qu' une* Machine corporelle peut *produire par de* ſimples Loix Méchaniques, *aprez qu' elle a été une fois miſe en mouvement.*

|| Voïez l' Appendice N° 13.

ble to make out, as it would be to ſhow how a *Houſe* or *City* could be *built*, or the *World it ſelf* have been at firſt formed by *mere Mechaniſm*, without any *Intelligent* and *Active* Cauſe. That Things could not be *at firſt produced* by *Mechaniſm*, is expreſly allowed: And, when this is once granted; why, after That, ſo great Concern ſhould be ſhown, to exclude God's *actual* Government of the World, and to allow his Providence to *act* no further than barely in *concurring* (as the Phraſe is) to let *all Things* do only what they would do *of themſelves* by *mere Mechaniſm*; and why it ſhould be thought that God is under any Obligation or Confinement either in *Nature* or *Wiſdom*, never to bring about any thing in the Univerſe, but what is *poſſible* for a *corporeal Machine* to accompliſh by *mere mechanick Laws*, after it is once ſet a going; I can no way conceive.

117. This

117. *Ce que le ſçavant Auteur avouë ici, qu' il y a* du plus & du moins *dans les* véritables Miracles, *& que les* Anges *peuvent faire de* tels Miracles ; *ceci, dis-je, eſt directement* * contraire *à ce qu' il a dit ci-devant de la* nature du Miracle *dans tous ces Ecrits.*

* Voïez ci-deſſus le III Ecrit de Mr *Leibnitz*, § 17.

118——123. *Si nous diſons que le Soleil* attire *la Terre, au travers d' un Eſpace vuide ; c' eſt à dire, que la Terre & le Soleil* tendent *l' un vers l' autre (quelle qu' en puiſſe être la cauſe,) avec une Force qui eſt en* proportion *directe de leur* Maſſes, *ou de leurs* Grandeurs & denſitez priſes enſemble, *& en* proportion *doublée inverſe de leurs Diſtances ; & que l' Eſpace qui eſt entre ces deux Corps, eſt* vuide, *c' eſt à dire, qu' il n' a rien qui réſiſte ſenſiblement au mouvement des Corps qui le traverſent : tout cela n' eſt qu' un* Phénomene, *ou un* Fait actuel, *découvert par l'* Experience. *Il eſt ſans doute vrai que ce Phénomene n' eſt pas produit.* || ſans moyen, *c' eſt à dire, ſans une Cauſe capable de produire un tel effet. Les Philoſophes peuvent donc rechercher cette* Cauſe, *& tâcher de la découvrir, ſi cela leur eſt* poſſible, *ſoit qu' elle ſoit* méchanique *ou* non méchanique. *Mais s' ils ne peuvent pas découvrir cette Cauſe ; s' enſuit-il que l'* Effet *même, ou le* Phénomene découvert par l' Experience, *(car c' eſt-là* * *tout ce que l' on veut dire par les mots d'* Attraction *& de* Gravitation,) *s' enſuit-il, diſ-je,*

|| § 118.

*Voïez ci-deſſus la Note ſur § 113.

117. This learned Author's allowing in this Place, that there is *greater* and *leſs* in *true Miracles*, and that *Angels* are capable of working ſome *true Miracles*; is perfectly † *contradictory* to that Notion of the *Nature of a Miracle*, which he has all along pleaded for in theſe Papers.

† *See above, Mr.* Leibnitz's *Third Paper*, §17.

118——123. That the Sun *attracts* the Earth, through the intermediate void Space; that is, that the Earth and Sun *gravitate* towards each other, or *tend* (whatever be the Cauſe of that Tendency) towards each other, with a *Force* which is in a direct *proportion* of their *Maſſes*, or *Magnitudes and Denſities together*, and in an inverſe duplicate *proportion* of their *Diſtances*; and that the Space betwixt them is *void*, that is, hath nothing in it which ſenſibly reſiſts the Motion of Bodies paſſing tranſverſly through: All This, is nothing but a *Phænomenon*, or *actual Matter of Fact*, found by *Experience*. That this Phænomenon is not produced ‖ *ſans moyen*, that is, without ſome *Cauſe* capable of producing ſuch an Effect; is undoubtedly true. Philoſophers therefore may ſearch after and diſcover That *Cauſe*, if they *can*; be it *mechanical*, or *not mechanical*. But if they *cannot* diſcover the Cauſe; is therefore the *Effect* it ſelf, the *Phænomenon*, or the *Matter of Fact diſcovered by Experience*, (which is * all that is meant by the Words *Attraction* and *Gravitation*,) ever the

‖ § 118.

* *See above, the Note on* § 113.

diſ-je, que ce Phénomene ſoit moins certain & moins inconteſtable? Une Qualité
* § 122. évidente *doit-elle être appellée* * occulte, *parce que la* Cauſe *immédiate en eſt peut-être* occulte, *ou qu' elle* n' eſt pas encore découverte? *Lors qu' un Corps* † *ſe meut dans un Circle, ſans s' éloigner par la Tangente; il y a certainement* quelque choſe, *qui l' en empêche: Mais ſi dans quelques cas il n'*
† § 123. *eſt pas* poſſible || *d'* expliquer méchaniquement *la* Cauſe *de cet Effet, ou ſi elle n' a*
|| § 123. pas encore *été* découverte, *s' enſuit-il que le* Phénomene *ſoit faux? Ce ſeroit une maniere de raiſonner fort* ſinguliere.

124——130. *Le* Phénomene *même, l'* Attraction, *la* Gravitation, *ou* l' effort *(quelque nom qu' on lui donne)* par lequel les Corps tendent l' un vers l' autre; *& les* Loix, *ou les* Proportions, *de cette Force; ſont aſſez connues par les* Obſervations & les Experiences. *Si Mr.* Leibnitz, *ou quelque autre Philoſophe, peut expliquer ces*
* § 124. *Phénomenes par* * *les* Loix du Méchaniſme; *bien loin d' être contredit, tous les ſçavans l' en remercieront. En attendant, je ne ſçaurois m' empêcher de dire que l' Auteur raiſonne d' une maniere tout-à-fait extraor-*
† § 128. *dinaire, en* † *comparant la* Gravitation, *qui eſt un* Phénomene *ou un* Fait actuel, *avec la* Déclinaiſon des Atomes *ſelon la doctrine d'* Epicure; *lequel ayant corrompu, dans le deſſein d' introduire l' Atheïſme, une Philoſophie plus ancienne & peut-être plus*

ſaine

the leſs *True* ? Or is a *manifeſt Quality* to be called || *occult*, becauſe the immediate efficient *Cauſe* of it (perhaps) is *occult*, or *not yet diſcovered* ? When a Body * moves in a Circle, without flying off in the Tangent; 'tis certain there is ſomething that *hinders* it: But if in ſome Caſes it be not *mechanically* † *explicable*, or be not *yet diſcovered*, what *that ſomething* is ; does it therefore follow, that the *Phænomenon it ſelf* is falſe ? This is very *ſingular* Arguing indeed.

|| § 122.

* § 123.

† § 123.

124——130. The *Phænomenon* it ſelf, the *Attraction*, *Gravitation*, or *Tendency of Bodies towards each other*, (or whatever other Name you pleaſe to call it by ;) and the *Laws*, or *Proportions*, of that Tendency, are now ſufficiently known by *Obſervations* and *Experiments*. If This or any other learned Author can by || the *Laws of Mechaniſm* explain theſe Phænomena, he will not only not be contradicted, but will moreover have the abundant Thanks of the Learned World. But, in the mean time, to † compare *Gravitation*, (which is a *Phænomenon* or *actual Matter of Fact*,) with *Epicurus's Declination of Atoms*, (which, according to his corrupt and Atheiſtical Perverſion of ſome more antient and perhaps better Philoſophy, was an *Hypotheſis* or *Fiction* only, and an *impoſſible one*

|| § 124.

† § 128.

ſaine, s' aviſa d' établir cette Hypotheſe, *qui n' eſt qu' une pure* Fiction, *& qui d' ailleurs eſt* impoſſible *dans un Monde où l' on ſuppoſe qu' il n' y a aucune* Intelligence.

Pour ce qui eſt du grand Principe d' une || Raiſon ſuffiſante, *tout ce que le ſçavant Auteur ajoute ici touchant cette matiere, ne conſiſte qu' à* ſoûtenir *ſa Concluſion, ſans la prouver ; & par conſéquent il n' eſt pas néceſſaire d' y répondre. Je remarquerai ſeulement que cette Expreſſion eſt* Equivoque ; *& qu' on peut l' entendre, comme ſi elle ne renfermoit que la* Néceſſité, *ou comme ſi elle pouvoit auſſi ſignifier une* Volonté & un Choix. *Il eſt très-certain, & tout le monde convient, qu' en général* * *il y a une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *de chaque choſe. Mais il s' agit de ſçavoir,* ſi, *dans certains cas, lors qu' il eſt* raiſonnable *d' agir,* differentes manieres d' agir poſſibles *ne peuvent pas être* également raiſonnables ; ſi, *dans ces cas, la* † ſimple Volonté de Dieu *n' eſt pas une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *pour agir d'* une certaine maniere *plûtôt que d'* une autre ; *&* ſi, *lors que les* raiſons les plus fortes *ſe trouvent d'* un ſeul *coté, les* Agents intelligens & libres *n' ont pas un* Principe d' action, (*en quoi je croi que l' Eſſence de la* Liberté *conſiſte,*) *tout à fait* diſtinct *du* Motif *ou de la* Raiſon *que l' Agent a en vûë. Le ſçavant Auteur nie tout cela : Et comme il* || *établit ſon Grand Principe d' une* Raiſon ſuffiſante *dans*

|| § 125, &c.

* § 125.

† Voïez ci-deſſus ſur § 1—20, & 21-25.

|| § 20, & 125, &c.

too, in a World where no *Intelligence* was ſuppoſed to be preſent;) ſeems to be a very *extraordinary* Method of reaſoning.

As to the grand Principle of a * *ſufficient Reaſon*; all that this Learned Writer here adds concerning it, is only by way of *Affirming*, not *proving*, his Concluſion; and therefore needs no Anſwer. I ſhall only obſerve, that the Phraſe is of an *equivocal* Signification; and may either be ſo underſtood, as to mean *Neceſſity only*, or ſo as to include likewiſe *Will and Choice*. That in general there || is a *ſufficient Reaſon why* every Thing is, which *Is*; is undoubtedly true, and agreed on all Hands. But the Queſtion is, whether, in ſome Caſes, when it may be highly *reaſonable* to *act*, yet *different poſſible Ways of acting* may not poſſibly be *equally reaſonable*; and whether, in ſuch Caſes, the * *bare Will of God* be not *it ſelf* a *ſufficient Reaſon* for acting in *this* or the *other* particular *manner*; and whether in Caſes where there are the *ſtrongeſt poſſible Reaſons* altogether on *One* Side, yet in all *Intelligent* and *Free Agents*, the *Principle of Action* (in which I think the Eſſence of *Liberty* conſiſts,) be not a *diſtinct Thing* from the *Motive* or *Reaſon* which the Agent has in his View. All theſe are conſtantly denied by this Learned Writer. And his || laying down his grand Principle of a *ſufficient Reaſon*

* § 125. &c.

|| § 125.

* *See above*, *on* § 1-20, *&* 21-25.

|| § 26, *&* 125, *&c.*

dans un ſens qui exclud tout ce que je viens de dire ; & qu' il demande qu' on lui accorde ce Principe dans ce ſens-là, quoi qu'il n'ait pas entrepris de le prouver ; j' appelle cela une Petition de Principe : *ce qui eſt tout à fait indigne d' un Philoſophe.*

N. B. La mort de Mr. LEIBNITZ l'a empêché de répondre à ce dernier Ecrit.

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in ſuch a Senſe as to exclude all theſe; and expecting it ſhould be *granted* him in that Senſe, without *Proof*; This is what I call his *Petitio Principii*, or *Begging of the Queſtion*: Than which, nothing can be more unphiloſophical.

N. B. *Mr.* LEIBNITZ *was prevented by* Death, *from returning any Anſwer to this laſt Paper.*

APPENDICE,

ou

Recueil de Paſſages, tirez des Ouvrages imprimez de Mr. LEIBNITZ, *qui peuvent ſervir à éclaircir pluſieurs Endroits des Ecrits précédens.*

N° 1.

DIEU *ſelon nous eſt* Intelligentia Extramundana, *comme* Martianus Capella *l'appelle; ou plûtôt* Supramundana. Theodicée, pag. 396.

N° 2.

Il faut ſavoir qu'une ſpontaneïté *exacte nous eſt commune avec* toutes les ſubſtances ſimples; *& que dans la ſubſtance intelligente ou libre, elle devient un Empire ſur ſes actions.*

—— *Natu-*

THE APPENDIX.

BEING

A Collection of Paſſages out of Mr. LEIBNITZ'S *Printed Works, which may give Light to many Parts of the fore-going Papers.*

N° 1.

GOD, according to My opinion, is an *Extramundane Intelligence*, as *Martianus Capella* ſtiles him; or rather, a *Supramundane Intelligence*. *Theodicæa*, pag. 396.

N° 2.

We muſt know, that a *Spontaneity* ſtrictly ſpeaking, is common to Us with *All ſimple Subſtances*; and that This, in an Intelligent or Free Subſtance, amounts to a Dominion over its own

—— *Naturellement* chaque ſubſtance ſimple *a de la* perception, *&c.* Theodicée pag. 479.

Sed vis activa Actum quendam ſive ἐντελέχειαν *continet, atque inter facultatem agendi actionemque ipſam media eſt, & conatum involvit, atque ita* per ſe ipſam in operationem fertur; *nec auxiliis indiget, ſed ſola ſublatione impedimenti. Quod Exemplis, Gravis ſuſpenſi funem ſuſtinentem intendentis, aut Arcûs tenſi, illuſtrari poteſt. Etſi enim gravitas aut vis elaſtica mechanicè explicari poſſint debeantque ex ætheris motu; ultima tamen* ratio motûs *in materia, eſt* vis in creatione impreſſa; *quæ in* unoquoque corpore *ineſt, ſed ipſo conflictu corporum variè in natura limitatur & coercetur. Et hanc* agendi *virtutem* omni ſubſtantiæ *ineſſe aio, ſemperque aliquam ex ea actionem naſci; adeoque nec* ipſam ſubſtantiam Corpoream, *(non magis quam ſpiritualem) ab* agendo *ceſſare unquam. Quod illi non ſatis percepiſſe videntur, qui Eſſentiam ejus in ſola* extenſione, *vel etiam* impenetrabilitate *collocaverunt, & corpus omnimodè quieſcens concipere ſibi ſunt viſi. Apparebit etiam ex noſtris meditationibus, ſubſtantiam creatam ab alia ſubſtantia creata non ipſam vim agendi, ſed* præexiſtentis *jam* niſûs *ſui, ſive* virtutis agendi, *limites tantummodo ac determinationem accipere.* Acta Erudit. Ann. 1694, pag. 112.

Agere, *eſt character ſubſtantiarum.* Ibid. ad Ann. 1695. pag. 145.

Quæ [vis activa primitiva] *in* omni ſubſtantiâ corporea *per ſe ineſt; cùm corpus omnimodè quieſcens*

Actions. —— Naturally, *every ſimple Subſtance* has *Perception*, &c. *Theodic. pag.* 479.

But Active Force contains a certain Act or Efficacy, and is ſomething of a middle nature between the Faculty of acting and Action itſelf: It involves a *Conatus* or Indeavour, and is of itſelf carried towards Action; and ſtands in need of no Helps, but only that the Impediment be taken away. This may be illuſtrated by the Examples of a Heavy Body ſtretching the ſtring it is hung by, and of a Bow bent. For though Gravity or Elaſticity may and ought to be explained mechanically by the Motion of *Æther*; yet the ultimate *Cauſe of Motion* in Matter, is a *Force impreſſed at the Creation*: Which is in *every part of matter*, but, according to the courſe of nature, is variouſly limited and reſtrained by Bodies ſtriking againſt each other. And this *active Faculty* I affirm to be in *All Subſtance*, and that ſome action is always ariſing from it: So that not even *corporeal Subſtance*, any more than *Spiritual*, ever ceaſes *acting*. Which ſeems not to have been apprehended by Thoſe, who have placed the Eſſence of Matter in *Extenſion* alone, or even in *Impenetrability*; and fancied they could conceive a Body abſolutely at Reſt. It will appear alſo from what I have advanced, that One created Subſtance does not receive from Another the active Force it ſelf, but only the Limits and Determination of the *Indeavour* or *Active Faculty* already pre-exiſting in it. *Acta Erud. Ann.* 1694, *Pag.* 112.

To *Act*, is the Characteriſtick of Subſtances. *Ibid. ad Ann.* 1695, *Pag.* 145.

Which *primitive active Power*, is of it ſelf in *All corporeal Subſtance*: For, I think, a Body abſolutely

eſcens, à rerum natura abhorrere arbitrer. Ibid. pag. 146.

Ob formam, corpus omne *ſemper* agere. Ibid. pag. 147.

Potentiæ ſcilicet actricis *in formâ, & ignaviæ ſeu ad motum reſiſtentiæ in materiâ.* Ibid. pag. 151.

Etſi principium activum *materialibus notionibus ſuperius, & (ut ſic dicam)* vitale, *ubique* in corporibus *admittam.* Ibid. pag. 153.

Alibi à me explicatum eſt, etſi nondum fortaſſe ſatis perſpectum omnibus; ipſam *rerum* ſubſtantiam *in* agendi patiendique vi *conſiſtere.* Ibid. ad Ann. 1698, Pag. 432.

Ita ut non tantum omne quod agit, ſit *Subſtantia ſingularis, ſed etiam ut* omnis *ſingularis Subſtantia* agat *ſine intermiſſione*; corpore ipſo *non excepto, in quo nulla unquam quies abſoluta reperitur.* Ibid.

Quod ſi vero menti noſtræ vim inſitam tribuimus, actiones immanentes producendi, vel, quod idem eſt, agendi immanenter; jam nihil prohibet, imò conſentaneum eſt, aliis animabus vel formis, *aut, ſi mavis,* naturis Subſtantiarum *eandem vim ineſſe: Niſi quis* ſolas *in naturâ rerum nobis obviâ* Mentes *noſtras* activas *eſſe*; *aut omnem vim* agendi *immanenter, atque adeo vitaliter, ut ſic dicam, cum intellectu eſſe conjunctam arbitretur: Quales certè Aſſeverationes neque ratione ulla confirmantur, nec niſi invitâ veritate propugnantur.* Ibid. Pag. 433.

Hinc

abſolutely at Reſt, is inconſiſtent with the Nature of Things. *Ibid. Pag.* 146.

Every *Part of Matter* is, by its *Form*, continually *Acting*. Ibid. Pag. 147.

The *Active Power*, which is in the *Form*; and the *inertia*, or repugnance to Motion, which is in the *Matter*. Ibid. Pag. 151.

Though I admit every where in *Bodies*, a Principle ſuperior to the [common] Notion of Matter; a Principle *Active*, and (if I may ſo ſpeak,) *Vital. Ibid. Pag.* 153.

I have elſewhere explained, though it is a Thing perhaps not yet well underſtood by All; that the *very Subſtance* of Things, *conſiſts* in the Power of *Acting* and *being Acted upon*. Ibid. *ad Ann.* 1698. *Pag.* 432.

So that, not only *every Thing which acts*, is a *ſingle Subſtance*; but alſo *every ſingle Subſtance* does perpetually *act*: Not excepting even *Matter* it ſelf; in which there never is any Abſolute Reſt. *Ibid.*

If we aſcribe to *our own Minds* an intrinſick Power of producing immanent Actions, or (which is the ſame Thing) of Acting immanently: 'Tis no way unreaſonable, nay 'tis very reaſonable, to allow that there is the ſame Power in *other Souls* or *Forms*, or (if that be a better Expreſſion,) in the *Natures* of *Subſtances*. Unleſs a Man will imagine, that, in the whole Extent of Nature within the compaſs of our Knowledge, *our own Minds* are the *only* Things endued with *Active Powers*; or that All Power of *acting immanently* and *vitally* (if I may ſo ſpeak,) is connected with Underſtanding. Which Kind of Aſſertions, certainly, are neither founded on any Reaſon; nor can be maintained, but in oppoſition to Truth. *Ibid. Pag.* 433. The

Hinc judicari poteſt, debere in corporea Subſtantia *reperiri entelechiam primam, tanquam* πρῶτον δεκτικὸν activitatis ; vim ſcilicet *motricem primitivam, quæ præter extenſionem (ſeu id quod eſt merè Geometricum) & præter molem (ſeu id quod eſt mere materiale) ſuperaddita, ſemper quidem* agit, *ſed tamen variè ex corporum concurſibus per conatus impetuſve modificatur. Atque hoc ipſum* Subſtantiale principium *eſt, quod in viventibus* anima, *in aliis* forma Subſtantialis *appellatur.* Ibid. Pag. 434.

Primam [materiam] *eſſe merè paſſivam, ſed non eſſe completam Subſtantiam ; accedereque adeò debere* animam *vel* formam Animæ analogam, *ſive* ἐντελέχειαν τὴν πρώτην, *id eſt,* niſum *quendam ſeu* vim agendi primitivam, *quæ ipſa eſt Lex inſita, decreto divino impreſſa. A quâ ſententiâ non puto abhorrere Virum celebrem & ingenioſum, qui nuper defendit,* Corpus *conſtare ex* Materia & Spiritu ; *modò ſumatur* Spiritus *non pro* re intelligente (*ut alias ſolet,*) *ſed pro* Anima *vel* forma Animæ analoga ; *nec pro ſimplici* modificatione, *ſed pro* conſtitutivo Subſtantiali perſeverante, *quod* Monadis *nomine appellare ſoleo, in quo eſt velut* Perceptio & appetitus. *Ibid. Pag.* 435.

Contrà potius arbitror, neque ordini neque pulchritudini rationive rerum eſſe conſentaneum, ut vitale aliquid, *ſeu* immanenter agens, *ſit in* exigua *tantum* parte materiæ ; *cùm ad majorem perfectionem pertineat, ut ſit in* omni ; *neq;* quicquam *obſtet, quo minus* ubiq; *ſint* Animæ, *aut* analoga *ſaltem* Animabus ; *etſi* dominantes Animæ

Hence we may gather, that there muſt needs be in *corporeal Subſtance* an original Efficacy, or (as it were) prime Recipient of *Active Force*: That is, there muſt be in it a *primitive Motive Power*: Which being added over and above the Extenſion (or that which is merely geometrical,) and over and above the Bulk (or that which is merely material;) *acts* indeed continually, but yet is variouſly modified by the *Conatus*'s and *Impetus*'s of Bodies ſtriking againſt each other. And This is *That Subſtantial Principle*, which, in *Living Subſtances*, is ſtiled *Soul*; in *Others*, the *Subſtantial Form*. Ibid. Pag. 434.

The *materia prima* is indeed merely paſſive, but 'tis not a complete Subſtance. To make it complete Subſtance, there muſt be moreover a *Soul*, or a *Form analogous to Soul*, or *an original Efficacy*, that is, a certain *Indeavour*, or *Primitive Power of Acting*; which is an innate Law, impreſſed by the Decree of God. Which Opinion I think is not different from that of an Eminent and Ingenious Gentleman, who has lately maintained, that *Body* conſiſts of *Matter* and *Spirit*; meaning by the word *Spirit*, not (as uſually) an *intelligent thing*, but a *Soul* or *Form analogous to Soul*; and not a *ſimple Modification*, but a *ſubſtantial Permanent Conſtituent*, which I uſed to call a *Monad*, in which is as it were *Perception* and *Deſire*. *Ibid. pag.* 435.

On the contrary, I am rather of opinion, that 'tis neither agreeable to the Order, nor Beauty, nor Reaſon of things, that there ſhould be a *Vital Principle* or *Power of acting immanently*, only in a *very ſmall part of Matter*; when it would be an argument of greater Perfection, for it to be in *All matter*; and nothing hinders but that

mæ, *atque adeo* intelligentes, *quales ſunt* humanæ, *ubique eſſe non poſſint.* Ibid. Pag. 436.

Cum id quod non agit, *quod vi* activa *caret, quod diſcriminibilitate, quod denique omni ſubſiſtendi ratione ac fundamento ſpoliatur*; ſubſtantia *eſſe nullo modo poſſit.* Ibid. Pag. 439.

Voïez cy-deſſous, N° 11.

N° 3.

Il [Monſieur Bayle] *fait voir aſſés amplement* (Rep. au Provincial, ch. 139, p. 748, ſeqq.) *qu' on peut comparer l'* ame *à une* Balance, *où les Raiſons & les Inclinations tiennent lieu de poids; & ſelon luy, on peut expliquer ce qui ſe paſſe dans nos reſolutions, par l' Hypotheſe, que la volonté de l' Homme eſt comme une* Balance, *qui ſe tient en repos, quand les poids de ſes deux baſſins ſont égaux; & qui panche toûjours où d' un coté ou de l' autre, ſelon que l' un des baſſins eſt plus chargé. Une nouvelle Raiſon fait un* poids *ſuperieur; une nouvelle Idée rayonne plus vivement que la vieille; la crainte d' une groſſe peine, l' emporte ſur quelque plaiſir; quand deux paſſions ſe diſputent le terrein, c' eſt toûjours la plus forte qui demeure la Maitreſſe, à moins que l' autre ne ſoit aidée par la Raiſon, ou par quelque autre paſſion combinée.* Theodicée, Pag. 514.

L' *on a d' autant plus de peine à ſe determiner, que les Raiſons oppoſées approchent plus de l'*

that there may *Everywhere* be *Souls*, or at leaſt *Something analogous to Souls*; though *Souls indued with Dominion and Underſtanding*, ſuch as are *Humane Souls*, cannot be Everywhere. *Ibid. pag.* 436.

What doth not *act*, what wants *Active Power*, what is void of Diſcernibility, what wants the whole ground and foundation of Subſiſtence; can no way be a *Subſtance*. *Ibid. pag.* 439.

See below, N° 11.

N° 3.

Mr. *Bayle* has ſhown at large (in his *Anſwer to a Provincial, ch.* 139, *p.* 748 *&c.*) that a Mans *Soul* may be compared to a *Balance*, wherein Reaſons and Inclinations are in the place of Weights: And, according to Him, the manner of our forming our reſolutions may be explained by This Hypotheſis, that the *Will of Man* is like a *Balance*, which ſtands always unmoved when the Weights in Both Scales are equal, and always turns on one ſide or the other, in proportion as One Scale has more Weight in it than the Other. A *New Reaſon*, makes an Overpoiſe of *Weight*. A new Idea ſtrikes the Mind more vigorouſly than a foregoing one. The Fear of a Great Pain, determines more ſtrongly than the expectation of a Pleaſure. When Two Paſſions contend againſt each other, the ſtronger always remains Maſter of the Field, unleſs the Other be aſſiſted either by Reaſon, or by ſome other paſſion conſpiring with it. *Theodic. pag.* 514.

A Man has always ſo much the more difficulty of determining himſelf, as the oppoſite Reaſons

l' égalité ; comme l' on voit que la Balance *se determine plus promtement, lors qu' il y a une grande difference entre les poids. Cependant, comme bien souvent il y a plusieurs partis à prendre, on pourroit, au lieu de la* Balance, *comparer l' ame avec une* force, *qui fait effort en même tems de* plusieurs cotés, *mais qui n' agit que là où elle trouve le plus de facilité, ou le moins de resistance. Par Exemple, l' air étant comprimé trop fortement dans un* Recipient *de verre, le cassera pour sortir. Il fait effort sur chaque partie, mais il se jette enfin sur la plus foible. C' est ainsi que les* Inclinations de l' ame *vont sur tous les biens qui se presentent ; ce sont des volontés antecedentes ; mais la volonté consequente, qui en est le resultat, se determine vers ce qui touche le plus.* Theodicée, Pag. 515.

Voïez cy-dessous, N° 4 & 9.

N° 4.

Il n'y a jamais d' indifference d' équilibre, *c' est à dire, où tout soit parfaitement égal de part & d' autre, sans qu' il y ait plus d' Inclination vers un côté.* Theodicée, Pag. 158.

Il est vray, *si le cas* [de l' âne entre deux préz, également porté à l' un & à l' autre,] *étoit possible, qu' il faudroit dire qu' il se laisseroit* mourir de faim : *Mais dans le fond la Question est sur l' impossible, à moins que Dieu ne produise la chose exprés.* Ibid. Pag, 161.

Voïez ci-dessus, N° 3 ; & ci-dessous, N° 9.

N° 5.

Reaſons draw nearer to an equality: Juſt as we ſee a *Balance* turn ſo much the more readily, as the Weights in each Scale are more different from one another. However, ſince there are often more than two ways which a Man may take; we may therefore, inſtead of This ſimilitude of a *Balance*, compare the Soul to a *Force*, which has at one and the ſame time a *Tendency many ways*, but *acts on That part only* where it finds the Greateſt Eaſe, or the Leaſt Reſiſtence. For example: Air ſtrongly compreſſed in a Glaſs-Receiver, will break the Glaſs to get out, It preſſes upon every part, but at laſt makes its way where the Glaſs is weakeſt. Thus the *Inclinations of the Soul*, tend towards All apparent Goods; And theſe are the antecedent Volitions: But the Conſequent Volition, which is the laſt Reſult, determines itſelf towards That Good which affects us the moſt ſtrongly. *Ibid. pag.* 515.

See *below*, N° 4 and 9.

N° 4.

There is never any ſuch thing as an *Indifference in æquilibrio*; that is, ſuch an one, where every circumſtance is perfectly equal on Both ſides, ſo that there is no inclination to one ſide rather than the other. *Theodicæa*, *pag.* 158.

'Tis *True*, if the Caſe [*of the Aſs ſtanding between Two green Fields, and equally liking Both of them*] was poſſible, we *muſt ſay* he would ſuffer himſelf to be *ſtarved to Death*. But at the bottom, the Caſe is impoſſible to happen; unleſs God ſhould order circumſtances ſo on purpoſe. *Ibid. pag.* 161.

See *above*, N° 3; and below, N° 9.

N° 5.

—— *C' eſt une ſuite du Syſteme de* l' Harmonie préétablie, *dont il eſt neceſſaire de donner quelque explication icy. Les Philoſophes de l' Ecole croyoient, qu' il y avoit une* influence phyſique reciproque *entre le* corps *& l'* ame: *Mais depuis qu' on a bien conſideré que la penſée & la maſſe étenduë n' ont aucune liaiſon enſemble, & que ce ſont des creatures qui different* toto genere; *pluſieurs modernes ont reconnu, qu'* il n'y a aucune communication phyſique *entre l'* ame *& le* corps, *quoique la communication Metaphyſique ſubſiſte toujours, qui fait que l' ame & le corps compoſent un même ſuppoſt, ou ce qu' on appelle une perſonne. Cette communication phyſique, s' il y en avoit, feroit que l'* ame *changeroit le degré de la viteſſe & la ligne de direction de quelques mouvemens qui ſont dans le* corps; *& que,* vice verſa, *le* corps *changeroit la ſuite des penſées qui ſont dans* l' ame. *Mais on ne ſauroit tirer cet effet d' aucune notion qu' on conçoive dans le corps, & dans l' ame; quoique rien ne nous ſoit mieux connu que l' ame, puiſqu' elle nous eſt intime, c' eſt à dire intime à elle même.* Theodicée, pag. 172.

N° 5.

This is a Conſequence of my Syſtem of a *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*; which it may be neceſſary here to give ſome Account of. The Scholaſtick Philoſophers were of Opinion, that the *Soul and Body mutually affected each other* by a *Natural Influence*: But ſince it has been well conſidered, that * *Thought* and *extended Subſtance* have no Connexion with each other, and are *Beings* that differ *toto genere*; many modern Philoſophers have acknowledged, that *there is no phyſical Communication* between the *Soul* and the *Body*, though *a Metaphyſical Communication* there always is, by means of which the Soul and the Body make up *one Suppoſitum*, or what we call a *Perſon*. If there was any *phyſical Communication* between them, then the *Soul* could change the Degree of Swiftneſs, and the Line of Direction of certain Motions in the *Body*; and, on the other ſide, the *Body* could cauſe a Change in the Series of Thoughts which are in the *Soul*. But now, ſuch an Effect as this, cannot be deduced from the Notion of any thing we can conceive in the Body and Soul; though nothing be better known to us † than the Soul, becauſe 'tis intimate to Us, that is, to itſelf. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 172.

* The Thinking Subſtance, *he ſhould have ſaid*: *For* Thought, *or the* Act of Thinking, *is not a Subſtance.*

† Note. *As the* Eye *ſees not* itſelf; *and if a Man had never ſeen* Another's *Eye*, *nor the* Image *of his own in a Glaſs, he could never have had Any Notion what an* Eye *is*: *So the* Soul *diſcerns not its* own Subſtance.

Je ne pouvois manquer de venir à ce ſyſteme, qui porte que Dieu a créé l' ame d' abord de telle façon, qu' elle doit ſe produire & ſe repreſenter par ordre ce qui ſe paſſe dans le corps; & le corps *auſſi de telle façon, qu' il doit faire* de ſoi même *ce que l' ame ordonne. De ſorte que les loix, qui lient les penſées de l' ame dans l' ordre des cauſes finales, & ſuivant l' évolution des perceptions, doivent produire des images qui ſe* rencontrent & s' accordent *avec les impreſſions des corps ſur nos organes*; *& que les loix des mouvemens dans le* corps, *qui s' entreſuivent dans l' ordre des cauſes efficientes, ſe* rencontrent *auſſi & s'* accordent *tellement avec les penſées de l' ame, que le corps eſt porté à agir dans le tems que l' ame le veut.* Ibid. Pag. 176.

Monſieur Jaquelot *a très bien montré dans ſon Livre de la conformité de la Raiſon & de la Foy, que c' eſt comme ſi celui qui fait tout ce que j' ordonnerai à un valet le lendemain tout le long du jour, faiſoit un* Automate *qui reſſemblât parfaitement à ce valet, & qui executât demain à point nommé, tout ce que j' ordonnerois*; *Ce qui ne m' empecheroit pas d' ordonner librement tout ce qui me plairoit, quoique l' action de l' Automate qui me ſerviroit, ne tiendroit rien de libre.* Ibid. pag. 176.

Le vray moyen, par lequel Dieu fait que l' ame a des ſentimens de ce qui ſe paſſe dans le corps, vient de la nature de l' ame, qui eſt repreſentative *des corps, & faite en ſorte par avance qu*

I cannot help coming into this Notion, that God created the *Soul* in ſuch manner at firſt, as that it *produces within it ſelf*, and *repreſents in it ſelf* ſucceſſively, what paſſes in the *Body*; and that he has made the *Body alſo* in ſuch manner, as that it *muſt of it ſelf* do what the Soul wills. So that the Laws which make the Thoughts of the Soul *follow each other* ſucceſſively in the Order of final Cauſes, and in the Order of its Perceptions ariſing within it ſelf, *muſt* produce Images, which ſhall be *coincident*, and *go Hand in Hand* with the Impreſſions made by Bodies upon our Organs of Senſe: And the Laws by which the Motions of the Body *follow each other* ſucceſſively in the Order of efficient Cauſes, are likewiſe *coincident* and *go Hand in Hand* with the Thoughts of the Soul, in ſuch manner as that theſe Laws of Motion make the Body act at *the ſame Time* that the Soul Wills. *Ibid.* Pag. 176.

Mr. *Faquelot* has very well ſhown, in his Book concerning the *Agreement of Reaſon and Faith*, that this is juſt as if One who knew before-hand every particular thing that I ſhould order my Footman to do to Morrow all the Day long, ſhould make a *Machine* to reſemble my Footman exactly, and punctually to perform all Day to Morrow every Thing I directed. Which would not at all hinder my freely ordering whatever I pleaſed, though the Actions of my *Machine-Footman* had no Liberty at all. *Ibid.* Pag. 176.

The true Means by which God cauſes the Soul to have a Perception of what paſſes in the Body, is This; that he has made the *Nature of the Soul* to be *Repreſentative* of Bodies, and to

que les representations, qui naîtront en elle les unes des autres *par une ſuite naturelle de penſées, répondent au changement des corps.* Ibid. Pag. 550.

Voïez cy-deſſus, N° 2; & cy-deſſous N° 11.

N° 6.

Et de même, ſi Dieu vouloit que les organes des corps *humains ſe conformaſſent avec les volontés de l'* ame, *ſuivant le ſyſteme des* cauſes occaſionelles; *cette loy ne s'executeroit auſſi, que par des* miracles *perpetuels.* Theodicée, Pag. 383.

Voiez cy-deſſous, N° 8.

N° 7.

Imò potius materiam reſiſtere motui, *per quandam ſuam* inertiam *naturalem, à* Keplero *pluchrè ſic denominatam; ita ut* non ſit indifferens ad motum & quietem, *uti vulgò rem æſtimare ſolent; ſed ad* motum, *pro magnitudine ſuâ, vi tanto majore activâ indigeat.* Acta Erudit. ad Ann. 1698. pag. 434.

Inertiam naturalem, oppoſitam motui. *Ibid.*

Ignavia *quadam, ut ſic dicam; id eſt,* ad Motum repugnatione. Acta ad Ann. 1695, Pag. 147.

Ignaviæ, *ſeu* ad Motum reſiſtentiæ, *in materiâ.* Ibid. Pag. 151.

Les Experiences auſſi du choc des corps, jointes à la raiſon, font voir qu'il faut employer deux fois plus de force pour donner une même viteſſe

be before-hand ſo conſtituted, as that the *Repreſentations* which ſhall ariſe in it, one following another according to the natural Succeſſion of Thoughts ſhall be *coincident with* ſuch Change as happens in Bodies. *Ibid*, Pag. 550.

See *above*, N° 2; and *below*, N° 11.

N° 6.

In like manner, ſhould it be the Will of God, that the Organs of human *Bodies* ſhould move conformably to the Volitions of the *Soul*, conſidering thoſe Volitions as *occaſional Cauſes*; ſuch a Law could not be put in Execution, but by perpetual *Miracles*. *Theodicæa*, Pag. 383.

See *below*, N° 8.

N° 7.

Nay rather, Matter *reſiſts Motion*, by a certain natural *Inertia*, very properly ſo ſtiled by *Kepler*: So that Matter is not *indifferent to Motion and Reſt*, as is vulgarly ſuppoſed; but needs a greater active Force, in proportion to the Magnitude of the Body, to put it in *Motion*. *Acta Erudit. ad Ann* 1698, *Pag.* 434.

A Natural *Inertia*, repugnant to *Motion*. *Ibid.*

A certain *Sluggiſhneſs*, if I may ſo ſpeak, that is, a repugnancy to *Motion*. *Acta Erudit. ad Ann.* 1695, *Pag.* 147.

A *Sluggiſhneſs*, or Reſiſtence to *Motion*, in Matter. *Ibid. Pag.* 151.

The *Experiments* of Bodies ſtriking againſt each other, as well as *Reaſon*, ſhow that twice as much Force is required to give the ſame Velocity

teſſe à un corps de la même matiere, mais deux fois plus grand: Ce qui ne ſeroit point neceſſaire, ſi la matiere étoit abſolument indifferente au repos & au mouvement, *& ſi elle n' avoit pas cette* inertie *naturelle, dont nous venons de parler, qui lui donne une eſpece de* repugnance à être mûe. Theodicée. Pag. 142.

Il ſemble, en conſiderant l' indifference de la matiere au mouvement & au repos, *que le plus grand corps en repos pourroit être emporté ſans aucune reſiſtance par le moindre corps qui ſeroit en mouvement; au quel cas il y auroit action ſans reaction, & un effet plus grand que ſa cauſe.* Ibid. Pag. 538.

N° 8.

C' eſt pourquoy, ſi Dieu faiſoit une loy generale, qui portât que les corps s' attiraſſent *les uns les autres; il n' en ſauroit obtenir l' execution, que par des* miracles *perpetuels.* Theodicée, Pag. 382.

Voiez cy-deſſus, N° 6.

N° 9.

On peut dire de même en matiere de parfaite ſageſſe, qui n' eſt pas moins reglée que les Mathematiques; que s' il n' y avoit pas le Meilleur (Optimum) *parmi tous les mondes poſſibles, Dieu n' en auroit produit aucun.* Theodicée. pag. 116.

Voiez cy-deſſus, N° 4 & 3.

N° 10.

locity * to a Body of the ſame Kind of Matter, double in Bigneſs. Which would not be needful, if Matter was abſolutely *indifferent to Reſt and Motion*, and had not that natural *Inertia* I ſpoke of, which gives it a ſort of Repugnancy to *Motion*. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 142.

It might be expected, ſuppoſing Matter *indifferent to Motion and Reſt*, that the largeſt Body at Reſt, might be carried away without any Reſiſtence, by the leaſt Body in Motion. In which Caſe, there would be Action without Reaction, and an Effect greater than its Cauſe, *Ibid. Pag.* 538.

N° 8.

Wherefore if God made a general Law, that Bodies ſhould *Attract* each other; it could not be put in Execution, but by perpetual *Miracles*. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 382.

See *above*, N° 6.

N° 9.

The ſame may be ſaid concerning perfect Wiſdom, (which is no leſs regular than Mathematicks;) that if there was not a *Beſt* among all the Worlds that were poſſible to have been made, God would not have made *Any at all*. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 116.

See *above*, N° 4, *and* 3.

N° 10.

* Note. *The Author did not conſider, that twice as much force is requiſite* likewiſe *to* ſtop *the ſame Velocity in a Body of the ſame Kind of Matter, double in Bigneſs.*

N° 10.

Si fingeremus duas sphæras concentricas perfectas, & perfectè tam inter se quàm in partibus suis similares, alteram alteri ita inclusam esse, ut nec minimus sit hiatus; tunc, sive volvi inclusam, sive quiescere ponamus, ne Angelus quidem, ne quid amplius dicam, ullam poterit notare discrimen inter diversi temporis status, aut indicium habere discernendi utrum quiescat an volvatur inclusa sphæra, & quâ motûs lege. Acta Erudit. ad Ann. 1698, pag. 437.

N° 11.

J'y [dans le syſteme de l'Harmonie préétablie] *fais voir, que naturellement* chaque ſubſtance ſimple *a de la* perception, *& que ſon individualité conſiſte dans la loy perpetuelle qui fait la ſuite des perceptions qui lui ſont affectées, & qui naiſſent naturellement les unes des autres, pour* repreſenter *le* corps *qui lui eſt aſſigné, & par ſon moyen* l'Univers entier, *ſuivant* le point de veue *propre à cette ſubſtance ſimple, ſans qu'elle ait beſoin de recevoir aucune* influence phyſique *du* Corps: *Comme le* Corps *auſſi de ſon côté, s'accommode aux volontés de l'ame par* ſes propres loix, *& par conſequent ne lui obéït, qu'autant que* ces loix *le portent.* Theodicée, pag. 479.

Auſſi

N° 10.

If we imagine two perfect Spheres concentrical, and perfectly ſimilar both in the Whole and in every Part, to be incloſed one in the other, ſo as that there ſhall not be the leaſt Interſtice between them; then, whether the incloſed Sphere be ſuppoſed to revolve, or to continue at Reſt; an Angel himſelf (not to ſay more) could diſcover no difference between the State of theſe Globes at different Times, nor find Any Way of diſcerning whether the incloſed Globe continued at Reſt, or turned about; or with what Law of Motion it turned. *Acta Erudit. ad Ann.* 1698. *Pag.* 437.

N° 11.

In my Doctrine of a *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, I ſhow, that *every ſingle Subſtance* is naturally indued with *Perception*; and that its Individuality conſiſts in that perpetual Law, which cauſes its appointed Succeſſion of Perceptions, ariſing naturally in order one from another, ſo as to *repreſent* to it *its own Body*, and, by the ſame Means, the *Whole Univerſe*, according to the *Point of View* proper to that ſingle Subſtance; without its needing to receive any *phyſical Influence* from the *Body*. And the *Body* likewiſe, on *Its* Part, acts correſpondently to the Volitions of the Soul, by its *own proper Laws*; and conſequently does not obey the Soul, any otherwiſe than as thoſe Laws are correſpondent. *Theodicea. Pag.* 479.

It

Auſſi faut-il avouer, que chaque ame ſe re-preſente l' Univers *ſuivant* ſon point de vûe, *& par un rapport qui luy eſt propre ; mais une parfaite harmonie y ſubſiſte toûjours.* Ibid. Pag. 552.

L' *operation des* Automates ſpirituels, *c' eſt à dire des Ames, n' eſt point mecanique ; mais elle contient éminemment ce qu' il y a de beau dans la Mecanique ; les mouvemens, developpés dans les corps, y étant concentrés par la* repreſentation, *comme dans un monde Ideal, qui exprime les loix du monde actuel & leurs ſuites ; avec cette difference du monde ideal parfait qui eſt en Dieu, que la plûpart des perceptions dans les autres ne ſont que confuſes. Car il faut ſavoir que* toute Subſtance ſimple *enveloppe* l' Univers *par ſes perceptions confuſes ou ſentimens, & que la ſuite des ces perceptions eſt reglée par la nature particuliere de cette ſubſtance ; mais d' une maniere qui exprime toûjours* toute la nature univerſelle : *& toute perception preſente, tend à une perception nouvelle, comme tout mouvement qu' elle repreſente, tend à un autre mouvement. Mais il eſt impoſſible que l' ame puiſſe connoître diſtinctement toute ſa nature, & s' appercevoir comment ce nombre innombrable de petites perceptions entaſſées, ou plûtôt concentrées enſemble, s' y forme. Il faudroit pour cela qu' elle connût parfaitement tout l' Univers qui y eſt enveloppé, c' eſt à dire, qu' elle fût un Dieu.* Ibid. pag. 603.

Voiez cy-deſſus, N° 2 & 5.

It muſt alſo be confeſſed, that every Soul *repreſents* to it ſelf *the Univerſe*, according to its *Point of View*, and by a Relation *peculiar* to it: But there is always a perfect *Harmony* between them. *Ibid. Pag.* 552.

The Operation of *Spiritual Machines*, that is, of Souls, is not mechanical; but it contains eminently, whatever is excellent in Mechaniſm; the Motions which appear actually in Bodies, being concentred by *repreſentation* in the Soul, as in an Ideal World, which repreſents the Laws of the Actual World, and the Series of their being put in Execution; differing in This from the Perfect Ideal World which is in God, that moſt of the Perceptions in Human Souls are but confuſed. For we muſt know, that *every ſingle Subſtance* includes *the Univerſe* in its indiſtinct Perceptions; and that the Succeſſion of theſe Perceptions is regulated by the particular Nature of the Subſtance; but yet in a manner which always repreſents *Whole Univerſal Nature*. And every preſent Perception tends towards a new Perception; as every Motion, which ſuch Perception repreſents, tends towards a new Motion. But 'tis impoſſible the Soul ſhould be able to underſtand diſtinctly its own whole Nature, and to apprehend how this numberleſs Number of little Perceptions, heaped up, or rather concentred together, are produced. In order to This, it would be requiſite that the Soul underſtood perfectly the whole Univerſe, which is included within it; that is, it muſt be a God. *Ibid. Pag.* 603.

See *above*, N° 2 *and* 5.

N° 12.

N° 12.

L' enchainement *des causes liées les unes avec les autres, va loin. C' est pourquoi la raison que* M. Descartes *a alleguée, pour prouver l' independance de nos actions libres par un pretendu* sentiment vif interne, *n' a point de force. Nous ne pouvons pas sentir proprement nôtre independance; & nous ne nous appercevons, pas tousjours des causes, souvent imperceptibles, dont nôtre resolution depend. C' est comme si l' éguille aimantée prenoit plaisir de se tourner vers le Nord; car elle croiroit tourner independamment de quelque autre cause, ne s' appercevant pas des mouvemens insensibles de la matiere magnetique.* Theodicée pag. 162.

Voiez cy-dessous, N° 13.

N° 13.

Une infinité *de* grands & de petits mouvemens internes & externes *concourent avec nous, dont le plus souvent l' on ne s' apperçoit pas; & j' ai déja dit, que lors qu' on sort d' une chambre, il y a telles raisons qui nous determinent à mettre un tel pied devant, sans qu' on y reflechisse.* Theodicée pag. 158.

Voiez cy-dessus, N° 12.

N° 12.

The Chain of Cauſes connected one with another, reaches very far. Wherefore the Reaſon alledged by *Des Cartes*, to prove by a pretended *vigorous inward Senſe*, the independence of our Free Actions; is altogether inconcluſive. We cannot, ſtrictly ſpeaking, be *ſenſible of* our not depending on other Cauſes: For we cannot always *perceive* the Cauſes, (they being often *imperceptible*,) on which our Reſolutions depend. 'Tis as if a Needle touched with a Loadſtone, was *ſenſible of*, and *pleaſed with* its turning towards the *North*. For it would believe that it turned it ſelf, independently on any other Cauſe; not perceiving the inſenſible Motions of the Magnetick Matter. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 162.

See *below*, N° 13.

N° 13.

An infinite Number of *Great and Small Motions Internal and External*, concur with us, which generally we are not ſenſible of. And I have already ſaid, that, when a Man walks out of a Room, there are ſuch reaſons which determine him to ſet One Foot forward rather than the other, though he obſerves it not. *Theodicæa*, *Pag.* 158.

See *above*, N° 12.

LET.

LETTERS
TO
Dr. CLARKE
CONCERNING
Liberty and Neceſſity;
FROM A
Gentleman of the Univerſity
of CAMBRIDGE;
WITH
The Doctor's ANSWERS to them.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year, MDCCXVII.

LETTERS

TO

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FROM A

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Printed in the Year, MDCCXVII.

THE First LETTER.

Reverend SIR, *Jan.* 1. $17\frac{16}{17}$.

I Have no other pretenſe to trouble you on this occaſion, but That Right which all Mankind may plead to the Inſtructions of a Great and Good Man. The ſmall ſhare of time I have ſpent in Study, has been employ'd in examining the fundamental Principles of Reaſon and Philoſophy. In this purſuit I muſt have been abſolutely blind, if your Diſcourſe on the *Being and Attributes of God* had eſcap'd me; in which your account of *Liberty and Neceſſity* has ſilenc'd a great many Difficulties, which perplex'd me very much. But I have *One* ſtill remaining on my Mind, which I could wiſh to get rid of; and therefore beg your Aſſiſtance. I ſee plainly, Man is not over-rul'd by any *blind Impulſe*: But, that every *Volition* is *not neceſſary*, this I cannot ſee. 'Tis allow'd, that the *Will* is no other but the *laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding*. It will likewiſe, I ſuppoſe, be granted, that the *Laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding* aſſenting to or diſſenting from any *Speculative* Propoſition, is *neceſſary*. My enquiry then is, Why the laſt Judgement of the Underſtanding aſſenting to or diſſenting from any *Practical* propoſition (by which the Man is determin'd to act,) ſhould not be equally *neceſſary*: And alſo, whether *ſuch a Neceſſity* be not, in all its *Conſequences* and Effects, (tho' not

in its *foundation*,) the very ſame which the Fataliſts maintain. To give an Inſtance: A Man Judges it better to conſult his preſent Eaſe, than to wait for the greateſt Happineſs in Reverſion. Does he not then *Act* by the ſame *Neceſſity*, by which Another Man *Judges* the Contrary to be more Eligible? or, to ſpeak more properly, by the ſame *Neceſſity* by which a Mathematician *Judges* that a Triangle is one half of a Square on the ſame Baſe and between the ſame Parallels? To purſue this Matter a little farther: *God* is abſolutely perfect; He *Judges* then, in every Inſtance, That to be beſt, (*i. e. Wills* That,) which in Nature and Reality *is* beſt; He is therefore *neceſſarily* Good and Juſt. Every *Man* is Imperfect; He *judges* then in many Inſtances That to be beſt, (i.e. *Wills* That,) which in Nature and Reality *is not* beſt: Every *Man* therefore is *by neceſſity* imperfectly Good and Juſt; and That, according to their ſeveral Degrees of Imperfection. How is any Creature then accountable for the Want of that Perfection which God never gave it, neither was it in its Power to give itſelf? Thus, Sir, I have open'd my Opinion, as clearly and fully as I could; which will, I hope, ſave you ſome Trouble. And now, when I look back, I cannot but ſuſpect that I am got into a very odd train of Thoughts: And yet, when I take a ſurvey of my Ideas on all ſides, I am at a Loſs *how* or *where* the Deluſion could creep in. If you condeſcend to anſwer my Letter, I ſhall receive it with the Reverence and Eſteem due to ſo great a Character, and for ever think my ſelf

Your Moſt Obliged
Humble Servant, &c.

THE

THE

Anſwer to the Firſt LETTER.

Jan. 3d, 171$\frac{6}{7}$

SIR,

YOU have put the Argument againſt *Liberty*, more ſhort and ſtrong than I have uſually ſeen it. The True Anſwer to it, I think, is This. So far as any thing is *Paſſive*, ſo far 'tis ſubject to *Neceſſity*; ſo far as 'tis an *Agent*, ſo far 'tis *Free*: For *Action* and *Freedom* are, I think, perfectly *Identical Ideas*. To explain this, in the Inſtance you alledge. *Truth* and *Good* are to the *Underſtanding*, what a *Luminous Object* is to the *Eye*. The *Eye*, when *open*, ſees the Object *neceſſarily*, becauſe 'tis *paſſive* in ſo doing. The *Underſtanding* likewiſe, when *open*, perceives the *Truth* of a *ſpeculative Propoſition*, or the *Reaſonableneſs* of a *Practical* Propoſition, *neceſſarily*; becauſe the *Underſtanding* alſo is *paſſive* in ſo doing. Only, as a Man by the *Action* of ſhutting his Eyes, may avoid *ſeeing*; ſo by the *Action* of withdrawing his Attention, he may avoid *underſtanding*. But allowing the *laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding* to be always *neceſſary*, as indeed I think it is; yet *What* follows from thence? *Judging*, is one thing; and *Acting*, is another. They depend upon *Principles* totally different from each other, and which have no more connexion than *Activeneſs and Paſſiveneſs*. Neither *God* nor *Man* can avoid *ſeeing* That to be *True*, which they ſee *is True*; or *judging* That to be *Fit and Reaſonable*, which

they ſee *it's Fit and Reaſonable.* But in All this, there is *no Action*; any more than Gods being *Omnipreſent*, (which depends *not* on his *Will*,) can be ſaid to be a Divine *Act.* The *phyſical Power of Acting*, (which, both in *God and Man*, is the *Eſſence* of *Liberty*,) continues exactly the ſame *after* the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, as *before.* For example: It appears from ſeveral *Promiſes* (ſuppoſe,) that 'tis at this Inſtant *the laſt Judgment of the Divine Underſtanding*, that 'tis *not reaſonable* the world ſhould be deſtroyed This day. Does it follow from thence, that God's *phyſical Power* of deſtroying it, is not exactly the ſame *This day*, as it will be at *any time hereafter?* And is it not evident, that the *neceſſity* by which God is *Omnipreſent* or *Omniſcient*, and the *neceſſity* by which he *keeps his Promiſe*, are things that have *no ſimilitude* but in *Name*; the one being *natural* and *literal*, the other *merely figurative* and *moral?* The Summ is: There is no Connexion between *Approbation* and *Action*; between what is *Paſſive*, and what is *Active.* The Spring of *Action*, is not the *Underſtanding*: For a Being incapable of *Action*, might nevertheleſs be capable of *Perception*: But the Spring of *Action*, is *The Self-Motive Power*, which is (in *All* Animals) *Spontaneity*, and (in *rational* ones) what we call *Liberty.* All Errour in this Matter, has (I think) ariſen from Mens uſing the word, *Will*, in a *confuſed* Senſe, to expreſs (indiſtinctly) partly what is *Paſſive*, and partly what is *Active.*

I am, Sir, &c.

THE

THE Second LETTER.

Jan. 6th, $17\frac{16}{17}$.

Reverend SIR,

I Shall detain you no longer, than to acknowledge your great Favour, and proceed to offer my Reaſons, why I cannot apprehend how your Argument ſatisfies the Difficulty. But firſt it will be of uſe, to ſettle my Notion of *Neceſſity*. Thus therefore: When in any given Circumſtance it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe any Being, Mode, or Action, to have been otherwiſe than it actually is; That Being, Mode, or Action, is in That Inſtance *neceſſary*, abſolutely and properly ſpeaking. To apply this to the Queſtion before us, *viz.* Whether Human Actions are ſtrictly and properly *neceſſary*. The *laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding*, is granted *neceſſary* in every Inſtance of *Volition*; Every Action therefore, or Self-Motion, (be its Cauſe or Principle what it will,) is, I think, alſo *neceſſary*. For it either *neceſſarily follows* a Man's laſt *Judgment* or *Volition*, or it does not: If it *does*, it is then ſtrictly and properly *neceſſary*: If it be ſaid that it *does not* neceſſarily follow,

is not That a Contradiction in the very Terms? Is it not to ſuppoſe the very ſame Creature *Self-moving* and *not Self moving* at the very ſame time? So that if the Idea of *Freedom* be the Idea of *Self-Motive Power*, it is ſo far from being oppos'd to *Neceſſity*, that it *may be*, and I think, it *is* it ſelf *neceſſary*. Thus then *Neceſſity* is conſiſtent with perfect *Freedom*, (*i. e.* with *Self-motive Power*;) And the Divine Being himſelf is in all his Actions *neceſſary*, in the Natural and Literal Senſe of the Word. For it is as direct a Contradiction in Nature, to ſuppoſe *All-Wiſdom* (if I may uſe that Term,) acting unjuſtly or cruelly (that is, unwiſely;) as to ſuppoſe Omnipreſence confin'd: Since the *Moral* Attributes of God are as truly and properly *Natural*, as thoſe which are diſtinguiſh'd by that Name; and are therefore equally *neceſſary*. But this is a very high Perfection in the Creator; It cannot therefore be an Imperfection in the Creature. Nothing can be more clear. But then will it not unavoidably follow, that no Creature can be accountable for his Actions? Every Action or Self-Motion neceſſarily follows the laſt Determination of the Underſtanding: Where then can the Blame lye, but at the Underſtanding? What is Sin, but Folly? And how can any Man be accountable for it, any more than for not being Wiſer than God made him? Nothing remains, but to obſerve that I always uſe the Word *Neceſſity* in this Argument, to ſignify, not an *external Neceſſity* or *blind Impulſe*, but a *Neceſſity Internal*, which reſults from the very Being and Conſtitution of rational Nature; which latter will, I think, as naturally infer the Conſe-

Conſequence I have deduc'd, as the former: And to conclude my ſelf

Your moſt Obliged

Humble Servant.

THE

Anſwer to the Second LETTER.

Jan. 8th, 171⅚.

SIR,

YOUR Argument is urged with much Ingenuity. But it plainly appears to Me, that there is an Errour which lies under the Word *Volition*. Under that Term, you include both the *final Perception of the Underſtanding*, which is *Paſſive*; and alſo the *firſt Operation* or *Exertion of the Active Faculty* or *Self-motive Power*. Theſe two, you ſuppoſe to be *neceſſarily connected*. I think there is *no connexion* at all between them: And that in their not being connected, lies the Difference between *Action* and *Paſſion*: Which *Difference*, is the *Eſſence of Liberty*. If the two Things now-mentioned, were (as you ſuppoſe) connected by a *true phyſical Neceſſity*, there would remain *no difference* between *Action* and *Paſſion*, but this only, that *What* we now call an *Agent*, would erroneouſly imagine it ſelf to be an *Agent*, when in reality it was *merely paſſive*. Nay, indeed, there would be

be no ſuch Thing as an *Agent* or *Action* in the Univerſe. Neither *Man*, nor *Angel*, nor even *God himſelf*, would *act* in any other ſenſe, than a *Balance* determined on one ſide by an overplus of Weight; ſuppoſing it indued with *Perception* or *Underſtanding*. Now the Conſequence of This is, that there would be in the Univerſe, *All Patient* and *No Agent*, All *Effect* and No *Cauſe*: Which is a manifeſt and moſt expreſs Contradiction.

Again: You plainly confound *Moral Contradiction* and *Moral Neceſſity*, with *natural Contradiction* and *natural Neceſſity*. 'Tis indeed a *contradiction in Terms*, *Morally* ſpeaking, that a *Wiſe Man* ſhould do a *fooliſh Thing*, or an *honeſt* Man a *diſhoneſt* Thing: But 'tis no Contradiction in *Phyſicks*. And in *God himſelf*, were his *doing Acts of Goodneſs and Mercy* as *phyſically neceſſary* as his *being Omnipreſent*; 'twould be as abſurd to *Thank* him for *Doing Good*, as for *Being Omnipreſent*. Wherefore, were the *moral Perfections* of God *Neceſſary* (in the *ſame phyſical* Senſe, as the *Natural* Attributes are, which have *No Dependence on his Will* or *Power of Acting*;) they would not be *moral Perfections* at all.

I am,

SIR,

Yours, &c.

THE

THE Third LETTER.

Jan. 10th. $17\frac{16}{17}$.

Reverend SIR,

YOU have now brought the Debate into a very narrow Compaſs. The only Difficulty I find remaining, is, to *disjoyn* in my Mind the *laſt Judgment or Perception of the Underſtanding*, and the *firſt Exertion of the Self-motive Power*. For let us ſuppoſe them *disjoyn'd*, and conſider the Conſequence. Will it not follow, that *unintelligent Subſtance* may be capable of *Self-Motion*, and *mere Matter* be as abſolutely *Free* as *Infinite Wiſdom* itſelf? Nay, if in any Inſtance, Action or Self-Motion does not follow the laſt Perception or Judgment of the Underſtanding, the Agent muſt in That Inſtance be over-rul'd by a *blind Impulſe*: There is no Medium. To conſider this Matter more diſtinctly in the great Author of all Perfection: If his Actions do not neceſſarily follow the final Perception of his Underſtanding, how can it be *proved* that he *is* infinitely Juſt and Good?

'Tis no *Impoſſibility*, on this Hypotheſis, but he may *Act* in the *worſt* conceivable Manner, at the very ſame time when he *Judges* and *Wills* the *beſt*: For 'tis ſuppos'd that there is no Connection between Judgment and Self-motion, between Volition and Action. I do not underſtand your Diſtinction between *Phyſical* and *Moral* Neceſſity, becauſe indeed I have no Idea at all of the *Latter*. If it means the ſame which I expreſs'd by the Term *Neceſſity Internal*; it has, I think, as clear and diſtinct a Foundation in Nature, as any *Phyſical* Neceſſity whatſoever. Which I deſire you particularly to obſerve, becauſe I had reaſon to ſuſpect from your laſt Favour, that my Meaning was not ſufficiently clear on that Head.

I am SIR,

Your moſt Obliged

Humble Servant.

THE

Anſwer to the Third LETTER.

Jan. 12th, 171⅝.

SIR,

I Think your remaining Difficulty may be removed by the following Similitude. The Perception or laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding,

ing, is as diſtinct from the actual Exertion of the Self-motive Power; as *ſeeing* the Way, is, from *Walking* in it. Nor will it follow, becauſe the Perception of the Underſtanding is denied to be the immediate efficient neceſſary Cauſe of the Exertion of the Self-motive Power, that therefore *unintelligent Matter* may be capable of Self-Motion; any more than it will follow, if a Man's *Eyes* be denied to be the immediate efficient neceſſary Cauſe of his Walking, that therefore the Man may be capable of walking, though he has neither Legs nor Life. A Man's *Underſtanding* judges of what he is to do, as his *Eyes* diſcern the Way: But a Blind or winking Man has Power to walk without ſeeing; and every living Agent has a phyſical Power to act, whether he makes any Uſe of his Judgment and Underſtanding or no. *Unintelligent Matter* can be no Agent, becauſe *Action* ſuppoſes (in the very Notion of it) Life and Conſciouſneſs; But *That Conſciouſneſs* which makes *Action* to be *Action*, is entirely a diſtinct Thing from That *Perception* or *Judgment*, by which a Man determines beforehand concerning the *Reaſonableneſs* or Fitneſs of what he is about to act. An *Agent over-ruled by a blind Impulſe*, is a Contradiction in Terms; for then he is not at all an Agent, but a mere Patient. But an Agent acting not according to the laſt Judgment of his Underſtanding, (meaning always by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, the *laſt paſſive Perception*, and not the *firſt active Volition* of the Agent; which two Things muſt by no Means be confounded;) ſuch an Agent, I ſay, is like a Man ſhutting his Eyes, and walking at a Venture down a Precipice.

God

God always *Diſcerns* and *Approves* what is Juſt and Good, *neceſſarily*, and cannot do otherwiſe: But he always *acts* or *does* what is Juſt and Good, *freely*; that is, having at the ſame time a full *natural* or *phyſical Power* of acting differently. Otherwiſe, *Juſtice* (for Example) *in God*, would be nothing different from *Juſtice* in a *Sword*, when it *executes a juſt Sentence*; ſuppoſing the *Sword* to *perceive* what 'tis doing, and yet *cannot help* doing it. The Conſequence whereof is, that there could not poſſibly be in God *Any Moral Perfection* at all. For every Thing that is of a *Moral* Nature, implies in the very *Notion* or *Eſſence* of it, the Doing of ſomething, which at the ſame time was in the Agents Power not to have done. *Moral Neceſſity* therefore, is diſtinguiſhed from *Phyſical Neceſſity*, juſt as all other *Figures of Speech* are from *literal Expreſſions*: That is, 'tis in Truth, and philoſophically ſpeaking, *no Neceſſity* at all: And yet every one eaſily ſees, that the Juſtice and Goodneſs of an infinitely perfect *Free* Agent, may as *firmly and reaſonably be relied on*, as the Neceſſary Effect of any neceſſary Agent is known to be phyſically unavoidable.

I am SIR, *&c.*

THE

THE Laſt LETTER.

Jan. 24. 17^{16}_{17}.

SIR,

I HAVE now to my great Satisfaction a clearer Inſight, than I ever expected, into ſo Intricate a Queſtion as we have been upon. The Conſideration, that the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding can have no Influence on Self-Motion, becauſe there is no reſemblance between an Action and a Perception of the Mind, and that therefore there muſt be ſome diſtinct Principle of Self-Motion entirely Independent on the perceptive Faculty, weighs very much with me; and I think it is very probable (as you obſerve,) that our want of clearly diſtinguiſhing between the *Perceptive* and the *Active* Faculty, is the chief Origine of all Perplexity in this Queſtion. I ſhall trouble you no farther on this Occaſion, but leave the Reſt to Time, and repeated Reflection. But it were perfect Stupidity, or worſe Ingratitude, not to acknowledge your Candour and even Friendſhip to an entire Stranger, who appear'd to be engag'd in the purſuit of Truth. I know not how to expreſs my Sentiments

ments of it with Truth and Sincerity, unleſs in a Manner which will certainly be diſagreeable to you: But I ſhould have no Senſe of any thing that is Serious and Rational, if I knew not how to eſteem it.

I am, SIR, &c.

Remarks

REMARKS

UPON A

BOOK,

ENTITULED,

A Philoſophical Enquiry

Concerning

Human Liberty.

535. d. 20
2

By SAMUEL CLARKE, *D.D. Rector of St.* James's Weſtminſter.

LONDON:

Printed, for *JAMES KNAPTON*, at the *Crown* in St. *Paul's* Church-Yard, 1717.

REMARKS

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A Philosophical Enquiry

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Human Liberty.

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D. Rector of St. James's Westminster.

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REMARKS upon a Book, entituled, A Philoſophical Inquiry concerning Humane Liberty.

SINCE the greater part of the fore-going Papers were printed off, there has been publiſhed a Book entituled, *A Philoſophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty:* In which the Author propoſes *Six* diſtinct Arguments, to prove that there neither *is*, nor *can be*, any *Liberty* in Human Actions. The Arguments he offers, have (I think) been already in great meaſure obviated in the fore-going Papers. Yet becauſe ſome of them ſeem to be placed in ſuch a Light, as may poſſibly deceive unwary Perſons, whoſe Thoughts have not been much converſant upon ſo nice a Subject; I thought it not improper, upon this Occaſion, to ſet down ſuch Brief *Remarks*, as might be ſufficient to lay open to an intelligent Reader the Fallacy of the whole Book.

In the *First* place, I obſerve; the Author lays great ſtreſs upon the neceſſity of Mens forming to themſelves *clear Ideas*, and expreſſing thoſe Ideas in *clear Words*.

* *Pag.* 2. "*There is No Queſtion* (ſays * he) *in the* "*whole compaſs of Speculation, of which* "*Men have written more* obſcurely, *and of* "*which it is thought more impoſſible to diſ-* "*courſe* clearly, *and concerning which Men* "*more expect and pardon* obſcure *Diſcourſe,* "*than upon the Subjects of Liberty and Ne-* "*ceſſity: But this common Obſervation,* (ſays "he,) *is both a common and a learned* Er- "rour. *For, whoever employs his Thoughts* "*about — any Subject, ought to have ſome* "Ideas *to be the Object of his Thoughts:—* "*For where* Ideas *fail us in any matter, our* "Thoughts *muſt alſo fail us: And 'tis* "*plain, whenever we have* Ideas, *we are a-* "*ble to communicate them to Others by* "*Words.—When any Writer ſpeaks obſcure-*

Pag. 8. "*ly,——why did he write before he had a* "*Meaning, or before he was able to expreſs* "*to Others what he meant? Is it not un-* "*pardonable, for a Man to* cant, *who pre-* "*tends to* Teach"? All This, is very well ſaid. Let us now ſee, how the Author Himſelf has obſerved his own Rules.

The Queſtion he undertakes to determine,

* *Pag.* 11; and *running Title.* is * Thus ſtated by him; *Whether Man be a* Free, *or* Neceſſary *Agent*. And he is confident

fident, that Men *are* † *Neceſſary Agents*; that *All* allow Mad Men, and Children, and Beaſts, to be * *neceſſary Agents*; that ſome *Actions*, are plainly ** *Actions that are Neceſſary*; that there can be no diſpute, but Perception is a † *Neceſſary Action* of Man; and that Cauſes act on * *Neceſſary Agents*, to whom they are neceſſary Cauſes of *Action*. Now here I deſire to know, *what Idea* the word *Agent* or *Action* carries along with it, when joined with *Neceſſary*. Vulgarly indeed, in looſe, figurative, and improper Speech, we call *Clocks* and *Watches*, *Neceſſary Agents*. But in truth and ſtrictneſs of ſpeaking, (which ought always to be carefully preſerved in Philoſophical Debates,) a *Neceſſary Agent* or *Neceſſary Action* is a *Contradiction in Terms*. For whatever *acts Neceſſarily*, does not indeed *act at all*, but is only *acted upon*; is not at all an *Agent*, but a mere *Patient*; does not *move*, but *is moved* only. *Clocks* and *Watches*, are in no Senſe *Agents*; neither is their *Motion*, in any Senſe, an *Action*. Nor is it merely, " for " want of *Senſation* and *Intelligence*, that " Clocks and Watches are ſubject to an ab- " ſolute, Phyſical, and Mechanical Neceſ- " ſity". For the *Pulſation of the Heart*, though joined with *Senſation*, is yet as *neceſſary* a Motion, as that of a *Clock*; and the One is nomore an *Action* of the *Man*, than the other is of the *Clock*. Nor would a *Balance* indued with *Senſation* and *Intelli-*

† Pag 31.
* Pag. 53, 56, 92.
** Pag. 30.
† Pag. 32.
* Pag. 99.
Pref. p. 3.

gence, be any more an *Agent* when it *felt* itſelf moved by the Weights, than it is Now an *Agent without Perception*. A *neceſſary Agent* therefore, I ſay, whether *with* or *without Senſation*, is *No Agent* at all: But the *Terms* are *contradictory* to each other. To be an *Agent*, ſignifies, to have a *Power of beginning Motion*: And *Motion* cannot begin *neceſſarily*; becauſe *Neceſſity of Motion*, ſuppoſes an Efficiency Superiour to, and irreſiſtible by, the thing moved; and conſequently the *Beginning of the Motion* cannot be in that which is moved neceſſarily, but in the ſuperiour Cauſe, or in the Efficiency of ſome Other Cauſe ſtill ſuperiour to That, till at length we arrive at ſome *Free Agent*. Which *Free Agent*, may either (which is the caſe of *Men*,) have *received* the *Power of beginning Motion*, from the *Will* of a Superiour Free Agent: Or (which is the caſe of God Almighty,) he may be Himſelf *neceſſarily exiſtent*, *neceſſarily all-knowing*, *neceſſarily all-powerful*; becauſe *Exiſtence*, *Knowledge*, *Power*, and the like, are not *Actions*; But he cannot be a *neceſſary Agent*, without an expreſs contradiction in the very Terms. All *Power of Acting*, eſſentially implies at the ſame time a *Power of not acting*: Otherwiſe 'tis not *Acting*, but barely a *being acted upon* by That Power (whatever it be) which Cauſes the Action. When therefore this Author talks ſo much of *Neceſſary Agents* and *Neceſſary*

Actions

Actions; may not his own Queſtion be very reaſonably put to him, "*Why did he write* Pag. 8.
"*before he had a Meaning, or before he was*
"*able to expreſs to Others what he meant?*
"*Is it not unpardonable for a Man to Cant,*
"*who pretends to Teach*"? Or if (as ſeems moſt probable,) his real Meaning is, that Man is not *an Agent* at all; his Queſtion ſtill returns, *Why did he write, before he was* Willing *to expreſs to Others what he meant?*

Again: Does the Author really think that he expreſſes *clear Ideas* in *clear Words*, when he conſtantly confounds *Perception* (wherein the Mind is entirely *paſſive*,) with *Action* itſelf? And by the word, *Will*, without Any Diſtinction, means ſometimes the *Laſt Perception of the Underſtanding*, which is entirely *paſſive*; and ſometimes the *Firſt exertion of the Self-moving Faculty*, which again is *Action?* Thus he tells us, (*Page* 31,) "*There can be no Diſpute, but*
"Perception of Ideas *is a neceſſary* Action
"*of Man:*" And yet, without all diſpute, *Perception of Ideas* is *No Action* at all. *Page* 33, "*A Second* Action *of Man, is judging of*
"*Propoſitions:*" As if ſeeing a thing to be true or falſe, was an *Action*, or had any thing to do with the *Will*. *Page* 65, The *Phyſical power* of *doing*, what a wiſe Man will certainly chuſe *not to do*; or of *forbearing to do*, what yet a wiſe Man will not fail to *do*; is compared with being "*Able*
"*to refuſe our* Aſſent *to what is evidently*

" *True to us:*" Which (as before,) is not an *Action*, but a *Perception*. *Page* 78, 79, 81 *and* 82, By the ſame abſurd *Confounding* of what is *Active* with what is *Paſſive*, it is alleged, that, if Man was indued with *Liberty of Action*, he would not be " *neceſſa-* " *rily determined to* Aſſent *to Truth only*;" he would not " *be neceſſarily determined in his* " Aſſent, *by what ſeems a reaſon to him*;" he would " *be indifferent to* Propoſitions, *not-* " *withſtanding any reaſon for them*;" he might " *reject what appears True to him, and aſſent* " *to what ſeems abſurd to him*;" he would have an " *Indifference to receive Truth*;" he would be " *capable of Judging contrary* " *to his Reaſon*;" and would " *not be ne-* " *ceſſarily determined by the greateſt Evi-* " *dence, to* aſſent *to Truth.*" From *page* 36 *to* 57, the words *Willing* and *Preferring*, are continually made uſe of in the moſt confuſed manner, to denote equally, and without Any Diſtinction, both the *Laſt Perception* or *Judgment of the Underſtanding* which is entirely *Paſſive*, and alſo the *Firſt Exertion of the Self-moving Power* which is eſſentially *Active*. Theſe *Two* Things, I ſay, the Author conſtantly confounds together, as *One Individual*, by the ambiguous uſe of the words *Willing* and *Preferring*. Arguing, that becauſe *Willing* and *Preferring*, ſo far as thoſe Words ſignify the *laſt Perception* or *Approbation of the Underſtanding*, are *Paſſive* and *Neceſſary*; therefore *Willing*

ing and *Preferring*, when the ſame Words imply the *firſt Exertion of the Self-moving Power*, which is *eſſentially Active*, are *neceſſary* alſo: And becauſe, when *Will* ſignifies the *actual exertion of the Self-moving Power*, a Man then indeed muſt *neceſſarily do* that which he *Wills*, (becauſe it is not poſſible that a Man ſhould *not do* a thing, when he is *ſuppoſed to do* it;) therefore, when the ſame word [*Will*] ſignifies nothing more than the *laſt Approbation of the Underſtanding*, it ſhall ſtill be true that a Man muſt *Neceſſarily do* (uſing the word *Neceſſarily* in the Phyſical and proper Senſe) what his *Underſtanding approves*. Than which Conſequence, nothing can be more weak. For though the *Self-moving Power*, (which, if it is not *Free*, is a contradiction in Terms,) is an adequate Cauſe of Action; yet *Underſtanding* or *Judgment* or *Aſſent* or *Approbation* or *Liking*, or whatever Name you pleaſe to call it by, can no more poſſibly be the efficient *Cauſe* of *Action*, than *Reſt* can be the *Cauſe* of *Motion*. Nothing can poſſibly be the *Cauſe* of an *Effect* more *conſiderable* than *itſelf*. Nothing that is *paſſive*, can poſſibly be the *Cauſe* of any thing that is *Active*. An *occaſion* indeed, it *may* be; and *Action* may be *conſequent* (tho' without any *Phyſical* connexion,) upon *Perception* or *Judgment*; nay, it may eaſily (if you pleaſe) be ſuppoſed to be *ALWAYS conſequent* upon it, and yet that at the ſame time there be no manner of *Phyſical*

ſical or *neceſſary connexion* between them. For inſtance: God's *performing* his *Promiſe*, is *ALWAYS* conſequent upon his *making* it: Yet there is *no connexion* between them, as between *Cauſe* and *Effect*: For, not the *Promiſe* of God, but his *Active Power* is the alone *Phyſical* or efficient *Cauſe* of the *Performance*.

pag. 9. "*When Authors, who in other reſpects are e-*
"*qual, treat of any Subjects further than they*
"*have clear and diſtinct Ideas; they do and*
"*cannot but write to as little purpoſe, and*
"*take as abſurd pains, as the moſt ignorant*
"*Authors do.*"

Again: What is become of *clear and di-*
pag. 11. *ſtinct Ideas*, when we are told of "*Actions*
"being *determined by the CAUSES preced-*
"*ing each Action?*" of Man's being "*Ever un-*
"*avoidably determined in every point of time*
"*by the Circumſtances he is in, and the*
"*CAUSES he is under, to do that one thing*
"*he does, and not poſſibly to do any other*"? of
pag. 32. "*This firſt neceſſary Action*", [viz. *Perception*, which is *No Action* at all,] being "*the*
"*Foundation and CAUSE of all the other*
pag. 87. "*intelligent Actions of Man*"? and, of "*Plea-*
"*ſure and Pain being CAUSES to determine*
"*Mens Wills.*" For, *what Idea* can any Man frame, how *Pleaſure* or *Pain*, which are mere *paſſive Perceptions*; or how *Reaſons*, *Motives* and *Arguments*, which are mere *abſtract Notions*, can be the *phyſical*, *neceſſary*, and *efficient Cauſe* of *Action?* May not an *abſtract Notion* as well *ſtrike a Ball*, as be the *efficient*

Cauſe

Cauſe of *Motion in a Man's Body? Occaſions* indeed they may be, and are, upon which That Subſtance in Man, wherein the *Self-moving Principle* reſides, *freely exerts its Active Power.* But 'tis the *Self-moving Principle*, and not at all the *Reaſon* or *Motive*, which is the *phyſical* or *efficient CAUSE* of *Action.* When we ſay, in *vulgar* Speech, that *Motives* or *Reaſons DETERMINE* a Man; 'tis nothing but a mere *Figure* or *Metaphor.* 'Tis the *Man*, that freely *determines himſelf* to act. *Reaſons*, or *Perceptions of the Underſtanding*, can no more (properly and ſtrictly ſpeaking) *determine* an Action, than an *abſtract Notion* can be a *Subſtance* or *Agent*, can ſtrike or *move a piece of Matter.* Unleſs All that this Gentleman advances about *Reaſons* and *Motives* and *Perceptions of the Underſtanding*, be mere * *Cant*; and his true meaning be, that Man is indeed *No Agent* at all, but is moved *neceſſarily* and *mechanically* by mere *Impulſes of ſubtle Matter.* And then the Queſtion will ſtill for ever return upon him, about the *Original Cauſe* of *Motion*; Which muſt either finally be reſolved into a *Firſt Mover*, in whom conſequently there is *Liberty* of Action; or elſe into an *infinite and eternal Chain of Effects without Any Cauſe at all:* Which is an expreſs contradiction, except *Motion* could be *neceſſarily-exiſtent in its own Nature*; Which that it is not, is evident, becauſe the Idea of *Reſt* is no contradiction; and alſo be-

* pag. 8.

cauſe

cauſe there being no *Motion* without a *particular Determination one certain way*, and no *one* Determination being in nature more neceſſary than *another*, an eſſential and neceſſary *Tendency to Motion in all Determinations equally*, could never have produced any Motion at all.

Laſtly: By *what clear* and *diſtinct Ideas* can any Man perceive, that an *Indifferency* as to *Power*, (that is, an *equal Phyſical Power* either of *acting* or of *forbearing to act*;) and an *Indifferency* as to *Inclination*, (that is, an *equal Approbation* or *Liking* of *one Thing* or of *the contrary*;) is *One and the ſame Thing?* And yet theſe Two, are conſtantly *confounded* through the whole Book: The Author always ſuppoſing, that if a Man is not determined as *neceſſarily and irreſiſtibly*, as a *Weight* determines the Motion of a *Balance*; then he can *in no Degree* be influenced by, nor can have *any Regard* to, any *Motives* or *Reaſons of Action* whatſoever, but muſt be *totally indifferent* to All Actions alike. Thus *page* 66, an "*Indifferency to good and evil*" is put as equivalent to a *Phyſical Poſſibility of doing what appears leaſt eligible*; And a *Phyſical Poſſibility of doing what appears leaſt eligible*, is repreſented as a *Neceſſity of doing what appears leaſt eligible*; like "*Infants that cannot walk, left to go alone, with Liberty to fall*". *Page* 72, 73, Liberty is repreſented as an "*arbitrary Faculty, to*

"*chuſe*

" *chuſe without Regard to the Qualities of* " *Objects*; *indifferent to all Objects, and* " *ſwayed by no Motives in the Choice of* " *Objects*". *Page* 79, 80, " Indifferent *to* " *any Objects, notwithſtanding they ſeemed* " *good:* —— Indifference *to Pleaſure and* " *Pain, that is,* Liberty *to refuſe the firſt,* " *and chuſe the laſt*". *Page* 87, 88, 'Tis argued, that " *were Pain, as ſuch, eligible,*" [that is, *POSSIBLE to be choſen*, ſo the Word muſt be underſtood in this Place;] " *and Pleaſure, as ſuch, avoidable*; *Rewards* " *and Puniſhments could be NO MOTIVES* " *to a Man*". That unleſs " *Pleaſure and* " *Pain have a NECESSARY Effect on Men,* " *and it be IMPOSSIBLE for Men not*, &c. " *of what USE would be the Proſpect of* " *Rewards— or Puniſhments*"? And, " *if* "—*all Men COULD prefer or will Puniſh-* " *ment conſidered as Pain, and reject Re-* " *wards conſidered as Pleaſure, Men would* " *be under NO RESRAINT*". *Page* 89, 90, It is ſuppoſed to follow, if Man be not a *Neceſſary Agent*, that then he is not *at all* " *affected with Pleaſure and Pain*", but is " *indifferent to Pleaſure and Pain*", and " *equally indifferent to Morality and Immo-* " *rality*". The ſame abſurd Suppoſition, is repeated again, *page* 96. And *page* 99, 'tis alleged, that " *to repreſent Reaſons to* " *Men,— would be of no Uſe, if Men had* " *Free-Wills, or their Wills were not moved* " *by them*". As if nothing could poſſi-

bly

bly be of *any* Weight, or of *any* Uſe with Men, that did not *Neceſſitate* them: And if a Perſon be not determined *irreſiſtibly*, then he muſt be *totally indifferent* to *All Actions* alike, and can have *no Regard* to *Motives* or *Reaſons of Action* at all. Of which *Conſequence*, no Man can have a *clear* Idea; 'till it has firſt been *proved*, that *Self-Moving* or *Active Power*, is inconſiſtent with having *any Regard* to *Reaſons of Acting*.

In the *Next* Place, I obſerve, that the Author endeavours to impoſe upon his Reader a Falſe *Definition* of *Liberty*. "*I con-*
*Pref. p.2. "*tend*, ſays * he, *for Liberty, as it ſignifies* "*a Power in Man, to do as he wills or* "*pleaſes*". And this, he elſewhere ſtiles
†pag. 113. a † *Valuable Liberty*. Now in this Definition, beſides the ** foremention'd Ambiguity of the Words, *wills or pleaſes*; it ought carefully to be remarked, that the word, *Do*, has no Signification. For his Meaning is not, that the Man *acts* or *does* any Thing: But the *Liberty*, or *Power in Man*, to *do as he wills or pleaſes*, is, with *Him*, exactly and only the ſame, as the *Liberty* or *Power in a Balance* would be, *to move as it wills or pleaſes*, ſuppoſing the Balance indued with ſuch a *Senſation* or *Intelligence*, as enabled it to *perceive* which way the *Weights* turned it, and to *approve* the Motion, ſo as to fancy that it *moved itſelf*, when indeed it

*** See above, pag. 8 and 9.*

was

was only *moved by the Weights.* That this is his real Meaning, appears plainly from hence; that he makes the Difference between a *Man* and a *Clock*, to conſiſt only in †† *Senſation and Intelligence*, not in any *Power of acting.* Whereas indeed the whole Eſſence of *Liberty*, conſiſts in the *Power of acting.* *Action* and *Liberty*, are *identical* Ideas: And the *True DEFINITION* of a *Free-Being*, is, One that is indued with a Power of *acting* as well as of *being acted upon.* †† *Pref.* pag. 3.

This Miſtake in the Notion of *Phyſical Liberty* and *Neceſſity*, led him alſo into the like Miſtake in his Notion of *Moral Neceſſity.* *Moral Neceſſity*, in true and Philoſophical Strictneſs, is not indeed any *Neceſſity* at all; but 'tis merely a *figurative Manner of Speaking*, which, like all Other *figurative* Expreſſions, has nothing at all of *Phyſical Reality* in it. When a Man ſays, he *cannot POSSIBLY be deceived* in relying on the Word of a Perſon of known Veracity; the Meaning is not, that That Other Perſon has *no Power* to deceive him, or that (with Regard to the *Phyſical Action*) it is not as *eaſie* for That Perſon to depart from his Promiſe, as to keep it; but that the Man has great Reaſon to *depend* on ſuch a Perſon's Character, that he ſhall not be deceived by him. But now this Author makes * *Moral Neceſſity* and *Phyſical Neceſſity* to be exactly and Philoſophically the ſame Thing: Only * *Pref.* pag. 3.

with

with this Distinction, that *Physical Necessity* in an *Unintelligent* Subject, is *Physical Necessity*; but that the same *Physical Necessity*, in an *Intelligent* Subject, is only *Moral Necessity*. When a *Stone falls*, or a *Clock* or *Watch moves*, it moves by a *Physical Necessity*: But when a *Man* falls; or when he is determined to do *Any Action*, which he is exactly under the same *Physical Necessity* of doing, (only with this Circumstance, that his Understanding *approves* or *is pleased with it*,) as he is of *falling* when he is thrown down a Precipice; this (it seems) is *Moral Necessity* only. In which Matter, the Author is guilty of a double Absurdity. *First*, in supposing *Reasons* or *Motives* (unless those Terms be mere * *Cant*,) to make the same *necessary Impulse* upon *Intelligent* Subjects, as *Matter in Motion* does upon *unintelligent Subjects*; which is supposing *Abstract Notions* to be *Substances*. And *Secondly*, in endeavouring to impose it upon his Reader as a thing taken for *granted*, that *Moral Necessity* and *Physical Necessity* do not differ intrinsically in their *own Nature*, but only with Regard to the † *Subject* they are applied to: When on the contrary he well knows, that, by *Moral Necessity*, consistent Writers never mean any thing more, than to express in a *figurative Manner* the Certainty of such an Event, as may in Reason be fully depended upon, though *literally* and *in Philosophical Strictness of Truth*, there

* Pag 8.

† Pref. p. 3.

there be *no Neceſſity at all* of the Event. Thus if God has *promiſed* that the World ſhall continue another Year, 'tis a very natural and obvious Manner of Expreſſion, to ſay that the World *cannot poſſibly* come to an End This Year; and yet no reaſonable Perſon is by that Manner of ſpeaking led to imagine, that God has not at this moment the *very ſame phyſical Power* of deſtroying the World, as he will have at any time hereafter. And therefore 'tis with great unfairneſs, that this Author, at the Concluſion of his Book, having cited from *Dr Clarke* a Paſſage wherein ſuch a *figurative* Expreſſion occurs, makes from thence the following Inference: " *In this*, ſays * he, *Dr* Clarke " *plainly allows the Neceſſity for which I have* " *contended: For he aſſigns the ſame* " Cauſes *of human Actions, that I have done*; " *and extends the* Neceſſity *of humane Ac-* " *tions as far*; *when he aſſerts that a Man* " cannot, *under thoſe Cauſes*, poſſibly *do the* " *the contrary to what he does.*" Dr *Clarke's* words were theſe: " A Man intirely free " from all Pain of Body and Diſorder of " Mind, judges it unreaſonable for him to " hurt or deſtroy himſelf; and, being un- " der no temptation or external Violence, " he *cannot poſſibly* act contrary to this Judg- " ment: Not becauſe he wants a *natural* or " *phyſical Power* ſo to do, but becauſe it is " abſurd and miſchievous and *Morally impoſ-* " *ſible*,——that with a perfect Knowledge of

* *Pag.* 111.

" what is beſt, and without Any temptation
" to evil, his Will ſhould *determine itſelf* to
" *chooſe* to act fooliſhly and unreaſonably."
It was reaſonable to expect, that theſe words
[" *Not becauſe he wants a* Natural *or* Phy-
" ſical Power *ſo to do*",] had been ſuffi-
ciently explicatory of the foregoing ones.
And yet This ingenious Writer has found a
way to put an abſurd Interpretation even
upon *Theſe laſt Words* alſo. " *As to a* na-
" tural *or* phyſical Power *in Man, to act*
†Pag 111. " *contrary to That judgment*; *this* (ſays †he)
" —*is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with the*
" *Doctrine of* Neceſſity, *that* —*'tis a Con-*
" *ſequence of the Doctrine of* Neceſſity:
" *For if Man is neceſſarily determined by*
" *particular moral Cauſes, and cannot then*
" *poſſibly act contrary to what he does;*
" *he muſt, under* OPPOSITE *moral*
" *Cauſes, have a Power to do the contrary*".
That is to ſay: A Man's having, under the
SAME moral Cauſes, (which is evidently the
Senſe of Dr *Clarke's* words,) a Phyſical Pow-
er to do the contray to what he does; *means*
only his having, under the *OPPOSITE* moral
Cauſes, a Phyſical Power to do the contra-
ry to what he does.

This being premiſed; I proceed now briefly to conſider the *Six* Arguments, by which the Author undertakes to prove, that Man is (what by a plain *contradiction in Terms* he calls) a *Neceſſary Agent*; and that there neither is, nor can be, any ſuch thing as *Liberty*.

His

His *Firſt* Argument is: That *Experience*, which the *Vulgar* urge in Proof of Liberty, is not a Proof of it: That many celebrated *Philoſophers* and *Theologers*, both antient and modern, have given *Definitions* of *Liberty*, that are conſiſtent with *Fate* or *Neceſſity*: That ſome Great Patrons of Liberty, do, by their *Conceſſions* in this matter, deſtroy all Arguments from Experience: That All the Actions of Men may be ranked under the four Heads of *Perception*, *Judging*, *Willing*, and *Doing as we will*; and that *Experience* does not prove *Any* of theſe to be *Free*: And laſtly, that *Experience* not only does *not prove* Liberty, but, on the contrary, *Men may ſee by Experience that they are Neceſſary Agents*; 'Tis *matter of Experience, that Man is ever Determined in his Willing*; We *experience perfect Neceſſitity*; and *they who think Liberty a matter of Experience*, yet *allow that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding, and that, when two Objects are preſented to a Man's Choice, one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot chooſe the worſt.* I. pag. 11, 12. Pag. 14, — 19. pag. 19, — 30. pag. 31 — 56. pag. 31, 52, 109.

1. To the *firſt* part of This Argument, *viz.* that *Experience*, which the *Vulgar* urge in Proof of Liberty, is not a Proof of it: I anſwer; that All our Actions do Now in experience *Seem* to us to be *Free*, exactly in the *Same Manner*, as they *would* do upon

ſuppoſition of our being really *Free* Agents: And conſequently, though This alone does not indeed amount to a *ſtrict Demonſtration* of our beingFree; yet it leaves on the other ſide of the Queſtion nothing but a *bare Poſſibility* of our being ſo framed by the Author of Nature, as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by every experience of every Action we perform. The caſe is exactly the ſame, as in that notable Queſtion, *whether the World exiſts* or *no.* There is no *Demonſtration* of it from Experience: There always remains a *bare Poſſibility*, that the Supreme Being may have ſo framed my Mind, as that I ſhall always neceſſarily be deceived in every one of my Perceptions as in a Dream, tho' poſſibly there be *No material World*, nor any other Creature whatſoever, exiſting beſides my Self. Of This, I ſay, there always remains a *bare poſſibility:* And yet no Man in his Senſes argues from thence, that *Experience* is *no Proof* to us of the *Exiſtence of Things.*

Pag. 14, —19. 2. But many *celebrated Philoſophers and Theologers, both antient and modern, have given Definitions of Liberty, that are conſiſtent with Fate and Neceſſity.* I anſwer: Whether this be ſo, or no, is nothing to the purpoſe. The true definition of *Liberty*, is, *a Power to Act*; as I have juſt now ſhown, *pag.* 15. When ThisGentleman can ſhow, that *Action*, or *the Power of Acting*, is conſiſtent with *Fate* or *Neceſſity*; then he will gain his Point.

3. But

3. But further; *Some of the greateſt Patrons of Liberty, do, by their* Conceſſions *in this matter, ſufficiently deſtroy all Arguments from Experience.* I anſwer again: Whether This alſo be ſo, or no, is nothing at all to the purpoſe. The Queſtion is not, what any Man has or has not *conceded*, but what the *Truth of the Caſe* is. Pag. 19,—30.

4. To the Allegation, *That all the Actions of Men* may be ranked under the *four* Heads of *Perception, Judging, Willing,* and *Doing as we will*; and that *experience* does not prove *Any of theſe to be Free:* I anſwer: *Firſt,* As to the *Perception of Idea's*; this is not an *Action* at all, but a *mere Paſſive Faculty*; And therefore all that the Author here advances about its being a *Neceſſary Action,* is an entire Abſurdity. *Secondly,* As to *Judging of Propoſitions,* that is, (as the Author here explains it,) *aſſenting* to what appears *true,* and *diſſenting* from what appears *falſe*; This alſo, like *feeling* what we *feel,* or *hearing* what we *hear,* is not an *Action* at all, but is merely *paſſive*; And is therefore abſurdly called, *Another Action of Man. Attention* indeed, or a Man's *chuſing* to *fix his Thoughts* on one Subject rather than another, is an *Action*; and therefore belongs not to *This* Head, but comes properly under the *fourth* Head, of *Doing as we will:* But *Aſſenting* to what appears *True,* or *Diſſenting* from what appears *Falſe,* are not *Actions. Thirdly,* As to *Willing*; This word Pag. 31,—56. Pag. 32. Pag. 33, 34. Pag. 36, &c.

Word (as I before obſerved) has a great Ambiguity in it, and ſignifies two diſtinct Things. Sometimes it ſignifies the *laſt Perception or Approbation of the Underſtanding*, and ſometimes *the firſt Exertion of the Self-moving or Active Faculty*. It can only be in the *former* Senſe of the Word, that this Au-
pag. 40. thor ſays, " *Willing or Preferring, is the* " *ſame with Reſpect to Good and Evil, that* " *Judging is with Reſpect to Truth or Falſhood:* " *It is JUDGING that one thing is upon the* " *whole better than another, or not ſo bad as* " *another* ". And it can only be in the *latter* Senſe of the Word, that he ſays, " *This*
pag. 37. " *Power of the Man thus to order the Begin-* " *ning or Forbearance, the Continuance or End-* " *ing of any Action, is called the Will*; *and* " *the ACTUAL EXERCISE thereof, Wil-* " *ling* ". Now theſe *two* things, tho' expreſſed by the *ſame* Word, are yet very different things, and have no Similitude the one to the other. The *one* is entirely *paſſive*, belonging to the Underſtanding only, and has nothing to do with the Queſtion about Liberty; The *other* is truly *active*, and therefore comes not under *this* Head, but under the following *fourth Head* of *Doing as we will*. By *confounding* theſe two things together, the Author conſtantly amuſes and perplexes his Reader: By *diſtinguiſhing* them carefully, the Difficulties he propoſes, are all eaſily removed. Thus, to that Queſtion,
pag. 37. " *Whether we are at Liberty to will, or*

" *not*

" *not to will* ": The true Anſwer is; in the *former* Senſe of that Word, we *are not* at Liberty; in the *latter* Senſe of it, we *are*. To the Queſtion, " *Whether we can* " *ſuſpend Willing, or no*; " (in which, the Learned and Judicious Mr. *Locke* was indeed much perplexed:) the Anſwer is the ſame; that, in the *former* Senſe of the Word *Willing*, we *cannot* ſuſpend; in the *latter*, we *can*. To the Queſtion, " *Whether we are* " *at Liberty to Will or chuſe one or the o-* " *ther of two or more Objects* ": The Anſwer is ſtill the ſame; in the *former* Senſe of the Word, we *are not* at Liberty; in the latter, we *are*. Nor does it make any Alteration in this Caſe, whether the Objects propoſed be *perfectly alike and indifferent*, or whether they be *unlike and different*. For if the *Underſtanding* judges them to be *indifferent*, it cannot help judging them to be *indifferent*; and if it judges them to be *different*, it cannot help judging them to be *different*: And yet in either Caſe, the *Self-moving Faculty* retains fully a Phyſical Power, or Liberty, of *actually exerting itſelf* towards either of the *indifferent*, or either of the *different* Objects. Which *Liberty of acting*, with Regard to the *indifferent* Objects, is a *moral* as well as *Phyſical Liberty*: But with Regard to the *Different* Objects, 'tis joyned with *that Inclination*, which (by an uſual *Figure* of Speech) is ſtiled *Moral Neceſſity*; Which every rational Being does

pag. 38.

pag. 40.

pag. 44, — 52.

ſo much the more conſtantly and regularly follow, as the Being is more rational and perfect; but which nevertheleſs is as far from intrenching in the leaſt Degree upon *Literal and Phyſical Liberty*, as even a *perfect Indifferency itſelf*. This, I ſay, is plainly the true Anſwer to all the foregoing Queſtions: *Except* it be denied, that there is at all in Man any *Self moving Power:* Which ſhall be conſidered preſently in its proper Place. *Fourthly* and laſtly; as to that which
pag. 31, and 52. This Gentleman calls the *Fourth* (but which is indeed the *Only*) *Action* of Man, *viz. DOING as we will*, or actually exerting the Self-moving Faculty: Of this I ſay, as before, that ſince in All Caſes it does now by Experience *Seem* to us to be *free*, that is, *Seem* to us to be really a *Self-moving Power*, exactly in the *ſame Manner* as it *would* do upon *Suppoſition* of our being *actually Free* Agents; the *bare phyſical Poſſibility* of our being ſo framed by the Author of Nature, as to be unavoidably deceived in this Matter by every Experience of every Action we perform, is no more any juſt Ground to doubt the Truth of our Liberty, than the *bare natural Poſſibility* of our being all our life-time, as in a Dream, deceived in our Belief of the *Exiſtence of the Material World*, is any juſt Ground to doubt of the Reality of its *Exiſtence*. But this Author goes ſtill further; and contends, not only that *Experience* is *no Proof of Liberty*, but

5. That

5. That, on the contrary, *Men may ſee by Experience, that they are neceſſary Agents:* That *'tis Matter of Experience, that Man is ever determined in his Willing:* That *we experience perfect Neceſſity:* That *if we Will* any Actions, *we find we MUST do thoſe Actions, unleſs ſome external Impediment hinders us:* That *Man is ever unavoidably determined in every Point of Time, by the Circumſtances he is in, and CAUSES he is under, to do That One thing he does, and not Poſſibly to do any other:* And that *They who think Liberty a Matter of Experience,* yet *allow that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding, and that, when two Objects are preſented to a Man's Choice, he CANNOT chooſe the worſt.* To all which, I anſwer: pag. 31, 52, and 109.

Firſt; The Experience of a Man's *ever* doing what he judges reaſonable to do, is not at all an Experience of his being under any *Neceſſity* ſo to do. For *Concomitancy* in this Caſe, is no Evidence at all of *Phyſical Connexion.* Upon *Suppoſition* of perfect Liberty, a *reaſonable Being* would ſtill *conſtantly do* what appeared *reaſonable it ſhould do:* And therefore its *conſtantly doing ſo*, is no Proof at all of its wanting *Liberty* or a *Phyſical Power of doing otherwiſe*: See above, *page* 9, 10.

But *Secondly*: Either Man *has* within himſelf *a Faculty or Principle of Self-Motion*, that is, a *Power of Beginning Motion*; or he *has not*,

If

If he *has* within himſelf a *Principle or Power of Self-Motion*; then (which is the Eſſence of *Liberty*,) That *active Subſtance*, in which the Principle of Self-Motion inheres, is it ſelf the only proper, Phyſical, and immediate *CAUSE* of the Motion or Action: For, that any thing *extrinſick* to the Agent, ſhould be the Mover, or Phyſical Cauſe of the *Self-Motion*, is a Contradiction in Terms. And if it be ſaid, that *Reaſons* or *Motives* are the *Cauſes* of Action; this can be true only in a *Figurative* Senſe: For, to make *Reaſons* or *Motives* the *Literal* and *Phyſical* Cauſe of Motion or Action, is ſuppoſing *abſtract Notions* to be *Subſtances*. In like manner; if it be ſaid, a Man *MUST do* thoſe Actions which he *Wills*, and *CANNOT do otherwiſe*; this alſo muſt either be underſtood in a *figurative* Senſe only, if by the word [*Will*] be meant merely the *approbation of the Underſtanding*: or elſe, if by the word [*Will*] be meant the *actual exertion of the Self-moving Power*, then the ſaying a Man *MUST neceſſarily do* thoſe actions which he *Wills*, ſignifies nothing more than that it is not poſſible for a Man *not to do a thing* at the ſame time that he is *Suppoſed to do it*.

But now, on the other hand, if a Man *has not* within himſelf a *Principle of Self-motion*, or a *Power of Beginning Motion*; then, being *No Agent* at all, (notwithſtanding his *Perception* or *Intelligence*,) any more than

than a *Clock* or a *Watch*; his Motions muſt all be wholly owing to the efficient Impulſe of ſome extrinſick Cauſe, and the Motions of That to the Efficiency of ſome Other Cauſe; and ſo on; till either at length we arrive at ſome *Free Agent*, in whom is perfect *Liberty*; or elſe we muſt go on *in infinitum* through an eternal Chain of dependent *Effects* without Any *Cauſe* at all; Which is Abſurd. *See above, pag. 6 & 11.*

The Author concludes this Argument, with obſerving that the Actions of *Children* and of *Beaſts*, are *allowed*, by the Greateſt Advocates of Liberty, to be *All neceſſary:* And thereupon asks, To what Age do Children continue *neceſſary* Agents, and When do they become *Free?* I anſwer: If any Advocates of Liberty have allowed any ſuch thing, it was very *weakly* done of them. The *Actions* of *Children*, and the *Actions of every living Creature*, are *all* of them *eſſentially Free*. The Mechanical and voluntary Motions of their Bodies, ſuch as the *Pulſation of the Heart*, and the like, are indeed *all neceſſary*; but they are *none* of them *Actions*. Every *Action*, every Motion ariſing from the *Self-moving Principle*, is *eſſentially free*. The *Difference*, is This only. In *Men*, this *Phyſical Liberty* is joined with a Senſe or conſciouſneſs of *moral good* and *evil*, and is therefore *eminently* called *Liberty*. In *Beaſts*, the ſame *Phyſical Liberty* or *Self-moving Power*, is wholly ſeparate from a Senſe or conſciouſ-

pag. 53, — 56.

neſs

neſs or capacity of judging of *moral good* and *evil*; and is vulgarly called *Spontaneity*. In *Children*, the ſame *Phyſical Liberty* always is from the very Beginning; And in proportion as they increaſe in Age, and in capacity of Judging, they grow continually in Degree, not more *Free*, but more *Moral* Agents.

II. His *Second* Argument to prove Man *a Neceſſary Agent*, is, "*becauſe all his Actions*
pag. 57. "*have a Beginning: For whatever has a Be-*
"*ginning, muſt have a Cauſe*; *And every*
"*Cauſe, is a Neceſſary Cauſe.*" A-
pag. 82. gain; "*If Any Action whatſoever, can be*
"*done without a Cauſe*; *then Effects and*
"*Cauſes have no neceſſary relation, and by*
"*conſequence we ſhould not be neceſſarily de-*
"*termined in any caſe at all.*" The Fallacy of This Argument, lies in the words, *Neceſſary Cauſe*. 'Tis true, that *whatever has a Beginning, muſt have a Cauſe*. 'Tis true alſo, that *every Cauſe* is *a Neceſſary Cauſe*; that is, that every adequate efficient Cauſe, when it is *ſuppoſed to operate*, cannot but *produce the Effect*, of which it is at That time an adequate efficient Cauſe. But This is ſaying nothing more, than that any thing *muſt needs be*, when it *is ſuppoſed that it is*. Which is nothing to the Queſtion about Liberty and Neceſſity. For the *Free Self-moving Power*, when it is *ſuppoſed to exert itſelf*, cannot

not but *produce that Motion or Action*, of which it is at that time the immediate efficient Cauſe. If I miſtake not therefore, This Argument (in the True Intent and Meaning of the Author) is entirely founded upon the *Suppoſition*, that there neither is nor can be in Nature any ſuch thing as a *Self-moving Power* at all. For, What elſe is the Meaning of his affirming, that, if Mans Actions are not *Neceſſary*, (that is, if they be not *phyſically and efficiently* cauſed by mechanical *Impulſe of Matter*, which is making them to be mere Paſſions and not Actions at all; or by *Reaſons and Motives*, which is making Reaſons and Motives to be phyſical Agents or Subſtances;) then "*a thing can have a Beginning, which* pag. 57. "*has no Cauſe*;" and, "*Nothing can produce* "*Something?*" And when he tells us, that "*if Any Action whatſoever can be done* With- pag. 82. "out a Cauſe, *then Effects and Cauſes have* "*no neccеſſary relation, and by conſequence* "*we ſhould not be neceſſarily determined in* "*Any caſe at all*;" And that, "*if in the* pag. 82. "*moſt indifferent things there was not a* "Cauſe *of Choice, but a Choice could* "*be made* without a Cauſe, *then All Choices* "*might be made* without a Cauſe, *and we* "*ſhould not be neceſſarily determined by the* "*greateſt Evidence to Aſſent to Truth:*" What is this, but *Suppoſing* that there is no ſuch thing in nature as a *Self-moving Power*; and that if every *Action* and *Choice* be not as neceſſarily determined by ſomething over

which

which the Perſon has No Power, as our *Aſſent to Truth* (which is not at all an *Action* or a *Choice*) is neceſſarily determined by the appearing Evidence; then an *Action* is done abſolutely *without any Cauſe* at all, and *Nothing can produce Something?* What is This, I ſay, but *Suppoſing* (inſtead of *proving*) that there neither is nor can poſſibly be, any ſuch thing as *Self-moving* or *Active* Power, not in *Man* only, but even in no other *Being* whatſoever, no not even in *God himſelf?* For, the Argument is Univerſal: And the Concluſion alſo is Univerſal: "*Liberty* "(ſays he) *or a Power to act or not to act,* "*to do this or another thing under the ſame* "*Cauſes, is an Impoſſibility.*" The Argument therefore ſtanding thus: I anſwer; (Though to the bare *Suppoſition*, that a *Self-moving or Active Power is impoſſible*, it were ſufficient to oppoſe the contrary *Suppoſition*, that *ſuch a Power is not impoſſible*: But I anſwer;) If there be no ſuch thing in nature, as a *Self-moving* or *Active Power* or *Principle of beginning Motion*, (which is the Eſſence of *Liberty*;) then there is, in the Motions of the Univerſe, an infinite progreſſion of *dependent Effects* without *any Cauſe at all*; an infinite progreſſion of *paſſive Communications*, without *any Agent*, without *any thing Active at all* in Nature. Which is a manifeſt Contradiction; Unleſs *Motion* could be *neceſſarily-exiſtent*: Which that it cannot poſſibly be, I have ſhown above, *pag.* 11, 12.

Pag. 59.

I can-

I cannot omit to take notice here by the way, that This Gentleman, in the paſſage now cited, pleaſantly ſtiles *Liberty*, not only an *Impoſſibility*, but *ATHEISTICAL* alſo; and contends that "*Liberty ſtands, and can only be grounded, on the abſurd Principles of Epicurean Atheiſm.*" Mr. *Leibnitz* has done the ſame, in his Debate with Dr. *Clarke*, *Paper IV*, § 18; and *Paper V*, § 70. As if *Epicurus*'s ſuppoſing *Lifeleſs Atoms* to be moved by *Chance*, that is, by *Cauſes to Him unknown*; was the ſame thing as our aſcribing either to *God* or *Man*, a *Principle or Power of Action* or *of beginning Motion*. pag. 59.

III. The Authors *Third* Argument againſt Liberty, is, that Liberty would not be a *Perfection*, but an *Imperfection*; and that to be a *Neceſſary Agent*, is an *Advantage* and a *Perfection*. And upon this Argument, he is very large. pag. 62, 81.

He alleges, that Men would be *irrational Agents*, if they had a power of *judging* otherwiſe than according to appearing evidence; And that nothing "*can be more irrational and inconſiſtent, than to be able to refuſe our* Aſſent *to what is evidently true to us, and to aſſent to what we ſee to be evidently falſe.*" All which, is very right. But this Argument is founded on a ridiculous definition of Liberty; as if a Power pag. 63. pag. 65.

of

of *Acting*, implied alſo a Power of *Underſtanding*, as Men pleaſed.

pag. 66. He ſuppoſes, that a *Power* [a *Phyſical Power*] of *chooſing Evil as Evil*, implies being "*indifferent to Good and Evil*"; "*in-*
pag. 70, 72. "*different to what cauſes pleaſure or pain*;" "*indifferent to all Objects, and ſwayed by*
"*no Motives.*" Which is ſuppoſing, that whatever things are naturally *poſſible* for a Man to do, he has an *equal inclination* to do.

pag. 66. He urges, that Liberty would be an Imperfection; becauſe 'tis an Imperfection, to be *capable* of *chuſing Miſery*. And, by the ſame Argument, *Exiſtence* or *Life*, in all Beings except God Almighty, is an Imperfection; becauſe it ſubjects them to a Poſſibility of *Pain* and *Uneaſineſs*. Alſo *Virtue* and *Moral Goodneſs* will, for the ſame reaſon, be *imperfections*; becauſe they *eſſentially* include a *Phyſical Power* of doing what is *Evil*. And even in the *Divine Nature itſelf* it would be a contradiction to ſuppoſe any *Moral perfection*, if God was under the ſame *phyſical neceſſity* of *doing all the good he does*, as he is of being *Omnipreſent and Omniſcient*.

pag. 67. He argues, that "*a Power to will or chuſe*
"*at the ſame time any one out of two or more*
"*indifferent things, would be no perfection*;"
becauſe, if the things were "*really indif-*
pag 68. "*ferent*," there could be no "*Benefit*" ariſing from the Choice. This is the ſame Argument, by which Mr. *Leibnitz* proved that 'tis *impoſſible* for God ever to have created any

any *two* pieces of Matter *exactly alike*, becauſe, whatever *Situation* he placed them in, there could be no *Benefit* in their not being *tranſpoſed*.

He inſiſts, that this "*arbitrary faculty* pag. 72, 68, "*would ſubject a Man to more wrong Choices*," 73. to "*more Miſtakes*, than *Man conſider-* "*ed as a Neceſſary Being*," [as a *Neceſſary Agent*, he means;] "*determined in his Choice.*" That is to ſay: The *Power of Chooſing*, ſubjects a Man to make more *wrong Choices*, than if he had *no Power of Chooſing at all*. Which is undoubtedly true. But if the *Power of Chooſing*, be an imperfection; then *Life* and *Activity*, which *eſſentially* involve a *Power of Chooſing*, are imperfections likewiſe; and a *Stone* is a *more perfect* Creature than a *Man*.

He asks, concerning the Perfection of God; "*can any thing be perfect, that is not Neceſſa-* "*rily perfect?*" That is to ſay; If God be *neceſſarily* indued with *perfect Liberty*, then, by reaſon of That *neceſſity*, he cannot be indued with *any Liberty* at all.

Again: "*Is it not a Perfection in God, Ne* pag. 74. "*ceſſarily to Know all Truth*, and *to be ne-* "*ceſſarily Happy*"? I anſwer: Yes; Becauſe *Knowledge* and *Happineſs* are neither of them *Actions*.

Again: *Is it not alſo a Perfection in him,* pag. 74. "*to Will and Do A L W A Y S what is Beſt?* I anſwer; Yes: But not to *Do* ſo by a *Phyſical Neceſſity*; becauſe That is not a *Perfection*, but a *Contradiction in Terms*. Whate-

ver is *physically necessary*, is *No Action*, neither in *God*, nor in any other Being.

He cites, with Great Satisfaction, certain *Weak* Expressions of Some very Learned and
pag. 74, 75. Eminent Men, concerning *all things* being in their own nature *indifferent*; and *becoming Good, only by God's Willing them*: Also
76, 77. concerning *infinite Perfection excluding Successive Thoughts in God*: And that *the Essence of God is one perfect Thought*: And that *tho' his Transient Acts are done in a Succession of Time, yet his Immanent Acts, his Knowledge and his Decrees, are One with his Essence*: And that *the Immanent Acts of God being supposed Free, 'tis not easy to imagine how they should be One with the divine Essence, to which Necessary Existence does most certainly belong*: And that *if the Immanent Acts of God are necessary, then the Transient must be so likewise, as being the certain effects of his Immanent Acts*: And that thus *a Chain of necessary Fate must run through the whole Order of things*; *and God himself then is no Free Being*. All which, and many other the like Citations, are nothing at all to the Purpose: Proving nothing, but only shewing the pernicious Effects of *Scholastick Jargon*, which has sometimes imposed so far even upon very Learned and Good Men, as to make them think that More Knowledge is conveyed into the Mind by *words that have no Signification*, than by *mere inarticulate Sounds*.

pag. 78, & 67. He alleges, that Saints in Heaven *cease to have Liberty*; and that *Angels are more perfect*

fect than Men, becauſe they are neceſſarily determined to judge right in relation to Truth and Falſhood, and to chuſe right in Relation to Good and Evil. I anſwer: Neither *Saints*, nor *Angels*, nor *God himſelf*, have in any degree the leſs *Liberty*, upon account of the *Perfection* of their Nature: Becauſe, between the *phyſical Power of Action*, and the *Perfection of Judgment* which is *not Action*, (which two things This Author conſtantly confounds,) there is *no Connexion.* God *judges* what is right, and *approves* what is Good, by a *phyſical neceſſity of Nature*; in which *phyſical neceſſity*, all notion of *Action* is neceſſarily excluded: But *Doing* what is good, is wholly owing to an *Active* Principle, in which is *eſſentially* included the notion of *Liberty.* Nor is it any thing to the purpoſe, that, in a *perfect* Being, *Doing right* is *Always concomitant with*, or *conſequent* upon, *Judging right*; unleſs it was a Conſequence in the way of *Phyſical connexion* betwen *Cauſe* and *Effect:* Which that it *is not*, and *cannot be*, I have ſhown *above*, (*pag.* 9;) both from the *Nature of the thing*, and from the *Inſtance* of a *Promiſe made by a Perfect Being*, which is *ALWAYS* followed with Performance, and yet, being a *mere Abſtract*, cannot be itſelf a *phyſical* or *immediate efficient Cauſe* of *Action.* A *proper phyſical efficiency* might as well, and with as much truth, be aſcribed to *Final Cauſes*, which every one knows to be nothing but *Abſtract Conſidera-*

tions; as it is by This Author aſcribed to *Moral Cauſes*, to *Reaſons*, *Arguments*, *Judgment*, and the like.

pag. 78, 82. All that follows upon This Head, is nothing but Repetitions of the ſame groundleſs Notions: That *Man* would be more *perfect* than he is, if he were indued with *only Paſſive and Perceptive Faculties*, without any *proper Active Powers*: That if Man was not a *Neceſſary Agent*, then he would be *INDIFFERENT* both to *Propoſitions* and *Objects*; he could be *convinced upon no Principles*; all *Reaſonings would be of no Uſe to him*; he *might reject what appears True to him*, and *aſſent to what appears abſurd to him*; and all his *Motions*, would depend upon *Chance*: Laſtly, that if a Man's Actions were not *Neceſſary*, then there would not be a *Cauſe of Choice*, but *a Choice could be made without a Cauſe*, and *All Choices could be made without a Cauſe*, and *we ſhould not be neceſſarily determined by the greateſt Evidence to Aſſent to Truth*, &c. Than all which Aſſertions, nothing can be more abſurd; They being all built entirely upon ſuch Suppoſitions as theſe; that there is no Middle between *Neceſſity* and *Abſolute Indifferency*; that *Perception of Truth*, is as much an *Action*, as *Doing what is right*; and that either *Neceſſity* or *Nothing*, is the *efficient Cauſe* of all *Choice* and *Action*: As if there could not poſſibly be any ſuch thing in Nature, either in *Man* or in Any *Other Being* whatſoever, as a *Power* or *Principle of beginning*

ning Motion. Concerning which Matter, *ſee above, pag.* 30.

His *Fourth* Argument againſt *Liberty*, is, that 'tis inconſiſtent with the *Divine Preſcieience:* For "if God foreknows the exiſtence "of any thing, as it depends on its own "Cauſes; That exiſtence is no leſs neceſſary, "than if it was the Effect of his Decree: "For it no leſs implies a Contradiction, that "Cauſes ſhould not produce their Effects; "than that an Event ſhould not come to paſs, "which is decreed by God." The Fallacy of which Argument, ariſes merely from a *Narrowneſs* or *Defect* in *Language*; The word *Preſcience* being uſed to ſignifie *Two* diſtinct Attributes or Perfections of the Divine Nature, which, though vulgarly called by the *Same* common Name, are yet as really and truly *different* from each other, as any *other two* Attributes whatſoever. This will appear by conſidering, that the only means we have of framing to our ſelves any true Notion of the Divine Perfections, is, by way of Analogy; inlarging in our Ideas, to an infinite Degree, every kind of Perfection which we obſerve in Finite Intelligent Beings. Now One ſort of Perfection is, *Knowledge.* And *Knowledge*, in *Men*, ſignifies *Three* diſtinct Things. A Man who never was in *France*, *KNOWS* that there is ſuch a Place as *Paris:* And here the word, *Knowledge*, means nothing but a firm *Belief*, founded upon un- IV. pag. 82,84.

queſtionable Evidence. A Man *KNOWS*, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones: Here the word, *Knowledge*, ſignifies *Science*, or the Perception of a Truth which is neceſſary in its own Nature. A Man *KNOWS*, that a very Covetous Perſon, whoſe Temper he is perfectly acquainted with, will certainly accept a very gainful Propoſal when laid before him: And here the word, *Knowledge*, means nothing but *right and good Judging*. Now, to apply this to the preſent Argument: The *former* of theſe three ſorts of *Knowledge*, can in no caſe, and in no degree whatſoever, have any place in *God*; becauſe it *eſſentially* includes, in its very *Notion*, a *finiteneſs* or *limitation of Preſence*. But the *Second* ſort of *Knowledge*, the *Science* or Perception of neceſſary Truths, is, in *God*, juſt as much more *extenſive* and *perfect* than in *Man*, as his *infinite nature* is more *perfect* than our *finite*. The *Third* ſort of *Knowledge* alſo, the *Judging rightly concerning Truths* which depend not on *neceſſary* but on *Free Cauſes*, is, in *God*, juſt as much more *extenſive* and more *infallible* than in *Man*, as the *Divine Nature* and *Underſtanding* is *Superiour* to *Ours*. Nevertheleſs, in *God*, theſe Two Perfections, each of them *infinite* in their *Degree*, are yet in their *Kind* as truly *diſtinct* from each other, as *Our narrow Science of Neceſſary Truths*, and *our fallible Judgment of Contingent Truths*, are things very *different* from each other. And *God's infallible Judgment concerning Contingent Truths*, does no more

alter

alter the nature of the things, and cauſe them to be *neceſſary*; than *Our judging right* at any time concerning a *contingent Truth*, makes it ceaſe to be *contingent*; or than *Our Science of a preſent Truth*, is any Cauſe of its being either *True* or *Preſent*. Here therefore lies the Fallacy of our Author's Argument. Becauſe from God's *foreknowing* the exiſtence of things depending on a Chain of *neceſſary* Cauſes, (which is ſtiled *Preſcience*,) it follows that the exiſtence of the things muſt needs be neceſſary, it being a contradiction that neceſſary Cauſes ſhould not produce their Effects: Therefore from God's *Judging infallibly* concerning things which depend *not on neceſſary* but *on free Cauſes*, (which Attribute, tho' totally of a different kind from the other, is yet uſually ſtiled by the general name of *Preſcience*;) he concludes that *theſe things* alſo, contrary to the *Suppoſition*, depend not upon *Free*, but upon *Neceſſary Cauſes*. Contrary, I ſay, to the *Suppoſition* in the Argument: For in the Argument drawn againſt *Liberty* from the *Divine Preſcience*, it muſt not be firſt *Suppoſed* that things are *in their own Nature neceſſary*; but from the *Divine Preſcience*, or power of *Judging infallibly* concerning *Free Events*, it muſt be proved that things *otherwiſe ſuppoſed free*, will thereby unavoidably become *neceſſary*. Which can no more be proved, than it can be proved that an Action *ſuppoſed at this preſent time to be free*, is yet (contrary to the Suppoſition)

on) at the ſame time *neceſſary*, becauſe in all paſt time (whether *foreknown* or *not foreknown*) it could not (upon That very *Suppoſition* of its being *now freely done*; I ſay, it could not) but be *future*. As has been at large explained in my Diſcourſe concerning the *Being and Attributes of God*, Part I. *pag.* 106. *Edit.* 4*th.*

V. His *Fifth* Argument, is as follows. "*If*
Pag. 86. "*Man was not a Neceſſary Agent, determined*
"*by Pleaſure and Pain; there would be no*
"*Foundation for Rewards and Puniſhments.*"
pag. 96. Puniſhments "*would be uſeleſs, unleſs Men*
"*were neceſſary Agents, and were determined*
"*by Pleaſure and Pain; becauſe, if Men*
"*were Free or Indifferent to Pleaſure and*
"*Pain, Pain could be no Motive to cauſe Men*
"*to obſerve the Law.*" This Argument *Suppoſes*, that whatſoever has in itſelf a *Power* of *Self-motion* or *Action*, cannot poſſibly have *Any Regard at all* to *Reaſons* or *Motives* of Action: And that an *Indifferency* as to *Power*, (that is, an *equal phyſical Power* either of *acting* or of *forbearing to Act*;) and an *Indifferency* as to *Inclination*, (that is, an *equal Approbation* or *Liking* of *one* Object or of the contrary;) is *One and the ſame thing*. Than which, nothing can be more evidently abſurd.

VI. His *Sixth* and Laſt Argument, is: "*If*
pag. 88. "*Man was not a neceſſary Agent, determin-*
"*ed*

" ed by *Pleaſure and Pain*; *he would have* " *no Notion of* Morality, *or Motive to prac-* " *tiſe it.*" If " *he was* Indifferent *to plea-* " *ſure and pain*, he would *have no Rule to go* " *by, and might never judge, will, and prac-* " *tiſe Right.*" This Argument, is merely to make up the Number; being the very ſame with the foregoing. pag. 90.

The remaining part of his Book, is taken up in anſwering *Objections*. The Chief of which, is; that *Puniſhments* would be *uſeleſs* and *unjuſt*, if Men were not *Free Agents*. To which he anſwers; that *Puniſhments*, or the *Fears of Puniſhment*, have the ſame effect upon *intelligent neceſſary Agents*, to determine their Actions towards the *Publick Good*; as *Weights* have upon a *Clock*, to make it go *right*. But how much ſoever *political Ends* may ſometimes poſſibly be ſerved, by doing *great Injuries* to *Innocent Perſons*, ſuch as *neceſſary Agents* cannot but be; yet all *Perſonal Juſtice and Injuſtice*, all *Right and Wrong* with regard to *particular Perſons*, is hereby totally taken away. And though *Weak and Frail Men* may fall under *Neceſſities* of doing *great Hardſhips* to *particular Perſons*, when there is no other *poſſible* way of ſecuring the *Publick Safety*; yet *God Almighty*, we are ſure, can never be reduced to any ſuch *Diſtreſs*, in order to ſupport his own Government. And therefore, if there be no ſuch thing as *Free Agents*,

and

and conſequently no ſuch thing as *Perſonal Merit* or *Demerit*; God, to be ſure, can *never* either *reward* or *puniſh* any Creature; (*Puniſhment*, at leaſt, he can never poſſibly inflict;) becauſe it muſt *neceſſarily* be *always unjuſt*. And thus this Author's Opinion abſolutely takes away all *Foundation* of *Religion*.

But becauſe anſwering Objections of his *own* raiſing, (if he were never ſo able to do it,) is nothing to the purpoſe: I ſhall briefly draw up for him the Sum of what has been ſaid, into *One Objection*; To which if he can give a clear and diſtinct Anſwer, after the manner of one who ſincerely ſeeks after the Truth, and not in a looſe and ambiguous Uſe of Words of uncertain Signification; this whole Matter may then poſſibly deſerve to be reconſidered.

Man, either *has* within himſelf a *Principle of Action*, properly ſpeaking; that is, a *Self-moving Faculty*, a *Principle* or *Power of beginning Motion*: Or he has *not*.

If he *has* within himſelf ſuch a *Principle*; then he is a *Free*, and not a *Neceſſary Agent*. For every *Neceſſary Agent* is *moved neceſſarily* by ſomething elſe; and then *That which moves* it, not the *thing it ſelf which is moved*, is the *True and Only Cauſe* of the Action. That any Other thing operating upon an Agent, ſhould *efficiently* and *neceſſarily* produce *Self-motion* in That *Agent*; is a direct *Contradiction* in Terms.

If

If Man *has not* within himſelf a *Principle* or *Power* of *Self-motion*; then every *Motion and Action* of Man, is ſtrictly and properly produced by the *efficiency* of ſome extrinſick *Cauſe*: Which *Cauſe*, muſt be either what we uſually call the *Motive* or *Reaſon*, upon which a Man acts; or elſe it muſt be ſome inſenſible *Subtle Matter*, or ſome *other Being* or *Subſtance* making an Impreſſion upon him.

If the *Reaſons* or *Motives* upon which a Man acts, be the *immediate* and *efficient Cauſe of the Action*: then either *abſtract Notions*, ſuch as all *Reaſons* and *Motives* are, have a *real Subſiſtence*, that is, are themſelves *Subſtances*; or elſe *That which has it ſelf no real Subſiſtence*, can *put* a Body into *Motion*: Either of which, is manifeſtly abſurd.

If inſenſible *Subtle Matter*, or any *other Being* or *Subſtance*, continually making impreſſion upon a Man, be the *immediate and efficient Cauſe* of his acting; then the *Motion* of That *Subtle Matter or Subſtance*, muſt be cauſed by ſome *Other* Subſtance, and the Motion of That by ſome *Other*, till at laſt we arrive at a *Free Agent*: And then *Liberty* is a *poſſible* thing: And then *Man* poſſibly may have Liberty: And if he may *poſſibly* have it, then *Experience* will prove that he *probably*, nay, that he *certainly* has it.

If we *Never* arrive at Any *Free Cauſe*: Then there is either *in infinitum* a Progreſſion of *Motions* without any *Mover*, of *Effects* without any *Cauſe*, of things *acted* without any

any *Agent*; Which is a manifeſt Contradiction: Or elſe *Motion* exiſts *neceſſarily of itſelf.*

If *Motion* exiſts *neceſſarily of itſelf*; it muſt be either with a *Determination every way*, or *one certain way*: If with a *Determination every way*, This is *no Motion at all*: If with a *Determination one certain way*, then That *Determination* is either *neceſſary*, and conſequently *all other Determinations impoſſible*; which is contrary to experience; Or elſe there muſt be a *particular Reaſon* of That determination, and ſo backwards *in infinitum*; which comes to the forementioned Abſurdity, of *Effects* exiſting without *Any Cauſe.*

I cannot make an End, without earneſtly deſiring this Author ſeriouſly to conſider with himſelf, *What* it is that he has all this time been pleading for. For though it might be ſuppoſed poſſible, that, among *Neceſſary Agents*, a ſort of a *Machine of Government* might be carried on, by ſuch *Weights* and *Springs* of *Rewards and Puniſhments*, as *Clocks and Watches* (ſuppoſing them to *feel* what is done to them) are *rewarded* and *puniſhed* withal; yet in truth and reality, according to This Suppoſition, there is nothing *intrinſically good* or *evil*, there is nothing *perſonally juſt* or *unjuſt*, there is *no Behaviour of rational Creatures* in any degree *acceptable* or *unacceptable* to *God Almighty.* Conſider the Conſequence of This. *Superſtition and Bigottry*

gottry, (things very *mechanical*, as well as very *miſchievous* to Mankind,) can never be rooted out, but by perſuading Men to look upon themſelves as *rational* Creatures, and to implant in their Minds *rational Notions* of *Religion*: *Religion* there can be None, without a *Moral Difference of Things*: A *moral Difference of things there cannot be*, where there is no place for *Action*: And *Action* there can be none, without *Liberty*.

A *Free* and Impartial Inquiry after *Truth*, where-ever it is to be found, is indeed a Noble and moſt Commendable Diſpoſition: A Diſpoſition, which every Man ought himſelf to labour after, and to the utmoſt of his Power incourage in all Others: 'Tis the Great Foundation of all uſeful *Knowledge*, of all true *Virtue*, and of all ſincere *Religion*. But when a Man in his *Searches* into the Nature of Things, finds his Inquiries leading him towards ſuch Notions, as, if they ſhould prove true, would manifeſtly ſubvert the very *Eſſences* of *Good and Evil*; The *Leaſt* that a Sober-minded Man can in ſuch a caſe poſſibly be ſuppoſed to owe to *God*, to *Virtue*, to the *Dignity of a rational nature*, is, that he ought to be in the higheſt degree *fearful* and *ſuſpicious* of himſelf, leaſt he be led away by *Any Prejudice*, leaſt he be deceived by any *erroneous Argument*, leaſt he ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed upon by any *wrong Inclination*. Too *great* an *Aſſurance* in Arguments of This Nature,

Nature, (even though at preſent they ſeemed to him to be *Demonſtrations*;) *Rejoicing* in the *Strength* of them, and taking *pleaſure* in the *carrying* of ſuch a Cauſe; is what a *Good Mind* can never be capable of. To *ſuch* a Perſon, the finding his *own* Arguments *unanſwerable*, would be the greateſt *Grief*: *Triumphing* in ſo *melancholly* a Field, would be the higheſt *Diſſatisfaction*; and nothing could afford ſo *pleaſing*, ſo *agreeable* a *diſappointment*, as to find his *own Reaſonings* ſhown to be *inconcluſive*.

I ſhall ſuggeſt to this Author's Conſideration, only one thing further: That All ſincere Lovers of Truth and Liberty, of free and impartial Examination, are under the higheſt Obligations in reaſon and Conſcience, always to make uſe of That Freedom which we ſo greatly eſteem and ſo juſtly boaſt of, in ſuch a manner only, as may give no occaſion to *Superſtitious Men* and *Lovers of Darkneſs*, to endeavour to retrench That Liberty of inquiring after Truth, upon which All *valuable Knowledge* and all *true Religion* Eſſentially depends.

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